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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine the accounting standard-setting process in 
relation to emissions rights and related liabilities in the Korean context in order to 
provide a better understanding of accounting issues under an emissions trading 
scheme (ETS). 
Using an interpretive inductive approach, this study comprises semi-structured, 
face-to-face interviews and analysis of relevant documents. Interviews were 
carried out with a wide range of key players, including accounting standard setters 
(Korean Accounting Standards Board, International Accounting Standards Board, 
and Autorité des Normes Comptables), accounting experts, industry and 
government. 
This study identifies how problematic accounting issues on emissions rights and 
related liabilities have been addressed by accounting standard setters. The key 
accounting issues under ETS are linked mainly with free allowances. It is found 
that accounting standard setters attempt to establish the most appropriate 
accounting standard under the given circumstances reflecting a variety of 
considerations, and that the most common elements affecting the development of 
accounting standards for ETS are the legal and economic context, the existing 
accounting framework, and preceding models and practices. Nevertheless, these 
factors affect the development of accounting standards for ETS in different ways. 
Accordingly, the primary accounting issues on which each standard setter 
concentrates vary depending on different circumstances and considerations. 
This study investigates the accounting standard-setting process for emissions 
rights by Korean accounting standard setters, from the agenda-setting stage to the 
final publication of the standard. The findings reinforce the importance of political 
factors in the standard-setting process, including stakeholders‟ participation in the 
process, prominent stakeholders, and the motivation, methods and timing of 
lobbying activities. In particular, the findings have important implications for the 
effectiveness of lobbying. Overall, the findings confirm that accounting standards 
are likely to be the political outcome of interactions between the accounting 
standard setter and stakeholders. 
  
 
The findings highlight desirable factors for accounting models of emissions rights. 
Desirability or appropriateness of standard is judged by the extent to which 
stakeholders in institutional environments consider the promulgation to be 
legitimate or authoritative. Therefore, accounting standard setters must make 
greater efforts to encourage stakeholders to participate in the standard-setting 
process in order to ensure institutional legitimacy. 
The originality of this study lies in its empirical research on accounting issues for 
ETS from a practical point of view. In particular, in its timely and detailed 
investigation of Korean accounting standard setters, this study provides a broader 
understanding of the accounting standard-setting process in the Korean context. 
The study also advances legitimacy theory by offering a framework particularly 
applicable to accounting standard setting process, which also incorporates 
stakeholder theory research. The study finds support from the framework and 
further contributes to the related literature by reviewing legitimacy conflicts. From 
an accounting policy point of view, the findings have implications for both national 
and international standard setters and provide guidance on how to achieve high-
quality accounting standards with a high degree of compliance. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 describes the background and 
motivation of this study; Section 1.2 presents the objective of the study, followed 
by the research questions; Section 1.3 provides an overview of the research 
design; Section 1.4 sets out the contribution of this research; and finally, Section 
1.5 presents the structure of the thesis. 
 Background and motivation 1.1.
Since the mid-1980s, as a result of a wide range of evidence of accelerating 
global warming from emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) by human economic 
activities (Stern and Treasury, 2006), climate change has emerged as one of the 
most serious challenges facing mankind (Hepburn and Stern, 2008). Many studies 
have warned that climate change may have a serious and irreversible impact on 
the sustainability of life on earth. There have been many calls for urgent global 
action in response to the potentially massive risk of climate change. A series of 
international efforts to tackle climate change has been made since 1992, when the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) triggered more 
integrated global understanding and collaboration (Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012). 
In accordance with the ambition of the UNFCCC, in 1997 a binding international 
commitment was made to facilitate the effective reduction of GHG through the 
Kyoto Protocol (Barrett, 2010). Along with a legally binding target on reducing 
GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol introduced policy instruments to achieve GHG 
emissions targets, which comprise three innovative, market-based, flexible 
mechanisms: emissions trading schemes (ETS), clean development mechanisms 
(CDM), and joint implementation (JI) projects (Cracea, 2012; Richelle, 2008). 
Amongst market-based measures for tackling GHG emissions, ETS have been 
expanding worldwide owing to a degree of certainty regarding government 
administration of emissions levels (Hepburn and Stern, 2008). For example, the 
EU (2005), New Zealand (2008) and South Korea (2015) have implemented 
schemes at national levels. Several forms of schemes are currently running at 
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regional levels, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI,1 2009), 
and in California (2013) and Québec (2013). 
From an accounting perspective, ETS has been an important emerging issue 
which has engendered a new „financial carbon accounting‟ sphere regarding how 
to account for carbon emissions in terms of pro forma reporting. Financial carbon 
accounting is regarded as a new inter-disciplinary area involving a high level of 
expertise in the disciplines of both accounting and carbon trading. In view of the 
relatively short history of ETS, it is still regarded as a novel issue from an 
accounting perspective.  
ETS are operated on the basis of a market mechanism by which the authority 
creates an administrative tool to deal with a certain level of emissions, known as 
„emissions rights‟ or „emissions allowances‟. 2  Emissions rights represent 
permission to emit; once allocated, they are tradable with a specific monetary 
value (Wemaere et al., 2009). Most schemes involve „free allocation‟, whereby the 
government distributes emissions rights to participants for free. The granted 
allowances constitute economic benefits for participants, similar to government 
grants. Accordingly, emissions rights create a new type of asset from an 
accounting perspective. In addition, the obligation to surrender emissions rights as 
emissions are produced creates a liability from an accounting point of view. In 
essence, in creating a new type of asset and liability, ETS raises basic accounting 
issues regarding the recognition and measurement of assets and liabilities. 
Moreover, the nature of emissions rights means that, from a financial accounting 
point of view, they do not fit comfortably into any existing asset category. For 
example, emissions rights may be treated as intangible assets3 because they 
represent rights to emit carbon, with no physical substance; yet they are 
considered to be consumed during the production process as a commodity. In 
addition, they are tradable on the market at a company‟s discretion, similarly to 
                                            
1
 RGGI established in 2009 in northern USA, currently involving nine states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont (http://www.rggi.org/). 
2
 Emissions rights are referred to as „permits‟, „rights‟ or „allowances‟ in different papers, depending on which 
aspects of emissions rights are focused on. This study mainly uses „rights‟ or „allowances‟. 
3
 According to IAS 38, „intangible assets‟ are non-monetary assets which are without physical substance and 
identifiable (either being separable or arising from contractual or other legal rights). 
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financial instruments. Multi-faceted attributes of emissions rights accompany a 
variety of potential uses (Lovell et al., 2010). Business entities are able to use 
emissions rights variously for different purposes. Accordingly, from an accounting 
point of view, ETS are potentially problematic because emissions rights give rise 
to a variety of tensions in the existing accounting framework. 
When implemented, ETS cover a large proportion of industry in terms of the broad 
scope and large number of participants affected. For example, the EU ETS, the 
largest in the world, covers more than 11,000 installations (EC, 2013). This implies 
that the impact of ETS on companies may be large and material. In particular, 
large emitters are expected to recognise assets and liabilities arising from many 
emissions rights and high volumes of emissions. The impact of ETS on financial 
statements may be sufficiently material that a business entity must provide 
stakeholders with relevant accounting information from the decision-usefulness 
perspective (Lovell et al., 2010). In addition, the accounting treatment of emissions 
rights and obligations may affect financial statements in various ways (Starbatty, 
2010). From an accounting point of view, ETS brings about „materiality‟ in terms of 
financial consequences, not only from a company‟s viewpoint but also from users‟ 
perspective. 
Since the EU ETS began in 2005, experts and practitioners have persistently 
called for authoritative accounting guidance on ETS in order to generate decision-
useful accounting information. In response, in 2004 the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) published accounting guidance for emissions rights as an 
interpretation, referred to as „IFRIC 3‟; however, IFRIC 3 was revoked in 2005. In 
the absence of an international accounting standard for emissions rights, a 
diversity of practices has emerged as an important problematic issue. In turn, the 
accounting standard-setting bodies have continued to make efforts to set up 
appropriate accounting guidance to deal with emissions rights and related 
liabilities under ETS. 
In essence, the difficulty in dealing with the complexity of emissions rights within 
the existing framework is attributable to the prolonged absence of accounting 
standards for emissions rights (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; Lovell, 2014). Lovell 
et al. (2010) acknowledge the necessity for empirical research in this area in order 
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to resolve „tensions‟ between newly-emerging accounting issues under ETS and 
the existing accounting framework. This study is motivated by these 
circumstances in relation to the complicated and unsettled issues relating to 
emissions rights. 
In summary, a number of policy measures have been taken to tackle carbon 
emissions. Amongst these, ETS may be considered to be „problematic‟ from an 
accounting point of view because, in contrast to many other accounting issues, the 
recognition of carbon emissions in financial statements brings about a number of 
new and complex issues (Lovell, 2014). In this regard, this study is concerned with 
how the complexity of emerging accounting issues under ETS may be resolved in 
the field. It explores how accounting standard setters address these complicated 
accounting issues in practice, and how they may ultimately resolve them. 
This research began as ETS in South Korea was being introduced, since the 
Korean ETS bill was established in 2012.4 In the absence of an international 
accounting standard for ETS, the Korean accounting standard setter, referred to 
as the „Korean Accounting Standards Board‟ (KASB), set out to establish an 
accounting standard for emissions rights in the run-up to the commencement of 
the Korean ETS on 1 January 2015. Against this background, this study is 
concerned with practical accounting issues with regard to ETS. Specifically, by 
investigating the accounting standard-setting process in the Korean context, this 
research examines how KASB dealt with the multi-faceted issues on emissions 
rights. 
 Research objective and research questions 1.2.
The aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of practical accounting 
issues under an emissions trading scheme through the accounting standard-
setting process. 
Accounting plays a „constitutive role‟ in social processes (Hopwood and Miller, 
1994, cited in Lovell et al., 2013). It is both constructed by the social, cultural and 
                                            
4
 The author worked on the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) in Korea, and was involved in 
establishing the Korean ETS bill in 2012. 
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political environment, and also influences society (Burchell et al., 1980). As ETS 
have affected the social and economic circumstances of organisations, accounting 
issues under ETS, referred to as „carbon accounting‟, have subsequently emerged 
in diverse disciplines and have been addressed from a variety of perspectives. 
However, only a few papers have dealt with these issues from a financial carbon 
accounting point of view (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011). Although there has been a 
surge of calls from accounting experts and practitioners for authoritative 
accounting guidance on ETS, specific accounting guidance for ETS has not yet 
been provided by IASB. 
In response to a scarcity of research on accounting issues under ETS, as well as 
the absence of an international accounting standard for ETS, this research 
investigates an accounting standard-setting process for emissions rights and 
related liabilities in order to identify how complicated and unresolved accounting 
issues under ETS may be managed and resolved in the field. To this extent, this 
study provides important insights into and knowledge on how accounting issues in 
relation to the unique attributes of ETS are addressed in the standard-setting 
process and how an accounting standard setter accomplishes an appropriate (or 
desirable) accounting standard for ETS. It contributes to determining the main 
attributes of „desirability‟ and „appropriateness‟ of an accounting standard with the 
introduction of a new policy, ETS. 
In addition, this study aims to shed light on the political nature of the accounting 
standard-setting process with the introduction of a new policy, ETS. Sutton (1984) 
posits that an accounting standard-setting process entails not only professional 
technical knowledge but also a political process. In particular, underpinning the 
latter aspect, numerous studies of standard-setting processes have been 
undertaken with regard to a wide range of cases and issues. However, few have 
been conducted empirically in the case of ETS. Therefore, this study contributes 
an empirical body of research on accounting standard setting for ETS. 
This research focuses on accounting issues for ETS since IFRIC 3 was withdrawn. 
Empirically, this study mainly investigates the standard-setting process by KASB. 
Since Korea adopted IFRS on 1st of January in 2011, the accounting treatment 
regarding emissions rights and related liabilities under ETS should correspond to 
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IFRS. However, without an international accounting standard for emissions rights, 
KASB had no choice but to attempt to develop its own accounting standards for 
emissions rights. Due to limited accessibility to materials published in English, 
KASB mainly referred to IFRIC 3 and the accounting models developed by IASB in 
2008-2010 and by the French accounting standard setter (Autorité des Normes 
Comptables, referred to as „ANC‟) in 2012. IFRIC 3 and the accounting models 
developed by IASB in 2008-2010 and ANC have substantially influenced the 
development of Korean GAAP on emissions rights. Accordingly, this study extends 
to research IASB‟s tentative decisions made in 2008-2010 and ANC‟s proposal in 
2012. 
As the primary concern about accounting issues under ETS arises in the context 
of standard setting, this study posits the following research questions. 
Research Question 1: How does an accounting standard setter tackle accounting 
issues under ETS in the standard-setting process in order to achieve the most 
appropriate accounting standard? 
This question is concerned with accounting issues on emissions rights and related 
liabilities, which are addressed mainly in standard setting since IFRIC 3 was 
withdrawn. Given a variety of nature of emissions rights, it is essential to 
investigate how accounting standard setters recognise emissions rights and 
related liabilities under the conceptual framework: to be specific, the elements of 
financial statements in the „Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting‟ in 2010 
provided by IASB and the „Conceptual Framework of Financial Accounting‟ under 
Korean GAAP in 2003 provided by KASB. It aims to identify factors that affect 
accounting standard setters in developing an accounting standard for ETS. In 
addition, this question investigates the accounting models or standards for ETS 
that accounting standard setters develop taking several factors into account. 
Thereby, the main attributes of each accounting model or standard are derived. 
This question aims to enhance understanding of the complex and diverse aspects 
of accounting issues under the scheme; to this extent, the purpose of this 
research is to appreciate how the accounting standard setter settles new and 
complicated issues associated with emissions rights in order to achieve the most 
desirable solution under various circumstances. 
  
7 
Research Question 2: How does the accounting standard-setting process proceed 
in the case of ETS? 
This question is concerned with the accounting standard-setting process in the 
case of ETS. By investigating the procedures through which due process 
proceeds, this question examines the players, motivations, methods and 
arguments in association with the accounting issues for ETS, and specifically: who 
constitute the main stakeholders; what stakeholders are interested in; how 
stakeholders participate in the process; how stakeholders attempt to reflect their 
own interests; how the accounting standard setter addresses a variety of interests 
raised by stakeholders while setting up the standard for ETS; and how the 
accounting standard setter makes a choice on specific accounting treatments 
considering various factors and reflecting stakeholders‟ interests. The main 
stakeholders in line with this research question were identified on the basis of a 
theory of stakeholder identification of Mitchell et al. (1997). 
The objective of this question is to explore the political features of the accounting 
standard-setting process in dealing with new accounting issues. It intends to elicit 
insights into the assessment of desirable features of accounting standards on 
emissions rights, as a consequence of the political process in standard setting. 
These questions are elaborated in Section 4.2, unfolding them into a number of 
objectives in association with each research question. 
 Overview of research design 1.3.
This study is concerned with accounting issues for ETS in practice, where an 
accounting standard setter sets up accounting standards for emissions rights and 
related liabilities. With regard to the main subject of this study, two research 
questions have been described in Section 1.2, which are subdivided into relevant 
objectives in Section 4.2. These research questions and associated objectives are 
guided by a wide range of perspectives from the literature on financial accounting 
issues under ETS (Section 3.2) and the accounting standard-setting process 
(Section 3.3), as well as the findings from fieldwork conducted in 2014. 
In view of the aim, research questions and objectives, an interpretive inductive 
methodological approach is adopted which is most suited to providing insights into 
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and understanding of the accounting issues under ETS. In accordance with this 
methodology, this study relies mainly on semi-structured and in-depth interviews, 
primarily undertaken face-to-face. Relying on Mitchell et al. (1997)‟s coverage of 
stakeholder salience, interviewees were deliberately selected amongst 
stakeholders who are heavily involved in the development of accounting standard 
for emissions rights from the KASB‟s perspective. In addition to the interviews, a 
number of documents have been analysed which are available in the public 
domain or were collected in the field. All interview transcriptions and documents 
have been coded and analysed using QSR NVivo 10 in order to organise the data 
effectively. Using an interpretive approach, the findings have been triangulated 
and interpreted. 
 Contributions 1.4.
First, the originality of this study lies in investigating how a new accounting issue 
arising from ETS is transformed into an accounting standard in practice. 
Compared with more conventional accounting issues, accounting issues under 
ETS have been comparatively little explored because of the novelty and short 
history of the issue from the point of view of the traditional accounting regime. In 
view of the paucity of empirical research in this area, this study contributes to the 
empirical body of literature on accounting issues for ETS. 
Second, this study enhances understanding of accounting issues under ETS from 
a practical point of view. By investigating the main accounting issues dealt with by 
accounting standard setters in the standard-setting process, this study identifies 
how problematic issues associated with emissions rights can be resolved in the 
field. Accordingly, this study is academically and practically valuable because it 
investigates tangible solutions to resolving the complexity of accounting issues 
under the scheme within the existing accounting framework. The accounting 
models explored in this study provide plausible solutions for other jurisdictions in 
need of an accounting standard for emissions rights. 
Third, this study extends understanding of the accounting standard-setting 
process from legitimacy perspective. It sheds light on the political attributes not 
only of the standard-setting process but also of the resulting accounting standards. 
In particular, this study probes how accounting standard setters make decisions in 
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the standard-setting process in pursuit of accounting standard setters‟ legitimacy. 
This study is important in demonstrating empirically how legitimacy functions in the 
standard-setting process. In addition, this study makes a contribution to a strand of 
literature on stakeholder‟s participation and lobbying activities in the standard-
setting process, including motivation, methods, timing and effectiveness of 
lobbying. 
Fourth, this study draws on features of „desirability‟ and „appropriateness‟ of 
accounting standards. It investigates how the accounting standard setter 
addresses accounting issues for ETS in order to establish the most appropriate 
accounting standard under a variety of conditions. The solutions sought by the 
accounting standard setter enable the deduction of core elements that determine 
the desirability and appropriateness of the accounting standard for emission rights. 
Fifth, this study makes an important contribution in drawing the attention of the 
case of KASB to other academics worldwide. Owing to the linguistic limitations of 
accessing KASB and its relatively short history, unsurprisingly, there have been 
few studies on KASB‟s standard-setting process. In particular, this study 
investigates very closely the entire process of accounting standard setting for ETS 
in Korea by speaking to KASB staff and stakeholders in person. This was timely 
because it corresponded with the launch of an ETS project set out by KASB in 
order to develop an accounting standard for emissions rights. This well-timed 
research generated the noteworthy findings of this study. To this extent, this study 
paves the way toward broadening international understanding of the accounting 
standard-setting process in the Korean context. 
Sixth, this study is important from a policy-making point of view. Empirical 
research on the accounting standard-setting process enables the accounting 
standard setter to understand the political nature of the standard-setting process 
and the importance of stakeholders‟ participation in the process. The findings and 
empirical evidence of this study highlight critical implications for the accounting 
standard setter to achieve a high-quality accounting standard with a high level of 
compliance. 
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 Structure of the thesis 1.5.
The remainder of this thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter 2 describes the 
background of this study, the emerging accounting issues arising from ETS, the 
main features of ETS and examples of ETS. Chapter 3 reviews extant research 
from two strands of literature: financial accounting issues under ETS and the 
accounting standard-setting process. A theoretical framework is derived from the 
literature review in order to interpret the findings. Chapter 4 describes the research 
questions and associated objectives, followed by the methodological choices, 
including the philosophical assumptions, methodological approach, research 
methods and data analysis. Chapters 5 to 6 correspond with the first research 
question and Chapter 7 goes in line with the second research question posed in 
Chapter 4. These chapters present the findings from the data collected in the 
fieldwork. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a summary of the main findings and 
recurring themes, with discussion and interpretation of the findings, and a 
summary of the contributions and limitations of this study and ideas for further 
research. 
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2. Background 
 Introduction 2.1.
This chapter provides a general overview of the context of this study, including 
carbon accounting and carbon trading. The next section presents carbon pricing 
instruments as a theoretical background to ETS. In Section 2.3, emerging 
accounting issues under carbon trading are discussed, and sub-section 2.3.2 
specifically discusses accounting for carbon, on which this study focuses. A 
general understanding of ETS is provided in Section 2.4, which covers general 
design features of ETS, as well as the EU and Korean ETS. Since this research 
explores accounting issues under ETS in the Korean context, Section 2.5 provides 
a general overview of KASB. This chapter provides an overall background from 
which to identify the research gaps presented in Chapter 3. 
 Carbon pricing instruments 2.2.
A number of policy instruments have been introduced to tackle climate change, 
including carbon pricing measures, support for low-carbon R&D, and financial 
support for adaptation. Carbon pricing is based on the idea of putting a price on 
GHG emissions (Hepburn and Stern, 2008). Theoretically, the carbon pricing 
mechanism originates from an economic instrument used to price emissions 
known as the „Pigouvian tax scheme‟, in which a tax is levied on activity 
generating negative externalities (Pasfield and Paeffgen, 2013). In practice, there 
are two forms of carbon pricing mechanisms where the externality associated with 
carbon emissions is converted into a price: carbon trading, in which the quantity of 
emissions is fixed but the price is determined by the market; and carbon tax, 
where the price is fixed but the level of emissions reduction is uncertain (Hood, 
2010). 
Several studies dealing with a variety of issues under ETS (e.g. Baldwin, 2008; 
Egenhofer, 2007; Ellerman et al., 2010; Hood, 2010; MacKenzie, 2009; OECD, 
2001; Pope and Owen, 2009) present the carbon trading operating mechanism. In 
essence, a government sets an overall cap on emissions, which is converted to an 
equivalent quantity of emissions rights representing an authoritative entitlement to 
emit (Wemaere et al., 2009). The overall cap is divided into sub-caps in sectors 
covered by the scheme. In line with the sub-caps, emissions rights are assigned to 
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each sector and to participants in the scheme (Ellerman et al., 2010). In order to 
comply with the obligation to meet the reduction target, participants are able to sell 
or purchase permits in the market by comparing their marginal cost of reducing 
carbon emissions with the market price of permits. ETS is based on a market-
based mechanism; accordingly, this is considered to be the most cost-effective 
policy instrument to tackle GHG emissions by inducing business entities 
strategically to adopt means of carbon reduction such as research and 
development in abatement technology (Egenhofer, 2007; Kruger et al., 2007; 
Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013).5 
In theory, both carbon tax and ETS are equivalent instruments to internalise the 
externality cost using a market-based approach in a „perfect market‟ subject to 
„complete information‟ (Braun, 2009; Pope and Owen, 2009). There has been a 
long-running academic debate over which market mechanism is more desirable in 
terms of transparency, effectiveness, market efficiency, certainty and acceptability. 
On the whole, carbon tax may be more efficient and less distortive from various 
perspectives, such as transparency, simplicity and administrative cost (Andrew et 
al., 2010; Mann, 2009, cited in Pasfield and Paeffgen, 2013, p.390). For instance, 
by using an existing tax system, a carbon tax may be less costly to implement 
than ETS, which requires setting up an entirely new market system (Andrew et al., 
2010). In addition, carbon tax provides business entities with greater certainty 
given a specific carbon tax rate, thereby enabling them to operate more 
predictably (Andrew et al., 2010). Moreover, since in reality it is almost impossible 
to run a „well-designed and credible‟ trading scheme (Garnaut, 2007, cited in 
Andrew et al., 2010), it is arguable that carbon tax is not only theoretically but also 
practically superior to ETS in terms of economic efficiency and environmental 
effectiveness. 
In spite of the theoretical superiorities of carbon tax, ETS is a much more 
attractive policy tool in reality. It has been predominantly preferred to carbon tax in 
practice because of a high degree of „acceptability‟, in the sense that, due to 
                                            
5
 Several studies (e.g. Carlson et al., 2000; Ellerman et al., 2010; Schmalensee and Stavins, 2012) assert 
that an emissions trading scheme based on a cap-and-trade mechanism is a more cost-effective way than a 
command-and-control approach to achieve environmental objectives. 
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generous free allowances, it can be politically reconciled without causing severe 
conflict between stakeholders‟ interests (Baldwin, 2008; Hepburn and Stern, 2008).  
In effect, governments tend to implement ETS rather than carbon tax schemes 
because ETS is a strong and attractive environmental policy tool, not only for 
tackling carbon emissions but also to harmonise with other energy or industrial 
policies. „Predictability‟ regarding a targeted reduction provides greater certainty 
about levels of emissions by setting a mitigation target (Baldwin, 2008), enabling 
the emissions reduction target to be achieved over time irrespective of energy 
price levels (Hood 2010).6 Accordingly, ETS is preferable to carbon tax in practice 
as a measure to tackle carbon emissions and to achieve a certain level of 
emissions (Andrew et al., 2010). Moreover, as long as a robust level of carbon 
prices is sustained, business entities are induced to invest in energy-efficient 
facilities and green technologies (Baldwin, 2008), thereby leading to a shift 
towards a low carbon economy in the longer term (Convery, 2009). 
From a business perspective, a carbon tax may be more desirable because of the 
regulatory certainty of a certain rate of tax. On the other hand, ETS may be a 
practically better means from a policy perspective. The benefits of the two 
measures cannot be compared directly. However, in virtue of various advantages 
in terms of applicability in reality, ETS has been preferred in practice as it is 
considered the most cost-effective mechanism for reducing carbon emissions. It 
appears that a preference for the better applicability of ETS rather than the carbon 
tax preference of business entities may result in a prevalence of ETS rather than 
carbon tax in practice. 
In summary, as an instrument for carbon pricing, ETS has been adopted over 
carbon tax worldwide on the grounds that ETS is politically more acceptable and 
provides greater certainty of achieving carbon reduction targets. Although ETS 
has been preferred to carbon tax as a measure for tackling carbon emissions, 
greater discretion is required when implementing such a scheme. Under ETS, a 
totally new market is artificially created, in which government manipulates the 
                                            
6
 In contrast to ETS, under a carbon tax regime, there is no certainty of a national economy achieving an 
„optimal level of pollution‟, which is an essential factor for estimating the extent of carbon tax (Hood, 2010; 
Pope and Owen, 2009). 
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supply of and demand for emissions rights. This may cause dysfunction in the 
carbon market if a robust carbon price cannot be sustained. For example, a 
collapse in the carbon price on the EU ETS market was observed at the end of 
2007, and the EU ETS has continued to struggle with low carbon prices.7 This 
implies a vulnerability of the market mechanism of ETS. Furthermore, ETS may be 
driven by political intervention in relation to cap setting, allocation, etc. ETS entails 
interference from lobbying and political decisions that may impair cost-
effectiveness, which is its most important benefit. Therefore, in admitting that ETS 
cannot be a perfect measure under perfect conditions, governments must operate 
schemes rigorously following implementation. 
 Emerging accounting issues under carbon trading 2.3.
2.3.1. Accounting for carbon 
As ETS has been expanding worldwide since the Kyoto Protocol was approved in 
1997, an essential technical issue that has emerged is how to measure carbon 
emissions accurately. The accurate measurement of carbon emissions is a critical 
element in implementing schemes at different levels, including the product unit 
level, organisational level, industrial level, national level and even planet level. As 
a platform to measure GHG emissions for implementing ETS, a new 
interdisciplinary field of accounting has appeared, referred to as „carbon 
accounting‟. Since carbon accounting is widely and differently used in various 
contexts, it is necessary to differentiate various carbon accounting systems and 
identify a specific sub-area of carbon accounting in accordance with this research. 
Prior to this study, preliminary work was necessary to articulate the scope of the 
research in light of financial reporting under ETS, in order to identify relevant 
elements in designing a new market. Financial carbon accounting is presented as 
the scope researched for this study. This section helps to identify the principal 
actors and interest groups relevant to this research by highlighting a particular 
dichotomy of carbon accounting. 
                                            
7
 Since prices went below €10/t CO2 in 2011, the price of EUA (EU allowance: 1 allowance (EUA) equals 1 
tonne of CO2 or its equivalent) has been around €6-€7/t CO2 (Source: EUA future prices 2005–2011 and 
2008-2012, http://glossary.eea.europa.eu//terminology/sitesearch?term=EUA+price). 
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One distinct strand of previous research on accounting issues under ETS deals 
with various uses of carbon accounting. Various attempts have been made to 
build a „market-enabling accounting platform‟ in the process of measuring, 
verifying and reporting carbon stocks or carbon footprint at national, organisational, 
project and personal levels (e.g. Ascui and Lovell, 2011, 2012; Bowen and 
Wittneben, 2011). 
Many definitions of „carbon accounting‟ have been given in the literature (e.g. 
Ascui and Lovell, 2011, 2012; Bowen and Wittneben, 2011; Stechemesser and 
Guenther, 2012; Schaltegger and Csutor, 2012). Previous studies highlight that 
carbon accounting has been employed with a wide variety of meanings in various 
fields, reflecting a wide spectrum of carbon activities (Ascui and Lovell, 2011). 
Bowen and Wittneben (2011, p.1025) define carbon accounting as „the 
measurement of carbon emissions, the collation of this data and the 
communication thereof, both within and between firms‟. From the perspective of 
the relationship between accounting and society, Lovell et al. (2012) describe 
carbon accounting as „the accounting treatment chosen by companies [that] 
constructs the significance of carbon markets, and provides insights into the 
relative importance of carbon in communications to stakeholders via an 
organisation‟s financial accounts‟. On the whole, carbon accounting is widely used 
in the context of the measurement of carbon at an organisational level. 
The term „carbon accounting‟ may be used and interpreted differently depending 
on the objectives of organisations using it (Ascui and Lovell, 2011, 2012; Bowen 
and Wittneben, 2011; Schaltegger and Csutora, 2012; Stechemesser and 
Guenther, 2012). Several studies illustrate different uses of carbon accounting 
from different organisational perspectives. For example, on the basis of a 
systematic literature review, Stechemesser and Guenther (2012) suggest four 
different scales – national, project, organisational and product – and subdivide the 
organisational scale into carbon management accounting and carbon financial 
accounting. Ascui and Lovell (2011) distinguish carbon accounting in terms of five 
frameworks: physical, political, market-enabling, financial, and social or 
environmental. Schaltegger and Csutora (2012) also provide a framework for 
carbon accounting at different organisational and geographical levels, addressing 
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scientific, political-economic and corporate levels as well as global, multinational, 
national and local levels. Bowen and Wittneben (2011) show how carbon 
accounting has evolved in three distinct organisational fields (counting carbon, 
carbon accounting, and accountability for carbon) in light of accuracy, consistency 
and certainty. Notably, Ascui and Lovell (2011) suggest a framework (see Figure 1) 
to define carbon accounting by selecting and combining different scopes for either 
mandatory or voluntary purposes. This framework indicates the extent to which 
carbon accounting may be applied to a wide variety of dimensions. 
Figure 1: Various types of carbon accounting 
(adapted from Ascui and Lovell, 2011, p.980) 
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Carbon accounting is categorised variously according to scale, and individual 
frameworks of carbon accounting identify the key issues, institutions and players 
which make up each one (Ascui and Lovell, 2011). For example, scientists tend to 
emphasise carbon accounting in terms of „the practice of making scientifically 
robust and verifiable measurement of greenhouse gas emissions‟ (Watson, 2009, 
p.6, cited in Ascui and Lovell, 2011). Meanwhile, as ETS is globally pervasive, 
accounting experts have asserted that assets, liabilities and profits/losses 
associated with emissions rights and obligations should be reported in monetary 
terms in financial statements (Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012). 
In short, carbon accounting is considered to be an „enabler‟ for tackling climate 
change issues in terms of the measurement of GHG emissions on various 
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dimensions (Ascui and Lovell, 2011). Considering all aspects of carbon 
accounting, it cannot be defined as a single term but should be understood as 
activities related to measuring, calculating, monitoring, reporting and verifying 
carbon emissions at different organisational levels in the form of either monetary 
or physical information. 
Carbon accounting development has influenced and in turn has been influenced 
by recent developments in integrated reporting and earlier developments in 
particularly environmental but also social reporting (it should be stressed that it is 
particularly difficult to disentangle developments in the environmental reporting 
arena from those in the social). Discussions on forms of accounting that 
incorporate economic, social and environmental corporate impacts predate that of 
carbon accounting and can be traced in the 1960s. Gray et al. (1996) highlight that 
at the time “the most important (for the planet and society if not for business and 
accounting)” related development was “the emerging environmental movement 
which laid the groundwork for the environmental revival of the late 1980s” (Gray et 
al., 1996, p. 92). The early 1970s are generally regarded as the period when 
environmental reporting “research first became established as a substantial 
discipline in its own right” (Owen, 2008, p. 243). Environmental (and social) 
reporting appears to have first come, 
As a natural consequence of the debate then raging concerning the role of 
the corporation in society at a time of rising societal expectations and 
emerging environmental awareness. More perceptive managements, 
particularly those of prominent corporations in environmentally or socially 
sensitive sectors, speedily grasped the public relations benefits in 
producing, at least rudimentary, social reports which attempted to convey a 
picture of corporate responsiveness to key societal concerns (Owen, 2004, 
p. 24).  
Indeed following this increased public awareness that augmented environmental 
responsibility, the whole area of accounting standards and regulation also became 
a matter of debate, and for the first time accounting was seen both as part of, and 
a potential source for solving, the associated with the environmental damage 
problems (Gray et al., 1996). This was reflected in the publication of The 
Corporate Report (TCR) in 1975 by the Accounting Standards Steering Committee. 
TCR identified various user groups in society, ranging from the equity investment 
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group through to government and the public, and suggested that organisations 
publish statements such as value added statement, employment report and 
energy usage statement. TCR thus played an important part in expanding the 
involvement of the accounting function in the accountability of organisations to 
different groups in society (Quirke, 1996). As Perks (1993, p. 36) points out, it was 
the first time that public accountability was seen “as being in addition to legal 
obligations and [the Report] argued that it arises from the custodial role played in 
the community by economic entities”. Although this was still far from considering 
related reporting developments as being, “at the heart of an examination of the 
role of information in organization–society dialogue” (Gray et al., 1995, p. 48, see 
also Parker, 2005), as many researching the field would hope, TCR remains “the 
most radical re-statement, from the accounting profession, of how organisational 
disclosure needed to be enhanced by social and environmental accounting” (Gray, 
2002, p.690).  
Environmental reporting nevertheless became widespread during the 1980s and 
1990s, with an increasing number of (predominantly large) organisations 
publishing related information in their annual reports. Important early drivers seem 
to include action by European legislators in the early 1990s (such as the European 
Union‟s Fifth Action Programme and the Environmental Management and the 
Audit Scheme, EMAS). It seems however to have been first the Brundtland Report 
(UNWCED, 1987) and then the run up to the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, 
which transformed the global awareness and prominence of environmental issues, 
and it is within that changed atmosphere that the „standalone‟ environmental 
reports started to emerge (Gray et al., 2014). Environmental reporting appears to 
have been subsequently driven by the development of a range of voluntary 
reporting guidelines and the increasing attention given by professional accounting 
bodies to environmental reporting issues (Gray et al., 2014). Indeed, in more 
recent years, initiatives from diverse entities including SustainAbility, 
AccountAbility, The Global Reporting Initiative, The United Nations Global 
Compact and the Prince of Wales Accounting for Sustainability Project have all 
appeared to be increasingly influential.  
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Research on environmental reporting has also followed suit with a number of 
dedicated papers being published in the last 40 years (Vourvachis and Woodward, 
2015) and with journals such as Accounting, Organizations and Society; 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, and Accounting Forum publishing 
dedicated issues to the phenomenon (see e.g. Callon, 2009; Engels, 2009; 
Lohman, 2009; and Milne and Grubnic, 2011; for some notable contributions). 
Research highlights the complexity of environmental reporting and key issues of 
concern, such as the surprising organisational lack of environmental information 
systems to support reporting despite the, now, decades of guidance and 
experimentation (Gray et al., 2014). Nevertheless and whether it is examined in a 
standalone form or in conjunction with developments in social reporting, research 
suggests that it is largely the voluntary nature of the offered initiatives that 
prohibits the more systematic development of the field. Indeed research highlights 
that related organisational practice is primarily influenced by organisational 
attempts to achieve legitimacy (Deegan, 2002) and/or to manage stakeholders 
(Mitchel et al., 1997) (see next chapter for a detailed discussion of these 
frameworks). It thus seems that “[w]ithout mandatory reporting guidelines… 
companies will continue to produce reports which leave out impacts… material to 
key stakeholder groups” (Adams and Narayanan, 2007, p. 83). And it is the 
potential of the more recent initiatives such as integrated reporting (as well as 
carbon accounting) to be mandated that highlight their contribution to enhancing 
the legitimacy and further development of the field (in both professional and 
research terms). 
Integrated reporting in its most recent form has only been developed in the last 
decade, as the outcome of the collaboration of the Prince of Wales‟ Accounting for 
Sustainability Project, with the International Federation of Accountants and the 
Global Reporting Initiative. It nevertheless seems to be prominent in the current 
development of social and environmental reporting (de Villiers et al., 2014). As 
both carbon accounting and integrated reporting are relatively young projects, they 
can contribute towards each other‟s legitimacy. As global climate change entails a 
variety of social, environmental, and economic impacts, carbon accounting has a 
need to integrate more relevant information to support stakeholders to evaluate an 
organisation‟s strategy, governance, performance, and prospects under the 
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impacts of global climate change (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; de 
Villiers et al., 2014). On the other hand, integrated reporting needs to also 
incorporate the corporate impacts with respect to climate change, in particular 
carbon, in order to offer more inclusive reporting frameworks to the stakeholders 
concerned. As a consequence, carbon accounting has appeared in a wide range 
of accounting and reporting for the issues arising from global climate change. 
Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008, p.703) put an emphasis on providing 
relevant non-financial reporting in addition to financial reporting to the extent to 
which stakeholders enable to assess the impact of global climate change and to 
evaluate how the company deals with the „risks and uncertainty associated with 
global climate change‟. Considering the important role of integrated reporting in 
terms of the extent of information provided, integrated reporting can be regarded 
as a more appropriate vehicle to provide more „forward-looking‟ information to 
enable stakeholders to effectively assess an organisation‟s strategy and 
performance in the context of environmental, social and economic challenges 
(Solomon and Maroun, 2012, p.8) than current accounting templates. 
Nevertheless, de Villiers et al. (2014) highlight that despite its ambitious aim and 
high potential, integrated reporting over the years seems to be developing into a 
rather complementary as opposed to a revolutionary new framework that could 
replace existing templates and serve the stakeholders information needs. In that 
regard, carbon accounting which has been debated by international accounting 
bodies for a number of years with a number of related standards being issued is at 
a more mature stage and could contribute towards the greater acceptance of 
integrated reporting by accounting standard setters and preparers. 
In the previous literature on carbon accounting, an explicit distinction has been 
made between financial carbon accounting, focusing mainly on carbon assets and 
liabilities under ETS, and other organisational frameworks of carbon accounting 
(Ascui and Lovell, 2011). Adopting Ascui and Lovell‟s (2011) categorisation of 
carbon accounting, financial carbon accounting can be envisaged in terms of 
scope, main attributes, organisations involved and key issues. Ascui and Lovell 
(2011) classify the types of carbon accounting at organisational level as shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1: Types of carbon accounting at the organisational level 
(adapted from Ascui and Lovell, 2012, p.57) 
 Internal 
(Management accounting) 
External 
(Accounting and reporting) 
Physical 
Carbon flow accounting 
Carbon footprinting and 
labelling(products) 
Strategic carbon 
management accounting 
Carbon footprinting and 
reporting(organisations) 
Climate risk, opportunity and 
governance disclosure 
Monetary Carbon cost accounting 
Financial carbon accounting and 
reporting* 
* This study focuses on the area of financial carbon accounting and reporting 
The main concerns of carbon accounting at the organisational level are the 
development of carbon accounting systems as a way of recording and reporting 
carbon-related data according to quantitative and qualitative standards, and 
assessing companies‟ efforts to reduce GHG emissions activities (Bowen and 
Wittneben, 2011). Specifically, financial carbon accounting focuses on accounting 
for emissions allowances and corresponding liabilities (Stechemesser and 
Guenther, 2011). In light of financial carbon accounting, the development of new 
accounting rules for emissions allowances is essential in order to provide useful 
information to users. 
In summary, carbon accounting is used for various measurement, performance 
monitoring and verification purposes at different levels. On the basis of 
categorisations of carbon accounting in previous studies, a tentative conclusion 
can be drawn that accounting for emissions allowances under ETS is conceptually 
linked with financial carbon accounting. Financial accounting affects the allocation 
of economic resources, and accounting rules substantially influence stakeholders 
(Jorissen et al., 2012). This study focuses on financial carbon accounting, which 
helps to delineate the accounting issues that may arise, the main stakeholders, 
and the interests of those stakeholders. 
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2.3.2. Accounting for ETS 
Since the EU ETS was launched in 2005, financial reporting under ETS has been 
an emerging issue considerably different from other accounting issues that have 
been discussed within the traditional accounting regime. As accounting for carbon 
credits is still at a „formative‟ stage (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011, p.709), rules and 
practices are still „hot‟ and „unsettled‟ (Lohmann, 2009, cited in Lovell et al., 2013). 
Financial accounting for emissions rights has received relatively little attention 
from either academics or practitioners compared with other accounting issues 
(Lovell et al., 2013; Lovell, 2014). Accordingly, there is a paucity of academic 
literature in the area of financial accounting reporting under ETS. 
Nevertheless, a handful of notable papers highlights the necessity for financial 
reporting under ETS (e.g. Ascui and Lovell, 2011, 2012; Bebbington and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Mackenzie, 2009). This strand of early academic work 
contributes to building a backdrop and raising issues regarding how to incorporate 
emissions rights into the traditional accounting framework. As a background to this 
study, this is a preliminary overview to understand the necessity of financial 
reporting for relevant activities under ETS. 
Firstly, accounting reporting of activities under ETS has been conducted on a 
voluntary basis in response to a demand for social accountability. Bebbington and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) highlight corporate accountability to stakeholders for a 
variety of economic and social consequences of climate change. As a result of the 
„polluter-pay principle‟ and the „market-based mechanism‟, ETS has been 
spreading worldwide because of the extent to which climate change has become a 
social and economic circumstance by which organisations are significantly 
affected. In turn, stakeholders have called for accounting information regarding 
entities‟ carbon-related activities under ETS (Solomon et al., 2011). In response to 
a social demand for accounting information, companies have voluntarily reported 
their carbon activities under ETS as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
or as a part of existing financial reporting in line with accounting standards (Lovell 
et al., 2010). As also discussed earlier, emerging as a new area or social and 
environmental reporting in line with the formation of the International Integrated 
Reporting Committee in 2010, integrated reporting has been widely utilised for 
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social and environmental disclosure in a voluntary manner (de Villiers et al., 2014), 
and could further incorporate and push towards more systematic reporting of 
carbon impacts. In this context, Ascui and Lovell (2012) address that, to date, 
„external demand‟ from stakeholders has been the main factor provoking 
disclosure of carbon activities. 
Secondly, the market mechanism of ETS enables emissions permits and 
obligations to be assessed at monetary value, which has led to the incorporation 
of tradable emissions rights into pro forma reporting. By placing a price on a unit of 
carbon emissions, carbon-emitting activities and corresponding performance 
under ETS can be described in monetary terms. MacKenzie (2009) regards 
emissions rights as a tool for „making things the same‟ in terms of financial 
reporting. Put differently, emissions allowances can be captured in financial 
statements by putting monetary values on emissions for the purpose of financial 
reporting (MacKenzie, 2009; Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012). In essence, the 
inherent calculability of emissions allowances is a critical determinant 
corresponding with the role of accounting as „economising‟ (Miller and Power, 
2013), whereby accounting conceptualises and transforms the carbon-related 
activities of organisations into money values. 
Thirdly, due to a distinctive attribute of allowances of the entitlement to emit 
greenhouse gases, ETS creates a new type of asset and liability in financial 
statements from an accounting point of view, which needs to be displayed in 
financial statements in monetary terms (Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012). Having 
implemented a scheme, government allocates the intended amount of emissions 
rights either for free or by auctioning. In turn, the distributed emissions rights are 
characterised as an asset for an entity. Meanwhile, irrespective of the number of 
emissions rights held, participants in the scheme must comply with their obligation 
to surrender them to the government as they carry out business activities 
generating GHG emissions (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). This 
comprises a liability in accounting terms. 
In essence, ETS creates a new type of asset, liability, revenue and expense so 
that relevant information under the scheme necessitates the disclosure in financial 
statements of a form of asset and liability (Bowen and Wittneben, 2011; Cook, 
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2009; Lovell et al., 2010; Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012). This necessity for 
disclosure gives rise to a critical issue from a practitioner point of view, whereby 
financial reporting of emissions allowances has become an issue urgently in need 
of accounting standards. From both academic and practical points of view, the 
increasing need for financial reports under ETS has intensified calls for 
standardisation. As greater emphasis has been placed on comparability and 
consistency, it has become more desirable for financial reporting of performance 
under ETS to be provided as a conventional accounting standard (Bebbington and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). 
Lastly, the introduction of ETS may have significant and substantial economic 
consequences (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Haupt and Ismer, 
2013; Lovell et al., 2010). Several papers stress the importance of accounting for 
and reporting of business performance under ETS. Since regulatory and 
competitive risks of uncertainty may be associated with ETS, relevant information 
needs to be disclosed in order to enable stakeholders appropriately to assess the 
potential economic impact of ETS on a company. 
To be specific, ETS may fundamentally affect companies‟ strategic development in 
taking account of, for example, estimated total emissions, the technology available 
for abatement, the marginal costs of reduction and the costs of purchasing 
emissions rights (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008). In pursuit of the 
most cost-effective way of reducing carbon, companies may invest in abatement 
technology or facilities, or change their pricing strategy or product mix (Jaehn and 
Letmathe, 2010). The introduction of ETS drives business entities to make efforts 
to reduce carbon emissions, which are inevitably accompanied by changes in 
cash flow. 
In addition, energy-intensive and carbon-intensive industries encounter substantial 
increases in production costs. Since most schemes include free allocations as 
measures to lessen the burden on carbon-intensive industries, participants in the 
schemes are expected to receive a large volume of free allowances, and this initial 
free allocation results in a „transfer of wealth‟ (Kruger et al., 2007, p.114) because 
emissions rights are used to offset obligations under ETS. The total amount of free 
allowances may constitute so-called „materiality‟ in financial statements, so 
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emissions rights and related liabilities should be reported. Ratnatunga and Jones 
(2012) assert that entities‟ activities and obligations under ETS must be reported 
to their stakeholders and must contain all material information which is relevant 
and reliable. Haupt and Ismer (2013) reiterate the necessity for financial reporting 
of relevant information under the scheme. All relevant accounting information 
should be disclosed and reported to enable existing and potential stakeholders to 
make informed decisions (Lovell et al., 2010). In essence, from a „decision-
usefulness‟ perspective, all activities under ETS with economic consequences 
must be reported to stakeholders. 
 Understanding of ETS 2.4.
A full understanding of ETS is essential for well-developed accounting standards 
for such schemes. Prior to reviewing the accounting issues under ETS, it is 
important to understand how each scheme is designed and actually operates. 
Corresponding to the aims of this research, the EU and Korean ETS are 
introduced as particular cases. A comprehensive appreciation of general features 
of ETS and the specific attributes of each scheme will help to identify the 
accounting issues under ETS. 
2.4.1. General features of ETS 
Most emissions trading schemes focus mainly on a cap-and-trade approach 
(Uddin and Holtedahl, 2013). Based on Hood‟s (2010) study, general design 
features of ETS have been derived from analysis of existing and proposed ETS as 
of 2010. 
Cap-and-trade versus baseline-and-credit schemes: In terms of 
implementation, there are two types of emissions trading schemes: cap-and-trade 
and baseline-and-credit. A cap-and-trade scheme is subject to an „absolute‟ level 
of cap, whereas a baseline-and-credit scheme is subject to a „relative‟ level of cap 
(Wemaere et al., 2009). Under a cap-and-trade scheme (e.g. EU ETS), the cap is 
implemented by issuing allowances to emit up to the cap. The overall cap on 
emissions is established, whereby „allowances‟ or „permits‟ are issued 
corresponding to the cap as an authorisation and entitlement to emit (Wemaere et 
al., 2009). The aggregate number of allowances or permits is determined within 
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the overall cap. „Allowances or permits are used to offset participants‟ emissions. 
Once allowances have been allocated to participants, they are tradable on the 
market. 
In contrast, under a baseline-and-credit scheme (e.g. clean development 
mechanism), the cap is implemented by assigning an individual baseline of 
regulated emissions to the cap (Cook, 2009). Credits are issued to participants 
only when emissions are produced below the baseline. The baseline is not 
tradable; only credits being issued are tradable. Hence, the trading mechanism 
operates after issuing credits and credits are tradable only after a compliance 
period (Starbatty, 2010). Trading under a baseline-and-credit scheme may cause 
„insufficiency to sustain the market‟ (Cook, 2009). Starbatty (2009, p.17) posits 
that „the trading window in a baseline and credits is shorter than in a cap and trade 
scheme‟. Presumably, owing to the great extent of tradability of allowances, cap-
and-trade schemes are adopted predominantly to ensure better implementation of 
the cap. 
Statutory versus voluntary schemes: ETS is operated either mandatorily or 
voluntarily. Under a statutory scheme, participants mandatorily comply with their 
obligations under the scheme, while under a voluntary scheme, entities are free to 
decide whether to take part in the scheme. 
Cap setting and allocation of allowances: At the initial stage of a cap-and-trade 
scheme, it is necessary to establish the level of cap, or the reduction target to be 
achieved by the scheme. The cap may be converted into an absolute quantity of 
emissions quotas representing „allowances‟ or „permits‟, or it may be determined 
on the basis of relative criteria such as a business as usual (BAU) basis. In 
general, a unit of allowance represents the right to emit one tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent (tCO2-eq). The authority then sets out the initial allocation 
process by determining how many allowances are to be allocated to participants. 
Allowances may be distributed by auctioning, allocating for free, or combining 
these two methods. The quantity of allowances distributed to each company may 
be determined on the basis of the company‟s historical emissions (referred to as 
„grandfathering‟) or on the basis of a desired level of emissions performance being 
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attained (referred to as „benchmarking‟). The scheme sets aside a proportion (or 
amount) of total allowances for new entrants. 
Offsets: „Offsetting‟ is a type of flexibility measure intended to reduce the cost of 
compliance with obligations under ETS. When emissions reductions are achieved 
in a project not covered by the scheme, following a process to verify the extent to 
which an entity has achieved a reduction in emissions from the project, the 
authority provides the entity with credits equivalent to the verified reduction in 
emissions. The credits generated by offsetting projects can either be sold on the 
market or offset for compliance purposes. Most schemes allow the use of carbon 
credits issued under CDMs (known as certified emission reductions or CERs), and 
some schemes provide a domestic offset crediting system to generate offsetting 
credits. 
Flexible measures: In addition to the offsetting mechanism, a variety of flexible 
measures for compliance are included in the design of ETS. For example, when 
participants have a shortage of allowances to surrender at the end of a 
compliance year, they may use allowances allocated for the next compliance year 
(referred to as „borrowing‟), while „banking‟ allows unused allowances to be carried 
forward to a future trading period. If emissions are reduced below the allocated 
allowances, business entities may sell their extra allowances on the market or 
carry them forward (bank them) for future use (Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). 
Thus, these flexible measures – offsetting, banking and borrowing – help greatly in 
smoothing short-term volatility in carbon prices. 
Measures to protect competitiveness of industries: In considering the 
introduction of an ETS, a government must coordinate tensions arising between 
environmental conservation and economic impact. Taking competiveness issues 
into consideration, schemes are deliberately designed in order to minimise their 
adverse effects, for example by setting moderate reduction targets at an initial 
stage, providing generous free allocations, or allowing a generous use of offsetting. 
Specifically, most schemes include provisions to ease competitive disadvantage 
for emissions-intensive industries by providing a high level of free allowances, 
sometimes even amounting to 100 per cent of companies‟ emissions reduction 
targets, referred to as „100 per cent free allocation‟ (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Market mechanism under ETS 
„100 per cent free allocation‟ means that emissions allowances equivalent to the 
cap set are freely allocated to participants. The figure below assumes that the 
estimated emissions of an entity are 10 units at the beginning and 20 units at 
the end of a period, and the government allows the entity to emit 18 units, which 
is the reduction target. Assuming that 1 unit of allowance represents a right to 
emit 1 unit of emissions, the government distributes 18 units of allowances for 
free, referred to as „100 per cent free allocation‟. If the entity has emitted 22 
units of emissions at the end of the period, four units more than the 18 
allowances allocated, then it must purchase more permits on the market in 
order to fulfil its obligation to surrender permits to the government. By contrast, 
if it has emitted only 16 units by making efforts to reduce emissions, it may sell 
its remaining allowances on the market. This is how a market mechanism in 
ETS works. 
 
 
 
There is an argument that measures to protect „at-risk‟ industries are unnecessary. 
For instance, the overall impact of ETS on the economic cost and international 
competitiveness of industries is relatively small, so the impact on output growth 
will be limited (OECD, 2012b). In this context, Hood (2010) argues that measures 
and policies to support existing production patterns may undermine and prevent 
the transition to a sustainable and low-carbon economy in the long term. In 
contrast, some sectors of industry have persistently contended that measures to 
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protect competitiveness should be included in ETS. From a practical point of view, 
ETS may be implemented successfully with a high degree of acceptability, and in 
order to achieve such acceptability it must inevitably take account of the adverse 
effects of ETS on the economy. In reality, industry competitiveness is generally 
taken into consideration when designing ETS. 
Reporting, surrendering, penalising: Emissions that participants produce during 
a compliance year should be measured and reported to government. This is 
associated with the area of carbon accounting at the physical and external level 
(see Table 1). For external reporting, emissions must be verified through either 
self-auditing or independent auditing. Participants must surrender emissions 
allowances to the amount emitted during the trading year (Jaehn and Letmathe, 
2010). They may purchase or sell allowances on the market in line with their 
needs. In the case of a shortage of allowances to surrender, participants may use 
offsetting credits or borrow allowances from the next compliance year. In order to 
ensure compliance with obligations to report and surrender allowances, most 
schemes impose severe penalties for non-compliance. 
Intervention in the market: ETS is generally designed deliberately to incorporate 
administrative measures for intervening in the market under exceptional 
circumstances. The government draws a general picture of the market, for 
example the overall amount of permits, who will play a role in the supply of and 
demand for permits, and the anticipated price of permits. Since the market is being 
artificially created by the government, market imperfection inherently and 
potentially exists. Therefore, measures for the authority to address market 
imperfection should be included in order to intervene in the market if necessary. In 
order to tackle instability of the market, measures include setting a price ceiling or 
floor, or reserving part of the allowances. 
Nevertheless, in reality, all general features of ETS are operated variously to 
reflect the different circumstances under which scheme are established. In terms 
of general design features, each scheme differs slightly from the other (Starbatty, 
2010). As background to this study, it is necessary to establish the main features 
of the EU and Korean ETS in order to identify similarities and distinctive variations 
between the schemes. 
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2.4.2. EU emissions trading scheme 
The EU ETS is regarded as critical, not only in the EU but also globally, in terms of 
tackling climate issues. When the EU ETS was established in 2005, it was the 
world‟s first international ETS and the largest market in the world. The EU ETS 
has been regarded as a cornerstone to making an impact on the development and 
implementation of other schemes worldwide, and was a key reference when the 
Korean ETS was being developed. Meanwhile, from an accounting standards 
perspective, in several studies in academic and practical papers the accounting 
issues under ETS have been addressed in terms of the EU ETS model. 
Accordingly, it is necessary fully to understand the main features of the EU ETS as 
a precedent for later studies. 
Background of introduction of the EU ETS 
The Kyoto Protocol was a driving force in triggering the development of the EU 
ETS (Convery, 2009; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Bailey and Maresh, 2009). 
During the Kyoto negotiations, the EU insisted on inserting a binding numerical 
reduction target into the Protocol. Meanwhile, the US insisted on inserting market-
based flexible mechanisms, including international emissions trading, the clean 
development mechanism and joint implementation into the text of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Convery, 2009). In addition, the US opposed the inclusion of a legally 
binding quantitative target in the Kyoto Protocol without the flexible mechanisms it 
was suggesting (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). In order to achieve the Protocol 
with a binding reduction target, the EU yielded to include market-based flexible 
mechanisms (Bailey and Maresh, 2009; Convery, 2009; Pohlmann, 2009; 
Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 with a 
commitment to a legally binding target on emissions for developed countries within 
an agreed commitment period (2008-2012), with flexible mechanisms to enable 
the achievement of emissions targets (Egenhofer, 2007). Specifically, in terms of 
the reduction target, the 15 countries of the EU committed to reducing GHG 
emissions to eight per cent below the 1990 emissions level by 2012 (Freestone, 
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2009). The provision of international emissions trading contains very general and 
optional terms in Article 17 (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad 2009).8 
The EU intended to demonstrate efforts to comply with the mandatory Kyoto 
Protocol commitment (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009) in order to grasp global 
leadership of climate change issues. Correspondingly, the European Commission 
and most member states deployed emissions trading as a new cost-effective 
policy measure in order to achieve the EU‟s emissions target (Braun, 2009; 
Convery, 2009; Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). The EU ETS was developed in 
such a way as to make the vague expressions in the Protocol more concrete and 
technical (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). 
On the whole, evaluations show that the EU ETS was successfully implemented, 
and it has been described as the „cornerstone‟ of the EU‟s climate policy (Braun, 
2009, EC, 2013, Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). In addition, it has been 
regarded as a core instrument not only for reducing GHG emissions at the EU 
level but also for complying with the Kyoto Protocol commitments (Pohlmann, 
2009; Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009; Wettestad, 2009). In essence, the 
development of the EU ETS led the EU to take the initiative and leadership in the 
international climate change regime (Convery, 2009; Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 
2009). 
Main features of the EU ETS 
Phase III (2013-2020) of the EU ETS is currently running. Phase I (2005-2007) is 
considered to have been a so-called „pilot phase‟, while Phase II (2008-2012) is 
referred to as the „Kyoto phase‟ (Convery, 2009) because it entailed more fine-
tuned conditions corresponding with the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2008). 
                                            
8
 Kyoto Protocol (1998) Article 17: The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. 
The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of 
meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article (UN, 1998).  
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The EU ETS was based on a „cap-and-trade‟ model in order to encourage 
reduced GHG emissions in a „cost-effective and economically efficient manner‟ 
(Directive 2003/87/EC Article 1; Clò, 2009; Egenhofer, 2007). In terms of cap 
setting, in Phase I the cap was set on the basis of BAU expectations. However, in 
order to be more ambitious, in Phase II the cap was determined on an absolute-
cap basis, set at 6.5 per cent below verified 2005 levels. Now that Phase III is 
running, the current cap is set to reduce emissions by 1.74 per cent per year, 
linearly declining to approximately 21 per cent below verified 2005 levels by 2020. 
The EU ETS partially covers sectors which entail mainly heavy energy-using 
installations in power generation and manufacturing industries. The aviation sector 
has also been included since 2012. It covers installations undertaking the 
combustion of fuels with a total capacity 20MWth, and more than 11,000 
installations in 31 countries owned by 5,000 companies are currently participating 
in the EU ETS (EC, 2013).9 
The EU ETS allows full banking and borrowing within each phase (Convery and 
Redmond, 2007). The EU ETS directive explicitly allows unlimited banking, 
enabling participants to carry forward unused allowances to the next compliance 
year or the next trading phase. The EU ETS does not provide clear guidelines on 
borrowing. However, the deadline for submission (by 30 April in the following year) 
comes after the issue of the following year‟s units (before 28 February in each 
year); therefore, borrowing is de facto used unlimitedly within trading periods in 
participants‟ holdings (Convery and Redmond, 2007; Ellerman et al., 2010).  
A company owning an installation covered by ETS must annually verify and report 
its emissions arising during a compliance year by 31 March of the following year. 
By 30 April of each year, the company must surrender allowances (EUAs) 
corresponding to the total amount of verified emissions incurred during the 
preceding compliance year (EC 2013).10 To date, the EU ETS has been the 
world‟s largest carbon market, with over 70 million allowances being traded per 
                                            
9
 The 28 EU countries and the three EEA-EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) 
10
 EUA is an abbreviation for „European Union Allowance‟, a tradable unit under the EU ETS. One EUA 
represents the right to emit one tonne of CO2-equivalent. 
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day (EC, 2013; Pohlmann, 2009; Vespermann and Wald, 2011). In terms of total 
trading value, the EU ETS market accounted for around 148 billion US dollars in 
2011, about 84 per cent of the traded value of the international carbon market 
(Kossoy and Guigon, 2012). 
Governance and Allocation 
Phases I and II have been characterised as a „largely decentralized system‟ 
(Convery and Redmond, 2007; Convery et al., 2008; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; 
Ellerman et al., 2010). Each member state must develop a national allocation plan 
(NAP) consistent with the ETS directive, 11  whereby each is substantially 
responsible for the most essential ETS policies, including cap setting, allocation, 
operation of registries, measuring, reporting, verifying annual emissions and 
enforcement (Pohlmann, 2009). A decentralised system allowed each member 
state full discretion in operating the scheme; this led to generous allocations and 
unambitious target reductions during Phases I and II (Kruger et al., 2007, 
Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2008). 
Most allowances were allocated for free on the basis of grandfathering in both 
Phases I and II (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007, Ellerman et al., 2010). Although the 
guidance was for auctioning as an option up to 5 per cent (Phase I) or 10 per cent 
(Phase II) of total allowances,12 almost all allowances were allocated for free.13 In 
particular, along with cap setting based on BAU estimates and a grandfathering 
approach to allocation, generous allocations at the member state level caused 
„over-allocation‟ during the first period (Ellerman et al., 2010). Jaehn and Letmathe 
(2009) suggest that Phase I (2005-2007) was characterised by the „generous 
allocation of emission allowances‟ to participants in emissions-intensive industries 
according to the grandfathering principle. Consequently, the total allowances 
allocated in Phase I exceeded what should have been allocated in line with the 
real demand for allowances (Hood, 2010; Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). As a 
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 Directive 2003/87/EC.EC 2003.  
12
 Guidance to Directive 2003/87/EC (COM/2003/0830 final); Guidance for the 2008 to 2012 trading period 
(COM/2005/0703 final).  
13
 0.2 per cent of total European allowances were sold during Phase I (Schleich et al., 2009, cited in 
Venmans, 2012), while 3 per cent of total allowances were set aside for auctioning in Phase II (Hood, 2010). 
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result of the over-supply of allowances caused by over-allocation and restriction of 
banking to Phase II, Phase I experienced a zero price of allowances in 2007 (EC 
2013).14 Moreover, Phase II experienced an over-supply of allowances due to 
decreased demand for allowances caused by the economic downturn in late 2008 
(Hood, 2010; Venmans, 2012). As a consequence, the price of allowances 
dropped to €7/tCO2 at the end of 2012 (Venmans, 2012). Overall, over-supply of 
allowances occurred in both Phases I and II. Nevertheless, the main causes of 
over-supply of allowances differed: over-allocation driven by generous free 
allocations during Phase I; over-supply resulting from unexpected economic 
downturn in the EU during Phase II. 
The EU ETS has been transformed from a decentralised to a centralised system 
from Phase III (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). The European Commission 
adopted an amended Directive whereby all processes of ETS are to become 
centralised (Bailey and Maresh 2009; Pohlmann 2009).15 Under the centralised 
system for Phase III, large structural reforms have been made in terms of cap 
setting and allocation methods (Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2010). 
A single EU-wide cap is now applied to enhance consistency between EU member 
states. Auctioning has become the default method for allocation, and more than 
40 per cent of allowances were auctioned in 2013. Specifically, full auctioning is 
undertaken in the power-producing sector in order to address concerns about 
windfall profits in this sector (Bailey and Maresh, 2009; Hood, 2010).16 In 2013, 
industry sectors had to purchase at least 20 per cent of the allowances they 
needed, and the minimum auctioning rate will increase to 70 per cent by 2020 (EC, 
2013; Hood, 2010; Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2010). 
Meanwhile, 100 per cent free allocation is provided during the 2013-2020 period 
for energy-intensive and trade-intensive industries, so called „carbon leakage‟ 
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 The price of allowances fell to €0.08/tCO2 at the end of 2007 (Venmans, 2012).  
15
 Initial proposed amendment Directive 2008/101/EC, followed by final version adopted on 6 April 2009 
„Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community‟. 
16
 In the power sector in Phase I, windfall profits were created by passing through the costs of emissions to 
consumers. The windfall profits can be addressed by means of auctioning (Venmans, 2012).    
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sectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage.17 
With regard to concerns about protecting vulnerable industries in the competitive 
global market, the provision of 100 per cent free allocation was deliberately 
included in the amended Directive18 to prevent „carbon leakage‟ (Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, 2010). 
On the whole, the EU ETS has played a core role in accelerating the 
implementation of emissions trading worldwide (Ellerman et al., 2010). It is 
commonly accepted that the EU ETS is a role model for well-operated ETS 
(Convery et al., 2008; Ellerman and Buchner, 2007; Egenhofer, 2007) and has 
inspired the development of schemes in other parts of the world, such as New 
Zealand, South Korea and the USA (EC, 2013; Pohlmann, 2009). 
2.4.3. Korean emissions trading scheme 
Economic circumstances in Korea 
Korea had achieved a rapid industrialisation in the past five decades under the 
proactive state-intervention in the development of economy (Westphal, 1990). In 
pursuit of industrialisation, the Korean government was committed to encourage 
exports and nurture infant industries under the „Five Year Plan of Economy 
Development‟ (Westphal, 1990; OECD, 2012a; KOFIA, 2013). Adopting a strategy 
of export-led industrialisation since early 1960s, the Korean government 
implemented a number of measures to incentivise exports in a form of indirect or 
direct tax reductions, preferential interest rates, 19 and import licenses (Westphal 
et al., 1981; Westphal, 1990). 
In addition to export-led industrialization, the Korean government fostered targeted 
industries resulting in development of heavy industry in the mid-to-late 1970s: 
steel and petrochemicals in the late 1960s and early 1970s; shipbuilding and 
electronic products in the mid-to-late 1970s; automobiles and computers in the 
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 Carbon leakage is referred to as „the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs related to climate 
policies, businesses transferred production to other countries which have laxer constraints on greenhouse has 
emissions‟ (EC, 2013, p.4).   
18
 Directive 2009/29/EC. 
19
 In the late of 1960s, the non-preferential interest rate on loans was between 25 and 30 per cent per year 
while the preferential interest rate on working capital loans to exporters was 6 per cent (Westphal, 1990). 
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1980s (Westphal, 1990; OECD, 2012a). Under the protection granted by 
government, they were able to expand their businesses given a number of direct 
and indirect supports including privileged access to import licenses, preferential 
interest rates, tax benefits, etc. (Westphal, 1990). Major industries, which were 
mostly heavy manufacturing industries, led a significant increase of exports during 
1970 and 1980 (Westpahl, 1990; .Chang et al., 1998). 
In short, owing to an effective „government-driven and export-oriented 
industrialisation‟ strategy, the Korean economy had successfully caught up during 
the past 50 years and heavy industries in particular made an important 
contribution to expanding exports and economic growth (Westphal et al., 1981; 
Westphal, 1990; OECE, 2009a, p.125, OECD, 2012a; OECD, 2014). 
Since the 1990s, Korean industrial policy put more emphasis on the deregulation 
of service sectors including finance and telecommunication and technology-led 
development (OECD, 2009a; OECD, 2014). An array of financial liberalisation 
processes were carried out corresponding to the „Five-year Financial Liberalisation 
Plan‟ announced in 1993 under the Kim Young Sam government (from 1993 to 
1998) (Chang et al., 1998). In addition, in line with the technology-focused 
industrial policy, the Korean government promoted high-technology industry 
sectors by means of a number of government R&D programmes (OECD, 2014). 
Prior to global economic crisis in 2008, the economy growth rate had remained at 
around 5-8% (OECD, 2014). When the financial crisis arose in 2008, Korea had 
experienced economic regression with an economic growth rate at 2.8 per cent in 
2008 and 0.7 per cent in 2009 respectively.20 The global economic crisis in 2008 
required a new role for government sustaining „medium-and long-term‟ economic 
growth (OECD, 2009b, p.41). Following the financial crisis, the Korean 
government needed a new industrial policy to lead sustainable economic growth in 
the next 50 years (OECD, 2012a). Furthermore, along with the rapid economic 
development of developing countries including China India, Korea was expected 
to participate in global attempt to tackle environmental issue in order to address a 
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 Economic Statics of System, Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
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rising carbon levels (Jones and Yoo, 2012; Kang, 2012). Under these 
circumstances, the Korean government sought a new balanced-paradigm not only 
for the sustainable development of economy but also in response to an increasing 
global demand for addressing carbon emissions. 
Background to introduction of ETS in Korea 
In 2008, Korean President, Myung-bak Lee proclaimed „Low Carbon, Green 
Growth‟ as a national vision to lead development over the next 50 years (PCGG, 
2010a). The Green Growth Policy stemmed from an economic situation in 1990s 
where the Korean economy had experienced rapid population aging and falling 
potential growth (Jones and Yoo, 2012; OECD, 2012b; PCGG, 2010a). Korea‟s 
potential growth had been fallen from 7 per cent in 1995 to around 4 per cent in 
2010 (OECD, 2012b). In the pursuit of sustainable growth of the Korean economy, 
the Korean government intended to move torward a low-carbon economy by 
renovating energy-intensive manufacturing industries in order to strengthen their 
competence. 
Global climate change had an impact on the business sector to the extent to which 
a number of energy-intensive manufacturing companies were aware of the need 
to address the risk and uncertainly in association with climate change. In addition, 
the rise of China and India created rigorous competition in the area of heavy 
industries including steel, cement, refined oil, petrochemical which had  led the 
significant growth of Korean economy in 1970s-1990s. Under the circumstances 
which the manufacturing sectors faced, a shift to energy-efficient business was a 
critical factor for energy-intensive manufacturing industry to survive. 
Consistent with the Low Carbon, Green Growth policy, in 2009 the Korean 
government pledged to a voluntary mid-term target of a 30 per cent GHG 
reduction below the BAU level of 2020 by 2020 (PCGG, 2010a; PCGG, 2010b) in 
accordance with the maximum level of reduction target recommended by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change for Non-Annex I countries (Jones and 
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Yoo 2012; PCGG 2010a).21 The BAU emissions were calculated on the basis of 
the national statistics data: 776.1 MtCO2-eq in 2020 (Park and Hong, 2014).
22 
Three different scenarios on reduction target were developed on the basis of the 
BAU emissions: 21 per cent reduction, 27 per cent reduction, and 30 per cent 
reduction from the BAU level of 2020 (Park et al., 2012). The 30 per cent reduction 
target was set at 543.1 MtCO2-eq by 2020 (Park and Hong, 2014) implicitng the 
government‟s strong will of transposition toward low carbon and energy-efficient 
system nationwide (Park et al., 2012).Adopting a reduction target is a strategy 
aimed not only at offering a strong signal to domestic industries and consumers, 
but also taking the initiative in global GHG mitigation opportunities (Kang, 2012). 
The reduction target has become an adminstrative means to encourage all sectors 
in Korea to develop renewable energy and new technologies to reduce carbon 
emissions (Park et al., 2012). 
In order to achieve the target, the Korean government decided to adopt both 
regulatory and market-based policy measures (PCGG, 2010a). As a market-based 
measure, the Korean government proposed the introduction of ETS rather than 
carbon tax in the industry and energy sectors because it was seeking to achieve a 
reliable reduction (Park et al., 2012). The Korean government believed that ETS 
would be the most effective way of transforming energy/carbon-intensive 
industries into energy-efficient and low-carbon industries by leading them to invest 
in more energy-efficient technologies (PCGG, 2012b).  
Figure 3 demonstrates the chronological order of development of the Korean 
green growth policy and the Korean ETS. 
                                            
21
 Non-Annex I countries involved in mostly developing countries had no obligation to set a legally binding 
numerical reduction target during 2008-2012 under the Kyoto Protocol on the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Jones and Yoo 2012; Kang 2012). 
22
 The BAU of 2020 was initially estimated at 813 MtCO2-eq in the reduction scenario announced in 2009. In 
2014, the Ministry of Environment amended the estimation of the BAU level of 2020 set at 776.1 MtCO2-eq 
before setting reduction target of each entity. Nevertheless, Korean government has not changed the target of 
a 30 per cent GHG reduction below the BAU level of 2020 by 2020 since it is the National commitment toward 
international society in accordance with global efforts to tackle GHG emissions. 
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Figure 3: Development of Korean green growth policy and ETS 
(Source: PCGG, 2010a, 2012a; Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2013)  
Prior to setting out the ETS, the Korean government introduced a command-and-
control measure, referred to as the „Target Management System‟ (TMS), which 
has been implemented since 2012. Under the TMS, more than 470 companies 
producing over 25,000 tons of GHG emissions per year set a target for emissions, 
and companies were required to meet their reduction targets (Chatterton, 2013). In 
essence, TMS was regarded as a transitional measure for moving to ETS. The 
Korean government intended to transform the policy measure on GHG emissions 
from a command-and-control system (TMS) to a market-based system (ETS) 
because it considered ETS superior to TMS in terms of cost-effectiveness (PCGG, 
2010a, 2010b). A recent study shows that achievement of the reduction target 
through ETS would reduce costs by 40 per cent compared with direct regulation 
(Lee, 2009, cited in OECD, 2012b). In addition, data from the SO₂ trading 
programme operated in the US in the 1990s suggest that a cap-and trade 
approach is less costly than a command-and-control regulatory approach 
(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013). In effect, the Korean government put forward a 
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transformation from TMS to ETS as a core measure to achieve the national 
reduction target. 
Unlike other schemes, such as the EU ETS, the TMS played a significant role as a 
transitional instrument in leading the successful initiation of ETS. The TMS 
initiated the collection of data on verified GHG emissions which business entities 
generated before the Korean ETS started. It was important to establish a reliable 
data register in order to justify the allocation of allowances based on verified rather 
than estimated data when ETS was implemented. Unlike the EU ETS Phase I, as 
a result of the TMS, the Korean ETS commenced with more reliable data based 
on verified historical emissions. 
Establishment of ETS in Korea 
Initially, ETS was not welcomed by industry. Industry sectors presented their 
concerns about increased cost burdens if ETS were introduced. Since most large 
companies were expected to be affected by the ETS, companies in heavy-industry 
sectors such as power, steel, cement, petrochemicals and electronics (which as 
discussed earlier were key contributors to the country‟s most recent economic 
development) confronted an additional burden incurring a significant increase of 
costs due to the introduction of ETS. This would be of key importance to them as 
they would not only be expected to face higher economic burdens compared to 
other industries, but also this would also disadvantage them compared to their 
rising competitors from China and India (countries which have yet to apply a 
related standard) With a strong sense of objection to the introduction of ETS, 
industry sectors argued that ETS would weaken the international competitiveness 
of domestic industries, given that competitors in neighbouring countries such as 
China did not face similar burdens (Park et al., 2012). Moreover, they contended 
that the manufacturing sector in Korea was already sufficiently energy-efficient so 
it was not necessary to reduce carbon emissions by adopting ETS (Kang, 2012). 
The Korean government held several meetings and feedback sessions with 
various stakeholders in order to take into consideration a wide range of interests. 
Meanwhile, in the National Assembly, a special committee on climate change and 
green growth was set up to review the bill. As a consequence of several 
consultations at the levels of both the Korean government and the National 
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Assembly, the Korean ETS bill was finally approved by the National Assembly with 
unanimous bipartisan support on 11 May 2012. Since the Korean ETS bill 
contained only the basic structure and general rules for ETS, several controversial 
issues, including allocation criteria, the proportion of auctioning, early-action 
criteria, offsetting criteria and governance, remained to be determined and 
elaborated in a subordinate Presidential Decree. After a series of consultations 
with a wide range of stakeholders (PCGG, 2012a), the subordinate Presidential 
Decree of the Korean ETS bill was finalised in November 2012, and the Korean 
ETS commenced on 1 January 2015. 
Main features of the Korean ETS 
According to the Bill and the subordinate Presidential Decree,23 the Korean ETS 
covers companies emitting over 125,000 tonnes and facilities emitting over 25,000 
tonnes of carbon equivalents per year. More than 500 companies are required to 
comply with the scheme, including most heavy-industry sectors such as power, 
steel, cement, petrochemicals and electronics. The sectors covered by the Korean 
ETS are estimated to represent about 60 per cent of the country‟s total emissions. 
The Korean ETS has been designed in conformance with features of schemes 
operated in other countries; in particular, the EU model has been a key reference 
point for the Korean ETS (PCGG, 2012b). Based on the Bill and the subordinate 
Presidential Decree, the main features of the Korean ETS are shown as follows. 
Scope and Coverage: In principle, the trading phase lasts for five years. As a 
pilot phase, Phases I (2015-2017) and II (2018-2020) each last for three years. 
ETS participants are divided into two categories: voluntary and mandatory. Entities 
or installations emitting over a certain threshold (see above) are categorised as 
„mandatory participants‟. The Korean ETS covers all six Kyoto Protocol GHG 
emissions.24 
                                            
23
 Act on Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Permits (Bill no. 11690) and subordinate 
Presidential Decree (Presidential Decree no. 24429). 
24
 Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) (UN, 1998). 
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Allocation: Allocations can be on the basis of either grandfathering or 
benchmarking. The initial phase inevitably depends on grandfathering due to a 
lack of data to apply benchmarking. A 100 per cent free allocation in Phase I 
(2015-2017), 97 per cent in Phase II (2018-2020) and, after Phase III (2021-2025), 
less than 90 per cent is to be assigned, where the exact amount of allowances in 
each compliance year, sector and industry are specified in the national allocation 
plan. In order to ease the cost burden on companies in the early stage of 
implementation and to prevent carbon leakage, 100 per cent free allocation is 
available to energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries on the basis of: (1) 
production cost increases over 5 per cent and trade intensity increases over 10 
per cent; (2) production cost increases over 30 per cent; or (3) trade intensity 
increases over 30 per cent. The criteria for carbon leakage lists have been 
formulated with reference to the criteria of the EU ETS. The Korean government 
undertook a wide range of simulations and analyses, in which the criteria of the 
EU ETS were applied to the Korean ETS at sector, industry and entity levels. 
Correspondingly, a decision was made that the EU ETS criteria would be 
applicable on the whole to the Korean ETS without serious loss of competitiveness 
to Korean industries.25 
Adjustment of permits: If the national allocation plan is altered during a trading 
phase, the authority may take measures to adjust emissions permits by additional 
allocations or adjustment of permits for each compliance period. In the case of 
new implementations of facilities, mergers and acquisitions, changes in product 
mix, or unexpected changes to business plans, at the request of the compliance 
entity, the authority may allocate additional allowances to it. In addition, if facilities 
are entirely shut down, the authority may take measures to cancel permits 
allocated to those facilities. 
Flexibility measures: Offsetting is allowed for at most 10 per cent of total 
allowances that participants are required to surrender to the competent authority. 
Only domestic offsetting credits can be used in Phases I and II. From Phase III 
                                            
25
 The rationale regarding the Korean government‟s judgement is described on the basis of the author‟s work 
experience in the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) in 2012. 
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onward, international credits can be used for up to 50 per cent of the total offset 
limit. With this provision, the Korean government intends to lead reduction targets 
effectively by encouraging entities to invest in green technologies, rather than 
purchasing credits from outside companies for compliance. In terms of details of 
offsetting projects, a subordinate directive details specific types of offsetting 
projects, as well as criteria and procedures for approving and certifying external 
projects for offsetting. 26  Unlimited banking is allowed de facto because 
allowances can be banked to the next compliance year within the same phase or 
the first compliance year of the next phase. On the other hand, because of 
concern about the over-supply of allowances, limited borrowing is allowed, up to 
10 per cent of total allowances to be surrendered to the authority. 
International links: Under the general terms of the ETS bill and the Presidential 
Decree, the Korean ETS may link to other carbon markets, such as the EU ETS. 
However, more details will need to be provided in the form of a subordinate 
directive for future links with other systems. The enactment of links with other 
carbon markets is at the government‟s discretion. 
Market stabilisation measures: The authority may take measures to stabilise the 
carbon market in case of a severely fluctuating market in terms of soaring prices, 
mounting demand or collapsing prices. These measures include: 1) additional 
allocations up to 25 per cent of reserved permits; 2) imposing minimum or 
maximum limits on allowance holdings; 3) restrictions on banking, borrowing and 
offsetting; and 4) setting ceiling or floor prices for allowances. These criteria have 
been formulated on the basis of analysis of the trend in carbon prices in the EU 
ETS. In case of an abnormal dysfunction of the market, the Korean government 
may set up tangible measures to intervene in the market with very specific 
criteria. .  
Third-party market participation: During Phases I and II, trading market 
participants are limited to compliance entities and accredited public financial 
                                            
26
 The Ministry of Environment enacted the subordinate directive of offsetting as of 4 September 2014. 
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institutions27 in order to ensure market stability during the pilot periods. Foreign 
investors will be allowed to participate in trading permits in the Korean ETS market 
from Phase III (2021-2015) onward. 
Competitiveness issues 
International competitiveness issues stem from concerns about the extent to which 
ETS causes loss of competitiveness, leading to a „carbon leakage‟ issue. In 
general, in order to ensure a high level of legitimacy and acceptance when 
establishing ETS, governments take measures to support current production 
processes (Hood, 2010; Skjæ rseth and Wettestad, 2009). Similarly, the Korean 
ETS entails a number of measures to address competitiveness issues. 
Korean industry sectors have consistently insisted that ETS will bring about 
significant and substantial economic burdens, resulting in a severe loss of 
competitiveness of domestic industry.28 In addition, Lee (2010, cited in Jones and 
Yoo, 2012) argues that the adverse effects of ETS on Korean industry will include 
a significant decline in the turnover of the iron and steel industries. The Korean 
government could not disregard the voice of industry because industry sectors 
were regarded as core players in the move to a more green economy. They were 
regarded as the major stakeholders of the green growth policy: in particular, the 
success of ETS rested on the degree of compliance of corporate stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the manufacturing industry sectors have been an important part of 
economic growth to date where heavy manufacturing products such as automobile 
and steel are accounted as Korea‟s top export products.29 Due to the great 
importance of the manufacturing industry in the Korean economy, the Korean 
government was obliged to take into consideration the interests of the 
manufacturing industry in the introduction of ETS in Korea, and particularly their 
concerns over international competitiveness. In response, the Korean ETS has 
                                            
27
 Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea, Export-Import Bank of Korea, Korea Finance 
Corporation. 
28
 Institutions representing Korean industry include the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Korea Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry Associations (KCCI), Korea International Trade Association (KITA). A variety of 
industry associations have released statements opposing the introduction of ETS several times. 
29
 Korea‟s top ten export products are semi-conductor, products from petroleum, automobile, ship, displays, 
mobile utilities, parts of automobile thereof, synthetic resin, steel, and plastic products in 2014 
(http://stat.kita.net). 
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been designed to reflect the concerns and interests of domestic industries facing a 
potential loss of competitiveness due to the introduction of ETS. Measures need to 
be taken to alleviate the impact on some seriously-affected industries in order to 
curb the complaints of industry sectors (Jones and Yoo, 2012). Several provisions 
were included in the Korean ETS bill and the Presidential Decree; for example, 
100 per cent free allowances have been provided for energy-intensive and trade-
intensive industries (the so-called „carbon-leakage lists‟), and financial support, 
including loans, subsidies and tax benefits, is available for the installation of GHG 
reduction facilities and investment in green R&D. The Korean government 
intended to use free allowances as an administrative means for the purpose of 
offsetting a burden on the industry; the amount of free allowances could become 
an element to determine a company‟s costs arising from emissions. It indicates 
that a critical concern for manufacturing companies or large carbon emitters may 
lie in how extent a company‟s reduction target would be determined and how 
many allowances would be allocated thereby. 
In summary, the Korean ETS was launched on 1 January 2015 in order to achieve 
the national target reduction in GHG emissions in the most cost-effective way. For 
Korea, the adoption of ETS is regarded as a noteworthy breakthrough in terms not 
only of being the first country in Asia to pass a nationwide bill on ETS, but also of 
initiating a new policy tool for proactive participation in global climate change 
issues (PCGG, 2012b). 
Distinctive features of ETS have been derived from a review of general features of 
ETS and the main attributes of the EU and Korean ETS, as shown in Table 2. All 
features of ETS are associated with accounting issues. In other words, not only 
the general characteristics of ETS but also variations in each scheme may 
variously influence the development of accounting standards for ETS. Furthermore, 
the accounting issues arising from ETS have important implications from the 
perspective of conceptual framework since assets and liabilities in relation to 
emissions rights and obligations under ETS have only recently emerged. Due to 
inconsistency with the existing rules under the conceptual framework of financial 
reporting, recognition and valuation of the assets and liabilities under ETS may 
give rise to significant conflicts in the development of accounting guidance. In 
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addition, from a business entity‟s perspective, the accounting issues linked to the 
features of ETS may entail significant implications for how the financial statements 
are influenced depending on accounting treatment for emissions rights and related 
liabilities. 
Table 2: Summary of features of ETS 
General design 
features of ETS 
EU ETS Korean ETS 
Accounting 
implications 
General framework 
- Mandatory or 
voluntary 
- Cap-and-trade 
versus baseline-
and-credit 
Mandatory cap-
and-trade 
Mandatory cap-and-
trade 
Under cap-and-
trade, ensuring 
optimum tradability 
of emissions rights 
Time frame 
- Commitment 
period 
- Compliance year 
▫ Phase III: 2013-
2020 
▫ 12-month 
compliance year 
(1/1-31/12) 
▫ Phase I: 2015-
2017 
▫ 12-month 
compliance 
year(1/1-31/12) 
Inconsistency 
between business 
year and compliance 
year 
Cap/Reduction 
target 
- Absolute cap 
- Relative cap 
21% below 2005 
verified levels by 
2020 
30% reduction below 
BAU level of 2020 
by 2020 
Estimation of 
quantity of 
emissions rights that 
should be held in the 
end 
Allocation of 
allowances 
- Auctioning or 
free allocation 
- Grandfathering 
or benchmarking 
▫ Greater use of 
auctioning in 
Phase III leading to 
100% auctioning in 
2027 
▫ Benchmarking is 
the default method 
▫ 100% free 
allocation in Phase I 
▫ Grandfathering in 
most sectors 
(benchmarking in 
some sectors) 
Recognition of 
emissions rights and 
related liabilities in 
financial statements 
Flexibility for 
compliance 
- Offsetting, 
banking and 
borrowing 
▫ Restrictions on 
use of credits of 
Kyoto mechanisms 
▫ Unlimited 
banking/borrowing 
▫ Limited use of 
offsetting credits 
▫ Unlimited banking 
▫ Limited borrowing 
Recognition of 
emissions rights in 
the case of 
offsetting, banking or 
borrowing 
Competitiveness of 
„at-risk‟ industries 
- Carbon leakage 
lists 
- Free allocation 
▫ Criteria of carbon 
leakage lists 
▫ 100% free 
allocation to 
industries included 
in carbon leakage 
lists 
▫ Criteria of carbon 
leakage lists same 
as for EU ETS 
▫ 100% free 
allocation to sectors 
included in carbon 
leakage lists 
Same accounting 
issues as allocation 
of allowances 
Market oversight 
and rules 
- Reporting and 
verification 
- Penalties 
▫ Annual reporting 
by 31 March of 
following 
compliance year 
▫ €100/tCO2eq for 
non-compliance 
▫ Annual reporting by 
31 March of 
following compliance 
year 
▫ Maximum of KRW 
100,000/tCO2eq for 
non-compliance 
▫ Recognition and 
de-recognition of 
asset and liability 
▫ Accounting 
treatment of 
penalties 
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Of all the features shown in Table 2, the allocation of allowances gives rise to the 
most essential but critical accounting issues, relating to recognition and 
measurement. Owing to the unique and complex attributes of emissions rights, 
accounting experts have struggled to accommodate them within the existing 
accounting framework. Accordingly, this study sets out to explore how accounting 
standard setters cope with the problematic issues of recognition and measurement 
associated with the allocation of allowances. 
 Introduction of the Korea Accounting Standards Board30 2.5.
This research is concerned with accounting issues addressed in the standard-
setting process of the Korea Accounting Standards Board (KASB). Accordingly, it 
is necessary to understand the standard-setting process in Korea and the 
organisation of the Korean accounting standard setter as an overall background to 
this study. 
In Korea, the Financial Services Commission has a duty to set and amend 
accounting standards on the basis of the Act on External Audit of Stock 
Companies, the fundamental law governing accounting for companies. Since 2000, 
under Article 13 of the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, the Financial 
Services Commission has delegated this duty to KASB. In this respect, the Korea 
Accounting Institute (KAI) was established as an independent private organisation 
on 1 September 1999, with the mission to set accounting standards that ensure 
consistency and objectivity for external audits of corporations. 
Since July 2000, KAI has had the duty of setting and interpreting accounting 
standards, as well as providing a technical inquiry service in accordance with the 
Act on External Audit of Stock Companies. KAI is engaged in accounting 
standard-setting activities and conducts research on accounting and audit issues. 
It carries out all relevant work in setting up accounting standards. 
                                            
30
 This section refers mainly to KAI and KASB (2008), preface to Statements of Korea Accounting Standards 
(2011).  
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In addition, KASB was established under KAI for the purpose of deliberation and 
decision making regarding accounting standards and related matters. From an 
organisational perspective, as shown in Figure 4, KASB is embedded in KAI. 
Figure 4: Organisational Structure of KASB 
(KAI and KASB, 2008) 
 
According to the „Conceptual Framework of Financial Accounting‟ under Korean 
GAAP, the objective of financial reporting is described as providing useful 
information to enable investors and lenders to make economic decisions as 
follows: 
Usefulness for potential investors and lenders lies in assessment of 
future cash flows such as amount, inflow timing, or uncertainty. The 
information should be provided in order to assess the valuation of an 
entity based on the assessment of the expected dividends or risks of 
investments (para.20). [….] Financial reporting should provide the 
information to assess credit risks or the capability of repayment of debts 
in a timely manner (para.24). [….] The business performance measured 
by accounting earnings may be useful to assess the stewardship or 
accountability of management (para.30). 
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The information users are defined in general (KASB, 2003, para.12-para.16): they 
are comprised of investors, lenders, and other information users. Investors are 
defined as those who invest in equity securities or debt securities of a company. 
Lenders are defined as who lend money or provide credit to a company; in some 
cases, suppliers, customers, or employees may constitute lenders. Investors and 
debtors have a direct interest in the substance of a company. Other information 
users including managers, financial analysts, information intermediaries, the tax 
authority, supervisory regulatory organisations, or the general public may not have 
a direct interest in substance of a company, except for managers. 
In short, KASB articulates the objective of financial reporting in a very similar way 
to that of the conceptual framework issued by IASB (including the most recent 
reiteration currently in an exposure draft form), as providing information users 
(mainly investors and lenders) with useful information in order to make appropriate 
decisions on investment. The usefulness of information is determined by a variety 
of financial information to assess future net-cash flows of an entity. In this respect, 
financial reporting should deliver information on the entity‟s financial status, 
business performance, information regarding cash flows and equity status. 
The mission of KASB is independently to set, revise and interpret accounting 
standards to enhance the quality of Korean accounting standards and to suit 
Korean economic circumstances. Technically, KASB is a type of committee that 
deliberates and makes decisions in relation to accounting standards and related 
issues, while KAI is responsible for setting accounting standards conducting a 
variety of technical and practical works including documentation, consultation, and 
research. Since ultimate responsibility for setting and amending accounting 
standards lies with the Financial Services Commission, accounting standards set 
or amended by KASB are finalised by endorsement of the Financial Services 
Commission. KASB comprises member organisations as a form of board that 
makes decisions on accounting issues.31 KASB members include representative 
                                            
31
 Member organisations consist of the Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Korea Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry, Federation of Korean Industry, Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, 
Korea Listed Company Association, Korea Federation of Banks, Korea Securities Dealers Association, Asset 
Management Association of Korea, Korea Life Insurance Association, Korea Non-Life Insurance Association, 
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organisations in the area of accounting and finance in Korea, such as the 
association bodies of certified public accountants, industry, banks, insurance 
companies, supervisory organizations and Korean-stock exchange. These  
member organisations constitute the main stakeholders for KASB.  Practically, 
member organisations are regarded as stakeholders participating in the 
accounting standard-setting process mainly by providing comment letters. 
In 2007 Korean government announced it was adopting IFRS and this meant that 
all listed companies in Korea should mandatorily apply IFRS in their preparation of 
their financial statements from 1st of January 2011 onwards (KASB, 2013). This 
was in pursuit of high-quality accounting standards on a par with internationally 
accepted levels and improvement of accounting transparency of Korean entities 
(KASB, 2013; Yang et al., 2010). The adoption of IFRS brought a big change in all 
accounting systems in Korea, including accounting laws and regulations and 
practices because the preceding Korean accounting GAAP had been „rule-based 
standards‟ (KASB, 2013). 
In accordance with the „Roadmap toward IFRS adoption in Korea‟ which is a basic 
work-plan for adoption of IFRS, the „IFRS Adoption Task Force‟ undertook a series 
of activities to prepare adoption of IFRS (KASB, 2013). In terms of the way of 
adoption of IFRS, instead of „adaptation‟ which modifies IFRS to some extent by 
reflecting particular circumstances in a certain country, KASB undertook „adoption‟ 
which fully adopts IFRS as a whole without any adaption or modification (Yang et 
al., 2010). Under the copyright agreement between the KASB and the IFRS 
Foundation, the full adoption of IFRS was carried out by directly translating the 
entire set of IFRSs consisting of 38 IFRSs and 27 IFRICs into Korean (Yang et al., 
2010; KASB, 2013). The translated version of IFRS was referred to as „K-IFRS‟ 
meaning the Korean version of IFRS.  
The related laws and regulations were amended in accordance with adoption of 
IFRS in order to implement K-IFRS (KASB, 2013). The Act on External Audit of 
Stock Companies was amended to govern all listed-companies subject to 
                                                                                                                                    
Korea Exchange, Financial Supervisory Service, Korea Accounting Association, KOSDAQ Listed Companies 
Association. 
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mandatory application of IFRS. Some range of amendments was committed to the 
Act on Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets and Corporation Tax 
Law. 
Before the adoption of IFRS, all Korean companies, regardless of whether they 
were listed or not, ought to apply the Korean GAAP which was developed by 
KASB. K-IFRS was mandatorily applied to all listed companies and financial 
institutions whereas the adoption of IFRS was not compulsory for non-listed 
companies (KASB 2013). Accordingly, the accounting standards for non-listed 
companies were needed and KASB decided to set up accounting standards 
applying to non-listed companies. Based on the preceding Korean GAAP, a set of 
accounting standards were developed for to non-listed companies, referred to as 
„Accounting Standards for Non-Public Entities‟ replacing the preceding Korea 
GAAP. 32  The objective of „Accounting Standards for Non-Public Entities‟ 
describes their application to „amongst companies governed by the Act on 
External Audit of Stock Companies, the companies which do not apply K-IFRSs.‟ 
(para.30, KASB, 2011a). As a consequence of the adoption of IFRS, the Korean 
accounting systems include Korean IFRS issued by IASB (K-IFRS) for listed-
companies, accounting standards for non-public entities (Korean GAAP) and 
accounting standards for special purpose entities such as Corporate Restructuring 
Vehicle. Accordingly, the KASB‟s commitment for setting up or interpreting 
accounting standards lies in Korean GAAP for non-public entities or special 
purpose entities. 
With regard to the conceptual framework, KASB is in charge of the development of 
the conceptual framework for financial accounting in Korea (KASB, 2011a). Since 
K-IFRS and Korean GAAP for non-listed companies are the effective Korean 
accounting standards, KASB provides two types of the conceptual framework for 
financial reporting. The conceptual framework under Korean GAAP, referred to as 
the „Conceptual Framework of Financial Accounting‟ was developed by the 
Accounting Standards Deliberation Committee, a former body of KASB, in 2003. 
When the „Accounting Standards for Non-Public Entities‟ was issued in 2009, the 
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 In this study, „Korean GAAP‟ means „„Accounting Standards for Non-Public Entities.‟ 
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„Conceptual Framework of Financial Accounting‟ was handed over as it is as basic 
guidance for financial reporting under Korean GAAP for non-listed companies 
(KASB, 2011a). It delivers a wide range of guidance for preparation and 
presentation of financial statements including definition of information users, the 
general objective of financial reporting, qualitative characteristics of accounting 
information, assumptions of financial reporting, elements of financial statements, 
and criteria of recognising basic elements of financial statements such as assets, 
liabilities, incomes and expenses, etc. 
On the other hand, corresponding to the adoption of IFRS, KASB released the 
„Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under K-IFRSs‟ in 2011 (KASB, 
2011a). This conceptual framework was developed in accordance with the 
„Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting‟ in 2010 provided by IASB (KASB, 
2011b). This framework clearly states the correspondence between the 
„Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under K-IFRSs‟ and the 
„Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting‟ provided by IASB, The 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under K-IFRSs is not a component 
of K-IFRSs. The preface of Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under 
K-IFRSs articulates „this framework shall not be construed to apply any provision 
under K-IFRSs‟. In other words, in the event of inconsistency between K-IFRS and 
the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under K-IFRSs, K-IFRS takes 
priority over the conceptual framework. Accordingly, under the two-tier accounting 
standards system – K-IFRS and Korean GAAP for non-linted companies – there is 
no relationship between the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under 
K-IFRSs (or the „Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting‟ provided by IASB) 
and the „Conceptual Framework of Financial Accounting‟ under Korean GAAP. 
In general, there are similar features in standard setting between one accounting 
standard setting body and another. The standard-setting process comprises 
multiple stages: agenda decision; development of discussion paper at project level; 
development of exposure draft; issue of final outcome (standard); and 
implementation of standard. For example, according to IASB (2013), the IFRS 
process of standard setting consists of four stages: agenda consultation, research 
programme, standards programme and implementation. At the research 
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programme stage, a „discussion paper‟ is developed and published as a result of 
conducting a project. Following consultation on the discussion paper, a proposal is 
issued. Moving to the „standards programme‟ stage, an „exposure draft‟ is 
developed and published, followed by consultation on the exposure draft. Having 
addressed various issues arising from the exposure draft, a standard is developed, 
and IASB then finalises the standard. Finally, the IFRS is issued. 
KASB carries out a similar process in developing or amending accounting 
standards. In terms of K-IFRS, KASB closely monitors IFRS due process because 
K-IFRS entirely corresponds to IFRS. At the stage of a discussion paper and 
exposure draft, KASB conducts consultation on the paper or draft with Korean 
stakeholders. Once a new IFRS or IFRIC is released, KASB carries out 
consultations, deliberates and makes decision on adoption of IFRS or IFRIC as K-
IFRS (Yang et al., 2010). The K-IFRS is consequently endorsed by the Financial 
Services Commission.  
On the other hand, in the amendment or development of Korean GAAP, KASB 
conducts several steps as shown in Figure 5: agenda setting; development of a 
proposal; development of exposure draft; development of standard; and 
implementation of standard. 
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Figure 5: Development procedure for Korean accounting standards for non-
listed entities 
(KASB, 2011a) 
 
During the standard-setting procedure, KASB must undertake a consultation 
process, as shown in Figure 5. The consultation process is compulsory in 
accordance with the Directive for Generally Accepted Korean Accounting 
Standards. Accordingly, KASB must carry out due process by communicating in 
various ways with its stakeholders. Distinct opportunities are offered to 
stakeholders to convey their interests and views on particular issues. 
Setting the 
agenda  
•KASB consistently refers to the needs and opinion of stakeholders. 
•KASB evaluates potential items and adds them to the agenda.  
Discussion 
Paper and 
proposals 
•The research department conducts research and prepares a discussion paper to 
support the KASB 
•A new draft is proposed on the basis of a consultation process with stakeholders. 
•After internal discussions on the draft, the proposal is reviewed by the KASB. 
Exposure 
draft 
•Once approved in a KASB meeting, the exposure draft is released  to the public.   
•Comments are received on the exposure draft from the public (4-6 weeks). 
•If necessary, a public hearing is held. 
Developing 
accounting 
standards 
thereby 
•The KASB considers whether the comments are resolved and therby the exposure 
draft is revised to reflect comments. 
•The KASB decides and approves the final version of the accounting standard. 
•The KASB reports the final version of the accounting standard to the Financial 
Services Commission. 
Publication of 
the 
accounting 
standards 
•Given the approval of the Financial Services Commission, the KASB publishes the 
accounting standard. 
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For example, the KAI Forum is held as a public workshop that meets as and when 
a consultation process in the form of a workshop is necessary to discuss a certain 
accounting issue with the public and stakeholders. In addition, when an exposure 
draft is released, the KAI Forum meets in lieu of public hearings on the exposure 
draft. While the KAI Forum is open to the public, the technical committee is more 
likely to be a consultative group, including accounting expertise, specialists in 
certain issues and major preparers. The technical committee provides more 
professional and technical advice on certain accounting issues to KAI and KASB. 
In addition, when an exposure draft is published, a consultation process is 
followed, targeting its stakeholders through public hearings and comment letters 
on the exposure draft. 
 Summary 2.6.
This chapter has described the overall background to this study. First, ETS is one 
type of carbon pricing instrument for achieving a reduction target for emissions on 
the basis of a market mechanism. The introduction of ETS has significant 
economic consequences affecting business entities. In addition, ETS is based on 
a market mechanism by which a price is put on carbon emissions and participants 
are able to trade emissions rights freely in the market. This has engendered a new 
discipline referred to as „carbon accounting‟, which has been used extensively in 
various spheres and from a variety of perspectives in relation to quantifying carbon 
emissions. Amongst various areas of carbon accounting, financial carbon 
accounting is concerned mainly with the development of specific accounting rules 
on emissions rights and related liabilities under ETS. Accordingly, this study is 
underpinned by financial carbon accounting. 
ETS is considered to be one of the most cost-effective measures and has been 
widely implemented in practice. For example, the EU ETS, launched in 2005, is 
now in Phase III. With extensive reference to the EU ETS, the Korean ETS started 
in 2015. It is important to understand the main features of these schemes in order 
to identify relevant accounting issues under ETS. Based on the background of 
ETS and the scope derived for this research, the next chapter will review previous 
research on accounting issues and accounting standard setting in relation to ETS 
in order to identify research gaps.  
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3. Literature Review 
 Introduction 3.1.
This chapter consists of a review of two stands of literature: accounting issues for 
ETS and the accounting standard-setting process. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to identify research gaps in order to formulate research questions (see 
Chapter 4). In addition, this chapter aims to build a framework to support analysis 
and interpretation of the findings of this study (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7) as well as 
to develop the discussion (see Chapter 8). Section 3.2 reviews accounting issues 
in the ETS literature. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on the accounting 
standard-setting process and is extended to thematic features of the accounting 
standard-setting process. Finally, based on the literature review, key research 
gaps are identified in relation to this study, leading to the formulation of themes 
connected with the research questions. 
 Understanding of financial accounting issues for ETS 3.2.
This section presents a review of previous studies with regard to accounting 
issues for ETS, specifically accounting issues for emissions allowances and 
related liabilities. Amongst various areas of carbon accounting, the literature 
focusing on financial carbon accounting is reviewed, consistent with the research 
topic. This section presents a number of previous studies that demonstrate the 
main accounting issues under ETS, leading to identification of the main research 
gaps in relation to this study. 
3.2.1. Accounting issues for ETS 
Accounting for emissions rights and related obligations under ETS 
From the perspective of financial carbon accounting, the main concern lies in 
accounting for emissions rights and related liabilities under ETS within the existing 
accounting framework. Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) explain the 
accounting issues arising from ETS in light of financial accounting: recognition and 
evaluation of assets in relation to emissions rights and recognition of liabilities 
incurred by obligation surrendering allowances. For example, the companies 
participating in the EU-ETS need to recognise EUAs allocated for free and to 
evaluate them in the financial statement (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 
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2008). In this respect, it is necessary to explore whether emissions rights meet the 
definition of an asset. 
IASB (2015) explains the consensus on recognition of emissions rights and as an 
asset and a liability under IFRIC 3 in accordance with the conceptual framework. 
According to the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting in 2010 provided 
by the IASB, an asset is defined as: „a resource controlled by the entity as a result 
of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the 
entity‟ (para. 4.4(a)). Emissions rights are devised as an administrative grant to 
operate ETSs in the form of a market-based mechanism, to the extent to which 
emissions rights are freely tradable in the market like other commodities (Mace, 
2005), Once emissions rights are allocated by an authority (mainly government), 
entities are allowed to control emissions rights where they are transferred or held 
like other assets. Transferability and disposability at an entity‟s discretion endow 
emissions with rights in the nature of property rights. Accordingly, emissions rights 
can be viewed as an economic resource which an entity can control as a result of 
past events, which is the allocation of emissions rights committed by government, 
consequently fitting in the definition of asset (IFRIC 3, cited in IASB, 2015). 
Furthermore, emissions rights are mainly used to settle the entity‟s obligation to 
surrender a certain number of allowances to the authority at the end of the 
compliance period. When an entity receives or purchases emissions rights, 
emissions rights are perceived as economic benefits which can be used to offset 
the obligation arising from emitting activities in the future (IFRIC 3, cited in IASB, 
2015). Emissions rights are attributable to future economic benefits in terms of 
discharging obligations under ETS. In short, thanks to the nature of either 
controllability or offsetting obligation, emissions rights either granted by the 
government or purchased are able to meet the requirement of recognition as an 
asset. 
Meanwhile, a liability accrues in accordance with the definition in the Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting in 2010 provided by IASB: „a present obligation 
of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result 
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in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits‟ (para. 
4.4(b)). 
Once emissions occur, the obligation arises to deliver a determinable number of 
allowances to the government. Otherwise, the entity is expected to incur a 
significant penalty due to negligence under the scheme. As an entity produces 
carbon emissions, the obligation to surrender allowances occurs, which 
constitutes a liability in term of financial accounting (IFRIC 3, cited in IASB, 2015). 
In summary, for the purpose of financial reporting, emissions rights are eligible to 
be recognised as an asset while the obligation of submissions of allowances and 
should be reconised as a liability and a cost of carbon emissions recognised as an 
expense in the financial statement. 
With regard to accounting for ETS, various efforts have been made by the 
accountancy profession to account for emissions rights (Larrinaga, 2014). A 
particularly prominent feature of the literature on accounting issues under ETS is 
efforts to incorporate emissions rights into the existing accounting framework in 
light of financial reporting (e.g. Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Cook, 
2009; MacKenzie, 2009). Most previous studies have attempted to identify 
feasible solutions for the recognition, categorisation and measurement of 
emissions rights within the conventional paradigm. Unsurprisingly, these studies 
have dealt mainly with free allowances, since most schemes generally entail free 
allocation at the initial stage. MacKenzie (2009) analyses how the accounting 
profession has had difficulty in making emissions rights commensurable with 
financial reporting, specifically with regard to the classification and measurement 
of emissions rights within the existing accounting framework. Highlighting the 
urgency of accounting issues associated with carbon trading, Bebbington and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) discuss different ways of accounting for and reporting 
on carbon emissions, including financial accounting for emissions rights, and 
accounting for and reporting on the risks and uncertainty arising from the global 
climate change regime. Cook (2009) analyses ways of accounting for emissions 
allowances and liabilities corresponding with IFRIC 3 and its effects on financial 
statements. 
  
59 
Meanwhile, Ratnatungan and Jones (2012) stress the inevitability of the 
development of a new accounting framework. Under the premise that the current 
financial reporting framework does not provide an appropriate solution, they 
suggest a new approach to calculate the value of CO2 sources, and cite capability, 
referred to as „environmental capability‟, as displaying the value of assets and 
capability in a „capability balance sheet‟. This approach, based on the idea of the 
valuation of capability, can be regarded as a radical attempt at carbon accounting. 
Nevertheless, owing to the novelty of the idea, it is taking a long time for the 
valuation of environmental capability to be applied in practice. 
On the whole, previous studies highlight the necessity and importance of 
accounting and reporting on business activities and the financial consequences 
arising from ETS. While one strand of literature adopts an incremental approach, 
seeking a solution within the conventional financial accounting framework, another 
strand proposes a radical approach, arguing the inability of the existing framework 
to accommodate accounting issues under ETS. 
From the previous literature, the key questions with regard to the accounting 
treatment of emissions rights and obligations within the conventional accounting 
paradigm are summarised in terms of how to recognise and measure allowances 
and related liabilities using existing accounting techniques and practices. The 
recognition, measurement and presentation of emissions rights and relevant 
liabilities have been widely addressed by accounting experts, including accounting 
standard setters (e.g. IASB), academics (e.g. Cook, 2009; Black, 2013) and 
practitioners (e.g. KPMG, 2008). 
The main accounting issues derived from previous studies are as follows (adapted 
from Cook, 2009, p.460; Haupt and Ismer, 2013, p.76). 
 Emissions allowances: 
- Are emissions allowances assets, whether purchased or freely allocated by 
government? 
- If so, what type of assets are they – financial instruments or intangible 
assets? 
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- How should the value of allowances be initially and subsequently measured? 
In particular, in terms of free allocation, should income or a liability be 
recognised on the day allowances are received? 
 Liabilities arising from emissions: 
- When should a liability be recognised? 
- How should the liability be initially and subsequently measured? 
In essence, the starting point for accounting issues under ETS lies in the 
determination of the main characteristics of emissions rights. In terms of 
classification, accounting standard setters tend to make an assessment of the 
similarity of a particular accounting event or item by referring to existing 
accounting standards (Young and Williams, 2010). However, the assessment of 
emissions rights is necessarily ambiguous because of various aspects of 
emissions rights. Accounting treatments of emissions rights and related liabilities 
may differ depending on underlying assumptions in terms of the characteristics of 
emissions rights. If emissions rights are seen as intangible assets, they are treated 
under either a cost model or a fair value model.33 If they are assumed to be 
financial instruments, they are measured at fair value. Furthermore, since 
emissions rights and liabilities are reversed at the point of surrender, depending 
on accounting treatment, recognition and de-recognition of asset and liability may 
increase the volatility of accounting numbers. 
The diverse nature of emissions rights and the unique administrative process 
under ETS indicate that financial statements are materially affected by the way in 
which emissions rights are treated. Some studies (e.g. Cook, 2009; Ratnatunga 
and Jones, 2012; Haupt and Ismer, 2013) suggest the recognition and 
measurement of emissions rights and related liabilities by applying different 
accounting models, such as a cost model or a fair value model. Depending on the 
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 The fair value model cost models are types of measurement model, each based on one measurement such 
as fair value or historical costs. Fair value is referred to as „a current value of the asset, liability, or equity 
instrument at the measurement date; and „the market value for assets, liabilities and equity instruments traded 
in an active market ... Under the fair value model, assets and liabilities are measured at fair value at each 
reporting date and changes in fair value are reported in each period as income or expense ... [while] under the 
cost model, assets and liabilities are measured at each reporting date by reference to their historical costs. 
Historical cost is the entry price for the asset or liability ... In contrast to the fair value model, under the cost 
model, changes in the fair values of the assets and liabilities are not adjusted (Cairns, 2013, pp.131-3). 
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different accounting models, the potential impact on financial statements is 
analysed (e.g. Gledhill et al., 2007b; Cook, 2009; Fornaro et al., 2009; Haupt and 
Ismer, 2013). 
Overall, previous research highlights the problematic accounting issues that 
emerge under ETS and the main causes of these problems. These studies 
acknowledge the most problematic issues originating from the multi-faceted nature 
of emissions rights, in that they may be viewed as an intangible asset, financial 
instrument or inventory (commodity). Some studies point out the 
inappropriateness of existing accounting models to address the technical 
complexities of emissions rights. In addition, the previous literature suggests that 
the most significant accounting issues are associated with the recognition of free 
allowances. These studies have contributed to the initiation of standard setting for 
emissions rights, consistently raising issues about the necessity for a standard. In 
response to a surge of calls for an accounting standard for emissions rights, IASB 
took action in publishing an interpretation, IFRIC 3. This is described below. 
Ongoing debates on accounting issues with regard to ETS post-IFRIC 3 
Prior to the commencement of the EU ETS in 2005, in December 2004 the IASB 
issued an interpretation to account for emissions allowances, IFRIC Interpretation 
3, Emission Rights (IFRIC 3). 
According to IFRIC 3, emissions rights should be recognised as an intangible 
asset. In line with IAS 38 Intangible Assets, emissions rights either purchased or 
granted are measured initially at fair value (Starbatty, 2010). Allowances that are 
allocated at less than fair value, e.g. free allowances, are measured at fair value 
(Starbatty, 2010). Since such allowances are viewed as „government grants‟ 
(Black, 2013), IAS 38 Intangible assets and IAS 20 Accounting for Government 
Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance are applied in relation to free 
allowances. Accordingly, on the day of receiving free allowances (referred to as 
„Day 1‟), a company must recognise allowances as intangible assets at fair value; 
at the same time, a government grant is recognised as deferred income in a 
corresponding entry.  
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Meanwhile, as an entity produces emissions, an obligation occurs whereby the 
entity must surrender emissions rights to the government as a corresponding 
quantity of emissions is produced. This liability is recognised as a provision under 
IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. Accordingly, the 
liability is measured as a best estimate of expenditure to resolve the obligation by 
referring to the present market value of emissions rights (Starbatty, 2010). For the 
subsequent measurement of emissions rights, either a cost model or a revaluation 
model may be selectively applied. 34  (See Appendix 1 for more detail on 
accounting treatment under IFRIC 3) 
IFRIC 3 gave rise to many criticisms from EU ETS participants (especially large 
emitters) and the accountancy profession. These criticisms stemmed mainly from 
accounting mismatches (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Cook, 2009; 
MacKenzie, 2009; Warwick and Ng, 2012; Black, 2013). For example, if emissions 
rights are initially measured at fair value with no subsequent revaluation, and 
recorded at historical cost, a mismatch arises because the liability is revalued at 
fair value as emissions are generated (a so-called „measurement mismatch‟). 
Meanwhile, if emissions rights are subsequently revalued at fair value, another 
type of mismatch occurs in presentation. A change in the fair value of an 
intangible asset is recognised in other comprehensive income (OCI) under equity 
(on the balance sheet), while a change in the value of a liability is reflected in the 
income statement (Black, 2013; EFRAG, 2012; Lovell et al., 2010; Lovell et al., 
2013). Moreover, a mismatch in relation to „timing of recognition‟ may occur 
(Warwick and Ng, 2012, p.57), where an asset is recognised on Day 1 when 
allowances are received, while a liability is recognised as emissions are produced 
throughout the year (Ernst and Young, 2009, cited in Warwick and Ng, 2012). 
The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), the most prominent 
stakeholder of IASB, articulated concerns in relation to mismatches in IFRIC 3, 
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 According to IAS 38, an intangible asset should be subsequently measured either (Starbatty, 2010): 
(a) At its cost less any accumulated amortization and any accumulated impairment losses; or  
(b) At a revalued amount, being its fair value at the date of the revaluation less any subsequent 
accumulated amortization and any subsequent accumulated impairment losses. 
** Impairment: an asset is impaired when its carrying amount exceeds its recoverable amount (McKeith and 
Collins, 2013, p.189).   
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contending that these mismatches might cause artificial volatility in financial 
statements by not reflecting the „economic reality‟ of organisations from the 
perspective of „true and fair value‟ (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; 
Black, 2013; Königsgruber, 2009). Since IFRIC 3 set up accounting treatment on a 
fair value basis, Ratnatunga and Jones (2012) argue that the fair value model may 
intensify volatility in the income statement, which may bring about major internal 
concern. Meanwhile, some stakeholders were opposed to a gross approach in 
IFRIC 3, insisting on applying net presentation. They argued that no substantial 
effect on profit or loss should arise because all emissions rights held are obviously 
expected to be used for settlement of obligations at the end of the compliance 
year (IASB, 2010a). 
In response to several criticisms from stakeholders, IASB withdrew IFRIC 3 in 
June 2005 (Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Lovell et al., 2010; 
Warwick and Ng, 2012). As Bradbury (2007) documents, this was the only IFRIC 
that was withdrawn and not developed in to a standard during the period 2002-
2007 (i.e. his examined period), showcasing the exceptional character of this topic. 
Nevertheless, it is meaningful to analyse accounting treatment under IFRIC 3 as a 
starting point for identifying accounting issues under ETS and establishing 
subsequent solutions (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011). Furthermore, the revocation 
of IFRIC 3 resulted in „openly re-assessing‟ (PwC 2007, p.46) various accounting 
models, involving all stakeholders and experts in this issue. 
After IFRIC 3 became invalid, some academic writers explained the main reasons 
for the failure to promulgate an accounting standard for emissions rights. Lovell et 
al. (2010, 2013), Lovell and MacKenzie (2011) and Lovell (2014) consistently point 
out that the main reason for failure of standardisation in carbon accounting was 
friction or conflict between the complex nature of emissions allowances and a type 
of „inertia‟ whereby the solution was sought from within the existing accounting 
framework. Lovell et al. (2010) posit that emissions allowances are difficult to 
incorporate into existing accounting standards due to their various potential uses, 
as a commodity or a financial instrument. In line with assertions of previous 
studies, Lovell et al. (2013) restate that the core problematic accounting issues 
under ETS arise from the complexities associated with emissions rights. Lovell 
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(2014) refers to the „incommensurability‟ of emissions rights as an enigma in the 
standardisation of carbon accounting.  
In contrast to various uses of emissions rights with various practical purposes, 
IASB did not explicitly admit the treatment of emissions rights in different ways. As 
a rule, „emission rights should be treated in a single and uniform way‟ from a 
conventional accounting perspective (Lovell, 2014, p.272). In short, a degree of 
discrepancy between reality and institutionalisation resulted in delays in 
standardisation. 
In addition to the complex attributes of emissions rights and their multiple uses, 
Ascui and Lovell (2011) ascribe the failure of standardisation to „a lack of full 
understanding of ETS‟, resulting in difficulty in establishing appropriate accounting 
treatment of emissions rights within the traditional accounting framework. 
Carbon has been difficult to classify, in part because accountants and accounting 
standard setters lack a full appreciation of the „production process‟ of carbon 
credits: the science, politics and market-enabling rules involved in turning GHG 
emissions and emissions reductions, into tradable commodities (Lovell et al., 
2010). „Accountants typically seek to understand carbon by comparison with 
existing, more familiar, accounting entities such as taxes, leases, subsidies and 
commodities, without appreciating the complexities caused by changes in climate 
policy or regulation‟ (Ascui and Lovell, 2011, pp.988-9). 
In effect, the existing accounting framework has not accommodated accounting 
issues under ETS due to the unique and innovative attributes of emissions rights. 
These „unresolved tensions‟ (Lovell et al., 2013, p.745) have led practitioners to 
seek their own „legitimate‟ solutions in response to the absence of an international 
accounting standard on emissions rights (Lovell, 2014). Lovell (2014) probes 
empirically how practitioners cope with the ambiguity of accounting issues on 
emissions rights. By employing several methods, including in-depth interviews with 
staff from accounting standard setters (such as IASB and FASB), a survey of 
European companies and an analysis of documents, Lovell (2014) demonstrates 
how accountants seek „authority‟ of accounting treatment for emissions rights and 
related liabilities in the absence of an international accounting standard. Notably, 
  
65 
she stresses the emergence of local accounting standards: some national 
accounting standard setters in the EU have independently developed regional 
accounting standards for ETS. For example, the French accounting standard 
setter proposed accounting standards for emissions rights in 2012, and this 
proposal has been mandatorily applied to most listed companies in France. 
Overall, Lovell‟s (2014) findings are a significant contribution to an empirical body 
of research on carbon accounting issues, confirming ongoing friction and 
difficulties in developing accounting standards for emissions rights and related 
liabilities. In particular, Lovell (2014) views the „emergence of diverse local 
accounting standards for emission rights‟ as a „strength‟ not a „problem‟ because 
the standard is developed according to various needs. Overall, Lovell‟s (2014) 
findings have important implications for this study regarding the necessity of 
further empirical research on how other local standards for emissions rights are 
developed to accommodate a variety of stakeholders‟ interests. 
Considering the diverse nature of emissions rights, some studies (e.g. Lovell et al., 
2011; Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012) call for a „radical approach‟ in seeking an 
appropriate solution to emissions rights. A totally new approach is necessary from 
outside the existing accounting framework when developing accounting standards 
for emissions rights due to the inappropriateness of the existing framework. 
Nevertheless, Ratnatunga and Jones (2012) cite Quinn‟s (1978) assessment of 
„the real world of accounting practice‟, in which accounting standard setters have a 
tendency to take an incremental approach so that accounting standards evolve as 
marginal changes from existing practices. Lovell and MacKenzie (2011) support 
this propensity of standard setters, arguing that the accountancy profession has 
responded to climate change issues through the „application of existing accounting 
approaches and frameworks‟ rather than the development of new ones to address 
this issue. Under the premise of the „constitutive role‟ of accounting referred to by 
Hopwood and Miller (1994), Lovell and MacKenzie‟s findings (2011) confirm that 
accounting decisions are made largely on the basis of „path dependency‟ or 
„inertia‟ in the case of carbon accountancy. Admittedly, this implies the existence 
of inevitable limitations to taking a radical approach. 
  
66 
Despite several attempts to develop accounting standards for ETS, the process of 
setting up an international accounting standard for emissions allowances is still 
ongoing and looks unlikely to move forward (Lovell, 2014). 
3.2.2. Practice in the absence of accounting standard for emissions rights       
Since the withdrawal of IFRIC 3, no international accounting standard for 
emissions rights has yet been offered. This absence has resulted in a high degree 
of liberty in accounting for emissions allowances in practice (Cook, 2009; Fornaro 
et al., 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Lovell et al., 2010). In particular, companies under 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS have treated emissions rights and liabilities 
corresponding to their own accounting policy, which has been developed 
according to IAS 8 (Lovell et al., 2010, 2013).35 In turn, there has been concern 
that a variety of accounting treatments of emissions rights may reduce the 
comparability of accounting information and, as a result, decrease its quality 
(Lovell et al., 2010). 
Several noteworthy studies have examined how companies account for emissions 
allowances and liabilities under the EU ETS (e.g. Gledhill et al., 2007a, 2007b; 
Lovell et al., 2010; Warwick and Ng, 2012; Black, 2013). The earliest was 
undertaken by PwC and IETA (Gledhill et al., 2007a, 2007b) which jointly 
surveyed accounting approaches to EURs and CERs. Table 3 demonstrates the 
approaches applied in practice, drawing on the survey conducted by PwC and 
IETA in 2007. 
 
                                            
35
 IAS 8, Para 10. In the absence of an IFRS that specifically applies to a transaction, other event or condition, 
management shall use its judgment in developing and applying an accounting policy that results in information 
that is: (a) Relevant to the economic decision-making needs of users; and (b) relevant, in that the financial 
statements: a. Represent faithfully the financial position, financial performance and cash flows of the entity; b. 
reflect the economic substance of transactions, other events and conditions, and not merely the legal form; c. 
are neutral, ie free from bias; d. are prudent; and e. are complete in all material respects. Para 11. In making 
the judgment described in paragraph 10, management shall refer to, and consider the applicability of, the 
following sources in descending order: (a) The requirements in IFRSs dealing with similar and related issues; 
and (b) The definitions, recognition criteria and measurement concepts for assets, liabilities, income and 
expense in the Framework. Para 12. In making the judgment described in paragraph 10, management may 
also consider the most recent pronouncements of other standard-setting bodies that use a similar conceptual 
framework to develop accounting standards, other accounting literature and accepted industry practices, to 
the extent that these do not conflict with the sources in paragraph 11. 
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Table 3: Approaches applied in practice 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
Initial recognition – 
Allocated 
allowances 
At market value on date of issue; 
corresponding entry to government grant 
(deferred income) 
At cost; allowances 
for grants are at nil 
value 
Initial recognition – 
Purchased 
allowances 
At cost 
Subsequent 
measurement of 
allowances 
Subsequently measured at cost or market 
value, subject to review for impairment36 
Subsequently 
measured at cost, 
subject to review for 
impairment 
Subsequent 
measurement of 
government grant 
Government grant is amortised on a 
systematic and rational basis over 
compliance period 
Not applicable 
Recognition of 
liability 
Recognise liability as emissions are 
produced 
Recognise liability 
as emissions are 
produced. The 
liability is not 
presented until 
emissions produced 
exceed allowances 
held by participant 
Measurement of 
liability 
At market value of 
allowances which 
would be required 
corresponding to 
actual emissions 
At carrying value of 
allowances on 
hand to cover 
actual emissions; 
plus market value 
of allowances to 
cover excessive 
emissions 
At carrying value of 
allowances on hand 
to cover actual 
emissions (nil or 
cost); plus market 
value of allowances 
to cover excessive 
emissions 
(Source: Gledhill et al., 2007a, 2007b; Starbatty, 2010) 
Approach 1 is the approach taken by IFRIC 3, in which fair value measurement 
and gross presentation are applied. Approach 2 is akin to Approach 1 except for 
the measurement of a liability using the carrying amount of emissions rights held. 
Approach 3 is the simplest accounting model, in which free allowances are 
recognised at nil value and the asset/liability is displayed net. 
The survey presents a wide variety of accounting treatments for emissions rights 
in practice, given the lack of authoritative accounting guidance. Some entities 
                                            
36
 According to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, an entity must carry out the procedures of impairment when its 
assets are impaired; namely, assets are carried at no more than their recoverable amount. IFRIC 3 states that 
the existence or requirement of the scheme may cause a reduction in cash flows expected to be generated by 
certain assets. This reduction is an indication that those assets may be impaired and requires those assets to 
be tested for impairment in accordance with IAS 36 (Starbatty, 2010, p.42). 
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have continued to adopt IFRIC 3, while others have chosen an alternative 
approach due to the mismatch problems under IFRIC 3. Notably, the survey 
provides evidence that most companies rely on the accounting treatment of 
Approach 3. This indicates that a simpler and easier accounting treatment may be 
preferred in practice. 
Lovell et al. (2010) subsequently conducted a survey of accounting treatments 
used by companies participating in the EU ETS. In investigating accounting 
treatments of emissions allowances and related liabilities, the survey results 
largely corresponded with those found by PwC and IETA in 2007. Lovell et al. 
(2010) illustrate extensive diversity of accounting treatment of emissions 
allowances in the EU ETS because companies have a wide degree of liberty to 
choose a preferred accounting approach. In particular, a high level of non-
disclosure was observed due to the lack of a mandatory disclosure requirement. 
From this survey, Lovell et al. (2013) specify the materiality of accounting 
information associated with emissions allowances from a „usefulness‟ perspective 
in financial reporting. 
Meanwhile, Warwick and Ng (2012) selected 47 companies representing large 
emitters in the EU ETS and conducted content analysis using 2007 financial year 
annual reports of these companies in order to explore their accounting treatment 
of emissions allowances. They found no uniform pattern. In addition, their findings 
confirm the results of previous surveys on accounting treatments of emissions 
rights, demonstrating that large emitters in the EU ETS have adopted a variety of 
accounting approaches to dealing with emissions allowances. 
Similarly, Black (2013) undertook content analysis, examining the 2011 financial 
statements of 62 companies selected from large emitters in Phase II of the EU 
ETS. Black‟s (2013) study is different from previous surveys because it uses 2011 
annual reports, which belong to Phase II when auctioning had been undertaken 
only at a low level of total allowances under NAP II. Black‟s findings also largely 
correspond with the previous survey. Notably, Black (2013) illustrates a pattern of 
accounting treatment that combines a specific measurement base with a particular 
presentation approach: (a) a nil value approach to free allowances with a net 
liability approach; and (b) a market value approach to free allowances with a gross 
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liability approach. The analysis highlights important implications on how to create 
alternative accounting models for emissions rights by combining a measurement 
base with a presentation approach. 
The earlier surveys identify various aspects of accounting treatments of emissions 
rights and related liabilities. Starbatty (2010) asserts that there are various effects 
on financial statements depending on the accounting model used. In particular, 
depending on the measurement base, a big difference may arise in terms of the 
net effect on profit/loss and the net position of the asset/liability (see Appendix 2). 
Interestingly, this implies that a degree of volatility in the accounting numbers may 
be reinforced under a particular accounting model. 
In summary, in practice emissions rights have been treated as an asset. In terms 
of classification in the asset category, the majority of companies that disclose 
emissions allowances on their balance sheet have classified them as intangible 
assets. Nevertheless, the surveys present various categorisations into intangible 
assets, inventory or financial assets. This implies various uses of emissions rights 
in practice due to their diverse attributes. In terms of the initial valuation of free 
allowances, a significant proportion of companies initially measures free 
allowances at nil value on the balance sheet, which is inconsistent with IFRIC 3. 
With regard to recognition of a liability, the accounting profession largely agrees 
that a liability should be recognised as emissions are produced (Black, 2013). 
However, there has been no consensus on how to value this liability. In terms of 
measuring the liability, while IFRIC 3 recommends measuring at fair value, most 
companies measure it at the carrying value of allowances. Since most companies 
have taken a net approach in practice, if free allowances are initially recognised at 
nil value, only a net amount of liability is shown on the balance sheet (Black, 2013). 
By and large, „companies tend to deal with emission allowances departing from 
IFRIC 3‟ (Warwick and Ng, 2012, p.64).  
In addition, there has been a noticeably high degree of non-disclosure regarding 
emissions allowances and related liabilities in every survey. In other words, the 
absence of accounting standards for ETS inevitably results not only in various 
accounting treatments of allowances but also in discretionary reporting (Lovell et 
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al., 2013). In pursuit of usefulness of accounting information, accounting 
professionals have urged that accounting standard setters quickly develop 
authoritative guidance. 
Interestingly, Lovell et al. (2013) point out the potential „knock-on‟ effects on 
accounting treatment by auctioning. From Phase III of the EU ETS, the default 
allocation method has shifted from free allocation to auctioning. Most companies 
have initially measured free allowances at nil value during Phases I and II, but 
Lovell et al. (2010, 2013) raise the issue of how to account for emissions rights 
and related liabilities to reflect the substantial costs which arise in association with 
auctioning. 
More importantly, previous studies indicate the significance of practice in the 
development of accounting standards for emissions rights. Practice reflects how 
corporates deal with emissions rights in doing their business. Accounting standard 
setters are able to assess the various uses of emissions rights in practice, 
providing them with insights into elaborating accounting models for emissions 
rights. Furthermore, with mandatory adoption of IFRS, a variety of accounting 
treatments have been used by companies on the basis of IAS 8. If national 
accounting standard setters seek consistency with IFRS, practice should be taken 
into account in seeking an appropriate solution. In this context, Teixeira (2013) 
supports the importance of practice for evidence-informed standard setting that 
enables decision making on the basis of supported evidence or proof. 
In essence, previous studies demonstrate that the easier and simpler accounting 
treatment, referred to as the „net approach‟, has predominantly been used in 
practice. A particular accounting treatment that has been widely adopted over a 
long time may be likely to be „routinised‟ or „institutionalised‟ in the field (Georgiou 
and Jack, 2011, p.312), and companies may advocate an approach to which they 
are already accustomed. In this regard, it is necessary to explore how practice 
may affect the development of accounting standards for emissions rights. In 
particular, it is important to investigate which aspects of practice lead the 
accounting standard setter to make decisions on specific accounting models and 
rules for emissions rights in the accounting standard-setting process. 
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3.2.3. Suggestions from accounting experts 
Since IFRIC 3 was withdrawn, several proposals regarding alternative approaches 
have been made by accounting practitioners (e.g. IASB/FASB joint project, 2008-
2010; KPMG, 2008; ANC, 2012; EFRAG, 2012) and academics (e.g. Cook, 2009; 
Black, 2013; Giner, 2014). 
There has been concern that liberty to account for emissions allowances in 
practice might eventually decrease the usefulness of accounting information. 
Several studies (e.g. Bebbington and Jones, 2011; Fornaro et al., 2009; Lovell et 
al., 2010, 2013; Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011) have stressed the importance of 
setting accounting standards for emissions rights in light of the quality of 
accounting information. For example, Lovell et al. (2010) points out the lack of 
consistency and comparability in accounting information that business entities 
have produced with the lack of an accounting standard for emissions rights. 
Research conducted by Solomon et al. (2011) illustrates that institutional investors 
are particularly interested in comparing their investee companies‟ emissions with 
those of their competitors. This indicates that institutional investors expect climate 
change reporting to provide more consistent and reliable information for 
incorporation into their decision making (Solomon et al., 2011). 
In response, accounting standard-setting bodies have attempted to develop 
accounting standards for emissions rights. For instance, in 2008 IASB re-launched 
its Emission Trading Scheme Project as a joint project with the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in order to address unresolved accounting 
issues on emissions trading schemes (Black, 2013; Lovell et al., 2010; Lovell and 
MacKenzie, 2011). The project proceeded by discussing rigorously a number of 
critical accounting issues for ETS; nevertheless, little progress was made on the 
issue. After several meetings, the project was deferred. In 2012, IASB determined 
to resume accounting issues on ETS as a research project. 
As a national accounting standard setter, the French accounting standards setter 
(ANC) proposes how to account for emissions allowances and corresponding 
liabilities. ANC acknowledges emissions rights as an asset. However, in terms of 
the type of asset, emissions rights do not belong to any existing asset category, as 
they are neither financial instruments nor intangible assets (ANC, 2012). 
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Alternatively, ANC proposes that emissions rights should be sub-classified in 
inventory, since they are consumed in the production process. This view is 
different from the perspective of IASB, academics and most surveys on practice, 
which have reached a general consensus that emissions rights should be 
classified as intangible assets. Noticeably, ANC adopts a new economic approach 
in which different accounting models are applied depending on the type of 
business activity. To some extent, ANC‟s proposal is essentially consistent with 
KPMG‟s (2008) suggestion of an „activity-based model‟, in which the accounting 
treatment is differently applied to emissions rights depending on business 
activities (Lovell, 2014). ANC provides a different accounting treatment in 
accordance with different business models, depending whether a company 
purchases emissions rights under an obligation (GHG emitter) or trades the rights 
(trading company) in its ordinary business. ANC‟s proposal is evaluated as an 
„innovative model‟ (ANC, 2012, p.48) because an accounting treatment linking 
emissions rights with an obligation as one account is incompatible with the IFRS 
framework (Giner, 2014). 
In response to ANC‟s proposal, EFRAG released a comment paper in 2012. 
Overall, EFRAG agrees with the business model approach. However, supporting a 
fair value approach, EFRAG articulates opposition to netting off emissions rights 
and obligations, which is manifestly different from ANC‟s accounting treatment. It 
is notable that EFRAG‟s suggestions present an accounting treatment in 
accordance with each process under ETS, such as receiving free allowances, 
purchasing, emitting and surrendering permits during the period. EFRAG stresses 
the need for the development of a new accounting standard for ETS, since 
emissions rights and relevant liabilities have specific features that existing 
standards cannot accommodate. This assertion corresponds with the views of 
previous academic papers, such as Bebbington and Larrinaga-Gonzalez (2008) 
and Ascui and Lovell (2011), that more radical and fundamental changes should 
be pursued in developing an accounting standard for ETS. Considering that 
EFRAG is one of the most significant stakeholders of IASB, its suggestions may 
be extended to the development of an accounting standard for ETS from an IASB 
point of view. 
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In spite of all efforts by accounting standard setters to develop accounting 
standards for emissions rights, little progress has been made. Meanwhile, various 
suggestions have been offered by academic and practitioner organisations (e.g. 
KPMG, 2008; Ratnatunga and Jones, 2012; Haupt and Ismer, 2013). 
For example, KPMG (2008) suggests a type of activity-based model, which follows 
different accounting principles depending on the type of organisational activities 
undertaken, such as by emitters, creators of green energy, traders (or 
aggregators), and investors or consultants. According to KPMG‟s suggestions, the 
accounting treatment for emissions rights should be „commensurable‟ in terms of 
incorporating all types of business activities which might occur, with multiple 
intentions regarding uses of emissions rights. Thanks to its activity-based 
approach, KPMG‟s suggestions may be widely acceptable from a practical point of 
view. 
From the academic domain, Haupt and Ismer (2013) propose an accounting 
approach for emissions allowances in light of a „true and fair‟ view. They posit that 
previous suggestions, including IFRIC 3, have been inappropriate to 
accommodate all processes of ETS because the suggested accounting treatment 
for emissions is a kind of extended interpretation of the existing IFRS. From a „true 
and fair‟ point of view based on a fair value model, emissions allowances should 
be measured at fair value, regardless of whether they are allocated for free or 
purchased on the market. Haupt and Ismer (2013) oppose a net approach in 
which free allowances are initially measured at nil value because this approach 
undermines the transparency and comprehensiveness of financial statements. 
With regard to the subsequent measurement of allowances, they suggest a 
distinct approach depending on the objective of holding the allowances, either for 
compliance or for trading. This approach is consistent with previous suggestions 
by EFRAG and ANC, which have put forward different accounting treatments 
subject to different business models or different objectives for holding allowances. 
In terms of the measurement of a liability, a „cost of settlement approach‟ is 
suggested, whereby a liability is measured on the basis of „the carrying value of 
the allowances‟ held for compliance. They argue that the carrying value of the 
allowances held by an entity should be the best estimate for the cost incurred by 
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business activity. By and large, Haupt and Ismer‟s (2013) suggestions may 
provide a solution as an applicable and acceptable accounting model, both from a 
practical and from a theoretical point of view. A „true and fair value‟ perspective 
leads to an accounting treatment that is consistent overall with the existing 
accounting framework, e.g. IFRS. In addition, the business model approach may 
lead the accounting treatment to be extensively adopted in practice. 
In order to address diversity in practice, accounting professionals have suggested 
various accounting models. The most contentious accounting issues under ETS 
can be derived from these suggestions: 1) how to incorporate the various 
attributes of emissions rights into the existing accounting framework; 2) how to 
account for emissions rights and related liabilities considering the unique link 
between emissions rights and liabilities under the scheme. 
First of all, in order to address the diverse attributes of emissions rights, two 
strands of approach are suggested. On the one hand, some academic writers 
support a radical approach, stressing the inappropriateness of the existing 
accounting framework for incorporating multi-faceted emissions rights. On the 
other hand, as a more applicable approach constructed within existing accounting 
standards, some suggestions propose a so-called „economic approach‟ or „activity-
based approach‟. This means different accounting treatments depending on 
different activities involving emissions rights, such as trading on the market or 
consuming in the production process. These suggestions provide accounting 
standard setters with a critical insight into ways of coping with the complex 
accounting issues in relation to emissions rights. 
Secondly, there are divided perspectives on the preferable accounting treatment 
for emissions rights and related liabilities: a net approach or a gross approach. A 
net approach is a model in which an asset is recognised at cost (in the case of a 
granted allocation, allowances are recognised at nil); a liability is recognised only 
when the level of emissions exceeds the number of emissions allowances held. 
Subsequently, a net amount of liability is shown on the balance sheet. On the 
other hand, a gross approach is a way of recognising an asset and a liability 
separately, where the asset is measured at fair value and the liability should be 
recognised as emissions are produced. Studies present various ways of 
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measuring the liability. Notably, applying the carrying value of allowances, referred 
to by Haupt and Ismer (2013) as the „cost of settlement approach‟, may be a 
conceivable approach in terms of addressing the mismatch problems under IFRIC 
3 and presenting a unique link between emissions rights and related liabilities. 
According to several surveys on accounting treatment in practice, a net approach 
is preferable from a practitioner point of view. By contrast, accounting experts, 
including academics (e.g. Haupt and Ismer, 2013), largely favour a gross 
approach in terms of providing more useful accounting information. From the 
previous literature, it is impossible to judge which approach may be more 
appropriate or desirable in dealing with the unresolved accounting issues in 
relation to emissions rights. 
In the ongoing discussions of accounting models for emissions rights, 
accountancy researchers suggest directions in which research on accounting 
models should go. For example, although not exactly mentioning the „radical 
approach‟, Ascui (2014) insists that any proposal on the accounting treatment of 
emissions rights and related liabilities should be formulated by retaining the 
original „nuances‟ (p.21) of carbon markets rather than relying only on the „pre-
existing categorisation‟ in the existing accounting framework. Giner (2014) 
indicates that, regardless of the accounting model, a „common approach‟ that 
allows a business entity „more discretion‟ would be preferable in practice. This 
provides a useful hint toward a solution to the unresolved difficulties associated 
with the unique attributes of emissions rights. 
Following this review of previous studies, further investigation is necessary to 
probe which aspects of emissions rights critically affect the development of an 
accounting standard for emissions rights, and how accounting standard setters 
address the complexity in relation to emissions rights, taking into consideration the 
various interests of stakeholders (Research Question 1). 
3.2.4.  Summary and implications for research questions 
In reviewing the previous literature, this section has examined theoretical and 
practical perspectives that provide a deeper understanding of the accounting 
issues regarding emissions allowances. The core aspects of the strand of 
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literature in each section provide a framework to envisage research gaps in 
relation to this study. 
Similarly to previous studies, this study is motivated by the absence of 
international accounting standards for emissions allowances. By reviewing 
previous studies on accounting issues relating to emissions allowances, a major 
research theme has been identified: in order to design an appropriate accounting 
model for emissions rights, how have accounting standard setters dealt with the 
complex accounting issues on emissions rights since IFRIC 3 was revoked? 
(Research Question 1) Specifically, what are the most heavily discussed, 
contentious or controversial accounting issues? What are the main factors taken 
into consideration by each accounting standard setter in developing accounting 
standards for ETS? And what will be the final outcome as a consequence of 
accommodating a variety of factors? 
Despite all the suggestions from accounting experts, including academics and 
accounting standard setters, it is difficult to identify an appropriate solution to 
address all accounting issues in relation to emissions rights and related liabilities. 
Any suggestion cannot become absolute guidance on the determinants of the 
„desirability‟ of an appropriate solution to emissions rights. A desirable accounting 
model should ensure the best decision usefulness from the user‟s point of view, as 
well as the greatest applicability from the preparer‟s point of view, concurrently 
producing the highest quality of accounting information in light of the accounting 
conceptual framework. All these determinants of a desirable accounting model 
could be achieved directly in the field. Therefore, the actual accounting standard-
setting process for emissions rights needs to be explored in order to identify 
critical features that determine the desirability and appropriateness of accounting 
models for emissions rights. 
From a practical point of view, this study focuses on accounting issues under ETS 
arising from the standard-setting process. In accordance with the aim of this study, 
several previous studies with regard to this process are reviewed in the next 
section. 
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 Understanding the accounting standard-setting process 3.3.
This section reviews the literature with regard to the political nature of the 
accounting standard-setting process. The literature review in this section provides 
a general background to the process. By reviewing the literature on accounting 
standard setting, distinctive themes may emerge from both an accounting 
standard setter‟s point of view and a stakeholder‟s point of view. 
3.3.1. Political aspects of accounting standard setting 
Accounting standard setting is regarded not only as a highly technical process but 
also as a political process of choice (Sutton, 1984). On the one hand, the 
accounting standard-setting process embraces a high degree of professional 
knowledge and skills (Sutton, 1984). On the other hand, it is viewed as more as a 
political process in which various stakeholders are involved and provide inputs 
(Hodges and Mellett, 2002; Giner and Arce, 2012; Sutton, 1984). In the search for 
a desirable set of accounting rules corresponding with the introduction of a new 
policy (e.g. ETS), Demski‟s (1973)  impossibility theorem implies the imperative 
necessity of an approach focusing on the political facets of the standard-setting 
process. 37  Booth and Cocks (1990, p.512) highlight the political aspects of 
standard setting in an „institutional and social context‟, so issues of power and 
conflict surrounding an organisation (i.e. accounting standard setter) must be 
appreciated by means of research on accounting standard setting. In the context 
of the political process, the accounting standard setter is expected to play a role in 
resolving conflict between interest groups in order to reach a consensus. 
Numerous studies have addressed the subject of the accounting standard-setting 
process. One considerable strand of literature concentrates on the political 
aspects of standard setting (e.g. Georgiou, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2010; Sutton, 1984; 
Fogarty et al., 1994; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hodges and Mellett, 2002; 
Giner and Arce, 2012). This view originates from the premise that the accounting 
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 On the basis of „rational choice theory‟, Demski (1973) asserts that optimal accounting principles do not 
exist, stating: „[G]enerally speaking, we cannot rely on standards to provide a normative theory of accounting. 
No set of standards exists that always will rank alternatives in accordance with preferences and beliefs – no 
matter what these preferences and beliefs are‟ (p.721). This sheds light on the political aspects of accounting 
standard setting to achieve the second-best, whilst not guaranteeing the optimal solution. 
  
78 
standard setter essentially engages in political activities and is devoted to 
harmonising and adjusting various interests and stakeholder views in the 
standard-setting process. 
For example, Fogarty et al. (1994), Sutton (1984) and Watts and Zimmermann 
(1978) focus on the „political‟ aspects of standard setting where choices are made 
between the interests and views of different parties. Sutton (1984) views 
accounting as a type of regulation in which various interest parties, including 
managers, investors and auditors, seek to persuade a rule maker to set the rules 
to their advantage. 
A number of previous studies have dealt with the political nature of accounting 
standard setting rather than technical or professional aspects of the process. The 
standard-setting process may be characterised as being largely political, wherein 
a wide range of stakeholder interests are inherently coordinated through to making 
a choice (Becker, 1983, cited in Giner and Arce, 2012). Consequently, accounting 
standards are regarded as an outcome of political compromise (Rahman et al., 
1994, cited in Giner and Arce, 2012). 
When developing accounting standards, the accounting standard setter 
undertakes „due process‟, in which interest parties present their views and 
interests regarding a draft of the proposed accounting standards (Königsgruber, 
2009; Parker, 2012). Deegan (2000) defines „due process‟ as follows: 
Due process can be defined as a process wherein the regulator 
involves those parties likely to be affected by the proposed regulation in 
the discussions leading to the regulation – it provides an opportunity to 
„be heard‟ (Deegan, 2000, p.70). 
Due process is a consultation process in association with the development of 
accounting standards. It usually proceeds homogeneously from one accounting 
standard setter to another (Georgiou, 2004). Due process arises at various stages 
of standard setting, for example the agenda stage, the draft stage of a discussion 
paper, the issuing of a discussion paper for comment, the drafting stage of an 
exposure paper, publication of an exposure draft for comment, and a draft of the 
accounting standard (Georgiou, 2004).  
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Due process is an essential element through which to determine the political 
nature of the accounting standard-setting process. Practically, due process 
proceeds in such a way that various stakeholders participate in the standard-
setting process and convey their interests to an accounting standard setter.  
During due process, from agenda setting to enactment review, various interests 
may appear at each stage. At each stage of due process, stakeholders are able to 
express their specific interests and opinions to the accounting standard setter 
using formal and informal methods. Receiving input from stakeholders is 
particularly important in enabling the accounting standard setter to assess 
stakeholders‟ potential responses to enactment of a proposal (Tandy and Wilburn, 
1992). More importantly, the accounting standard setter is able preliminarily to 
coordinate or adjust interests or conflicts prior to issuing the final version of the 
accounting standard (Kwok and Sharp, 2005). 
For example, IASB provides several ways for stakeholders to participate in the 
standard-setting process, including formal public consultations, such as public 
hearings, and inviting comments on discussion papers or exposure drafts, as well 
as other informal methods, such as informal meetings with board members and 
staff (Jorissen et al., 2012). Stakeholders are able to participate directly in the 
process, for example by communicating directly with project staff, becoming 
members of a working group; or writing formal comment letters in response to a 
discussion paper or exposure draft released by IASB (Jorissen et al., 2012). 
In essence, due process is substantially and technically associated with the 
political characteristics of the accounting standard-setting process. It plays a role 
in conveying the interests of stakeholders to the accounting standard setter. By 
participating in the process, stakeholders may affect the formulation of accounting 
standards to their own benefit. The accounting standard setter has to take 
stakeholders‟ interests into account when developing accounting standards in 
order to ensure a high degree of acceptability of the outcome. In turn, accounting 
standards are promulgated as a result of compromise of various social and 
economic considerations (Parker, 2012).  
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3.3.2. Identification of stakeholders in the development of accounting standard 
for emissions rights 
Research concentrating on the political aspects of the standard-setting process 
needs to identify stakeholders who may have particular interests in the course of 
due process. A „stakeholder‟ can be “any identifiable group or individual who can 
affect the achievement of an organisation‟s objectives, or is affected by the 
achievement of an organisation‟s objectives” (Freeman and Reed, 1983, p. 91, 
see also Freeman, 1984). This implies that all entities are likely to have many 
stakeholders, which will include, among others, employees, communities, society, 
the state, customers, competitors, suppliers, local governments, stock markets, 
industry bodies, the media or even non-human life and future generations (Gray et 
al., 1996). There seem to be two variants of stakeholder theory, a moral 
(normative) and a managerial version (Deegan and Unerman, 2006). The moral 
perspective of stakeholder theory argues that all stakeholders have the right to be 
treated fairly by an organisation, and that issues of stakeholder power are not 
directly relevant. That is, regardless of whether stakeholder management leads to 
improved financial performance, managers should manage the organisation for 
the benefit of all stakeholders. As Hasnas (1998) states, this variant: 
Views the firm not as a mechanism for increasing the stockholders‟ 
financial returns, but as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests, 
and sees management as having a fiduciary relationship not only to the 
stockholders, but to all stakeholders… This of course implies that there 
will be times when management is obliged to at least partially sacrifice 
the interests of stockholders to those of the other stakeholders (p. 23).  
In contrast, the managerial variant of stakeholder theory is more „organisation-
centred‟. As Gray et al. (1996) note, under this premise: 
The stakeholders are identified by the organisation of concern, by 
reference to the extent to which the organisation believes the interplay 
with each group needs to be managed in order to further the interests of 
the organisation. (The interests of the organisation need not be 
restricted to conventional profit-seeking assumptions). The more 
important the stakeholder to the organisation, the more effort will be 
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exerted in managing the relationship. Information is a major element 
that can be employed by the organisation to manage (or manipulate) 
the stakeholder in order to gain their support and approval, or to distract 
their opposition and disapproval (p. 45, comments in brackets in 
original). 
Indeed, empirical evidence (Neu et al., 1998) finds stakeholder theory to be 
employed in a strictly organisation-centred way. In this case, stakeholder analysis 
assists in primarily identifying, “which groups are stakeholders deserving or 
requiring management attention, and which are not” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p.855; 
see also Clarkson, 1995 and Nasi et al., 1997, for similar arguments), and in 
ranking or prioritising their interests (Gray, 2001)38 in order to maximize the profit 
of an entity (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
Preceding literature has employed a wide range of definitions of stakeholders, and 
have more often vaguely employed the above stakeholder dichotomy, without 
offering more specific typologies which could refine the approach and add to our 
understanding of its applicability. A notable exception appears to be Mitchell et al. 
(1997)‟s study on stakeholder identification and salience, which could be 
particularly applicable in the context of accounting standard setters and their 
stakeholders. 
Instead of simply describing who stakeholders are, Mitchell et al. (1997) define the 
core but comprehensive attributes of stakeholder identification. In order to identify 
who constitute stakeholders, they suggest three variables as attributes which 
stakeholders may possess: (1) the stakeholder‟s power to influence the firm; (2) 
the legitimacy of the stakeholders‟ relationship with the firm; (3) the urgency of the 
stakeholder‟s claims on the firm. On the basis of Etzioni (1964)‟s categorization of 
power, Mitchell et al. (1997) understand the power depending on the resources 
where it originates: coercive, utilitarian, or normative means in order to affect the 
relationship between the parties. With regard to legitimacy, by using Suchman‟s 
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 A number of studies (Freeman, 1994; Clarkson, 1995; Mahoney, 1997) suggest that some stakeholders 
are more powerful that others and, still, “shareholders have the dominant role in external information provision 
(Gray et al, 1996, p. 47)”  
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definition of legitimacy, they utilise legitimacy as an attribute of stakeholders 
possessing a desirable social good. Urgency is an attribute to understand why a 
stakeholder‟s claim is prioritised as the most critical and important issue. Mitchell 
et al. (1997) argue „time sensitivity and criticality‟ (p.867) are the elements to 
determine the extent to which managers put immediate attention to stakeholder‟s 
claims. 
Identification of stakeholders is essential to make a judgment on the degree of 
priority of claims from stakeholders, which is “salience” in Mitchell et al. (1997)‟s 
terms. Mitchell et al. (1997) put an emphasis on the role of managers in 
stakeholder theory on the grounds that managers ultimately determine 
stakeholder salience on the basis of manager‟s perception of a stakeholder‟s 
attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) posit that it is critically essential to understand that 
stakeholders‟ attributes are „variables‟ which are socially constructed; stakeholders 
may or may not be perceived by managers depending on managers‟ perception of 
stakeholder salience. Managers‟ perception of stakeholder‟s attributes is indeed a 
critical determinant to identify “Who or What Really Counts” (Mitchell et al., 1997, 
p.864). Managers may then employ multiple typologies and identify stakeholders 
as dormant, discretionary, demanding, dominant, dangerous, dependent, definitive, 
and non-stakeholder. Stakeholder salience implies that the individuals or entities 
with no power, legitimacy, or urgency in relation to the firm may not appear as 
stakeholders as they would be perceived as having no salience. 
Meanwhile, Mitchell et al. (1997) highlight the changeability of stakeholders in 
terms of salience, and thus the subsequent degree of attention paid, subject to  
the attributes which they may possess. The levels of salience vary from issue to 
issue and from time to time and thus prominent stakeholders are in relation to a 
particular issue. 
Since this research deals with accounting standards setting process, accounting 
standard setters play a role as „managers‟ and their perception of stakeholders is 
a critical determinant of stakeholder salience. From the accounting standard 
setters‟ perspective, stakeholders can be delineated in relation to the objective of 
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financial reporting in the conceptual framework. The Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting in 2010 issued by IASB describes „the objective of financial 
reporting…[as being] providing financial information about the reporting entity that 
is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity‟ (OB 2). In that context,, it 
describes as limitation of general purpose financial reports  the existence of 
individual primary users who may have different information needs (OB 6, OB 8). 
Interestingly, the Conceptual Framework previously published (1989) had 
identified wider user groups and inter alia made explicit reference to employees, 
governments and general public. By limiting therefore the number of stakeholders 
in the latest reiteration (which is maintained in the latest exposure draft published 
in 2015), IASB seems to apply in practice the concept of stakeholder salience – 
and in relation to a particular issue of a Conceptual Framework. Although the 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting does not deliver specific terms for 
defining stakeholders of individual accounting standard setters – or in relation to 
specific standards being developed, the surrounding context of the objectives of 
financial reporting enables us to estimate the existence of a particular group of 
information users who may need additional information in relation to a certain 
accounting issue in which they may be of interest. In practice, certain stakeholders 
may emerge with a strong voice when they may have a big concern on a certain 
issue; some may not. 
Stakeholders can then be specified depending on the degree of of power, 
legitimacy, or urgency they possess and always on the basis of the accounting 
standards setter‟s perception of these attributes.  
For example, in relation to accounting standard setting for ETS, IASB perceived 
other national accounting standard setters and accounting firms (e.g. big four 
accounting firms) as main stakeholders. In the advent of the Phase I in the EU 
ETS in 2005, other national accounting standard setters and accounting firms 
were persistently invited to express their views on the development of the 
accounting standard for ETS in accordance with the commencement of EU ETS: 
as a consequence, IASB released IFRIC 3 in 2004. They were regarded as main 
stakeholders on the basis of IASB‟s perception on urgency. 
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On the basis of managers‟ perception on power, specific entities can be regarded 
as the main critical stakeholders because they may make distinctive voices on a 
particular issue. The conceptual framework provides general guidance to judge 
stakeholders, such as investors and financial information users which may be 
generally applicable. Nevertheless, not all of the stakeholders may make 
distinctive voices, and with particular reference to the development of the 
accounting standard for ETS. In this case,, large emitters participating in the ETS 
such as steel-makers, energy-generating companies, and oil-refining companies 
may arguably appear as the main critical stakeholders because they are directly 
affected by the accounting treatment under ETS. On the basis of stakeholder 
theory, stakeholders which KASB may perceive as salient for the development of 
the accounting standard for ETS are specified in the selection of interviewees in 
Chapter 4.  
3.3.3. Legitimacy in the accounting standard-setting context 
As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, stakeholder theory arguments are 
intertwined with legitimacy conceptualizations. Indeed it seems impossible to 
discuss stakeholder theory without some reference to legitimacy – and vice versa. 
In this section, the concept of legitimacy in the accounting standard setting is 
discussed. Discussion is aided by reference to previous studies in relation to the 
organisational mechanisms of accounting standard setters, as well as to studies 
on stakeholders‟ lobbying activities in Section 3.3.3. Both sections help build up a 
theoretical framework for this study, with reference to both stakeholder and 
legitimacy theories, in the context of accounting standard setting. 
On the premise of the political nature of accounting standard setting, it is 
necessary to review mechanisms by which accounting standard setters 
accomplish their institutional roles. Booth and Cocks (1990, p.517) refer to 
accounting standard setting as a legitimating process stating: „an analysis of 
standard setting should start from the proposition that, in the main, accounting 
standards will be produced that support and reflect the prevailing hegemony‟.  
Standard setting is a major social process for legitimating and propagating 
accounting with a particular nature and effect. 
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In viewing accounting standard setting as a process of „legitimating‟ accounting 
rules, which stakeholders generally accept as „desirable, proper, or appropriate‟, 
legitimacy theory is an appropriate theoretical framework to provide a better 
understanding of the mechanisms involved in accounting standard setting.  
Drawing from the foundational work of Parsons and Jones (1960) and Weber 
(1978), Legitimacy Theory has been made by researchers, “into an anchor-point of 
vastly expanded theoretical apparatus addressing the normative and cognitive 
forces that constrain, construct, and empower organizational actors” (Suchman, 
1995, p. 571). The theory is centred on the notion of a social contract, whereby 
“business agrees to perform various socially desired actions in return for approval 
of its objectives, other rewards and ultimate survival” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 
344). Consistent with this view, Richardson (1987, p. 352) asserts accounting is a 
legitimating institution, and provides a “means by which social values are linked to 
economic actions”. 
Failure to comply with societal expectations (in essence, to comply with the terms 
of the social contract) may lead to sanctions being imposed by society (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2006). As Lindblom (1993, p.3) notes: 
To the extent corporate performance does not reflect the expectations 
of the relevant publics a legitimacy gap exists… [This] will fluctuate 
without any changes in action on the part of the corporation… the 
corporation must make changes or the legitimacy gap will grow as the 
level of conflict increases and the levels of positive and passive support 
decrease… the resulting penalty for any perceived legitimacy gap will 
come in the form available and deemed appropriate by the particular 
person or persons. 
These sanctions may take an economic form (such as limited provision of financial 
capital, reduced demand of products, boycotts of output, strikes), a legal form (e.g. 
lawsuits, other legislative action) or social action (limited labour capital, publicity 
campaigns, information picketing [Lindblom, 1993; Deegan, 2000, 2002; Aguilera 
et al., 2004]). However, despite the theory‟s wide application, few researchers 
define the notion when they employ it and “Legitimacy and related concepts 
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unfortunately have been… both abstract and indefinite” (Hybels, 1995, p. 241). 
Further, “most treatments cover only a limited aspect of the phenomenon as a 
whole and devote little attention to systematizing alternative perspectives or to 
developing a vocabulary for describing divergent approaches… [Hence] research 
on organizational legitimacy threatens to degenerate into a chorus of dissonant 
voices” (Suchman, 1995, p. 572). By developing a legitimacy theory framework 
with specific reference to the accounting standard setting process and by 
incorporating stakeholder theory arguments as particularly expressed by Mitchell 
et al. (1997), I believe this study contributes towards greater theoretical refinement 
of the legitimacy notion. 
A theoretical perspective based on legitimacy theory which has been 
predominantly used in previous studies as a theoretical lens for understanding the 
accounting standard-setting process, is institutional legitimacy. According to 
Suchman (1995), institutionalists:  
Downplay both managerial agency and manager-stakeholder conflict. In 
a strong and constraining symbolic environment, a manager‟s decisions 
often are constructed by the same belief systems that determine 
audience reactions. Consequently, rather than examining the strategic 
legitimation efforts of specific focal organizations, institutionalists tend to 
emphasize the collective structuration (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) of 
entire fields or sectors of organizational life ( p. 576).  
From the perspective of institutional legitimacy, firstly it is necessary to identify 
what legitimacy means in an institutional setting. In order to identify legitimacy in 
the context of the accounting standard-setting process, previous studies justify 
legitimacy by relying on Suchman‟s (1995) typology. Suchman (1995) defines 
legitimacy comprehensively from an organisational point of view as: 
A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, 
p.574) 
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In an institutional setting, legitimacy depends on the perception of audiences. 
Legitimacy is the result of a positive judgment by an audience with regard to the 
appropriateness of an organisation and its actions (Richardson and Eberlein, 
2011). In this context, Deegan (2000) highlights that consideration of constituency 
is crucially linked to the existence of an organisation. Clearly in this context, the 
overlaps between stakeholder theory (particularly the managerial variant) and 
legitimacy theory are becoming almost impossible to disentangle.  
Larson and Herz (2013, p.103) stress the importance of constituency in attaining 
legitimacy, stating: „for an organisation to obtain legitimacy, survive and thrive, the 
organisation must be justified by its institutional stakeholders‟. Accordingly, the 
organisation strives to achieve and maintain legitimacy by gaining acceptability 
from its environment (Larson and Herz, 2013). In terms also of the accounting 
standard setter, legitimacy is a core element for the survival and prospect of the 
organisation. Several studies on accounting standard setting also view legitimacy 
as a critical factor for accounting standard setters, not only to ensure the 
acceptability of the outcome of its activities, but also to maintain the sustainability 
of the organisation (e.g. Durocher and Fortin, 2010; Fogarty et al., 1992; Larson, 
2002; Larson and Herz, 2013).  
In order not only to ensure the continued existence of the organisation but also a 
high degree of acceptability of the outcomes from its stakeholders, the accounting 
standard setter strenuously pursues legitimacy as an organisational objective. 
Achievement of legitimacy is one of the main objectives of a standard-setting 
organisation (Fogarty et al., 1994) and a fundamental factor in determining the 
legitimacy of accounting standards (Burlaud and Colasse, 2011). Burlaud and 
Colasse (2011) stress the role of legitimacy in the accounting standard-setting 
process, as it ensures that the accounting standard is implemented properly when 
issued. Proper implementation will allow the accounting standard to be 
„institutionalised, i.e. taken for granted and „routinised‟ in practice (Georgiou and 
Jack, 2011, p.312). In effect, legitimacy builds the confidence of users in financial 
statements which are produced by relying on accounting standards. In summary, 
accounting standard setters must achieve legitimacy in order to survive and thrive. 
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Accordingly, institutional legitimacy provides guidance on how the accounting 
standard-setting process should proceed in the pursuit of organisational survival 
and sustainability. 
The legitimacy of an organisation is not inherently given but is formulated or 
constructed (Burlaud and Colasse, 2011). Accordingly, it is necessary to identify 
types of legitimacy and the factors and determinants attributable to legitimacy. 
Suchman (1995) presents three types of legitimacy for organisations: pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy depends on the „self-interested 
calculation of the organization‟s most immediate audiences‟ (Suchman, 1995, 
p.578). More intuitively, pragmatic legitimacy concerns support from stakeholders 
in exchange for the expected benefits of a policy based on cost-benefit 
calculations. Meanwhile, moral legitimacy is a type of „positive normative 
evaluation of the organization and its activities, involving judgment of the 
organisation‟s activity as „the right thing to do‟ (Suchman, 1995, p.579). In other 
words, moral legitimacy is „sociotropic‟, as audiences perceive the „rightness‟ of an 
organisation‟s activities from a social welfare perspective. A judgment is made by 
evaluating whether the outputs or consequences (referred to as „consequential 
legitimacy‟), the techniques or procedures (referred to as „procedural legitimacy‟), 
or the structures (called „structural legitimacy‟) are of „social value‟ or „positive 
moral value‟. Cognitive legitimacy is based on „comprehensibility‟ and „taken-for-
grantedness‟ (Suchman, 1995, p.582). In contrast with evaluation or calculation 
(e.g. good or bad; positive or negative), cognitive legitimacy is a kind of 
unconditional acceptance or cognition, where the existence and functions of an 
organisation are conceived to be „taken-for-granted‟, so that „for things to be 
otherwise is literally unthinkable‟ (Zucker, 1983, p.25, cited in Suchman, 1995, 
p.583).  
In addition, along with the typology of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy 
which demonstrates the multiplicity of legitimacy dynamics, Suchman (1995) 
presents several strategies for gaining, maintaining and repairing each type of 
legitimacy. While legitimacy is a status or condition, „legitimation‟ is the process of 
achieving legitimacy (Lindblom, 1993). Suchman‟s legitimacy management 
strategies are associated with legitimation rather than legitimacy. By virtue of the 
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comprehensiveness of the typology of legitimacy and the extensive applicability of 
legitimacy management strategies, Suchman‟s ideas have been widely adopted in 
studies of accounting standard setting. 
Applying Suchman‟s (1995) typology of legitimacy to accounting standard setting, 
pragmatic legitimacy relates to how the standard setter will act in response to the 
input of stakeholders and to what extent the interests of stakeholders will be 
reflected in the final outcome. In addition, underlying notions of the conceptual 
framework, such as „decision-usefulness‟, „primacy of users‟ and „transparency‟ 
provide criteria against which to judge the „rightness‟ of moral legitimacy (Georgiou 
and Jack, 2011). As one component of moral legitimacy, procedural legitimacy is 
associated with „procedural features‟ of the standard-setting process (Durocher 
and Fortin, 2010). In other words, a well-developed due process in which the 
accounting standard setter ensures stakeholders‟ participation and carries out 
proper consultation is ascribed to the achievement of „procedural legitimacy‟ 
(Durocher and Fortin, 2010; Bamber and McMeeking, 2016). 
In addition to Suchman‟s (1995) typology of legitimacy, his legitimacy 
management strategies (Suchman, 1995) have been widely adopted as a 
theoretical framework for managing accounting standard setting with a strategic 
approach. For example, Durocher and Fortin (2010) explore the institutional 
legitimacy of the Canadian accounting standard setter, which originates from 
users, and how legitimacy management strategies are used by financial statement 
users. The findings demonstrate that the Canadian standard setter tends to focus 
on „symbolic features‟ rather than „pragmatic concerns‟ in its pursuit of legitimacy. 
These findings provide meaningful empirical evidence, confirming Young‟s (2003, 
p.497) assertion that „users remain a symbolic rhetorical category‟. In order to 
ensure legitimacy, the importance of a legitimacy management strategy is 
highlighted, suggesting that accounting standard setters should be more aware of 
users‟ views in the standard-setting process. In addition, Sinclair and Bolt (2013) 
explore the New Zealand accounting standard setter, focusing on how third-party 
voices are involved in the standard-setting process. Their findings suggest that the 
New Zealand standard setter achieves legitimacy by „conforming to the 
environment‟. In particular, the standard setter is inferred to achieve „pragmatic 
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legitimacy‟ with its strategy of incorporating third-party interests in its decisions. 
The findings indicate that stakeholders justify the standard setter‟s decisions as 
„right things to do‟ to the extent to which the accounting standard setter achieves 
„cognitive legitimacy‟, in Suchman‟s terms. 
Meanwhile, the notion of legitimacy is further elaborated as scoping the context of 
accounting standard setting. Burlaud and Colasse (2011) suggest three notions of 
legitimacy as being particularly applicable: political, procedural and substantial. 
Notably, in presenting the sources of legitimacy, Burlaud and Colasse (2011) 
contend no legitimacy in the case of IASB from these three perspectives. In 
response to Burlaud and Colasse‟s (2011) critique of IASB‟s legitimacy, Danjou 
and Walton (2012) make a counter-argument, pointing out a lack of detail in the 
three notions of legitimacy. Despite arguments over the appropriateness of the 
notion of legitimacy, the three categorisations of legitimacy elaborated by Burlaud 
and Colasse (2011) are meaningful in conceptualising legitimacy and envisaging 
the sources of legitimacy in the context of the accounting standard-setting process. 
Moreover, as components of a standard setter‟s legitimacy, Sinclair and Bolt (2013, 
p.776) refer to „substantive legitimacy‟, which relates to the content of the 
accounting standard and „procedural legitimacy‟, which is in essence fulfilled as a 
form of due process. 
In summary, previous studies on the legitimacy of accounting standard setters (e.g. 
Fogarty et al., 1992; Larson, 2002; Durocher and Fortin, 2010), find legitimacy to 
be a critical determinant allowing accounting standard setters to retain the right to 
set accounting standards and thereby secure appropriate implementation of 
accounting standards. Accordingly, previous studies indicate the necessity for the 
management of legitimacy so as to gain and maintain institutional legitimacy and 
ultimate survival. 
Richardson and Eberlein (2011) emphasise the significance of managing 
legitimacy on the grounds that the acceptance of accounting standards is 
essentially associated with how to manage the legitimacy of the standard-setting 
process. Richardson and Eberlein (2011) state the management of legitimacy in 
the context of accounting standard-setting:  
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It has long been recognised that continuing acceptance of accounting 
standard setting is a matter of managing the legitimacy of the standard-
setting process in addition to, or perhaps even independently of, the 
technical characteristics of those standards (Richardson and Eberlein, 
2011, p.217, cited in Larson and Herz, 2013). 
Suchman (1985) posits that various facets of legitimacy may emerge 
heterogeneously due to the diverse sources and effects of legitimacy. This implies 
that legitimacy management strategies have various effects on legitimacy. 
Accordingly, in the pursuit of institutional legitimacy, it is necessary to identify 
which type of legitimacy and managerial approach may be more appropriate for a 
particular issue under distinct circumstances. 
Importance of identifying stakeholders in the accounting standard-setting process 
Audiences or stakeholders, play a central role in the ultimate determination of 
legitimacy (Durocher and Fortin, 2010). Accordingly, in order to manage legitimacy 
in due process, the accounting standard-setting body must identify the 
stakeholders who will be affected by a new accounting standard. Stakeholders 
with a particular interest are more likely to participate in the standard-setting 
process and to exert more influence on the standard setter by defending their own 
interests. Identification of key stakeholders is therefore a starting point for the 
management of legitimacy. In identifying stakeholders, the accounting standard 
setter is able make a preliminary assessment of stakeholders‟ interests (McCarthy, 
2007, cited in Sinclair and Bolt, 2013, p.766). Various studies have been carried 
out to identify the main stakeholders, why they participate in the standard-setting 
process, when they exert influence on particular accounting rules during the 
process, etc. 
With regard to the major stakeholders of accounting standard setters, public 
accounting firms, professional accountancy bodies, preparers (corporations and 
other businesses) and users (such as financial analysts) are traditionally involved 
in the accounting standard-setting process (Larson and Herz, 2013). Stakeholders 
who may be significantly affected by an expected accounting standard will 
constitute the predominant interest group that will constantly offer its input to the 
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accounting standard setter. The various stakeholders are unlikely to be equally 
influential, insofar as they do not all participate in the standard-setting process at 
an equivalent level (Walker and Robinson, 1993, cited in Georgiou, 2010). 
Viewing accounting standard setting as a political process involving diverse 
interactions between an accounting standard setter and its stakeholders, the 
accounting standard setter must identify who may be primarily affected by a 
specific accounting standard, and who may not (Larson and Herz, 2013). 
Moreover, previous research (e.g. Georgiou, 2002; Johnson and Solomons, 1984; 
Jorissen et al., 2012; Larson, 2002, 2007; Larson and Herz, 2013) suggests that 
the participation of stakeholders is regarded as a key means for an organisation to 
obtain legitimacy and success. Accordingly, in order to achieve legitimacy, the 
standard setter should ensure stakeholders‟ participation in the standard-setting 
process (Larson, 2007). 
In summary, the most important and substantial way of obtaining legitimacy is to 
achieve a high degree of acceptability from stakeholders. Due process is 
considered to be a critical pathway to manage the legitimacy of the accounting 
standard setter. Strategically, in the pursuit of legitimacy it is essential for the 
accounting standard setter to identify prominent stakeholders, and facilitate their 
greatest possible participation in the standard-setting process. This will facilitate 
the achievement of legitimacy (Larson and Herz, 2013). 
Pursuit of institutional legitimacy in the accounting standard-setting process 
In the context of accounting standard setting, legitimacy management strategies 
involve two dimensions: 1) the procedural dimension of standard setting; 2) the 
decisional (Sinclair and Bolt‟s [2013] substantive legitimacy) dimension of the 
standard setter‟s choices in forming a set of accounting rules. 
First of all, with regard to the procedural dichotomy of standard setting, sources of 
legitimacy need to be explored. For example, Johnson and Solomons (1984, 
pp.172-3) develop prerequisite conditions to ensure legitimacy in due process: 1) 
„sufficient authority‟ to issue accounting standards; 2) „procedural due process‟, in 
which reasonable opportunity for participation in standard setting is ensured for 
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stakeholders to provide their input; and 3) „substantive due process‟ in order to 
deliver „adequate justification‟ and an „adequate rationale‟ for decisions. 
Johnson and Solomons‟ (1984) general conditions of legitimacy are further 
elaborated by later studies which identify core elements in gaining legitimacy. As a 
source of sufficient authority, an organisation needs a „regulatory component‟ such 
as a statutory mandate (Durocher and Fortin, 2010). Meyer and Rowan (1977, 
cited in Durocher and Fortin, 2010) view legal mandates as an official component 
of legitimacy. If the accounting standard setter is endowed with „a clear mandate‟ 
from government, this implies legitimacy (Durocher et al., 2007; Johnson and 
Solomons, 1984). 
Procedural due process is associated with justification of the standard-setting 
procedure. Ensuring adequate opportunities for participation in the standard-
setting process may encourage stakeholders to regard the process as „legitimate‟ 
(Burlaud and Colasse, 2011; Luthardt and Zimmermann, 2009; Richardson and 
Eberlein, 2011). Procedural legitimacy is delivered by procedural due process. 
Ensuing stakeholders‟ participation in the accounting standard-setting process is 
the most significant prerequisite to legitimacy (Larson and Herz, 2013). In addition, 
active involvement in the process may reinforce acceptance of and compliance 
with accounting standards, which may be one aspect of the desirability of 
accounting standards (Larson and Herz, 2013). 
Substantive due process relies on a conceptual framework that provides a 
theoretical foundation for a rationale of institutional roles, goals and objectives. 
Napier (2013) refers to the role of a conceptual framework consisting of a range of 
theoretical notions, through which standard setters are able to build a rationale to 
legitimate accounting rules by relying on the conceptual framework. Burlaud and 
Colasse (2011) highlight the role of a conceptual framework in ensuring the 
legitimacy of the standard-setting process. A standard setter‟s use of a conceptual 
framework contributes to building a reputation for competence and provides 
substantial legitimacy (Burlaud and Colasse, 2011, p.28). In the standard setting 
process, the conceptual framework enables the standard setter to develop 
accounting rules with a more robust, consistent and logical rationale. It influences 
stakeholders to consider an accounting standard to be persuasive and acceptable. 
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In summary, on the basis of a managerial approach to legitimacy, an accounting 
standard setter is able to intensify institutional legitimacy in due process by 
strategically addressing the elements of procedural and substantive due process. 
To be specific, in the pursuit of institutional legitimacy, the standard setter must 
properly undertake due process, ensuring stakeholders‟ participation in the 
process. In addition, by aligning with the conceptual framework, the standard-
setter must develop a robust and sound rationale for specific accounting rules so 
that most stakeholders will perceive the accounting standard to be legitimate. 
Along with the procedural dimension corresponding with due process, legitimacy 
management strategy is also applied to the decisional dimension of the standard-
setting process. In other words, the decision-making mechanism can be 
understood as the legitimising dynamics of organisational activities from an 
institutional legitimacy perspective. In order to produce legitimate outcomes, it is 
necessary to identify how the standard setter makes decisions on specific 
accounting rules which constitute a set of accounting treatments, as an accounting 
standard. 
Under legitimacy theory, it is assumed that organisational activities and their 
consequences are „desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions‟ (Suchman, 1995, 
p.577). When setting up specific accounting rules, the accounting standard setter 
will make choices in such a way as to legitimate the accounting rules so that its 
institutional activities are perceived to be desirable, proper, and appropriate within 
given specific circumstances. Specifically, accounting standard setters attempt to 
make choices in formulating a set of accounting rules in response to the specific 
interests of stakeholders, in order to ensure that most stakeholders will be largely 
in favour of the outcome (Baylin et al., 1996, cited in Richardson and Eberlein, 
2011). 
Suchman (1995) asserts that different types of legitimacy interact: one type of 
legitimacy may intensify another and vice versa, or they may conflict with each 
other. In other words, each type of legitimacy may function differently depending 
on different behavioural dynamics. In particular, a certain type of legitimacy or 
legitimation strategy may be distinctly more suitable for a particular environmental 
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condition (Suchman, 1995, p.604). In this regard, within Suchman‟s, distinct 
legitimacy and legitimation strategies may be identified in the context of 
accounting standard setting. Specifically, accounting standards are promulgated 
as legitimate by achieving pragmatic and procedural legitimacy, or by conforming 
to their environment. 
For instance, in a political context, accounting standard setting is a process 
involving a variety of interests of several stakeholders. Stakeholders who are 
concerned with a specific accounting issue may actively participate in the 
standard-setting process and voice their specific interests on the basis of „self-
interested calculations‟ (Suchman, 1995, p.578). Accordingly, given abundant 
opportunities for lobbying activities by stakeholders in the process, the outcome is 
more likely to be a compromise in terms of reflecting a specific input from a 
stakeholder. Accounting standards are therefore significantly associated with 
„pragmatic legitimacy‟, or „exchange legitimacy‟, using Suchman‟s (1995) typology 
of legitimacy. Because the accounting standard is in need of legitimacy, the 
standard setter tends to set accounting rules aligning with the interests of 
stakeholders in order to ensure a high degree of acceptability. In essence, 
pragmatic procedural legitimacy provides a theoretical window to understand the 
dynamics of how accounting standards are set; specifically, the accounting 
standard setter is prone to set accounting standards through political compromise 
and reconciliation of a variety of interests (Monciardini, 2016). 
In addition, „conforming to environments‟ is a type of legitimacy management 
strategy in which an organisation is simply placed „within a pre-existing institutional 
regime‟ (Suchman, 1995, p.587). In particular, an organisation may achieve 
„cognitive legitimacy‟ by conforming to established models or standards. From an 
institutional theory perspective, this mechanism is referred to as „isomorphism‟. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, cited in Suchman, 1995, p.589) conceptualise 
„isomophism‟ as a tendency for organisations to adopt similar rules and routines. 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001, p.570) define „institutional isomophism‟ as „the 
process by which organizations tend to adopt the same practices and/or structures 
over time in response to common institutional pressures‟ which may exist at the 
individual or organizational field level. In other words, simply mimicking or 
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following existing norms, structures and practices is a strategy for achieving 
legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.152, cited in Carpenter and Feroz, 2001, 
p.571) suggest that „organisations tend to model themselves after similar 
organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful‟. 
To a large extent, the pursuit of institutional legitimacy is attributable to institutional 
isomorphism, which is an institutional tendency to conform to environments. 
Institutional isomorphism provides a significant insight into the dynamics of 
institutional decision making in the accounting standard-setting process. Under the 
premise that organisations pursue institutional legitimacy, it is expected that 
accounting standard setters may make decisions „at the margin‟, for instance by 
following preceding accounting models or standards or adopting commonly used 
practice. This implies a pattern of inertia in decision making. To this extent, in the 
institutional isomorphic process, several accounting standard setters may affect 
each other, or they may learn by adopting or following pre-existing accounting 
models developed by other accounting standard setters. 
In summary, on the basis of legitimacy theory, and considering also the foregoing 
discussion on stakeholder theory, the process of legitimating accounting 
standards can be characterised as a process of political compromise among the 
stakeholders concerned. Legitimacy theory indicates that in order to achieve a 
desirable, proper, or appropriate outcome given specific circumstances, the 
accounting standard setter tends to build a set of accounting rules by means of 
compromise, reflecting prominent stakeholders‟ interests and/or conforming to pre-
existing standards or pervasive practices. In essence, political compromise is 
necessary to achieve desirable, proper, and appropriate accounting standards. 
In adapting strategic determinants to achieve institutional legitimacy in the context 
of accounting standard setting, as suggested by previous studies, Figure 6 is 
based on the strategic management of legitimacy, showing how institutional 
legitimacy is pursued during due process, and how legitimacy functions in decision 
making in the standard-setting process. 
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Figure 6: Legitimacy in the context of the accounting standard-setting 
process 
 
In summary, accounting standard setters pursue legitimacy as an institutional 
objective for organisational survival and sustainability. In pursuit of legitimacy, the 
accounting standard setter attempts to manage legitimacy strategically in the 
standard-setting process. In the procedural context, the accounting standard 
setter ensures rightness in due process by facilitating stakeholders‟ participation. 
Several previous studies shed light on the active participation of stakeholders as a 
key element in institutional legitimacy. In addition, the accounting standard setter 
tends to produce an outcome in such a way that accounting standards are 
perceived as being legitimate by its environmental constituency. In the search for 
legitimacy, accounting standards tend to be set as a result of political compromise, 
reflecting the various interests of stakeholders, and particularly their power and 
urgency of their claim. Moreover, the accounting standard setter has a tendency to 
conform to pre-existing standards or practices because this is a simple way to 
ensure cognitive legitimacy. 
Despite extensive theoretical and empirical studies based on legitimacy theory, 
the discipline of carbon financial accounting remains unexamined in terms of 
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institutional legitimacy. Since accounting issues relating to ETS are relatively new 
and innately complex, it may be meaningful to investigate how the accounting 
standard setter sets accounting standards for ETS in light of institutional legitimacy. 
Accordingly, this study aims to understand the institutional dynamics of how the 
accounting standard setter makes choices in the matter of ETS from an 
institutional legitimacy perspective. 
3.3.4. Review of studies on participation/lobbying 
Viewing accounting standard setting as a political process, this section reviews 
previous research on the standard-setting process from a constituency 
perspective. 
Stakeholders‟ participation has been a critical issue in the standard-setting 
process, not only from the perspective of the accounting standard-setting 
organisation but also for academics. Numerous studies have explored 
stakeholders‟ participation behaviour and lobbying activities. In particular, many 
studies of stakeholders‟ participation have taken an empirical approach to 
examine stakeholders‟ participation in the context of various standard setters, 
including the FASB, IASB and several national accounting standard setters. 
Owing to the availability of data, most research (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Larson, 2007; Georgiou, 2002; Königsgruber, 2009) has traditionally been 
conducted on the basis of analysis of comment letters sent to the standard setter. 
Georgiou (2004) asserts that writing comment letters is significantly associated 
with other methods of lobbying, and has therefore been widely used as a valid 
proxy for lobbying. 
Accounting standard setters generally ensure opportunities for stakeholders‟ 
participation throughout the various stages of due process. This implies that 
interested stakeholders are deliberately given opportunities to lobby a rule maker 
in order to influence the outcome. Schalow (1995, cited in Jorissen et al., 2012, 
p.697) refers to „participation‟ as „actions which interested parties take to influence 
a rule-making body‟. Sutton (1984, p.92-3) describes lobbying as „the efforts of 
individuals and organisations to promote or obstruct new regulations whatever the 
source‟. Zeff (2012) defines „political lobbying‟ as action against a proposal where 
an economic entity intervenes for the purpose of pressuring for a change in the 
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proposal or affecting the views or attitudes of the authorities responsible for the 
proposal. By and large, stakeholders‟ attempts to influence the standard setter‟s 
decision-making to reflect their interests are referred to as either „participation‟ 
(Schalow, 1995) or „lobbying‟ (Königsgruber, 2009; Sutton, 1984; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978; Zeff, 2002; Zeff, 2012).  
Many studies have been carried out on the subject of lobbying activity in the 
accounting standard-setting process (e.g. Larson, 2007; Georgiou, 2002, 2004, 
2010; Giner and Arce, 2012; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Zeff, 2002). 
Interrelated issues have been explored, including whether or not to lobby, which 
method(s) of lobbying to use and what arguments to use, in the context of IASB, 
the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and other accounting standard setters 
(Georgiou, 2004). 
Most studies of lobbying activity in the accounting standard-setting process imply 
the extent to which self-interested political lobbying activities have accomplished 
certain accounting issues. Most notably, Sutton (1984) builds a theoretical 
framework for lobbying activities with the assumption that the accounting 
standard-setting process is a „fundamentally political process‟. Using Downs‟ cost-
benefit framework (voting model), Sutton devises a model to examine how 
lobbyists make choices on lobbying activity on the basis of cost-effective decision 
making (in Sutton‟s terms, decision making means to „express his or her voice‟). 
By means of a „rational-choice model‟ of lobbying, Sutton (1984) analyses who 
lobbies, when and why they lobby, and what methods they use in accordance with 
cost-effectiveness criteria. Sutton analyses the major features of lobbying activity, 
using examples from the accounting standard-setting process in the UK and the 
US. 
Sutton‟s (1984) model is regarded as the most notable study founded on 
economic theory. Consequently, it has been adopted by a wide range of later 
studies on lobbying activities in the standard-setting process (e.g. Georgiou, 2002, 
2004, 2010; Giner and Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2006; Orens et al., 2011; 
Tutticci et al., 1994; Weetman and Collins, 1996). Several studies have extended 
Sutton‟s model to a wide range of subjects relating to lobbying, such as motivation, 
timing, players, methods and effectiveness. 
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All examinations of lobbying activities have contributed to enhancing 
understanding of the political nature of the accounting standard-setting process 
(Georgiou, 2002) and to providing insights into stakeholders‟ participation in the 
process (Jorissen et al., 2012). 
Motivation 
Sutton‟s rational choice model of lobbying articulates the motivation for lobbying. 
According to Sutton‟s model, an individual will vote if the perceived utility of voting 
exceeds the cost, taking into account the probability of influencing the result. In 
other words, a stakeholder engages in lobbying activity only when the benefits of 
lobbying exceed the costs. The benefits are adjusted by the probability that the 
lobbying actions will change the outcome of the standard-setting process (Jorissen 
et al., 2013). The cost of voting includes the cost of engaging with the proposal 
and acquiring the expertise needed to respond to it. The cost-effectiveness 
criterion serves as a theoretical lens for a number of studies examining 
motivations for lobbying activities in the standard-setting process, and Sutton‟s 
(1984) model of motivation for lobbying has been re-examined by a number of 
studies. 
Meanwhile, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) apply positive theory to explain the 
drivers of stakeholders‟ participation. According to positive theory, the benefits of 
participation depend on the potential impact of a new accounting proposal on the 
cash flows of a company. Specifically, the new accounting proposal may 1) alter 
the political costs, 2) affect the accounting numbers as a result of internal or 
external contracts bringing additional burdens, or 3) affect information gathering 
and bookkeeping costs (Georgiou, 2002; Jorissen et al., 2012). In particular, the 
benefits of lobbying are more clearly articulated in terms of positive theory, for 
example the material impact on a company‟s financial statements, borrowing 
agreements, and compensation contracts for internal management (Georgiou, 
2002). Based on positive theory, Watts and Zimmerman (1986, cited in Orens et 
al., 2011) generally assume that corporate lobbying is associated with the overall 
economic impact of the proposal on the financial statements of preparers. 
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Positive theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) has been used by later studies to 
explore motivations for lobbying (e.g. Francis, 1987; MacArthur and Groves 1993; 
Schalow, 1995; Dechow et al., 1996; Seamann, 1999; Ang et al., 2000; Hill et al., 
2002; Georgiou and Roberts, 2004, all cited in Jorissen et al., 2012, p.699). With 
regard to the impact on companies‟ financial statements, Morris (1986) and 
Deakin (1989, cited in Georgiou, 2002) suggest that companies are more likely to 
take lobbying action when they expect higher debt costs from the potential 
implementation of the proposal. Jorissen et al. (2012) illustrate that a negative 
impact on a firm‟s cash flow or accounting numbers is a significant motivation for 
preparers to participate more in the standard-setting process. Similarly, focusing 
on financial firms anticipated to be affected by accounting changes in IFRS 4, Kosi 
and Reither (2014) reiterate the economic consequences resulting from an 
anticipated accounting change as the main driver of lobbying activity. Overall, in 
line with Watts and Zimmerman‟s (1978) positive theory, numerous studies have 
found that an adverse effect on cash flow is a critical element associated with 
preparers‟ participation in the standard-setting process (Jorissen et al., 2012). 
In summary, motivation for lobbying is associated mainly with economic 
consequences. Several studies find that preparers‟ lobbying is due largely to the 
significant effect of expected accounting standards on the accounting numbers. 
Attributes of lobbying or not lobbying 
In addition to studies on the economic motives leading to lobbying activities, many 
studies have explored the determinants of lobbying or not lobbying from various 
perspectives. For example, Tandy and Wilburn (1992) explore various 
determinants of participation or lack of participation, such as low expectations of 
influencing the standard setter, few or no rewards for writing in, the cost of 
participation, limited time, a belief that other respondents (such as trade 
associations) will adequately represent their views, and a lack of knowledge or 
expertise regarding a particular issue. 
Tandy and Wilburn‟s (1992) findings have been further elaborated by later 
academic research. Georgiou has carried out a number of empirical studies (e.g. 
Georgiou, 2002, 2004, 2010) on several cases, exploring various reasons for 
  
102 
engaging or not engaging in lobbying activities, using Sutton‟s (1984) model and 
Watts and Zimmerman‟s (1978) positive theory. 
Georgiou (2002) finds that the unlikelihood of influencing the outcome is an 
important factor resulting in non-submission. In addition, when external auditors 
represent a company‟s position, companies may not make an individual 
submission because they tend to rely on the auditors (Georgiou, 2002). This 
largely confirms the claims of previous studies (Gavens et al., 1989, Walker and 
Robinson, 1993) that companies do not make individual submissions; instead, 
they convey their interests to „special-interest groups‟ representing their interests.  
Moreover, whether companies agree or disagree with a proposal may drive their 
decisions on whether or not to respond (Georgiou, 2002). Companies that agree 
with the proposals tend not to respond, while companies that disagree are more 
likely to respond promptly (Georgiou, 2002). In line with Schalow‟s (1995) claim, 
overall agreement with the proposal may be an important factor leading to non-
participation in the process (Georgiou, 2002). Georgiou (2010) also reveals that 
the costs associated with acquiring the necessary expertise and time to participate 
in the process are a critical determinant of participation. This finding largely 
supports Sutton‟s (1984) assertion. 
The background of stakeholders may also affect the extent of their participation. 
Orens et al. (2011, cited in Larson and Herz, 2013) suggest that a country‟s 
accounting regulatory background may affect decisions to participate in the 
accounting standard-setting process. Larson and Herz (2013) point out that 
institutional and cultural differences between countries may result in variations in 
the relative level of comment letter participation by various stakeholder interest 
groups. 
In summary, lobbying activities are triggered by economic motivation; however, 
whether or not to lobby has a variety of determinants. Therefore, it is necessary to 
explore which prominent stakeholders emerge in the matter of accounting issues 
for ETS, whether they engage in lobbying activities, and why they participate in 
the process. In addition, based on the findings of previous studies, this study sets 
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out to examine various attributes of lobbying and not lobbying amongst the 
stakeholders of KASB. 
Timing 
Since due process is undertaken throughout the standard-setting process, 
stakeholders may have several opportunities to take lobbying action. In view of  a 
sequential process of standard-setting, Georgiou (2004) highlights that the timing 
of lobbying is an important factor in its effectiveness. 
A number of studies have asserted that lobbying at an earlier stage is considered 
more effective than at the post-exposure draft stage (e.g. Sutton, 1984; Jordan, 
1991). Specifically, Sutton (1984) mentions that lobbying at an early stage in the 
process is more likely to influence the outcome. He argues that such lobbying 
influences the decision maker more effectively, highlighting that lobbying on a pre-
exposure draft is more productive because the probability of influencing a rule 
maker tends to be higher when the rule-maker‟s preferences are still undecided. 
Sutton‟s assertion has been restated in a number of later studies. Jordan (1991, 
p.180, cited in Georgiou 2004) reiterates that the timing of lobbying is associated 
with its effectiveness, suggesting that „in the arena of politics there is an iron law 
from lobbyists that the time to influence legislation is the drafting or even the pre-
drafting stage‟. 
By contrast, with the case of ASB, Georgiou (2004, 2010) argues that companies 
are more likely to lobby during the public consultation process, such as at the 
exposure draft stage, than at an earlier stage of the process, such as agenda 
formation (Georgiou, 2004). Contrary to Sutton‟s (1984) assertion, Georgiou (2004, 
2010) finds that companies do not concentrate their lobbying activities on the early 
stages. 
On the basis of a multi-issue/multi-period approach, Jorissen et al. (2012) provide 
empirical evidence that the timing of participation in the process varies depending 
on the characteristics of stakeholders. Specifically, the accounting profession 
(including academics), standard setters and users are likely to participate in the 
process at an earlier stage, whereas preparers tend to participate in the process at 
a later stage. 
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In terms of the most effective timing for lobbying activities, previous studies 
provide various and inconsistent conclusions. Some studies (e.g. Sutton, 1984; 
Jordan, 1991) argue that lobbying at an earlier stage is more influential on 
standard setters, while others (e.g. Georgiou, 2004, 2010; Jorissen et al., 2012) 
argue that the most effective timing is variously perceived depending on the 
characteristics of stakeholders and the intention of lobbying at different time 
horizons.  
Given the inconsistent results of previous studies with regard to the most effective 
timing of lobbying activities, further investigation is required, from the early to later 
stages of the accounting standard-setting process, to identify the most effective 
timing of lobbying activities in the case of accounting issues for emissions rights. 
Players 
Most studies have concentrated largely on corporate lobbying activities, in 
particular as „preparers of the financial statements‟ (e.g. Francis, 1987; Georgiou, 
2004; Larson, 1997; MacArthur, 1988; Schalow, 1995, all cited in Georgiou, 2010), 
regarding the main characteristics of preparers who lobby and those who do not. 
Many studies suggest that preparers tend to participate more actively in the 
standard-setting process, whereas users are unlikely to be actively involved in the 
process (e.g. Durocher and Fortin, 2010; Georgiou, 2004, 2010, 2012; Giner and 
Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2012; Larson, 2007; Sutton, 1984; Tandy and Willburn, 
1992; Tutticci et al., 1994). Sutton (1984) asserts that preparers are more likely to 
be involved in lobbying activities than users because their potential benefits are 
greater. In line with Sutton‟s assertion, Georgiou (2010) demonstrates that the 
level of lobbying activities undertaken by investment management firms (users of 
financial statements) is lower than other groups, including preparers. In addition, 
Giner and Arce (2012) reiterate Sutton‟s (1984) rational choice model, showing 
that preparers are the most active group of stakeholders. Jorissen et al. (2013) 
also reveal that users are less engaged in formal participation than preparers. 
These findings confirm the assertions of previous studies (e.g. Sutton, 1984; 
Larson, 2007). 
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Accounting standard setters tend to put users‟ interests first when setting 
accounting standards (Georgiou, 2010; Durocher and Fortin, 2010). Nevertheless, 
several studies (e.g. Sutton, 1984; Georgiou, 2010) find that users are significantly 
less likely to engage in the process. Accounting standard setters encounter a low 
level of input from users compared with preparers, which implies that the users‟ 
perspective may be relatively neglected in the standard-setting process (Georgiou, 
2010). The findings of previous studies reveal a lack of user participation in the 
process, reiterating Young‟s (2003, 2006) scepticism about users‟ primary value. 
Similarly, Durocher and Fortin (2010, p.497) also find the value of user-oriented 
conceptual frameworks to be questionable in a practical context, to the extent that 
users‟ value is in „a symbolic rhetorical category‟ rather than „a true pragmatic 
concern‟. 
Previous studies generally show a scarcity of inputs from users in the standard-
setting process, which may adversely affect the legitimacy ultimately pursued by 
the standard setter. In order to maintain legitimacy, standard setters must 
proactively seek users‟ inputs by facilitating their participation in the standard-
setting process (Durocher and Fortin, 2010). 
Meanwhile, it is widely revealed that the participation of preparers tends to be 
uneven and partial, and that only a few preparers are proactively involved in the 
standard-setting process. Tandy and Wilburn (1992) identify the existence of 
dominant stakeholder interest groups in most countries, such as domestic 
accounting standard setters, professional accountancy bodies and public 
accounting firms. In addition, Jorissen et al. (2012) reveal that comparatively small 
numbers of responses are usually involved in public consultation processes, the 
majority being from entities potentially affected by a new accounting standard. 
Burlaud and Colasse (2011) observe that few stakeholders have sufficient 
financial and intellectual resources to participate in the standard-setting process. 
Since most accounting issues are complex, respondents need a high level of 
accounting knowledge in order to respond appropriately in the process. Most 
preparers must take into account the cost of participation, which may be an 
obstacle to participation in the process. On the whole, the findings indicate that 
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accounting standards may be formulated reflecting only the interests of certain 
interest groups proactively involved in the process (Jorissen et al., 2012). 
Moreover, a number of previous studies find that larger firms are more likely to 
engage in lobbying than small firms (Ang et al., 2000; Georgiou, 2002; Georgiou, 
2005; Giner and Arce, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2006; Larson, 2007; Sutton, 1984, 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Larger companies are more likely than non-
lobbying companies (smaller counterparts) to experience greater impacts on their 
financial statements from the implementation of potential proposals (Georgiou, 
2002). Of the companies that engage in lobbying activities, larger companies are 
more likely to be influential in the process than smaller ones (Georgiou, 2002). 
In summary, extant studies explore various aspects of stakeholders who lobby or 
not. Stakeholders are not equally involved in the standard-setting process, insofar 
as a few stakeholders have a loud voice, significantly influencing the standard 
setter. This implies a degree of variation in terms of stakeholders‟ lobbying or not 
lobbying, depending on the issues. With a paucity of previous studies of lobbying 
activities regarding ETS, it is meaningful to explore further who are the 
stakeholders in accounting issues on ETS, what are their interests, and how they 
respond in the accounting standard-setting process. 
Methods 
In terms of methods of lobbying, Georgiou (2004) illustrates that while direct 
lobbying methods include „submitting comment letters‟ and „meeting with officials 
from the standard setting body or holding speeches at public hearings‟, indirect 
methods include using an „intermediary‟, such as the media, auditors or 
accountancy bodies. Direct informal lobbying involves „private conversations‟ or 
„meeting with members of the standard setter‟. Larson and Herz (2013) show that 
a range of formal and informal methods are used to participate in the process and 
to influence IASB and other accounting standard-setting organisations. 
Sutton (1984) mentions that actors (stakeholders) may take advantage of various 
lobbying methods simultaneously in order to maximise the effectiveness of 
influencing a standard setter. Amongst various lobbying methods, he argues that 
lobbying in informal ways is more effective than through formal methods. In line 
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with Sutton‟s (1994) assertion, Tandy and Wilburn (1992) show that companies 
are more likely to use indirect methods. Stakeholders may channel their views 
through representative organisations such as industry associations or large public 
accounting firms (Tandy and Wilburn, 1992). Similarly to Tandy and Wilburn‟s 
(1992) evidence, Georgiou (2010) reveals that a substantial number of companies 
indirectly input their interests into „user representative organisations‟. Presumably, 
companies consider that industry organisations will represent their views more 
effectively (Georgiou, 2010; Orens et al., 2011; Tandy and Wilburn, 1992). 
Overall, the findings indicate that companies are likely to rely on „representative 
organisations‟ rather than direct participation, which may be one of the most 
important factors hindering companies‟ participation in the IASB process 
(Georgiou, 2010, cited in Orens et al., 2011, p.217). This implies that accounting 
standard setters should pay more attention to the views of „representative 
organisations‟ because a substantial number of firms rely on them. 
In summary, previous studies provide empirical findings that various lobbying 
methods are used in both formal and informal ways. This has important 
implications from a policy perspective, because the accounting standard setter is 
able to facilitate stakeholders‟ participation by identifying the main methods on 
which a number of stakeholders depend. In this regard, this study needs to 
conduct further exploration of the means of lobbying on which stakeholders rely to 
convey their interests to accounting standard setters. 
3.3.5. Summary and implications for research questions 
Overall, previous studies exploring the accounting standard-setting process have 
provided a better understanding of the political aspects of standard setting. From a 
standard setter‟s perspective, legitimacy theory provides a theoretical framework 
to visualise the dynamics of standard setting. In addition, numerous studies on 
lobbying activities in the standard-setting process capture various attributes from a 
stakeholder‟s point of view. 
Despite the range of contributions by previous studies regarding the accounting 
standard-setting process, there are some limitations. Extant studies have mainly 
explored a single issue under a single jurisdiction. In addition, most studies of the 
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accounting standard-setting process have focused on a particular stage of due 
process (e.g. the discussion paper stage), relying on an analysis of documents, 
mainly comments letters because of the accessibility of data. In order to overcome 
the weaknesses associated with the limited scope and research method of the 
studies, some research has attempted to extend the scope to multi-issue/multi-
period (e.g. Georgiou, 2005; Larson and Herz, 2013). Nevertheless, there is still a 
lack of empirical research demonstrating the effectiveness of lobbying activities. In 
this regard, Sutton (1984) highlights the need for further research through 
questionnaires and interviews in order to explore how inputs from lobbyists are 
accommodated into final outputs. This implies that further empirical research is 
necessary in order to assess the effectiveness of lobbying. 
Since the accounting issues arising from the introduction of ETS are relatively new 
from the financial accounting point of view, research on the standard-setting for 
ETS has not been previously undertaken. Considering that accounting standards 
are the refined outcomes of standard-setting process, it is necessary to investigate 
the standard-setting process in order to identify how accounting standard setters 
address any emerging issues and how they would find an appropriate solution. 
Unlike previous studies, this research probes the entire standard-setting process 
from agenda setting to the completion of an accounting standard and from a 
combined legitimacy and stakeholder point of view. In accordance with Sutton‟s 
(1984) suggestions for further study, this study explores the final outcome as a 
consequence of the consultation process, enabling an assessment of the 
effectiveness of lobbying activities. Moreover, this study relies not only on analysis 
of documents but also on face-to-face interviews. In contrast to other studies, 
accounting standard setters and stakeholders are interviewed in the field in order 
to obtain deeper and richer content. 
The main research gaps derived from the literature review are as follows. From an 
institutional legitimacy perspective, how does accounting standard setting proceed? 
How do accounting standard setters make decisions to maximise legitimacy when 
setting accounting standards for emissions rights? How do stakeholders become 
engaged in the standard-setting process? How do lobbying activities emerge in 
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the standard-setting process? And how effective is stakeholders‟ participation? 
(Research Question 2) 
In summary, by reviewing the previous studies on accounting issues in relation to 
emissions rights and related liability arising from ETS in Section 3.2, the first 
research gap is identified: how accounting standard setters tackle accounting 
issues under ETS in pursuit of desirable accounting standards for emission rights. 
Focusing on the political aspects of accounting standards, the second research 
gap emerge: how the accounting standard-setting process proceeds in the case of 
ETS.  
Having identified the research gaps by reviewing the literature, the next chapter 
addresses the methodological approach used to accomplish this research. 
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4. Methodology 
 Introduction 4.1.
The aim of this research is to provide a better understanding of how accounting 
issues under ETS are addressed by accounting standard setters in the standard-
setting process. The purpose of this chapter is to present the research questions 
and associated objectives and the general methodological approach and methods 
used in this study. Section 4.2 presents the research questions and related 
objectives. Section 4.3 discusses the research approach, including the 
philosophical assumptions, methodology and research methods on which this 
study is based. Section 4.4 describes how data were collected in the field, 
followed by the data analysis process in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 identifies some 
limitations which may arise in association with the research design on which this 
study relies. 
 Research questions and objectives 4.2.
Following the withdrawal of IFRIC 3, various efforts and suggestions have been 
made by professional accounting experts, including academics and practitioners, 
in search of authoritative accounting guidance for ETS. Nonetheless, due to the 
unique attributes embedded in emissions rights and the novelty of this issue 
compared with other common accounting issues, standard setting for emissions 
rights and related liabilities remains an ongoing task. Accordingly, this study sets 
out to examine how accounting standard setters have tackled problematic 
accounting issues under ETS in developing accounting standards for emissions 
rights since IFRIC 3 was revoked. Specifically, the study examines: (a) the 
accounting models with which IASB and FASB worked between 2008 and 2010; 
(b) a proposal made by ANC in 2012; and (c) Korean GAAP for emissions rights 
set up by KASB in 2014. Underpinned by the political nature of accounting 
standards, this study is concerned with how accounting standard setters introduce 
accounting standards for emissions rights under particular institutional conditions 
and with various stakeholder interests. Specifically, the standard-setting process is 
explored in the cases of IASB, ANC and KASB. In particular, the case of KASB is 
examined most closely throughout the standard-setting process from the agenda-
setting stage to the promulgation of the accounting standard. Since accounting 
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standards are regarded as the consequence of political compromise, this 
investigation into the standard-setting process is essential to understand how 
accounting standards are produced through interactions between the accounting 
standard setter and its stakeholders in the process of accounting standard setting 
for emissions rights. To this extent, the elements that determine the desirability or 
appropriateness of accounting standards will be identified from this investigation. 
Two research questions and associated objectives have been formulated from the 
research gaps identified from the review of related literature discussed in Chapter 
3 and the implications of a preliminary interview.39 These are as follows: 
Research Question 1: How does the accounting standard setter tackle accounting 
issues under ETS in the standard-setting process in order to achieve the most 
appropriate accounting standard? 
Objectives: 
 To examine the main accounting issues for emissions rights and related 
liabilities that have been addressed by accounting standard setters since 
IFRIC 3 was withdrawn, in the cases of IASB, ANC and KASB. 
 To examine how accounting standards for emissions rights are developed 
under different circumstances. 
 To probe how accounting standard setters cope with problematic accounting 
issues for ETS in particular contexts by coordinating the various interests of 
stakeholders. 
 To examine the factors which accounting standard setters take into 
consideration in the standard-setting process and how these factors affect the 
development of accounting standards for emissions rights. 
 To identify the main features of the most appropriate solution for the 
incorporation of accounting issues for emissions rights into the existing 
accounting framework. 
                                            
39
 A preliminary interview with KASB was undertaken in April 2013. KASB had been aware of the necessity 
for an accounting standard for emissions rights with the commencement of the Korean ETS, and it 
subsequently established an ETS project to develop this accounting standard. 
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 To gain insights into how the accounting regime accommodates new policy 
issues arising from ETS into the existing accounting framework. 
 To gain insights into the role of practice and preceding accounting models in 
developing accounting standards for emissions rights. 
 To gain insights into the determinants of the desirability and appropriateness 
of accounting standards for emissions rights subject to various factors and 
circumstances. 
Research Question 2: How does the accounting standard-setting process proceed 
in the case of ETS? 
Objectives: 
 To examine the accounting standard-setting process for emissions rights in the 
cases of IASB, ANC and KASB. 
 To identify the main stakeholders and the specific interests of stakeholders in 
relation to accounting issues for emissions rights. 
 To examine how stakeholders attempt to reflect their interests in the standard-
setting process, thereby identifying various features of stakeholders‟ 
participation in the process. 
 To explore how the accounting standard setter makes decisions in setting 
accounting rules for emissions rights from the perspective of legitimacy. 
 To examine the extent to which the interests of stakeholders are 
accommodated, and thereby assess the effectiveness of stakeholders‟ 
lobbying activities. 
 To gain insights into political features of the accounting standard-setting 
process. 
 To gain insights into how institutional legitimacy is pursued in the standard-
setting process and how legitimacy functions in decision making in setting 
accounting standards for emissions rights. 
 To gain insights into interactions and cooperation between standard setters 
that enhance the quality of accounting standards and ensure institutional 
legitimacy. 
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 Research approach 4.3.
4.3.1. Philosophical assumptions 
The first step in research design is to articulate the research framework adopted. 
McKerchar (2010, p.63) refers to a research framework as „the theoretical 
underpinning or inquiry paradigm‟ adopted when designing research. Grix (2004, 
p.171, cited in McKerchar, 2010, p.63) posits that „the research framework is the 
philosophical underlying that provides some indication for where research is 
originated, what research is doing, and how research is being done‟. This implies 
that, in designing research, it is essential to articulate the type of research 
framework chosen, as the choice of research framework will affect all elements of 
the research design, including methodology, methods and analysis (McKerchar, 
2010). In addition, as readers interpret the research outcomes or examine the 
contribution of the research, the research framework provides them with 
„expectations‟ regarding elements of the research (McKerchar, 2010, p.65). This 
indicates that the research framework is connected with all research processes, 
not only to the design, but also to the analysis and interpretation of the findings. 
The research framework reflects underlying philosophical assumptions about how 
a researcher views the world, referred to as „ontology‟, and how a researcher 
believes that knowledge is created, referred to as „epistemology‟ (McKerchar, 
2010). The philosophical assumptions and theoretical framework link to create the 
overall research process (Creswell, 2003). In other words, a philosophic 
orientation to inquiry will affect the formulation of the framework, the 
understanding of the nature of the qualitative approach and the conduct of the 
research in the field (Creswell, 2003). 
In this regard, for the purpose of understanding the orientation and objective of 
this research, firstly the research framework is identified, reflecting the 
philosophical assumptions of ontology and epistemology. Bryman and Bell (2011) 
presents two types of ontological positions: objectivism and constructivism. Oats 
(2012b) distinguishes two ontological assumptions: „realism‟ and „nominalism‟. 
Both „objectivism‟ and „realism‟ take the ontological position that social 
phenomena (or social worlds) exist independently of and separately from the 
individual‟s perception of them (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Oats, 2012b). By contrast, 
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„constructivism‟ and „nominalism‟ take the opposite stance in terms of ontological 
position, viewing society as relative (Oats, 2012b). Specifically, nominalism is 
based on the assumption that the social world consists of names or concepts to 
which social actors refer (Oats, 2012b). Constructivism assumes that social 
phenomena are continuously accomplished by social actors, implying that society 
is built up of social interactions and is being changed over time (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). 
From an ontological perspective, the philosophical position of this research is 
constructivist in nature because it examines meanings or knowledge 
accomplished by social entities engaged in the Korean ETS. In particular, it 
explores the process of how the accounting standard for ETS in Korea was 
formulated as a consequence of interactions between social actors, i.e. KASB and 
Korean companies. In light of this ontological position, the researcher adopts a 
subjective position toward society. In other words, society is explored as a 
subjective reality resulting from interactions between social actors. Specifically, 
meanings and knowledge are explored on the basis of the perception that an 
accounting standard for ETS (a social phenomenon) is being built by interactions 
between the accounting standard setter and stakeholders (social actors). 
In relation to epistemology, Bryman and Bell (2011) and Oats (2012b) categorise 
two epistemological positions: positivism and interpretivism. Interpretivism is a 
predominantly non-positivist assumption. Bryman and Bell (2011) refers to 
interpretivism as a term to contrast with positivism, while McKerchar (2010, p.74) 
suggests that interpretivism is a core, „non-positivist‟ theoretical paradigm. 
Oats (2012b, p.11) defines positivism as an epistemological assumption that 
„seeks to explain and predict by searching for causes, patterns and relationships 
that hold across space and time. Hypotheses are developed from theories and 
then tested‟. Guba and Lincoln (2005, pp.195-203, cited in McKerchar, 2010, p.72) 
state that „positivism does assume that the researcher is completely objective and 
relies on empirical means to create scientific truth and knowledge about reality‟. 
Accordingly, in the context of positivism a researcher takes an objective position in 
explaining social reality. Correspondingly, positivist researchers take an objective 
stand and create knowledge through „deductive reasoning‟ on the basis of 
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empirical evidence or tested theories (McKerchar, 2010). Thus, researchers with 
positivist assumptions tend to adopt a quantitative methodology in designing their 
research. 
On the other hand, interpretivism is based on a philosophical view that „social 
science cannot create true objective knowledge of any kind‟ (Oats, 2012b, p.11). 
This is a view that social phenomena are outcomes of interactions of social 
entities, and therefore it is necessary to go inside the worlds in order to establish 
the meaning of the social construction (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Oats, 2012b). 
Interpretivism assumes that „the knowledge created is subjective and that the 
findings are probably true for their given context‟ (McKerchar, 2010, p.75). In this 
regard, interpretivism provides interpretations regarding social reality from a 
researcher‟s own subjective perspective (McKerchar, 2010). Interpretation 
accordingly entails an understanding of social reality reflecting the researcher‟s 
own perspective, philosophy, personal experiences and existing knowledge. In 
this context, Chua (1988, p.60) refers to interpretation of interpretivism describing: 
„this philosophical tradition focuses on the constructive and interpretive action of 
people, whether it be their ability to organise sense data through forms of a priori 
knowledge, or as reflected in the essentials of their experiences‟. In essence, 
interpretivist researchers commonly create knowledge through inductive reasoning. 
McKerchar (2010) claims that a qualitative methodology is generally adopted with 
an interpretivist approach. Nevertheless, she argues that the typical linkage 
between methodology and philosophical foundation is not rigid. 
As an epistemological position, the underlying philosophy of this study is 
consistent with interpretivism. On the basis of an interpretive stance, this research 
elicits findings from inside a particular society involved in the Korean ETS and in 
the governance surrounding accounting standard setting in Korea. Knowledge 
claims for this research are created by interpreting the meanings constructed by 
stakeholders engaged in setting up an accounting standard in the run-up to the 
commencement of the Korean ETS. This research investigates the interests of the 
main stakeholders with regard to ETS accounting issues, and how these interests 
are reflected in the new accounting standard for ETS.  
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The researcher‟s own background plays a key role in interpreting the findings of 
the study. For instance, the author has experience of establishing the Korean ETS 
bill and the subordinate Presidential Decree of the Bill in 2012, and was engaged 
in a variety of technical work, including documenting a draft of the subordinate 
Presidential Decree of the Korean ETS bill and a number of internal reports, and 
conducting consultations with various stakeholders. This background provides a 
better understanding of stakeholders‟ interactions, and insights into the Korean 
ETS and emerging accounting issues corresponding with the commencement of 
the Korean ETS. The researcher‟s background supports the appreciation of 
phenomena in relation to the Korean ETS and related accounting issues, resulting 
in profound interpretations of the findings through her own lens. 
On the basis of interpretation of the findings, discussion is developed to support 
knowledge claims for plausible solutions to resolve problematic accounting issues 
under ETS, the political nature of the accounting standard-setting process, and 
elements determining the desirability and appropriateness of the accounting 
standard in the case of ETS. This process is undertaken in accordance with an 
interpretive understanding of both social phenomena and the views of social 
entities. 
4.3.2. Methodology 
McKerchar (2010, p.90) refers to methodology as an overall guideline to how the 
research will proceed and a platform for choosing methods for research. Thus, 
aligned with the philosophical assumptions of the researcher, the methodological 
approach influences the nature of data collection (McKerchar, 2010). 
Using a quantitative methodology, researchers seek „objective and absolute truth‟ 
on the basis of a view that the world can be described objectively (McKerchar, 
2012). Accordingly, this approach requires a researcher to adopt an objective or 
neutral position. Furthermore, in terms of epistemology, a quantitative 
methodology reflects a view that knowledge is created by facts and observations 
verified by an empirical approach. The quantitative approach is driven by 
deductive reasoning, hypothesis testing, the study of variables, or making 
statistical generalisations (McKerchar, 2010, 2012). 
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On the other hand, qualitative research involves interpretive inquiry, in which 
researchers go into society to collect data, and interpret data from their viewpoint 
on the world on the basis of inductive reasoning. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) point 
to interpretivism as an essential attribute of qualitative research as follows: 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world. Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive, material 
practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the 
world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including 
field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and 
memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that 
qualitative researchers study things in their natural setting, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.3). 
Since the research framework of this study is philosophically based on 
interpretivism, as mentioned above, the research uses a qualitative methodology. 
Qualitative research is more suitable for this research on the grounds that the 
research topic is a novel issue, so neither sufficient data have been accumulated 
to undertake quantitative research nor has a relevant applicable theory been 
developed. Creswell (2013, p.40) states that qualitative research can be used 
when „quantitative measures and the statistical analysis simply do not fit the 
problem‟. In financial accounting, emissions trading schemes are regarded as a 
novel issue because little research on accounting issues under ETS has been 
carried out to date. Accordingly, it is difficult for accounting researchers to identify 
the critical „variables‟ that need to be examined: „Qualitative research is 
exploratory and is useful when the researcher does not know the important 
variable to examine‟ (Morse, 1991, cited in Creswell, 2003, p.22). 
Qualitative research is appropriate when a research topic is being explored 
without being backed up by theory (Creswell, 2003). Morse (1991, p.12, cited in 
Creswell, 2003, pp.74-5) specifies the conditions under which qualitative research 
may be more suitable: 
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(a) the concept is „immature‟ due to a conspicuous lack of theory and 
previous research; (b) a notion that the available theory may be 
inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; (c) a need exists to 
explore and describe the phenomena and to develop theory; or (d) the 
nature of the phenomenon may not be suited to quantitative measures. 
In particular, the accounting issues regarding ETS have not previously been 
explored in Korea. Therefore, a qualitative approach is very appropriate to this 
research inquiry and the scope of investigation, in which the phenomenon 
(accounting issues under ETS) in the Korean context needs to be understood, 
rather than empirically testing a particular theory. 
In qualitative research, the researcher interprets the data, which involves 
developing a description of an individual or setting, analysing data for themes or 
categories, and finally interpreting or drawing personal and theoretical conclusions 
about its meaning, stating the lessons learned and suggesting further questions to 
be asked (Wolcott, 1994, cited in Creswell, 2003, p.182). This also means that the 
researcher filters the data through a personal lens situated in a specific socio-
political and historical moment. 
Prior to the launch of the Korean ETS in 2015, setting up the accounting standard 
for ETS had been under discussion in Korea. Whilst conducting a pilot interview 
with KASB in 2013, it was noticed that KASB had outlined an ETS project to set 
the accounting standard for emissions rights just as this research was 
commencing. This research aims to explore how accounting issues under ETS are 
addressed in the standard-setting process and how various factors are 
accommodated into the standard in the Korean context. In addition, this research 
investigates stakeholders‟ views and actions toward the accounting standard for 
ETS. Based on the meanings and useful findings from this research, policy issues 
on ETS will be raised from the perspective of accounting. It should be noted that 
such knowledge claims cannot be gained from experimental data. Since this 
research inquiry is connected with exploring interactions between social actors 
toward a certain object, knowledge claims are created by interpreting empirical 
data in the field. 
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In essence, taking account of all attributes of this research, including the novelty of 
the topic, the aims of the study and the implications of the findings, this research 
proceeds by taking a qualitative approach on the basis of interpretivism. 
4.3.3. Research methods 
Research methods are a specific technique for collecting data. Oats (2012a, p.9) 
states that „methods refer to the specific techniques employed in the pursuit of 
research, including data collection and data analysis‟. Methods are means by 
which data are collected, such as experiments, interviews and surveys 
(McKerchar, 2010). 
Oats (2012a) highlights the necessity for alignment throughout the elements of 
research, including research framework (philosophical assumption), methodology 
and methods. In this regard, the method needs to be consistent with the 
qualitative and interpretive methodology adopted for this research (McKerchar, 
2010). 
Creswell (2003, p.198) claims that qualitative research occurs „in natural settings 
where human behaviours arise and social events take place‟. This implies that 
qualitative research entails fieldwork for data collection. In line with the interpretive 
approach, qualitative methods, including field notes, interviews, conversations, 
recordings and memos, are techniques for transforming the world into a series of 
data sets.  
Interviews  
Among the various qualitative methods available, interviews are critically important 
for an interpretive approach (Oats, 2012a). Interviews are usually employed when 
a researcher seeks to obtain more „in-depth insight‟ into a particular topic of 
interest (Denscombe, 1998). Bryman and Bell (2011) refers to interviews 
employed in connection with qualitative research as „qualitative interviews‟.  
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p.29) refer to the advantages of qualitative interviews 
as a research method as „a unique potential for obtaining access to and describing 
the lived everyday world‟ and „privileged access to people‟s basic experience of 
the lived world‟. They describe qualitative interviews as a „knowledge-producing 
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activity‟ (cited in Oats, 2012a, p.20). Qualitative interviews allow a researcher to 
be objective in terms of obtaining data which is non-biased, „real data‟ or an 
interviewee‟s „authentic meaning‟ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p.29). Following 
the data collection, the researcher moves into a subjective position from which the 
findings are interpreted by the researcher, creating a narrative (Oats, 2012a). 
There are two main types of qualitative interview: unstructured and semi-
structured. 
Starting with a single question introducing a theme or topic, unstructured 
interviews are similar to informal conversation (Bryman and Bell, 2011; 
Denscombe, 1998). On the other hand, semi-structured interviews address a list of 
questions or issues, although the interviewer has flexibility in terms of the order of 
questions, in order to encourage interviewees to develop or elaborate their own 
views or explanations of processes, beliefs or experiences (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Bryman and Bell (2011, p.467) describes how to conduct semi-structured 
interviews as follows: 
The researcher has a list of questions on fairly specific topics to be 
covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has 
a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions may not follow on 
exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. Questions that are not 
included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up on 
things said by interviewees. But, by and large, all the questions will be 
asked. 
Semi-structured interviews are an appropriate approach particularly if interviewees‟ 
views are vital for understanding social circumstances (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
On the whole, as a research method, interviews have the advantage of generating 
in-depth information. They are a useful research method when a research topic is 
associated with exploring a phenomenon in depth and in detail (Denscombe, 
1998). This is because interviews enable a researcher to obtain valuable and 
profound data from „key informants‟ who are deliberately chosen to give their own 
unique perspectives and concerns on a specific issue (Denscombe, 1998). 
Furthermore, the process of interviewing is flexible, and an interviewer can adjust 
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a line of inquiry depending on an interviewee‟s response during the interview 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Denscombe, 1998). 
In this regard, semi-structured, in-depth interviews are the main research method 
used in this research, and the interviews were conducted face-to-face. A semi-
structured interview aims to understand themes of everyday lives in relation to the 
subject of research. The purpose of the interview is to obtain interviewees‟ 
descriptions of phenomena, while the researcher interprets the meaning of the 
descriptions. Conducting semi-structured interviews as a method of collecting data 
in this research enabled the collection of profound information with „real‟ and 
„authentic‟ meanings in relation to accounting issues for ETS. 
The main objective of this study is to explore how accounting issues under ETS 
were tackled by KASB in the standard-setting process. In particular, this study is 
concerned with the institutional dynamics between the accounting standard setter 
and stakeholders. Accordingly, key players were identified who were engaged in 
setting up the accounting standard for emissions rights in Korea. These key 
players provided „privileged views and opinions‟ on the accounting issues in the 
field. In-depth interviews were conducted with key practitioners in KASB and the 
main interested stakeholders who participated in the standard-setting process.  
Another distinctive objective of this research is to explore the position of IASB 
toward ETS accounting issues. Although public documents released by IASB are 
accessible, they do not provide sufficiently rich data regarding, for example, why 
IASB has delayed releasing an IFRS for ETS, and what position it has taken with 
regard to establishing an accounting standard for ETS. In order to accomplish this 
research, it is necessary to understand the real and authentic concerns 
underpinning this issue from IASB‟s point of view. Given the limited access to data, 
semi-structured interviews with IASB were carried out in order to acquire rich and 
in-depth views on accounting issues for ETS. 
An interview with ANC was also undertaken. ANC released a proposal for the 
accounting treatment of emissions rights and related liabilities in the form of 
French GAAP in 2012. ANC‟s proposal emerged following the withdrawal of IFRIC 
3, and this proposal influenced later attempts by other accounting standard setters 
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in need of an accounting standard for emissions rights, including KASB. The case 
of ANC was regarded as significant progress in the evolution of accounting models 
under ETS once IFRIC 3 had been revoked. Thus, a semi-structured interview 
was conducted with ANC in order to obtain in-depth data, including the 
background, the underlying logic of the accounting model and the real sources of 
a potential solution. 
Overall, in-depth interviews supported the gathering of rich and tangible data to 
assess a variety of factors functioning in standard setting, such as the extent to 
which the stance of the standard setter was transformed and why standard setters‟ 
views changed. 
Document analysis 
In addition to interviews, document analysis is used in qualitative research. 
Documents are critical sources for research in enhancing understanding of „events, 
processes and transformations in the context of social relations‟ (May, 2001). 
Bowen (2009) defines document analysis as „a systematic procedure for reviewing 
or evaluating documents‟. Document analysis has several advantages from 
various perspectives. Bowen (2009) suggests that documents may be exploited as 
„supplementary research data‟, and enable a researcher to gain not only 
information but also insights into the extent to which research contributes to a 
particular body of knowledge. Furthermore, documents provide an important 
source to track a change or development and verify the findings obtained from 
other sources (Bowen, 2009). Flick (2006) posits the necessity for analysis of 
documents in qualitative research as a „complementary strategy‟ to other methods 
such as interviews. 
Document analysis can be used throughout a research study, for example for 
building background information, generating research questions to be explored, 
and verifying evidence from other sources (Bowen, 2009). In addition, document 
analysis is applicable to qualitative research, in combination with other qualitative 
research methods such as interviews or observation (Bowen, 2009). Atkinson and 
Coffey (2004, p.58) state that documentary data are an essential part of qualitative 
analyses, as „there are many research questions and research settings that 
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cannot be investigated adequately without reference to the production and use of 
documentary materials‟. 
Furthermore, document analysis is an important research method in conducting 
„thematic analysis‟. Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006, p.32, cited in Bowen, 2009) 
refer to thematic analysis as „a form of pattern recognition within the data, with 
emerging themes becoming the categories for analysis‟. Document analysis allows 
for „rich textual thematic analysis‟ (Altheide, 2000). This implies the importance of 
document analysis as a means of data triangulation, where a researcher pursues 
„multiple sources of evidence‟, seeking „convergence and corroboration through 
the use of different data sources and methods‟ (Bowen, 2009, p.28). 
Considering the range of research settings and the posited research questions in 
this study (Section 4.2), document analysis provided useful supplementary 
research data in the form of relevant information and insights to describe the 
findings with reliable and detailed content. Analysis of relevant documents 
enabled the findings from interviews to be corroborated and verified, such as the 
background and underlying logics of the accounting models that each accounting 
standard setter dealt with, the arguments on accounting issues under ETS, and 
changes in stance by accounting standard setters. In effect, document analysis 
was of great methodological value for this research. 
In summary, semi-structured interviews were used as the primary research 
method, and document analysis was undertaken as a complementary method. 
Since relevant documents were obtained not only by accessing publicly available 
online sites but also directly from interviewees in the field, document analysis was 
carried out intentionally to contextualise interviewees‟ general statements and 
illuminate underlying meanings in their statements. In addition, documents 
enabled subsequent events in the accounting standard-setting process to be 
followed up after completion of the interviews in the field. 
 Fieldwork activities 4.4.
Miles and Huberman (1994, cited in Creswell, 2003, p.185) state that four aspects 
must be considered in relation to the selection of participants or sites: the setting 
(where the research will take place), the actors (who will be observed or 
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interviewed), the events (what the actors will be observed or interviewed doing), 
and the process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by the actors within the 
setting). In terms of these four factors, the data collection for this study was 
purposely bounded as follows. 
Setting: The fieldwork was conducted mainly in Korea. In addition, in order to 
address research questions in relation to accounting issues for ETS, fieldwork was 
also conducted in London and Paris where IASB and ANC are located. 
Actors: The prominent actors in relation to the research questions are accounting 
standard setters. KASB is the most critical actor in this setting, as well as IASB 
and ANC. In addition, stakeholders of KASB were intentionally contacted in order 
to obtain their views and perspectives on the issues. 
Events: The core event in this study is the accounting standard-setting process for 
ETS following the withdrawal of IFRIC 3. This study focuses mainly on the 
standard setting of Korean GAAP for emissions rights. It also explores previous 
discussions in which IASB and ANC had been involved in setting up accounting 
standards for emissions rights. 
Processes: With regard to Research Question 2, this research follows the entire 
process of accounting standard setting for emissions rights in the context of KASB. 
This process consisted of several stages, including KAI Forum meetings, technical 
committee meetings, KASB meetings and public hearings. 
 Interviews 4.5.
Samples were chosen on the basis of non-probability sampling; in other words, 
interviewees were purposefully selected. Purposive sample selection is beneficial 
when specific people may make a special contribution to the research because 
they have unique insights or are in a specific position in an organisation 
(Denscombe, 1998). Creswell (2003, p.185) also considers intentional sampling in 
fieldwork to be a common attribute of qualitative research. 
The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select 
participants or sites (or documents or visual material) that will best help 
the researcher understand the problem and the research question. This 
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does not necessarily suggest random sampling or selection of a large 
number of participants and sites, as typically found in quantitative 
research. 
Identification of stakeholders is an essential stage for determining whom I would 
interview. Since Mitchell et al. (1997) emphasised as a role of managers to 
determine stakeholder salience on the basis of manager‟s perception of 
stakeholder‟s attributes (see Section 3.3.2). For this research, I viewed KASB as a 
„manager‟ in Mitchell et al. (1997)‟s terms; accordingly, the interview samples were 
mainly chosen on the basis of observation on how KASB perceived its 
stakeholders in the development of accounting standards for ETS. Sampling was 
deliberately conducted among  stakeholders which KASB had explicitly identified 
as important and were consulted  and got involved in consultation process of the 
development of the Korean ETS. 
Moreover, given the limited time and resources available for the research, it was 
important to interview the „right‟ person who could answer the research questions. 
The selection of interviewees was attributed to my judgment on the basis of work 
experience in the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) during 2011-
2012. When I was involved in establishing the Presidential Decree of the Korean 
ETS bill in 2012, I carried out several consultations with various stakeholders with 
regard to the Korean ETS. This work experience supported the identification of 
appropriate individuals who had taken part in accounting standard setting for ETS. 
Since the introduction of ETS in Korea was keenly controversial among 
stakeholders, a variety of groups such as government, NGOs, companies, and 
experts in climate change was regarded as stakeholders with great interests in the 
issues of ETS. Amongst them, it is critically essential to identify who constitutes 
the appropriate stakeholder group for the accounting issues for ETS. Thanks to 
my work experience, I was able to judge who would be more relevant to 
researching the accounting issues for ETS. 
A deliberately selected sample was expected to provide more relevant answers to 
the research questions than a randomly selected sample. Since the research topic 
is associated mainly with accounting issues in the Korean ETS, purposive 
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sampling led to concentration on a specific population to conduct in-depth face-to-
face interviews. 
The primary data collection method in this study was face-to-face semi-structured 
interviews. Interviews were conducted with two phases. As the first phase, a 
preliminary interview was carried out with the KASB in March 2013 because I 
intended to identify which were the key interest parties forKASB. At the start of the 
ETS project in March 2013, KASB held the KAI forum as a form of public hearing 
(The 120th KAI forum). It invited POSCO (the largest emitter among Korean 
companies), Ministry of Environment (the competent authority), Samjeong KPMG 
and Samil PwC (big four accounting firms) to present in the forum. In addition to 
these entities, when launching the technical committee for ETS in 2014, KASB 
called Financial Services Commission (the supervisory authority of financial 
market in Korea), South-East power Co. (one of electricity generation companies) 
as a member of the committee. The attendants in the KAI forum and the member 
of the technical committee assisted me to identify whom KASB perceived to be the 
most relevant stakeholders for this issue. The participants in the KAI forum were 
Korean companies-especially large emitters, accounting exerts in accounting firms, 
and the government. 
Moreover, this preliminary interview also suggested the necessity for interviews 
with IASB and ANC. During the preliminary interviews, I found KASB to have 
relied significantly on the cases of IASB and ANC. KASB referred to all preceding 
models available in English version including IFRIC 3, the accounting models 
developed by IASB in 2008-2010 and by ANC in 2012. KASB staff posited that the 
accounting model of IASB was different from that of ANC due to the different 
perspective toward emissions rights and related liabilities. Both models were 
analysed by KASB in the pursuit of the most appropriate model in Korea. It 
provided good grounds for justifying key players who were able to provide 
privileged information regarding the research inquiry. I made judgment on 
necessity of interview with IASB and ANC in order to see how the preceding 
models may affect the development of accounting model for emissions rights and 
related liabilities in Korea. Given KASB‟s reliance on IASB and ANC, it was 
decided from the perspective of stakeholders‟ salience, that other accounting 
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standard setters may not be of great relevance in terms of accounting issues 
under ETS. Accordingly, interviews with standard setters (in addition to KASB) 
only involved members of IASB and ANC and other accounting standard setters 
were not included. 
On the basis of the preliminary interview with KASB and the researcher‟s private 
network, I was able to judge who may be a right person as stakeholders for this 
issue. The stakeholder group consists of accounting standard setters, companies 
who may be categorised as large emitters, industry associations, government, 
public organisations, and accounting experts. 
Amongst various stakeholders in relation to ETS issues, I deliberately excluded 
NGOs because NGOs did not constitute major stakeholders according to 
stakeholders‟ salience insofar as the accounting issues for ETS. NGOs had not 
delivered any interest or expressed any concern in relation to accounting issues 
for ETS to KASB beforehand. As a consequence, they were not invited in the KAI 
forum for the development of accounting standard for ETS. Although they were 
regarded as one of the most important stakeholders with regard to ETS, they 
seemed to be perceived by KASB as an irrelevant entity with regard to the 
accounting issues for ETS. On the grounds of stakeholder‟s salience and 
considering KASB‟s decision, I decided not to interview members of NGOs. 
Based upon my judgment, interviewees were nominated and contacted by email in 
order to make arrangements for interviews. I selected Korean companies mainly 
considered to be „large emitters‟ in Korea. Based on the historical record of 
emissions per year, I contacted companies ranked within top-ten emitters since 
they are mainly responsible for producing carbon emissions in Korea. The 
companies ranked within top-ten emitters mainly belonged to steel, petroleum, 
power generation, cement, semi-conductor industries. In addition to companies, I 
deliberately included a certain industry association in the list of interviewees. 
Among a wide range of industry associations in Korea, I selected the Federation 
of Korean Industries, referred to as FKI, a multifunctional association for domestic 
industries, which exists in the form of an incorporated body. FKI is composed of 
representatives from the major corporations in Korea. In addition, FKI has 
association members, which represent major corporations whose annual sales 
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should be fifty billion KRW. 40 In other words, FKI is regarded as a representative 
association on behalf of large companies in all industrial sectors such as 
manufacturing, finance, construction, wholesales and trade, transportation and 
storage, electricity and gas, and telecommunications. Since most large emitters in 
Korea are member of FKI, I believed that an interview with FKI would be 
appropriate in order to identify its role regarding the issue for this research. 
In relation to the accounting experts, I intentionally contacted a few accountants 
who were working in the big-four accounting firms in Korea. For the „accounting 
experts‟, most accountants in Korea are members of the professional accounting 
body in Korea, called ‟Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA)‟. 
Accountants working in the accounting firms such as the big-four accounting firms 
are technically in charge of financial reporting. Accordingly, I made the judgment 
that accountants working in the big-four accounting firms were much more 
appropriate experts to answer the technical accounting issues in relation to ETS. 
Korean government also needed to be interviewed: the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance were deliberately selected because they 
are mainly in charge of the ETS policy in Korea. In particular, I chose to interview 
the Task Force Team of ETS in the Ministry of Environment, which is the 
competent authority of ETS in Korea. In addition, I deliberately included public 
organisations in relation to ETS or energy since I was aware that some public 
organisations were conducting research on accounting and taxations issues for 
Korean ETS. Besides, I intentionally contacted persons or organisations which 
were able to provide appropriate views on the Korean ETS development. Some 
experts in climate change and a director in charge of operation of the carbon 
exchange market in the Korean Exchange were therefore also included. 
While carrying out the fieldwork, more interviewees emerged through so-called 
„snowballing‟. Snowball sampling is a type of interview process in which the 
number of interviewees is extended in the process of interviewing (Denscombe, 
1998). Snowballing is a complementary method in the sense of not only extending 
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the size of sample but also enhancing the credibility of interviews, and in this 
regard it is technically compatible with purposive sampling (Denscombe, 1998). 
Once an interviewer has embarked on research with a few interviewees, each 
interviewee may nominate relevant people who may need to be included in the 
sample (Denscombe, 1998). As a consequence of snowballing, a director working 
in the accounting and finance division in GS Caltex Co., an accounting standard 
setter working in IASB and an accounting expert having worked in IASB were 
additionally interviewed.  
Interviewees were asked to nominate other individuals who might be relevant to 
this topic. In Korea, 17 interviews were undertaken, including one focus group 
interview. In London, two interviews were carried out with experts from IASB. One 
interview was undertaken in Paris and another in Munich. Overall 21 interviews 
with 32 participants were conducted. The final list of participants is presented in 
Table 4.  
Table 4: List of interviewees 
Interview Participant Code Role Name of 
institution 
Date 
1 1 ASS 1 Accounting 
standard-setter  
KASB 05/03/2014 
2 ASS 2 Accounting 
standard-setter  
KASB 05/03/2014 
2 3 ASS 3 Accounting 
standard-setter  
KASB 04/04/2014 
3 4 ASS 4 Accounting 
standard-setter  
IASB 05/06/2014 
4 5 ASS 5 Accounting 
standard-setter  
IASB 06/06/2014 
6 ASS 6 Accounting 
standard-setter  
IASB 06/06/2014 
5 7 ASS 7 Accounting 
standard-setter  
ANC 01/07/2014 
8 ASS 8 Accounting 
standard-setter  
ANC 01/07/2014 
6 9 EXP_ACC 1 Accounting 
Expert 
Siemens 03/07/2014 
7 10 EXP_ACC 2 Accounting 
Expert 
KPMG Korea 07/03/2014 
11 EXP_ACC 3 Accounting 
Expert 
KPMG Korea 07/03/2014 
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8 12 EXP_ACC 4 Accounting 
Expert 
PwC Korea 03/03/2014 
9 13 COM 1 Industry POSCO 05/03/2014 
10 14 COM 2 Industry GS Caltex 11/03/2014 
15 COM 3 Industry GS Caltex 11/03/2014 
11 16 COM 4 Industry GS Caltex 07/05/2014 
12 17 COM 5 Industry Samsung Elec. 12/03/2014 
18 COM 6 Industry Samsung Elec. 12/03/2014 
19 COM 7 Industry Samsung Elec. 12/03/2014 
20 COM 8 Industry  12/03/2014 
13 21 COM 9 Industry South-East 
Power Co. 
07/03/2014 
22 COM 10 Industry South-East 
Power Co. 
07/03/2014 
23 COM 11 Industry  07/03/2014 
14 24 COM 12 Industries 
association 
Federation of 
Korean 
Industries 
10/03/2014 
15 25 GOV 1 Government Ministry of 
Environment 
14/03/2014 
26 GOV 2 Government Ministry of 
Environment 
14/03/2014 
16 27 GOV 3 Government Ministry of 
Strategy and 
Finance 
18/03/2014 
17 28 PO 1 Public 
organisation 
Korean 
Exchange 
14/03/2014 
18 29 PO 2 Public 
organisation 
Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory 
and Research 
Center of 
Korea 
21/03/2014 
19 30 PO 3 Public 
organisation 
Korean Energy 
Management 
Corp. 
21/03/2014 
20 31 EXP_CC 1 Expert in 
climate change 
Korean Energy 
Management 
Corp. 
21/03/2014 
21 32 EXP_CC 2 Expert in 
climate change 
Korea Institute 
of Industrial 
Technology 
20/03/2014 
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The fieldwork for interviews took place in Korea, London, Paris and Munich. 
Interviews in Korea were conducted in Korean, while other interviews in London, 
Paris and Munich were undertaken in English. 
Interview questions were drafted in accordance with the research questions. 
However, in line with the semi-structured interview approach, all interviews 
proceeded in the form of open questions in order to obtain interviewees‟ „pure 
experience unspoiled by any leading questions‟ (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, 
p.48). 
In addition, all interviews were electronically recorded using a recording device. 
During the fieldwork in Korea, two KASB meetings were attended as an observer 
on 28 March and 11 April 2014. Recording of these meetings was not permitted, 
but extensive notes were taken of discussions in these meetings relating to the 
research questions. 
4.5.1. Document analysis 
In order to conduct data analysis, relevant documents were selected as a 
supplementary source to verify and specify the data obtained from interviews. 
Along with interviews in the field, it was necessary to analyse relevant documents 
because the accounting issues explored in this study were described in highly 
technical terms. Scott (1990, cited in Flick, 2006, p.248) suggests the use of four 
criteria for documents to be employed: authenticity, credibility, representativeness 
and meaning. These criteria were used to assess documents provided by IASB, 
ANC, KASB and other interviewees. Accordingly, a set of documents relevant to 
the research questions was selectively adopted as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: List of documents 
Document title 
Type of 
document 
Reference 
number 
Source Date  
Emission Trading Schemes 
Research 
paper 
Agenda paper 
10A 
IASB May 2010 
Recognition of assets in a 
cap and trade scheme 
Staff paper IASB Agenda 
paper 
10A/FASB 
Agenda 6A 
IASB Sep 2010 
Existence and recognition of 
liabilities for the allocation in 
Staff paper IASB Agenda 
paper 
IASB Sep 2010 
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a cap and trade scheme 10B/FASB 
Agenda 6B 
Issues to be discussed at 
future board meetings 
Staff paper IASB Agenda 
10C/FASB 
Agenda 6C 
IASB Sep 2010 
Recognition of a liability for 
emissions in excess of initial 
allocation, and measurement 
of liabilities in an emission 
trading scheme 
Staff paper 
IASB Agenda 
7A/FASB 
Agenda 8A 
IASB Nov 2010 
Initial and subsequent 
measurement of purchased 
allowances (assets) (cap and 
trade scheme) 
Staff paper 
IASB Agenda 
7B/FASB 
Agenda 8B 
IASB  Nov 2010 
Balance sheet presentation 
of the assets and liabilities in 
an emission trading scheme 
Staff paper IASB Agenda 
7C/FASB 
Agenda 8C 
IASB  Nov 2010 
The Research Programme 
Agenda 
paper 
Agenda paper 
13A 
IASB Apr 2014 
Background scheme 
information 
Staff paper IASB Agenda 
6A/ASAF 
Agenda 4B 
IASB Nov 2014 
Summary of accounting 
issues 
Staff paper IASB Agenda 
6B/ASAF 
Agenda 4C 
IASB Nov 2014 
Pollutant Pricing 
Mechanisms (formerly 
Emissions Trading Schemes) 
Agenda 
paper 
IASB Agenda 
6A 
IASB Jun 2015 
Proposals for accounting of 
GHG emission rights 
Agenda 
paper Agenda 12 IASB/ANC Oct 2012 
Review of the law relating to 
the ETS 
Agenda 
paper 
Agenda 1 KASB Mar 2014 
Exposure draft, Accounting 
standards for Non-public 
entities „Emission rights and 
Liability to deliver 
allowances‟ 
Agenda 
paper 
Agenda 2 KASB Jun 2014 
SKAS No. 33 „Greenhouse 
gas emission permits and 
emission liability‟ 
Agenda 
paper Agenda 2 KASB Sep 2014 
SKAS No. 33 „Greenhouse 
gas emission permits and 
emission liability‟ 
Agenda 
paper Agenda 1 KASB Oct 2014 
Minutes of the technical 
committee for the ETS 
Meeting 
minutes  KASB Mar 2014 
KAI Forum: Exposure draft 
„Emission rights and Liability 
to deliver allowances‟ 
Presentation 
and minutes  KASB Jul 2014 
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Documents were purposively adopted in relation to key topics: accounting issues 
discussed by the accounting standard setter; accounting models sought in the 
standard-setting process; and accounting standards for emissions rights set up by 
each accounting standard setter. The purpose of including these documents in the 
fieldwork activities was to contextualise and verify interviewees‟ general 
statements, to clarify the underlying content which interviewees might not have 
articulated in their statements, and to follow up subsequent events after the 
interviews. 
 Data analysis 4.6.
Transcription of interviews 
Transcription is a process of converting interviews „from an oral conversation to a 
written mode‟ to provide a form amenable to substantial data analysis (Kvale, 
2009, p.183). Once data have been recorded, transcription should be the next 
step toward data interpretation (Flick, 2006). In other words, transcription is a 
starting point in the analytic process (Kvale, 2009). 
After conducting the interviews, all interviews were subsequently transcribed. A 
personal code was assigned to each interviewee in order to safeguard anonymity 
in accordance with the ethical considerations of this research. 
Coding 
Coding is considered to be a key step in the context of qualitative analysis 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011), and data coding is regarded as a preliminary stage 
toward data analysis (McKerchar, 2010). Practically, as the analytical process 
proceeds, the researcher tends to build up connections by elaborating data, 
specifically breaking data apart, drawing concepts from the data, and combining 
data in line with related concepts (Corbin, 2008). 
McKerchar (2010, p.227) defines coding as „a generic process by which data is 
organised into categories on the basis of themes, concepts, or similar features that 
will allow for analytical generalisations to be made‟. Coding is the process of 
organising data into more manageable forms in order to interpret it more 
systematically (Neuman, 1994). 
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When conducting coding, computer-assisted qualitative analysis (CAQDAS) is 
widely adopted for qualitative research. CAQDAS is defined as the use of a 
dedicated computer software package (such as NVivo) which assists the 
researcher in managing and retrieving data more efficiently compared with manual 
systems (Liamputtong, 2009, p.293, cited in McKerchar, 2010, p.247). Bryman 
and Bell (2011) states that CAQDAS supports the delineation of codes by building 
up „trees of interrelated ideas‟. 
Thematic analysis is commonly used for qualitative analysis (Bryman and Bell, 
2011), and is adopted to identify themes emerging from the data on the basis of 
inductive reasoning (Ezzy, 2002, p.88, cited in McKerchar, 2010, p.232). Although 
it is one of the most common approaches in qualitative analysis, there are no 
specified procedures for conducting thematic analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Generally, thematic analysis is conducted by „visualising‟ themes or sub-themes 
and, since there is no systematic way to identify themes, the researcher‟s intuition 
or perspective plays a critical role in theme identification (McKerchar, 2010). 
Based on data collected from fieldwork activities, data analysis and interpretation 
were undertaken to elicit a detailed description of the setting and the individuals, 
followed by analysis of the data for themes and issues (Creswell, 2003). QSR 
NVivo 10 was used to organise the data effectively and systematically, and to 
better facilitate the elicitation of themes. Using NVivo, initial codes were assigned 
to chunks of data. The coded data from interview transcriptions and notes taken in 
KASB meetings were then subjected to thematic analysis. Distinctive themes were 
identified, such as „main accounting issues for emissions rights‟, „factors to be 
considered‟, „attributes of stakeholders‟ participation in the standard- setting 
process‟ and „ways of reflecting stakeholders‟ interests‟. 
Triangulation 
In obtaining data sets from multiple resources, the data must be triangulated. 
Triangulation is an analytical skill combining several qualitative methods, and is 
widely used in various settings with different study groups and theoretical 
frameworks (Flick, 2006). In order to validate data obtained from one method, 
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triangulation is strategically adopted to further enrich the data analysis (Flick, 
2006). 
In this study, triangulation was undertaken for data analysis where data obtained 
from individuals was interlinked. The interview transcripts, email correspondence 
received from interviewees, and relevant documents analysed constituted a large 
volume of qualitative data. Creswell (2003) posits that triangulation can be 
undertaken to check the accuracy of findings. In order to ensure the credibility and 
authenticity (internal validity) of data obtained from the interviews, document 
analysis was carried out on the documents listed in Table 5. This process can be 
regarded as a process of triangulation, as referred to by Creswell (2003, p.196). 
In order to identify significant themes and concepts, connections between themes 
were visualised and, more importantly, existing theory, such as legitimacy, was 
applied to recurring themes. 
Writing-up 
Following coding and data analysis, descriptive versions of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
were drafted. As a consequence of iterative reading of the first draft, the most 
appropriate quotations were extracted and distinctive themes derived from the 
findings were presented. In effect, these themes comprise the structure of this 
thesis. Discussion and conclusions evolved subsequently (see Chapter 8). 
 Limitations 4.7.
There are inevitable limitations to a qualitative approach. Lillis (1999, p.84) points 
out that the semi-structured interview method may be subject to interviewer bias 
whilst conducting the interviews or during data analysis, which may diminish the 
„credibility of theory building from qualitative data‟. In order to minimise „the 
intrusive effects of the interviewer‟ (Lillis, 1999, p.84), the questions were cast in a 
neutral way, without a specific list of interview questions. Endeavours were made 
not to bias interviewees with leading questions. 
Denscombe (1998) states that an appropriate sample size may be a crucial factor 
to ensure accuracy of results, as small-scale research may lead the findings to be 
invalidated. The sample size in this study (21 interviews) might be regarded as 
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relatively small; however, a greater number of participants (32 persons) were 
interviewed. Qualitative approach entails an assumption that research is a process 
of „discovery‟ rather than the testing of hypotheses (Denscombe, 1998). 
The main data were obtained through interviews with a few interviewees in a 
single country (South Korea) on a single issue (ETS). Accordingly, the findings 
cannot be generalised in statistical terms. Nevertheless, the qualitative research 
contributes to providing valuable real-world observations which have not 
previously been investigated. 
Data analysis inevitably involves subjective interpretations as the findings are 
analysed and interpreted on the basis of the researcher‟s individual perspective, 
values and thoughts. In order to tackle the potential weakness of subjective 
analysis in the qualitative approach, the theoretical framework of legitimacy theory 
was used to interpret the findings and create a narrative in order to ensure 
objectivity of analysis. All relevant literature referred to in Chapter 3 contributed to 
building a theoretical lens for interpretation of the data. Analytical interpretation 
was conducted on the basis of various extant studies, and these new findings 
contribute to relevant existing literature. 
 Summary 4.8.
This chapter has presented the two main research questions and their associated 
objectives for this study. The overall research approach taken in this study has 
been described and explained. As the main research framework, philosophical 
assumptions have been discussed in detail. A constructivist position has been 
taken in terms of the ontology and an interpretivist position in terms of the 
epistemological approach to this study. In accordance with the philosophical 
assumptions made, qualitative research was chosen as an appropriate 
methodological approach for this study. In particular, a qualitative approach was 
considered more suitable for exploring the research objectives and questions of 
this study, where there was a need to examine and interpret empirical data in the 
field. In essence, an interpretive inductive methodological approach has been 
taken, which is well suited to providing insights and understanding of the 
accounting issues for ETS, which is the main subject of this study. 
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The fieldwork included semi-structured and in-depth interviews, mainly conducted 
face-to-face, and a number of relevant documents were analysed. Details of the 
interviews have been described, including the selection of interviewees, schedule 
and processes. Notes taken during KASB meetings were coded along with 
transcription of the interviews. Relevant documents were utilised mainly to analyse 
data collected in the field. On the basis of an interpretive approach, the process of 
data analysis has been described in detail. Finally, some limitations of this study 
have been addressed. 
The next three chapters present and describe the findings of this study, in line with 
the research questions and objectives. 
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5. Accounting Issues for ETS in the cases of IASB and ANC 
 Introduction 5.1.
This chapter presents and analyses the findings in relation to Research Question 
1: How does the accounting standard setter tackle accounting issues under ETS 
in the standard-setting process in order to achieve the most appropriate 
accounting standard? It presents the findings on various aspects of accounting 
issues arising when an accounting standard-setting body sets up accounting 
standards for ETS. 
In particular, this chapter describes the main accounting issues for emissions 
rights and related liabilities which have been addressed by IASB and ANC 
following the withdrawal of IFRIC 3. The accounting models of these two 
organisations have substantially influenced KASB in its development of 
accounting models for emissions rights (see Chapter 6). 
General observations are presented in Section 5.2, followed by specific 
accounting issues addressed by each accounting standard setter. Section 5.3 
describes a number of observations in relation to how accounting issues for ETS 
evolved in the IASB-FASB joint project conducted from 2008 to 2010. This is 
followed in Section 5.4 by findings revolving around accounting issues addressed 
by the ANC. The findings presented in this chapter emerged as themes 
throughout the interviews. 
 General Observations 5.2.
In line with previous studies, key accounting issues under ETS include the 
recognition, measurement and presentation of emissions rights and related 
liabilities corresponding with each process of the ETS. In particular, the 
interviewees were generally in agreement that the main accounting issue relates 
to free allowances. One interviewee described this well: 
I guess the main question, if and when you address the accounting for 
emission trading schemes, is whether you also deal with a situation of 
free allowances. So I think that was the biggest hurdle at my time from 
a conceptual point of view (EXP_ACC 1). 
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Similarly, another interviewee emphasised that the core accounting issue is 
intrinsically driven by free allowances: 
When it comes to accounting for emissions rights, the main issue is how 
to account for free allowances. If or when emissions rights are allocated 
for free at the initial stage, the accounting issue arises because 
companies can sell or purchase emissions rights at their discretion 
(EXP_ACC 2). 
Meanwhile, when breaking down the accounting issues into detail, each 
accounting standard setting body tended to concentrate on different aspects under 
the different circumstances which each organisation faced. The accounting 
standard setter had to take specific attributes of each scheme into consideration 
when developing an accounting standard for ETS. For example, IASB 
concentrated mainly on the accounting treatment of free allowances and related 
liabilities in its joint project with FASB from 2008 to 2010. When IASB restarted the 
ETS project in 2008, it attempted to develop an accounting standard to be applied 
to all kinds of emissions trading schemes worldwide (Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; 
Lovell, 2014). In general, most schemes entail free allocations in order to ease the 
burden on industry arising from the introduction of ETS (see Section 2.4.1). For 
example, most allowances were distributed for free during Phase II of the EU ETS, 
while the joint ETS project was proceeding. This is presumably why IASB 
concentrated on accounting issues relating to free allowances during the period of 
the joint project. 
On the other hand, ANC initiated the establishment of a French accounting 
standard for emissions rights prior to commencement of Phase III (2013-2020) of 
the EU ETS. From Phase III onward, auctioning has become the default method of 
allocation, so companies may incur substantial increases in production costs by 
purchasing emissions rights. ANC intended to accommodate features arising from 
this large structural change in the EU ETS into a new accounting standard. 
Meanwhile, KASB focused mainly on accounting issues relating to free allowances 
and related liabilities because 100 per cent free allocation was expected in Phase 
I (2015-2017) of the Korean ETS. 
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In essence, under the different circumstances in which accounting issues on 
emission rights were being addressed, each accounting standard-setting body 
emphasised different accounting issues. 
Figure 7 demonstrates in chronological order how discussions on accounting 
standards for emissions rights evolved, corresponding to the commitment periods 
of the EU ETS and the Korean ETS. It illustrates the different attributes of each 
specific phase in the scheme that explain the main accounting issues on which 
each accounting standard setter concentrated at that time. In addition, Figure 7 
implies the idea of „path dependency‟ in the development of accounting models for 
emissions rights. When developing its accounting model, it is presumed that KASB 
was significantly influenced by preceding models because it referred mainly to 
IFRIC 3, IASB‟s tentative decisions, and ANC‟s proposal. 
Figure 7: Development of accounting standards for ETS 
 
The main accounting issues identified through interviews are discussed in the next 
section. 
 IASB’s tentative decisions, 2008-2010 5.3.
From 2008 to 2010, IASB discussed the accounting issues relating to ETS with 
FASB as a form of joint project. Despite vigorous discussions during the joint 
project, IASB made only a few tentative decisions on how to account for emissions 
allowances and related liabilities. To this extent, the ETS project ended up being 
deferred in 2010 „without making that much progress‟ (ASS 5). 
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Emissions right meet the Conceptual Framework‟s (as published by IASB, 2010, 
but also in the latest reiteration) definition of an asset as „a resource controlled by 
the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are 
expected to flow to the entity.‟ 
When the ETS project was resumed in 2007, one IASB member (ASS 5) had 
reached a „solid‟ conclusion on the recognition of free allowances as an asset 
without a conflict. A free allowance was regarded as a sort of economic resource 
that „an entity can control‟ (EXP_ACC1). According to IASB staff paper 7B,41 the 
board members and staff largely agreed that emissions rights should be 
categorised as assets, regardless of whether they were obtained for free or 
purchased. 
With a clear conclusion on viewing emissions rights as an asset, the next 
accounting issues to be addressed were set out as follows: 
1) Asset side: If allowances (either free or purchased) are recognised as an asset, 
how should allowances be measured? 
2) Liability side: What kinds of obligations/liabilities arise in each scheme, and 
how should relevant liabilities be measured? 
5.3.1. Day 1 issue 
One interviewee (ASS 5) viewed the accounting treatment of free allowances as a 
more „fundamental‟ issue from a conceptual framework point of view. With regard 
to the measurement base for allowances, IASB took a fair value approach in which 
either purchased or granted allowances are measured at fair value. IASB staff 
paper 7B suggests that IASB had reached a tentative conclusion that free 
allowances should be measured at fair value in accordance with the approach to 
purchased rights. 
Measuring free allowances at fair value brought about a number of significant 
„knock-on issues‟ from an accounting conceptual point of view (ASS 5). 
                                            
41
 IASB Agenda 7B/FASB Agenda 8B, Staff paper (Nov 2010): Initial and subsequent measurement of 
purchased allowances (assets). 
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Specifically, a fair value approach raised vigorous debates on the corresponding 
entry of free allowances. One interviewee described how subsequent accounting 
issues arose in relation to the corresponding entry: 
So it is clearly an asset. The problem is how you look at the situation 
that you have a debit entry, that you have only received those 
allowances because someone expects you to emit in the future, and 
how you would enter that. So that was one of the questions related to 
how you account for the assets (EXP_ACC1). 
When companies receive allowances for free and recognise them at fair value, an 
accounting issue subsequently arises: Should the gain be recognised or should a 
liability for the allocation be recognised at the time of allocation? This is the so-
called „Day 1 issue‟. 
It appears that IASB attempted to deal with the Day 1 issue by generating neither 
mismatch problems under IFRIC 3 nor any conflict with the existing accounting 
framework. IASB members refrained from putting strain on the conceptual 
framework because they did not „want to see any flaws that might be in the 
conceptual framework‟ (EXP_ACC 1). 
According to IASB staff paper 7A,42 there were three alternatives to address the 
Day 1 issue (as shown in Figure 8); 1) recognise a liability on Day 1; 2) recognise 
a Day 1 gain; or 3) recognise deferred income. 
Figure 8: Alternative accounting entries for free allowances on Day 1 
Dr) Emissions rights      XX (FV) 
 
Cr)    View 1. Liability          XX 
       View 2. Gain            XX 
       View 3. Deferred Income  XX 
          (under IFRIC 3) 
 
The issue with regard to the corresponding entry of recognition of emissions rights 
given for free by the government intrinsically relates to the nature of emissions 
                                            
42
 IASB Agenda 7A/FASB Agenda 8A, Staff paper (Nov 2010): Recognition of a liability for emissions in 
excess of initial allocation, and measurement of liabilities in an emission trading scheme.  
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rights which can be either delivered for offsetting obligations arising from 
emissions or sold at a designated price in the market.  
With regard to recognition and measurement of an asset, the board tentatively 
decided that an entity should recognise emissions allowances as assets, initially 
and subsequently measured at fair value, whether received free of charge from 
the government or purchased. 
The corresponding entry of emissions rights to be allocated for free can be 
considered to be a liability or a credit income. Some viewed that the allowances 
are given to the entity in contemplation of the entity‟s expected future emissions.  
According to the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting in 2010 of IASB, a 
liability is defined as „a present obligation…arising from past events, the 
settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources 
embodying economic benefits.‟ As expected future emissions occur, the entity will 
incur an expense in profit or loss that effectively reverses the gain initially 
recognised. Emissions rights embody a present obligation akin of a contingent 
liability. They are deemed to be not a „transferable certificate‟ to be sold in the 
market but an instrument which must be delivered to settle the obligation arising 
from emissions. Accordingly, as allowances are recognised, a liability would 
accrue to be recognised as a corresponding entry (View 1). 
On the other hand, the latter view is based on the idea that the entity has no 
obligation to do anything at the start of the compliance period when allowances 
are issued. As a result of receiving the allowances from government for less than 
fair value, income would be recognised as a gain (View 2). Meanwhile, the 
allowances are given as „assistance by government in the form of transfers of 
resources to an entity in return for past or future compliance with certain 
conditions relating to the operating activities of the entity‟ (IASB, 2015), which 
would mean a government grant (View 3). 
Apparently, none of these alternatives provided a satisfactory answer in line with 
IASB‟s intention. One interviewee referred to all the potential solutions as being 
„uncomfortable‟ from an accounting framework perspective: 
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I think the reason the boards have struggled with the Day 1 issue is that 
the most obvious interpretation of the framework says you‟ve got an 
asset on day one but you don‟t have to give over any allowances until 
you emit. But it produces an answer that most people don‟t really feel 
that comfortable with (ASS 5). 
The third view in Figure 8 adopts the same approach as under IFRIC 3. When an 
entity receives free allowances, no liability arises on Day 1; instead, an entity 
recognises deferred income as a form of government grant. One interviewee (ACC 
5) ascribed the withdrawal of IFRIC 3 to recognition of a „Day 1 gain‟ as deferred 
income rather than recognition of a liability in the corresponding entry of free 
allowances. Under IFRIC 3, recognition of deferred income caused the main 
mismatch problems, which gave rise to severe criticisms from major stakeholders 
at that time. The interviewee said: 
The reason IFRIC 3 wasn‟t accepted, really, was that IFRIC 3 
concluded there is no liability, and therefore there‟s a gain on Day 1 and 
then there are some consequences from that as well. But that‟s really 
it‟s a mismatch of products (ACC 5). 
IASB was unlikely to adopt the third alternative because it wished to avoid the 
mismatch problems of IFRIC 3. 
Instead, according to IASB staff paper 7A, the members were divided between two 
main views; some members were opposed to recognition of a Day 1 gain, while 
others were against recognition of a liability on Day 1 on the grounds that free 
allowances have eventually to be returned to the authority. One interviewee said 
that there was keen debate between IASB members in relation to the Day 1 issue: 
The biggest hurdle from a conceptual point of view, because the IASB 
board was clearly split into two groups. There was one group basically 
saying if and when you receive free allowances, you don‟t have any 
obligation to return those allowances so there is no obligation at the 
point in time when you receive the allowances. […] There was another 
group within the board, […] in favour of having a situation where the 
free allowances would not result in a gain at day one (EXP_ACC 1). 
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Recognition of a Day 1 gain brings about a number of problems, making it 
unacceptable from an accounting standard setter‟s point of view as well as from 
companies‟ and investors‟ points of view. With reference to IAS 20 Accounting for 
Government Grants and Disclosure of Government Assistance, recognition of a 
Day 1 gain in exchange of free allowances may cause conflict with IAS 20 
because government grants do not constitute gains on the day of receipt. In other 
words, a Day 1 gain may be in conflict with the conceptual framework, explained 
by one interviewee: 
There was another group within the board, and they were basically 
saying, “well, if and when you analyse emission trading schemes and 
the accounting for them, and if and when you come to the conclusion 
that there is a day one gain, then please come back to us and report to 
us, because we want to see any flaw that might be in the conceptual 
framework”, because from their point of view it did not make any sense 
(EXP_ACC 1). 
Furthermore, industry may argue that recognition of a Day 1 gain might place an 
additional burden on companies in addition to mandatory participation in a 
statutory ETS. Free allowances are provided by government for the purpose of 
easing burdens at the initial stage of the scheme. No industrial company would 
agree that free allowances make companies better off in the future, because they 
are only given for compensation (COM 1, EXP_CC 2). In this context, the same 
interviewee commented: 
In a situation when most companies would say they receive additional 
burdens but some of the burdens are eased by free allowances, by 
saying in that event that a company is better off because of receiving 
allowances is just not telling the entire picture, and therefore they did 
not concur with the other group but basically were in favour of having a 
situation where the free allowances would not result in a gain at Day 1 
(EXP_ACC 1). 
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Notably, this interviewee‟s comment indicates that, from a user‟s point of view, a 
Day 1 gain does not provide any „decision-useful‟ information to users because it 
is predictable that a Day 1 gain will be reversed on surrender: 
They [investors] would say, „If you come to the Day 1 gain, if you tell us 
the numbers we will just reverse the numbers. We can fix the model by 
just reversing the numbers.‟ But the question would be is it a wise 
conclusion or is it helpful accounting if the accounting itself results in 
information that first must be translated into different numbers before 
providing decision-useful information? I would take the view and say if 
analysts have to reverse the numbers and other users of financial 
statements have to reverse the numbers in order to get to a meaningful 
picture for the company, why wouldn‟t the accounting answer in itself 
come to a conclusion that results in that picture that is the correct 
picture from the perspective of the users? (EXP_ACC 1) 
Indicatively, from a user‟s perspective, investors would consider accounting 
information much more decision-useful if the information enabled them to assess 
appropriately the performance of an entity as a result of emissions under ETS. In 
this context, one interviewee said: 
What they [investors] want to do is predict what the company‟s going to 
pay for the emissions it does; and they‟re more interested in forecasting 
what‟s going to happen over the whole year, and what‟s going to 
happen in future years as well. Those fluctuations you get from the Day 
1 gains and from subsequent re-measurements don‟t really give them 
information that helps them very much with those assessments (ASS 5). 
In addition, from the perspective of future cash flow, the rationale of a Day 1 gain 
may not be persuasive because it does not generate a substantial or actual gain. 
Assuming that all property, plant and equipment (PPE) are measured at fair value, 
participation in the scheme gives rise to additional costs of PPE, the carrying 
amount of which decreases as a consequence of bearing emissions costs. As an 
entity receives free allowances, the increase in production costs under the scheme 
can be offset by free allowances. In other words, free allowances do not generate 
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actual gains, although they are recognised as an asset. One interviewee provided 
an explanation of this view: 
If you look at the discounted cash flows for the company, potentially you 
might not say that the present value of the company increases as a 
result of entering into the scheme. If you would account for all those 
premises at fair value, perhaps you would see the decrease in fair value 
and perhaps you would receive the allowances on top and you might 
end up at kind of the same level. But as a result that you don‟t decrease 
the premises or the property, plant and equipment unless you have 
impairment, you don‟t see that change, that switch in value from the 
factory to the allowances and that interaction between those two items 
(EXP_ACC 1). 
In essence, recognition of a Day 1 gain raised a number of subsequent arguments. 
It appeared to be difficult to persuade stakeholders of the validity of the second 
alternative, not only from an accounting conceptual point of view but also from the 
perspective of the entire picture of ETS. 
Taking into consideration all arguments opposing a Day 1 gain, IASB appears to 
have reached a tentative decision on recognition of a liability on Day 1 in line with 
the first alternative in Figure 8. If neither a Day 1 gain nor deferred income was an 
acceptable way of recording a corresponding entry for free allowances, the other 
alternative was to recognise a liability on Day 1. 
A liability should be recognised when „it is probable that an outflow of resources 
embodying economic benefits will result from the settlement of a present 
obligation and the amount at which the settlement will take place can be 
measured reliably‟ (para. 4.46, IASB, 2010e). However, recognition of a liability 
became more problematic from an accounting conceptual framework perspective 
because there is no present obligation to deliver allowances when allowances are 
issued. Recognition of a liability on Day 1 brought great tension within the existing 
accounting framework because no emission and no obligation arises on Day 1. 
One interview (ASS 5) referred to the liability issue as „the biggest single issue‟ 
saying „is there a liability at all [on Day 1]?‟ Both this and another interviewee 
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(EXP_ACC 1) acknowledged that recognition of a liability on Day 1 gave rise to a 
„fundamental decision‟ from an accounting framework perspective. 
In addition, recognition of a liability on Day 1 was accompanied by „knock-on 
issues‟ (ACC 5). Having decided to recognise a liability on Day 1, IASB members 
had to judge whether a liability actually exists in exchange for receiving free 
allowances, even though emissions do not arise on Day 1. As a consequence, it 
seems that IASB members struggled to justify the substance of the liability on Day 
1 from a conceptual point of view. One interviewee (ASS 5) went on to describe 
why the existence of a liability on Day 1 had materialised: 
The boards struggled really to identify really what the liability was. And I 
think most board members actually felt there was some kind of liability 
but found it very difficult to really pin down what it was. And that‟s really 
the fundamental decision, because there are some sorts of knock-on 
issues as well if you do conclude there isn‟t a liability (ASS 5). 
From previous literature in relation to recognition of liabilities (e.g. Haupt and 
Ismer, 2013), it is generally acknowledged that an obligation under the scheme is 
generated when an entity actually produces emissions. There is a consensus on 
the timing of recognition of a liability: a liability is recognised as emissions are 
generated. Consequently, the board members had to identify the „essential 
fundamental issue‟ of whether there is a liability on Day 1 even if no real emissions 
are produced on Day 1. 
One interviewee (ASS 5) explained further how to resolve the „tension‟ between 
the concept and the reality. The board members tried to understand what drove 
the tension. Specifically, the board attempted to identify what the obligation event 
under ETS really was. In terms of the characteristics of obligation under ETS, the 
board members expressed different views. Some viewed emitting activity as an 
obligation event; thus, no obligation accrues until emissions occur. Proponents of 
this view took their logic from voluntary schemes in which entities do not incur any 
present obligation when allocating allowances. Others viewed the allocation of 
free allowances as an obligation event; thus, as soon as allowances are allocated, 
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an obligation to comply with the requirements under the scheme occurs. One 
interviewee provided an explanation of different views on this issue: 
In essence, some would take the view it is not free, because it is 
dependent on the fact that you emit in the future. If you don‟t emit, 
you‟re not allowed to keep the allowances. And therefore some of the 
board members did take a different view, a different perspective on 
schemes where there‟s a claw-back. […] So they said „if that happens, 
you return the allowances that you did not use in your production to pay 
for your emissions‟ (EXP_ACC 1). 
The board decided tentatively that an obligation arises when an entity receives 
free allowances. In order to resolve the tension with reality, the board supported 
their decision by analogy with a claw-back clause in the UK. 43  The same 
interviewee described the sources of the tentative decision: 
I think that was in the UK at that time at least the case, that they did 
hand out also free allowances but if, during a compliance period, you 
went out of business or you stopped your emissions – let‟s assume that 
on day one you receive 100 allowances for the year, on day two you 
stop your premises, you stop emitting – in that event the UK scheme 
had a so-called claw-back, so they said “if that happens, you return the 
allowances that you did not use in your production to pay for your 
emissions”. And if you have that kind of scheme, the question turns 
slightly different, whether you have a present obligation when you 
receive the allowances. Because in essence some would take the view 
it is not free, because it is dependent on the fact that you emit in the 
future. If you don‟t emit, you‟re not allowed to keep the allowances 
(EXP_ACC 1). 
Meanwhile, as an alternative solution, one interviewee (EXP_ACC 1) suggested 
an analogy with voluntary schemes. He stated that, since neither a gain nor a 
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 A claw-back is a mechanism requiring participants in a scheme to return excess allowances in case of 
closure of installations (Starbatty, 2010). 
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liability arises on Day 1 when allocating free allowances in voluntary schemes, the 
same logic could be applied to a statutory scheme. In voluntary schemes, when a 
commitment is entered into, an entity does not recognise either a liability or a Day 
1 gain. Agreement to participate in a voluntary scheme is in the nature of a private 
contract that generates a „performance obligation‟ (EXP_ACC 1). This obligation 
does not bring about recognition of a liability corresponding with free allowances. 
In addition, the agreement could be considered as a type of „executory contract‟ 
(EXP_ACC 1) in which recognition of a Day 1 gain is unnecessary when an entity 
receives free allowances. One interviewee indicated that the board could have 
avoided struggling with the Day 1 issue at that time if the accounting treatment 
under a voluntary system had been considered: 
If you enter into a voluntary scheme and you receive free allowances, 
it‟s like a performance obligation – you have to perform at a certain level, 
otherwise you have to pay additional (extra), you have a net loss. But if 
you come to that conclusion in a voluntary scheme, why would you not 
apply that thinking to a statutory scheme? Why are statutory schemes 
that different? (EXP_ACC 1) 
It is noteworthy that if a „holistic view‟  had been taken, combining a voluntary 
scheme with a statutory scheme, this interviewee believed that it would have been 
unnecessary to come up with a solution to the debate on recognition of a gain or a 
liability on Day 1. In other words, if the analogy of voluntary schemes had been 
extended to the statutory scheme, it would have been a mere „measurement‟ issue 
of the corresponding entry of free allowances, not a „fundamental‟ or „conceptual‟ 
issue of recognition of a liability. In this context, this interviewee explained: 
Perhaps you could take it from the voluntary schemes and take it from 
there and then come to the statutory schemes and say that‟s the 
mechanism that should apply to voluntary schemes. And let‟s have a 
look. Is it different for statutory schemes? And let‟s take a holistic view 
of both situations. So that is, I guess, the rationale for why the focus of 
the board was really only on statutory schemes (EXP_ACC 1). 
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5.3.2. Presentation issue 
Meanwhile, the board did not reach a tentative decision on the presentation issue. 
IASB staff paper 7C44 provides details on how the discussion developed with 
regard to the presentation of assets and liabilities. Three different approaches 
were discussed: a gross approach, a net approach, and linked presentation. The 
board members had different views on each approach. Some members preferred 
gross presentation while others supported net presentation and others were in 
favour of linked presentation. The members advocating a gross presentation 
asserted that presenting the allowances with related liabilities on a net basis 
should be prohibited because the allowances and related liabilities do not meet 
the offsetting criteria under IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements: „An entity 
shall not offset assets and liabilities [….] unless required or permitted by an IFRS‟ 
(para. 2). On the other hand, a net approach views the allowances and related 
liabilities to meet the criteria for offsetting because the allowances are the only 
methods to settle the liabilities in the scheme. Since an entity intends to use 
allowances for offsetting the liabilities, „the intention‟ leads to meet the offsetting 
criteria. 
The third approach is the same as a net approach in principle utilising a form of 
linked presentation. IASB staff paper 7C explains a linked presentation: „the 
allowances and related liabilities should be presented gross on the face of the 
balance sheet, but should total a net emissions asset or net emission liability, a 
linked presentation (para. 20)‟. In principle, assets and liabilities should not be 
offset. If linked presentation is exceptionally applied to emissions rights and 
related liabilities, the linked presentation would be shown in the balance sheet as 
follows: 
Emissions rights and related liabilities 
   Emissions rights   XXX 
   Less: emissions liabilities  (XX) 
X 
                                            
44
 IASB Agenda 7C/FASB Agenda 8C, Staff paper (Nov 2010): Balance sheet presentation of the assets and 
liabilities in an emission trading scheme.  
  
152 
In terms of a net amount of emissions rights in the balance sheet calculating 
difference of the amount of emissions rights held and the amount of liabilities 
arising from the obligation surrendering allowances, there is no difference 
between a net presentation and a linked presentation. The only difference lies in a 
way of presentation of liabilities. While the amount of liabilities is not shown in the 
balance sheet under a net presentation, the amount of liabilities is displayed as a 
form of subtracting from the emissions rights under a linked presentation. This 
approach is based on a unique linkage between the allowances and related 
liabilities because the liabilities should be settled with only allowances. Advocates 
for a linked presentation insisted that this approach should be applied only when 
an entity intends to use allowances to settle the liabilities at the end of the period. 
While IASB did not manifestly object to linked presentation, FASB was apparently 
a proponent of this approach. One interviewee (ASS 5) presumed that some 
FASB members supported linked presentation on the basis of „unit of account‟. 
This interviewee mentioned various views on the presentation issue: 
There were some FASB members particularly who said that they 
thought there was a kind of unit of account question, and that if you saw 
the objective as accounting for the scheme as a whole, then somehow 
you wouldn‟t have this day one gain problem‟ […] If you said it was the 
scheme as a whole, I guess that might push you towards some sort of 
net presentation, or maybe even a linked presentation (ASS 5). 
The idea of „unit of account‟ for emissions rights and related liabilities is associated 
with a unique administrative process whereby the obligation under the scheme is 
discharged only by surrendering emissions rights. In other words, there is a 
linkage between an asset and a liability where an entity producing emissions does 
not recognise both an asset for emissions rights issued for free and a liability for 
emissions at the same time. The entity should recognise a liability only when it has 
produced emissions and holds insufficient emissions rights to cover them; 
otherwise, recognising an asset when it holds emissions rights in excess of its 
requirement. Corresponding with an exclusive offsetting mechanism under the 
scheme, this might be a more appropriate way to account for the scheme as a 
whole from an accounting perspective. Based on the exclusive link between 
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emissions rights and obligation under the scheme, emissions rights and related 
liabilities could be accounted for as „one unit of account‟ in financial statements. 
This is the rationale for linked presentation and unit of account. 
It is commonly admitted that a gross approach might be more „transparent‟ 
(EXP_ACC 1) and „decision-useful‟ (ASS 1) because investors want to take 
advantage of full information. The IFRS conceptual framework uses gross 
presentation as the default rule for presentation. One interviewee admitted this: 
From investors‟ point of view, generally investors want to be provided 
full information. […] In this regard, investors might firstly prefer a gross 
presentation which displays a total number of assets on the one side 
and a total number of liabilities on the other side (ASS 4). 
One interviewee (EXP_ACC 1) pointed out that from a company perspective, the 
presentation issue was regarded as a significant issue because of the impact on 
financial numbers. Some companies were opposed to gross presentation, arguing 
that it would negatively affect their debt (or equity) ratio. Amongst the three 
alternatives presented in IASB staff paper 7C, companies were likely to favour 
either net presentation or linked presentation for the presentation of emissions 
rights and related liabilities: 
Some would object and say that it also has some impacts on your ratios 
– on your equity ratio. And some companies have very clear views on 
why they would recognise something gross or net, and I think I can 
clearly see the view that many would favour a linked presentation 
(EXP_ACC 1). 
However, linked presentation might cause conflict with the IFRS framework 
because gross presentation is a primary principle in terms of presenting assets 
and liabilities. One interviewee (ASS 4) referred to a possible incompatibility 
between linked presentation and the IFRS conceptual framework. In this regard, 
instead of linked presentation, the same interviewee addressed that a net 
approach might become a plausible approach to presentation under the premise 
of „unit of account‟. In addition, a net approach has been commonly used in 
practice because it is simpler and more applicable. Nevertheless, this interviewee 
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added that it was impossible to judge which approach would be more appropriate 
from an accounting conceptual point of view. 
In summary, the findings suggest that the most contentious accounting issue 
under ETS turned out to be the Day 1 issue. Specifically, when emissions 
allowances are measured at fair value, the most problematic issues are 
associated with the corresponding entry of free allowances on Day 1. As the joint 
project proceeded between 2008 and 2010, it appears that IASB concentrated on 
accounting issues which were more fundamental and significant from an 
accounting conceptual point of view. 
As an international accounting standard setter, IASB focused on a more 
fundamental issue that might ultimately have significant consequences if the 
standard were introduced. Despite the arguments over the presentation issue, this 
issue was not as critical to IASB as the Day 1 issue. It appears that the 
presentation issue may have been regarded as a type of subsequent and more 
technical matter, while the Day 1 issue was considered to be the most 
fundamental problem when discussing the accounting treatment of emissions 
rights at that time. Presumably, that is why the board members did not reach a 
tentative decision on the presentation issue at that time. On the other hand, for 
companies and preparers the presentation issue was one of the most important 
issues because they were concerned about the impact on financial numbers (e.g. 
debt ratio). These findings provide a better understanding of the gap between the 
accounting standard setter‟s perspective and the preparers‟ perspective in terms 
of the core accounting issues of each perspective. 
 Autorité des Normes Comptables’ proposal in 2012 5.4.
This section presents the accounting issues for emissions rights that the French 
accounting standard setter, ANC, dealt with in developing a proposal for emissions 
rights in 2012. 
5.4.1. Background 
In 2012, ANC proposed an accounting standard for ETS (entitled „Proposals for 
Accounting of GHG Emission Rights‟) in the form of French GAAP to be applied to 
French listed companies in their separate and consolidated financial statements. 
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Importantly, the transformation from Phase II (2008-2012) to Phase III (2013-2020) 
of the EU ETS was the main driver leading ANC to develop its own accounting 
standard for ETS. From Phase III onward, auctioning has become the default 
method of distributing allowances. Industries must purchase at least 20 per cent of 
their allowances for compliance with Phase III, and consequently they face 
substantial increases in production costs. Correspondingly, ANC acknowledged 
that it was time to provide accounting guidance in order to incorporate into 
financial accounts the increasing costs caused by purchasing emission rights. In 
this context, one interviewee described the background well: 
At the beginning (Phase I and Phase II) there was nearly no cost or at 
the margin. […] The system is progressively moving to a paying system 
because less and less emitters are allocated free emission rights. […]  
Now there are new emission costs. So we had to think about the impact 
of this movement. We considered that it was not the same thing to 
manage a bonus-malus system as to manage new emission costs (ASS 
8). 
As addressed in Section 5.2, ANC faced different circumstances from those faced 
by IASB. When IASB was working on the ETS project during that time, the EU 
ETS was running in Phase II, in which most allowances were allocated for free. In 
effect, free allowances constituted the most critical accounting issue, so IASB 
focused primarily on issues regarding free allowances. On the other hand, ANC 
was aware of a shift in the allocation method from free allocation to auctioning, 
and that the existing accounting treatment „was not able to deal with these new 
issues‟ (ASS 8). Admitting the necessity for new accounting guidance 
corresponding with Phase III from 2013, ANC decided to set up a new accounting 
standard for ETS. 
ANC stated that its aim in setting up the new accounting standard for ETS was to 
provide authoritative accounting guidance dealing with various types of business 
activities emerging when the scheme entered Phase III. For example, some 
companies in the carbon linkage sector would be given free allowances. On the 
other hand, electricity-generating companies would be expected to purchase as 
many emissions rights as they needed in order to meet their reduction obligations. 
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Furthermore, as the carbon market was becoming more advanced, intermediaries 
might participate more actively in the market in the pursuit of arbitrary gains. In 
summary, as the scheme was changing, ANC acknowledged the need for new 
accounting guidance which could be applied to various types of business. This 
was clearly articulated by one interviewee: 
From an accounting point of view we had to deal with an accounting 
system able to comply with free emission rights – allocated for free – or 
auctioned, and to deal with emitters which don‟t play in the market, and 
banks which propose to trade emission rights because they have no 
emissions and they want to make a profit with the difference in value. 
The aim of this proposal is to be able to deal with several situations – 
whether or not you have limits, whether you are allocated for free or not 
(ASS 8). 
5.4.2. Scope 
French companies must apply IFRS to their financial statements, yet at the same 
time most large French companies mandatorily participate in the EU ETS. ANC 
explicitly admitted that French companies which have to use IFRS do not wish 
their financial statements to be regulated by two different accounting rules: 
consolidated financial statements under IFRS and accounting for emissions rights 
under a new accounting rule yet to be formulated: 
All companies have to apply French GAAP for their individual accounts. 
But then obviously the largest companies are the largest emitters, and 
they use IFRS for their consolidated accounts, and so we needed to 
have a system that was compatible between French GAAP and IFRS. 
[…] Obviously, the largest companies didn‟t want to have to have two 
different accounting systems, one for the French GAAP and one for 
IFRS (ASS 7). 
For this reason, ANC intended not to pursue two different accounting systems 
when developing accounting guidance for emissions rights. In other words, it 
aimed to set an accounting standard for ETS based on existing standards. The 
scope was clearly addressed by ASS 8: 
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The scope was to issue an interpretation compliant with French 
accounting standards which could be a basis for reflection within the 
IASB community, and which didn‟t imply issuing new standards to deal 
with (ASS 8). 
Consequently, accounting treatment of emissions rights was deliberately devised 
within IFRS and French GAAP. This limited scope was very important for ANC 
because it was a critical constraint in the development of the accounting standard 
for emissions rights. In effect, ANC had to seek a solution by marginally changing 
existing accounting standards rather than creating totally new accounting rules 
only for ETS: 
We didn‟t want to issue a system which would have needed a new 
specific French standard for emission rights. We based our reflections 
on the existing French standards. We just changed it at the margin. And 
we didn‟t want to push the IASB to issue a specific standard for 
emission rights (ASS 8). 
In this regard, ANC called it a „proposal‟ (ASS 7), which was more in the form of 
an interpretation, with French companies being regulated by French GAAP as well 
as IFRS. One interviewee referred to how the accounting guidance was developed 
and why it was called a „proposal‟: 
You don‟t need a specific IFRS standard to apply what we propose. It 
works within the existing standards. […] This is why they‟re called 
„proposals‟, because under IFRS there‟s no given set of standards that 
specifically deals with this; whereas under French GAAP this is a 
regulation. So this is already applied under French GAAP and it‟s 
applied by the French large companies that use IFRS in their 
consolidated accounts (ASS 7). 
5.4.3. Accounting issues 
The nature and classification of emissions rights 
Given a general consensus on the asset requirements of emissions rights, the 
next accounting issue was the classification of emissions rights into existing asset 
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categories. Unsurprisingly, ANC faced difficulty in categorisation of emissions 
rights because they cannot be embraced within „the literal accounting definitions‟ 
(ASS 7) of any asset class. Due to the specific and innovative nature of emissions 
rights, emissions assets cannot appropriately be defined as financial instruments, 
intangible assets or inventory, nor could ANC determine an exactly suitable 
category from amongst existing asset categories. In addition, emissions rights 
have a regulated and administrative nature because they are created and 
allocated by government. Once allocated, entities own and are able to sell and 
purchase emissions rights at their discretion. 
Unlike suggestions from most previous studies and prevalent practice in the EU, 
where emissions rights are categorised as intangible assets, ANC asserted that 
emissions rights could not be considered as intangible assets because companies 
can operate facilities without holding emissions rights while they are producing 
emissions. In other words, emissions rights held by a company do not provide 
companies with the legal entitlement to carry out their ordinary business activities 
which produce emissions. The ANC‟s viewpoint differed substantially from the 
view of IASB, which regarded emissions allowances as intangible assets both 
under IFRIC 3 and in its tentative decision of 2008-2010. In addition, ANC 
mentioned that the inventory category is not strictly suitable for emissions rights 
because they have no physical substance. One interviewee described the 
multifaceted nature of emissions rights which resulted in having to find a solution 
„outside the box‟: 
We began with assets, it was not a financial instrument we are sure of 
that. Despite the fact that the IASB considered it was an intangible 
asset, we didn‟t consider it was really an intangible asset because, even 
if you don‟t have emission rights, when you are emitting you are 
compliant with regulation within the definition of inventories, you think to 
match everything. When you refer to raw materials, it is materials and 
not physical. […] We thought it didn‟t have all the characteristics. In 
neither of these classifications of assets did it tick all the boxes of the 
definition. So we tried to think outside the box (ASS 7). 
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Notably, ANC sought a practical solution by looking outside existing asset 
definitions. It took a so-called „economic approach‟ to analyse when and why 
companies purchase emission rights, how they manage them, and how they 
account for emissions rights in their business. One interviewee explained how the 
economic approach was taken: 
We tried to think what are companies, what are investors purchasing 
emission rights intending to do? What are they intending to do? And 
what is their business model when they purchase emission rights or 
when they own them? (ASS 8) 
ANC was manifestly aware of how emissions rights had been dealt with by 
companies. Specifically, most French companies had accounted for emissions 
rights as being consumed in the production process like commodities (that is, raw 
materials), as supported by one interviewee‟s comments: 
Despite the fact that it is not a raw material, it is not a physical material. 
Companies manage this exactly as a raw material, as a physical 
material. […] The system of emission rights results in an additional cost 
of physical raw materials – fossil fuel materials – which are used in 
production. And these materials, when they are held before production, 
are inventories. They are not intangible assets, of course. So the 
subcategory is inventory and it‟s a net additional cost for inventories 
held by the companies. Or if they don‟t have inventories they consume 
it as soon as they purchase it, but it‟s included in their production costs. 
So there is a logical way to consider this as inventory and to reflect this 
in production cost, because there was another argument that – have 
you ever seen the cost of an intangible asset reflected in production 
costs? And companies said “never”. […] As emission rights were 
managed as a specific new commodity, they had the nature of a new 
administrative raw material (ASS 8). 
Importantly, this practice provided ANC with a critical insight with regard to how to 
account for emissions rights. From the treatment in practice, in which companies 
dealt with emissions rights in the same way as raw materials consumed in the 
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production process, ANC built a logic stating that emissions rights are considered 
to be a new type of commodity. Accordingly, ANC created the concept of 
emissions rights as a so-called „new administrative raw material‟, referred to by 
one interviewee as „administrative raw materials, which are managed in exactly 
the same way as physical materials‟ (ASS 8). 
Business models 
ANC articulated new accounting guidance to be applied to various types of 
business under the EU ETS, including mandatory participants and financial 
intermediaries. With this objective, it shed light on intentions for holding or 
purchasing emissions rights: why would a business entity purchase emissions 
rights? ANC derived an answer from real usage patterns in business: „emission 
rights are consumed in the production process; or they are held for sale in the 
ordinary course of business‟ (ASS 8). Having identified the intentions for holding or 
purchasing emissions rights, the same interviewee defined two business models: 
a „production business model‟ and a „trading business model‟. 
The production model is appropriate for „companies which are obliged to purchase 
emission rights owing to their manufacturing activity‟, while the trading model is 
applied to „companies which voluntarily purchase emission rights for purposes 
other than compliance‟. This interviewee differentiated the objectives or intentions 
of using emissions rights under each business model as follows: 
Purchase: why do you purchase? It‟s compulsory within the production 
model; it‟s absolutely voluntary in the trading model, because your 
ambition is to make profit. The purpose of the purchase in the 
production model is compliance; in the trading model the purpose is to 
realise a capital gain (ASS 8). 
Under the premise that emissions rights are considered to be a new type of 
administrative raw material, ANC developed an accounting treatment for 
emissions rights based on the business model, as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Summary of accounting treatment under business models 
(adapted from ANC‟s proposal, 2012) 
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Business 
model 
Purpose of 
purchase 
Effect of 
purchase 
Treatment 
in 
business 
Accounting treatment 
(in line with IAS 2) 
Classification Measurement 
Production 
business 
model 
Compliance 
with 
obligation 
under the 
scheme 
Freeze or 
secure 
production 
costs 
Consumed 
in 
production 
process 
Raw material 
inventory 
At cost 
Trading 
business 
model 
Appreciation 
in value or 
capital gains 
Generate 
gains 
Held for 
sale as for 
ordinary 
business 
Trading 
Inventory 
At fair value 
 
ANC was able to elaborate a set of accounting rules for emissions rights in 
accordance with IAS 2 Inventories and French GAAP in terms of recognition and 
measurement. One interviewee highlighted the consistency of accounting 
treatment under the business models within the existing accounting framework: 
We had two business models: pollution business models where 
emission rights are consumed in the production process; or they are 
held for sale in the ordinary course of business. It‟s a definition of 
inventory in IFRS 2 and in our French standards too. And the 
measurement of inventories in IFRS is at cost when it‟s used in the 
production process, and fair value is allowed when they are held for 
trading purposes (ASS 8). 
ANC reckoned that the measurement requirement under IAS 2 could be 
appropriately applied to emissions rights under each business model. With 
reference to IAS 2, emissions rights under the production model are measured at 
cost, while under the trading model they are measured at fair value. One 
interviewee (ASS 8) stressed that the proposal based on business models 
harmonised entirely with existing accounting standards, in particular IFRS and 
French GAAP, in terms of classification and measurement. ANC achieved its goal 
within the constraints by means of an economic approach properly reflecting 
actual practice. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the effect of purchase of emissions rights, under the 
production model, companies are able to freeze their production costs by 
  
162 
incorporating the purchase costs into production costs. In effect, freezing the 
production cost is beneficial for companies as emissions rights are treated like any 
„raw material‟ (ASS 7). From the perspective of managerial accounting, freezing 
production costs is a decisive factor in securing marginal costs and setting out a 
product price in the internal budgeting process. In this context, one interviewee 
referred to the significance of „the notion of freezing and stabilising‟ production 
costs in relation to pricing strategy: 
If you want a certain margin, you know at what price you need to sell it. 
And that‟s why the notion of freezing or stabilising, if you want, your 
production cost is important (ASS 7), 
On the other hand, under the trading model, companies may pursue capital gains 
by purchasing emissions rights because reducing production costs may not be 
meaningful for their business model. One interviewee stressed the distinction 
between the business models in terms of the effect of purchase: 
The effect of the purchase is obviously not the same. In the production 
model the purchase freezes your production cost; under the trading 
model you don‟t freeze anything because you have no production cost 
(ASS 8). 
In summary, based on how companies deal with emissions rights in practice 
during their production process, the business models were devised by aligning 
with reality. The business models should be perceived as a practical solution 
derived from practice. In effect, the business models were highly applicable to any 
type of business under ETS. In addition, the business models were beneficial for 
managerial control thanks to the effect of freezing production costs. 
With regard to a mechanism for de-recognition of an asset and recognition of a 
liability as emissions arise, the underlying analogy of the ANC‟s proposal evolved 
with a firm rationale and logical reasoning within the existing accounting 
conceptual framework. Notably, ANC had a different view from previous 
discussions with regard to a mechanism for de-recognition of an asset and 
recognition of a liability. 
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For example, in previous papers (e.g. IFRIC 3), assets were de-recognised in 
accordance with either surrendering or selling them. On the other hand, ANC 
posited that emissions rights should be de-recognised as emissions are generated, 
assuming that emissions rights are no longer an asset as soon as a company 
produces GHG emissions, in the sense that emissions rights are expected to be 
used to settle the obligation arising from emissions. The underlying logic of de-
recognition of asset was explained by ASS 8: 
We had to answer very important questions. Are emission rights still an 
asset after the production and after emissions? We can consider that 
emission rights are no longer an asset after production because they 
only generate what an asset is able to generate if they are held before 
producing, because they can be sold or can be used for future 
compliance. As soon as you have emitted, they cannot be sold; they 
cannot be held for future compliance because they must be kept for 
past emissions. Of course, as there is a free market they can be sold, 
but at the same time, if the company decides to sell them, the company 
immediately generates a liability for the same amount. So we consider 
that as soon as you have emitted, even though you have an 
administrative certificate – of course you still have it – you no longer 
have an asset in hand (ASS 8). 
In terms of the liability, ANC presumed that the liability stems from the event that 
an entity has to purchase emission rights from the accounting point of view. ANC 
justified the liability as an accounting event of purchasing emissions rights, not 
surrendering them on the grounds that the outflow of resources is essentially in 
line with purchasing emissions rights. ANC viewed the surrender of emissions 
rights as an administrative process to prove compliance, as stated by the following 
interviewee: 
We had to think about the end of the obligation – the end of the liability, 
the obligating event. Is the obligating event of force, the obligation to 
surrender emission rights to the state when you emit. […] We really 
think that the obligation is a purchase of emission rights and not the 
surrendering to the state, because only the purchase gives a way for 
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the outflow of resources. Surrendering the emission rights is not really 
the end of the liability; it‟s an administrative way for the system to work 
and it‟s a proof that you are compliant, but it‟s not a sign of the outflow 
of resources (ASS 8). 
In addition, it is notable that „unit of account‟ was manifestly adopted in ANC‟s 
proposal for recognition of assets and liabilities. Under the production model, 
emissions rights and related liabilities are accounted for under the „same unit of 
account‟ (ASS 7). This means that emissions rights and related liabilities cannot 
be presented simultaneously on a balance sheet (ASS 8). Consequently, a 
company has „either an asset or a liability‟, „but not the same time‟ (ASS 8) on a 
balance sheet. On the other hand, under the trading model, only an asset is 
presented on the balance sheet, to the value of emissions rights held by the 
company. 
Remarkably, owing to „the same unit of account‟ for emissions rights and the 
corresponding liability under the business models, the so-called mismatch 
problems under IFRIC3 could be resolved. ANC emphasised that presentation 
under the business models should be distinguished from net presentation. The 
presentation under the production model is apparently similar to net presentation 
from an asset/liability point of view. However, ANC took the approach of netting 
asset and liability in order to deal with emissions rights and related liabilities under 
the same unit of account. In this context, ASS 7 said: 
It‟s not a net of an asset and a liability. It‟s inventory: you‟ve either used 
it or you don‟t have enough. A lot of people say to us „well, it‟s a net 
presentation‟. If you think business model, if you think of how this works, 
it‟s not a net presentation. It can‟t be, because you either have too 
many that you‟re going to use or you don‟t have enough; it looks like a 
net presentation for people who think you have to have an asset and 
you have to have a liability. This is not what we think. We think if you 
have an asset, you don‟t have a liability (ASS 7). 
In addition, ANC posited the usefulness of business models from a user‟s point of 
view. The business models provide more useful accounting information under ETS 
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because „this system gives [you] the exact position of the balance sheet or an 
asset or a liability‟ (ASS 8). 
For example, under the production model showing either an asset or a liability is 
displayed on the balance sheet, if information users identify the existence of a 
liability on the balance sheet, they are able to judge immediately whether a 
company is at risk and assess how many emissions rights need to be purchased. 
One interviewee (ASS 7) addressed that information users are able directly to 
figure out the position of a company and the extent to which it may face risk. In 
this regard, the same interviewee stressed how the business models can be 
perceived to be more decision-useful. 
Moreover, ANC also emphasised that the production model provides the exact 
performance in the profit and loss statement as a result of managing „the 
appropriate level of performance‟ associated with emission activities (ASS 8). 
Notably, ANC indicates the influence of the business models on other jurisdictions 
which are in need of accounting standards for emissions rights. One interviewee 
posited that the business model approach may be a plausible way for other 
accounting standard setters which attempt to develop accounting standards within 
the existing accounting framework: 
This was the first time that we‟d actually pushed the business model 
approach, and I know the Koreans [KASB] are very keen on 
performance, operating measures and everything as we are – and 
within the discussions that exist currently on the conceptual framework, 
we think the business model needs to be taken into account. So this is 
one way of applying it and demonstrating that we think there is no need 
to change IFRS to apply this. And it‟s for the individual countries to look 
at how people apply their own. How do they use, manage their own 
emission rights within the constraints of their own systems? How do 
they do that? And you‟ll probably find it‟s the same thing. So there might 
be minor changes to these, but this is probably something that can be 
applied. If you consider it‟s part of your production cost, well, you know, 
the consequences flow and are relatively easy to apply (ASS 7). 
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In summary, the business models delivered an applicable solution to the 
accounting treatment of emissions rights in light of both financial accounting, with 
a firm rationale within the existing accounting framework, and managerial 
accounting, with the effect of freezing production costs. 
Justifying the business models 
ANC acknowledged that justifying the business models might be problematic in 
the sense that an entity may change its strategic intention for purchasing 
emissions rights in order to „optimise‟ production costs. Some asserted that 
specific guidance should be provided in order to identify and justify which model 
should be applied, as there was concern that a company might manipulate its 
accounting numbers by changing from one business model to another. 
In order to take this concern into consideration, according to ANC‟s proposal an 
entity is required to document its „strategy, targets and contracts to purchase 
emission rights‟ in order to validate its business model. Along with documentation, 
an entity must report some off-sheet numbers in association with its activities in 
order to validate the particular business model on which it relies.45 
Despite concerns in relation to justifying the business models, ANC highlighted 
that no problem has emerged to date in the process of implementing the proposal. 
The main reason for successful implementation may be ascribed to the fact that 
both production and trading models had already been pervasively applied in most 
large companies for managing raw materials, such as oil. A large industrial group 
has separate legal entities or divisions in charge of producing and trading 
commodities for carrying out their core business. In other words, the production 
model and the trading model can be applied simultaneously to a single entity with 
both production and trading divisions. In this sense, ANC asserted that there is no 
difference between raw materials and emissions rights when applying the 
business models, as explained by ASS 7: 
                                            
45
 According to the ANC‟s proposal (para 5.2.), an entity must report on the number of emissions rights held 
at the period‟s cut-off date and their association with past and future emissions; the total aggregate number of 
emissions rights purchased and sold since the beginning of the multi-year plan and for each business model. 
  
167 
Those large companies, they also have a production business model 
and a trading business model for raw material; it already exists. The 
same company can have petrol for its own activities and it can have 
petrol for trading purposes, so it already has the two business models. 
So within a big group, and oftentimes what you‟ll have is that – 
obviously the big group is a consolidation of a number of companies – I 
think within a group. Usually there‟s a central trading desk which is a 
separate company. So you can find it, but oftentimes you will have 
strictly the production units, that it will be clear what they do; you‟ll have 
the trading. And if you do have a legal entity that has both, they 
obviously have systems in place for all the other things where they do 
one and the other, and we considered that it was no different for this 
specific inventory (ASS 7). 
Moreover, ANC emphasised that emissions rights can be controlled in terms of 
valuation by taking advantage of the „own-use model‟ within an internal audit 
system. For example, an auditor may allow measurement at cost for purchase of 
emissions rights for own use, while measuring at fair value emissions rights 
outside the own-use model. In this context, one interviewee stated: 
For raw materials auditors ask the companies to document their own 
use purchases. In the own-use model, the auditors allow the company 
to value the commodity at cost. If you are outside the own-use model, if 
you don‟t have the real intention for the commodity to be delivered – for 
instance if you have no production forecast – you are outside the own-
use model and this commodity is valued at fair value (ASS 7). 
In addition, ANC asserted that each company must keep sufficient budgeting data 
to enable it to make judgments on which model is more appropriate for their 
business. For example, in light of the internal control and budget process, it is 
critical for an entity to „secure‟ margin and production cost in order to set up price 
control and strategy under a managerial control system. In order to secure 
production costs, an entity may decide to apply the production model. In this 
setting, one interviewee referred to internal controllability in the operation of the 
business model: 
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You have to think in a company‟s process obviously there‟s budgeting – 
budgeting based on production plans which are established years in 
advance – and so you have an idea of what the volume is that you‟re 
looking at that‟s going to normally come within the production business 
model. After a while, obviously history says what you‟ve been doing, so 
you can see if the company‟s been playing around or not. So I think 
there‟s enough information beforehand and afterhand to check and say 
what is reasonable within the one business model to have (ASS 7). 
Thanks to several „internal safeguards‟ (ASS 7), application of the business 
models is unlikely to undermine the implementation process. In other words, 
contrary to a number of concerns raised in relation to validation of a particular 
business model, companies are unlikely to switch from one business model to 
another simply in order to manipulate their earnings or improve their margins. 
To date, ANC has not reported any complaints from or conflicts with French 
companies when applying its proposal to account for emissions rights. In essence, 
ANC‟s proposal may be regarded as an accounting model for emissions rights 
with a high degree of acceptability and applicability. It is expected to become a 
reference with regard to post-enactment for other accounting standard setters over 
time. 
 Summary 5.5.
This chapter has presented and discussed the findings in relation to Research 
Question 1 and its related objectives in the cases of IASB‟s tentative decisions 
2008-2010 and ANC‟s 2012 proposal. Several key findings have been identified 
with regard to accounting issues on emissions rights and related liabilities since 
IFRIC 3 was withdrawn. 
In line with previous studies, there is general consensus on the core accounting 
issue of how to account for free allowances. Although the key accounting issues 
stem from free allowances, the most material accounting issues with which each 
standard-setter primarily dealt turned out to differ under various circumstances. 
While IASB‟s tentative decisions were being made, Phase II of the EU ETS was 
running, under which most allowances were allocated for free. Therefore, the 
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accounting issue in relation to free allowances was primarily addressed in IASB‟s 
tentative decisions. For IASB, the most arguable issue related to recognition of the 
corresponding entry of free allowances on Day 1 (the so-called the „Day 1 issue‟). 
In particular, recognition of a liability on Day 1 was regarded as „the biggest single 
issue‟ (ASS 5) which caused the most heated arguments. It appears that 
recognition of a liability on Day 1 was tackled as a priority because it gave rise to 
more fundamental knock-on issues in light of the accounting conceptual 
framework. On the other hand, the presentation issue was not argued as intensely 
as the Day 1 issue; in effect, IASB did not reach any conclusion in relation to the 
presentation issue at that time. 
Meanwhile, ANC intended to develop new accounting guidance for emissions 
rights in accordance with Phase III of the EU ETS, in which auctioning is the 
default allocation method. Accordingly, the costs under ETS were expected to rise, 
and companies needed to incorporate actual costs associated with the purchase 
of emissions rights into their accounts. Against this background, ANC pursued the 
development of a type of umbrella accounting guidance to be applied 
comprehensively to various types of business under ETS. Furthermore, the 
accounting guidance was to be subject to the existing accounting framework, 
specifically IFRS and French GAAP. Notably, ANC sought a solution with 
reference to how companies actually dealt with emissions rights in practice. In 
effect, actual business practice inspired ANC to devise business models under the 
premise of different uses of emissions rights for different purposes. The 
accounting rules were elaborated logically on the basis of each business model, in 
line with the existing accounting framework. By virtue of several strengths of the 
business models, ANC‟s proposal has been successfully implemented with a high 
degree of compliance to date. 
The accounting models which were addressed by IASB‟s tentative decisions and 
ANC‟s proposal were referred to by KASB. Consequently, all aspects of the 
accounting models investigated in this chapter have effectively influenced KASB in 
its quest for an appropriate model for emissions rights in Korea. Details of 
accounting issues in the case of KASB are described in the next chapter. 
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6. Accounting issues for ETS in the case of KASB 
 Introduction 6.1.
This chapter presents and analyses the findings in relation to Research Question 
1 in the context of KASB. KASB initiated the establishment of an accounting 
standard for emissions rights and related liabilities in the run-up to the 
commencement of the Korean ETS on 1 January 2015. The author was able to 
explore the Korean case as KASB was in the process of setting up Korean GAAP 
on emissions rights. This chapter describes the accounting issues for ETS in the 
Korean context on the basis of interviews in the field and documentary analysis. 
As noted in Section 1.1, this study is concerned primarily with accounting issues 
on ETS in the Korean context. Accordingly, in this chapter more specific details 
are given on the case of KASB in light of accounting issues on emissions rights 
and related liabilities. Section 6.2 addresses the background to the development 
of Korean GAAP for ETS. Section 6.3 analyses factors to be considered when 
developing an accounting standard for emissions rights. Section 6.4 describes 
features of Korean GAAP relating to emissions rights and liabilities, including 
accounting models and specific accounting treatment. 
 Background to initiation of Korean GAAP for ETS 6.2.
According to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies (Article 13), the Korea 
Accounting Institute (KAI) and KASB are entitled to set accounting standards (see 
Section 2.5). Introduction of the Korean ETS gave rise to need of standardisation 
of ETS. In this context, one interviewee highlighted the need for accounting 
guidance when a new policy is introduced and applied to business entities. In line 
with Hopwood and Miller‟s view (1994), referring to the „constitutive role‟ of 
accounting in social processes, the interviewee stated: 
When a new policy is introduced such as an emissions trading scheme, 
accounting guidance should be set up. Given accounting information 
reflecting business activities under a new policy (e.g. ETS), 
stakeholders are able to analyse how the new policy influences the 
business, in particular to what extent assets, liabilities, or profit and 
losses would be affected (ASS 3). 
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Moreover, the Korean government officially requested KASB to establish an 
accounting standard for ETS by the end of 2014 as a part of follow-up measures 
for a three-year plan for economic innovation which was implemented in March 
2014 (MOSF, 2014). In response to the government‟s call to set an accounting 
standard for ETS, the ETS project was effectively accelerated.    
Corresponding to the call from government and statutory responsibility for 
accounting standards, KASB acknowledged its mission to set an accounting 
standard for emissions rights (ASS 3). 
In the absence of IFRS for emissions rights hitherto, KASB felt that it was 
desirable to develop its own accounting standard for emissions rights in 
accordance with the commencement of the Korean ETS. KASB expected that 
Korean GAAP for emissions rights would contribute to ensuring overall 
comparability of accounting information between Korean companies. 
In addition, Korean companies might not be comfortable with the diversity of 
accounting treatment under IAS 8. Rather, they might prefer to be provided with 
specific guidance by an authoritative organisation. Two interviewees (ASS 3 and 
ASS 4) acknowledged a preference for uniformity in Korean companies. 
Considering the usefulness of accounting information and the companies‟ 
preference for a unified rule, it was judged that KASB had made the right decision 
in setting up Korean GAAP for emissions rights. One interviewee (ASS 4) referred 
to the importance of the development of Korean GAAP for emissions rights, given 
the absence of IFRS. In particular, he stressed the necessity of Korean GAAP to 
ensure comparability at least between Korean companies. He commented: 
I think that Korea is better to set up national accounting standards for 
ETS because it enables it to ensure comparability among regional 
companies. If the KASB does not set up the Korean GAAP, this would 
result in decreased comparability between Korean companies. On top 
of that, considering the specific Korean propensity not to accept variety 
but to pursue uniformity, using IAS 8 paras. 10 to 12 would not be 
appropriate for Korean companies. In this regard, the second best 
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would be to provide Korean GAAP for emissions rights that would be 
unvaryingly applied to Korean companies (ASS 4). 
Accordingly, KASB admitted the inevitability of developing a new accounting 
standard for ETS and thereby determined to develop an accounting standard for 
ETS in accordance with the start of the Korean ETS. 
  Factors for consideration 6.3.
It was observed that, from the beginning of the ETS project, KASB took several 
factors into consideration in setting up an accounting standard for ETS. 
KASB explained the factors generally to be considered when establishing 
accounting standards.46 Firstly, the accounting standard setter must pursue the 
most desirable accounting model, to be built with proper analogy and a firm 
rationale. Secondly, as a primary principle, the accounting standard setter must be 
aware of information users‟ needs and decision-usefulness from a user‟s point of 
view. One interviewee stated that „decision-usefulness‟ was the primary objective 
in setting an accounting standard for emissions rights: 
The main principle of accounting is providing timely accounting 
information in order to optimise the flow of capital. That is, accounting 
information should be timely provided to stakeholders. For doing this, 
the accounting standards are necessary to produce decision-useful 
accounting information. […] From the information users‟ point of view, 
the accounting standards for ETS would be important in light of the 
usefulness of accounting information (ASS 3).  
Despite the importance of users‟ needs, one interviewee (ASS 1) admitted the 
difficulty of identifying users‟ needs precisely due to a lack of previous surveys on 
this issue. As an alternative, KASB referred to practice commonly adopted by 
companies participating in the EU ETS in order to acquire insights into users‟ 
needs. Thirdly, the accounting standard setter must consider the extent to which 
                                            
46
 This view was identified in a pilot interview in April 2013. Since the pilot interview was carried out at the 
beginning of the standard-setting process, the factors were described in more general terms. These factors 
were further elaborated as the standard setting progressed (see Figure 9). 
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preparers will be burdened when producing accounting information. In other words, 
accounting rules should be applicable and acceptable from a preparer‟s point of 
view, and accounting rules should be formulated in such a way as to produce 
accounting information without generating unnecessary extra costs for companies. 
The factors to be considered were elaborated more tangibly by accommodating 
stakeholders‟ concerns and interests. An agenda paper for the KASB meeting 
held on 28 March 2014 („Review of the law relating to the ETS‟) explicitly states 
that KASB took two factors into consideration when setting up an accounting 
standard for ETS. 
Firstly, it was necessary to minimise the impact of the new accounting standard for 
ETS on the objectives of ETS. In particular, the accounting standard should not 
cause dysfunction of the scheme‟s market mechanism. In addition, the accounting 
standard for emissions rights should not undermine the ability of ETS to achieve 
GHG emissions reduction targets in the most effective manner on the basis of a 
market mechanism. 
When the Korean government requested the establishment of a new accounting 
standard, it provided guidelines for KASB to follow. One interviewee (GOV 2) 
stated that the government called for an accounting standard for ETS that would 
not 1) place additional burdens on industry or 2) impede tradability on the market. 
Corresponding to the guidance given by the government, the accounting standard 
for ETS was intentionally designed to minimise the impact on the scheme.  
Secondly, and more importantly, KASB wished to promulgate the accounting 
standard for ETS so that companies mandatorily adopting IFRS (referred to as „K-
IFRS adoption companies‟ hereafter) would be able to apply it to their accounts. 
Participants in the Korean ETS are designated on the basis of criteria in the ETS 
bill.47 About 70 to 80 per cent of participants are KOSDAQ-listed companies that 
                                            
47
 According to the Korean ETS bill, installations emitting over 25,000 tCO2eq/year in 2012, entities emitting 
over 20,000 tCO2eq/year in 2013 and entities emitting 15,000 tCO2eq/year in 2015 must mandatorily 
participate in the scheme. 
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mandatorily apply IFRS to their financial statements.48 Consequently, any new 
accounting model should be subject to the IFRS framework to the extent to which 
K-IFRS adoption companies can adopt Korean GAAP for emissions rights in line 
with IAS 8. In other words, the accounting standard for ETS should not give rise to 
any conflict with the IFRS framework. If conflict with IFRS occurred, K-IFRS 
adoption companies might not refer to the standard, even though the accounting 
standard for emissions rights was provided by KASB. In this regard, KASB had to 
set up an accounting standard for ETS compatible with the existing accounting 
standards, in particular IFRSs. 
These two factors were articulated clearly in the documents provided by KASB. 
The factors to be considered are summarised as follows: 
1) In accordance with the objective of the scheme to achieve the GHG 
emissions reduction target in the most effective way, the accounting 
standard for emissions rights must be set up in such a way as to minimise 
its impact on the operation of the scheme. 
2) To enhance comparability between companies, the accounting standard 
for ETS should be established in a way that enables K-IFRS adoption 
companies to apply it to emissions rights. 
In effect, these factors substantially affected KASB‟s choice of accounting model 
and rules. 
In addition, it is noteworthy that KASB also took major stakeholders‟ interests into 
account. While conducting a preliminary interview in March 2013, I observed 
whom KASB perceived to be major stakeholders regarding accounting issues for 
ETS in Korea (See section 4.5). At an early stage in ETS development, in March 
2013, KASB held the KAI forum as a form of public hearing. It invited POSCO: the 
largest emitter among Korean companies, the Ministry of Environment: the 
competent authority, Samjeong KPMG and Samil PwC: big four accounting firms. 
                                            
48
 Since Korea adopted IFRS in 2011, companies with total assets greater than 2 trillion KRW must 
mandatorily apply IFRS to quarterly and half-year reporting (KASB 2013). In the absence of IFRS for 
emissions rights to date, K-IFRS adoption companies may develop their own accounting policy to deal with 
emissions rights and related liabilities in line with IAS 8. 
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In addition to these participants, the Financial Services Commission and the 
South-East power company also consisted of a member of the technical 
committee consulting mainly on technical issues in the development of the 
accounting standard for ETS. Interestingly, KASB did not concentrate on all 
companies but focused on a few relevant companies, principally large emitters, 
who may have a big concern on this issue. Accordingly, the participants in the KAI 
forum and the member of technical committee constituted the major stakeholders 
whom KASB perceived had a significant interest the accounting issues for ETS. 
ASS 1 stated the background for calling them in due process in the development 
of the accounting standard for ETS: 
KAI forum was held in order to identify a range of accounting issues 
arising from the ETS. Hence, we invited the relevant entities engaging 
in the Korean ETS such as large emitters, mainly companies, and 
accounting firms which might do research a wide range of ETS issues 
in the perspective of accounting. […] We [KASB] made a form of a 
technical committee in order to mainly address technical issues. As a 
member of technical committee, we called POSCO, South-East power 
Co., Ministry of Environment, the Financial Services Commission, 
Samjeong (KPMG), and Samil (PwC) because we consider them giving 
the most appropriate advice for this issue (ASS 1). 
On the basis of the participants in due process in the development of the 
accounting standard for ETS, the major stakeholders were identified: large 
emitters, accounting firms and the competent authority of ETS (government). 
Although in the documents KASB did not apparently articulate stakeholders‟ 
interests as a factor to be considered, prominent stakeholders‟ interests needed to 
be taken into account as one of the most significant elements influencing its 
consideration. KASB paid close attention to the voices of stakeholders. In addition, 
it was observed that the main stakeholders, consisting mainly of large emitters, 
persistently raised their concerns regarding the anticipated accounting model with 
KASB throughout due process. In essence, the interests of stakeholders were a 
critical feature which was taken into consideration in the development of the 
accounting standard for ETS. 
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Based on the findings, the factors that KASB took into account in setting up the 
accounting standard for emission rights are shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Factors considered in the case of KASB 
 
Figure 9 indicates how the factors affected the development of the accounting 
standard for ETS as constraints. The KASB had to 1) address the negative impact 
on financial and accounting numbers; 2) minimise the negative impact on the 
scheme and the carbon market; and 3) align with IFRSs. These factors 
substantially and significantly influenced KASB‟s choice of specific accounting 
models and rules. 
 Features of Korean GAAP for emissions rights 6.4.
6.4.1. Identifying accounting issues for emissions rights 
With the introduction of a new measure or policy, a high level of understanding is a 
critical premise for a high-quality outcome when developing accounting standards. 
Accordingly, the accounting standard setter must comprehend all the measures 
and processes of ETS in the development of an accounting standard for it. 
Notably, KASB acknowledged a necessity for sufficient comprehension of all 
features and processes of ETS before identifying relevant accounting issues. In 
addition to the advanced professional and technical aspects of ETS, the Korean 
ETS was formulated as a consequence of political consultation in which a variety 
of interests were reflected. Thus, time-consuming efforts were required to gain a 
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complete understanding of the contents of the Korean ETS bill, including the 
background to the scheme, the aim and mechanism of its measures, and the 
process and its effects. 
During the interviews, it was observed that KASB staff and board members had 
endeavoured to gain a comprehensive understanding of features of the Korean 
ETS. At the same time, KASB staff had made strenuous efforts to transform each 
process under the scheme into accounting events in order to shape accounting 
rules in accordance with each business activity which might occur under the 
scheme. Indeed, the findings demonstrate KASB‟s efforts to understand how the 
Korean ETS would operate, and consequently to identify and justify relevant 
accounting issues under ETS. For example, in KASB meetings held on 28 March 
and 11 April 2014 it was observed that KASB members had reviewed the main 
features of the Korean ETS bill and the relevant accounting issues regarding 
emissions rights. The meetings were held as a preliminary session before making 
a tentative decision on an appropriate accounting model for the ETS.49 
The staff in KASB definitely had a very keen appreciation not only of general 
features and processes of ETS, but also of politically-related attributes under the 
Korean ETS. In this regard, KASB staff were capable of properly identifying and 
justifying accounting issues under the ETS. To this extent, they were able to 
develop a KASB staff proposal on emissions rights with a robust and adequate 
rationale. 
Ascui and Lovell (2011) argue that the development of accounting standards for 
ETS within an existing accounting framework is doomed to failure due to a lack of 
appropriate appreciation of each process of ETS. In contrast to Ascui and Lovell‟s 
assertion, in the case of KASB, a high level of expertise and knowledge was 
acquired as a result of strenuous efforts to understand the Korean ETS. 
In addition to a full understanding of all processes under ETS, KASB attempted to 
identify and justify accounting issues relating to emissions rights. KASB staff 
referred to all available existing accounting models and industry practice 
                                            
49
 A review of accounting models for ETS was undertaken in a later meeting held on 9 May 2014. 
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commonly used in Europe. For example, they referred mainly to IFRIC 3 (2004), 
ANC‟s proposal (2012), EFRAG‟s comment paper (2012), and a survey on 
accounting for emissions rights in Europe conducted by PwC and IETA in 2007. 
KASB staff worked on analysing and comparing all available accounting models 
taking all factors into consideration (see Section 6.3). 
Based on the accounting issues identified, KASB set up a process for decision 
making in relation to accounting rules for emissions rights and related liabilities, as 
shown in Figure 10. The process in Figure 10 appears to have been beneficial as 
a way of identifying and elaborating accounting issues for ETS. 
Figure 10: Procedure for development of accounting rules for ETS 
 
(Source: Agenda paper of KASB meeting, March 2014: „Review of the law relating 
to the ETS‟) 
In accordance with the procedures shown in Figure 10, a set of accounting issues 
was identified on the basis of documents obtained from KASB and interviewees. 
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With regard to the main accounting issues, most interviewees in Korea pointed to 
free allowances. Unsurprisingly, due to 100 per cent free allocation in Phase I, the 
primary accounting issues were associated with the recognition, measurement 
and presentation of free allowances, which gave rise to contentious arguments 
and controversy among stakeholders. 
Recognition of emissions rights 
KASB had to justify whether emissions rights could be recognised as an asset. 
According to the definition of an asset in the Conceptual Framework of Financial 
Accounting under Korean GAAP,,  „an asset is a resource controlled by the entity 
as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to 
flow to the entity‟ (para. 90). One interviewee (ASS 1) reckoned that emissions 
rights exactly fit the requirement of an asset, specifying that „emission rights are 
an economic resource controlled by the entity as a result of allocation from the 
government‟. In addition, emissions rights are expected to be used to offset the 
obligation under ETS or may be sold, resulting in a cash inflow that must be 
capable of generating inflows (or decreasing outflows) of economic benefits. In 
this context, the same interviewee commented explicitly defining emission rights 
as assets: 
In line with criteria for recognition of an asset in the Conceptual 
Framework of Financial Accounting, emissions rights should be 
recognised as assets on the grounds that emissions rights are capable 
of generating cash inflows or offsetting an entity‟s statutory obligation 
under the ETS. In other words, it is highly probable that any future 
economic benefit associated with the item will flow to the entity. 
Furthermore, emissions rights can be measured at monetary value 
which can be observed on a market. This means that the item 
(emissions rights) entails a cost or value that can be measured with a 
high degree of reliability (ASS 1). 
In terms of recognition of emissions rights as assets, no conflict has arisen, 
similarly to previous discussions relating to other accounting standard setters and 
in previous research. As a prerequisite for elaborating an accounting treatment, 
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KASB reached a solid conclusion that emissions rights should be regarded as 
assets. 
Perspective on emissions rights 
It is important to make an assumption regarding the perspective on emissions 
rights because this assumption subsequently affects the determination of the 
measurement base and the timing of recognition and de-recognition of emissions 
rights. Acknowledging emissions rights to be an asset, one interviewee (ASS 1) 
referred to the attributes of emissions rights as various and complex, a non-
physical substance akin to intangibles, with tradability akin to financial instruments, 
and a commodity akin to raw materials. Because of the complicated and various 
natures of emissions rights, similarly to the debate in the case of other standard 
setters, KASB struggled to justify the exact classification of emissions rights within 
existing asset categories. 
In order to justify its perspective on emissions rights, KASB derived an idea from 
business models which had been introduced in ANC‟s proposal and EFRAG‟s 
comment paper. One interviewee (ASS 1) explicitly admitted the necessity of 
distinguishing different uses of emissions rights depending on the purpose of 
holding them. This interviewee also posited multiple simultaneous uses of 
emissions rights: emissions rights are primarily used for compliance purposes as 
well as being tradable at discretion. The same interviewee commented on the 
appropriateness of business models in accommodating a variety of features of 
emission rights: 
Emissions rights can be variously used in all kinds of business activities 
due to the diverse nature of emission rights. […] In this regard, the 
business model approach is appropriate to embrace the various 
attributes of emissions rights (ASS 1). 
Under the premise of various uses of emissions rights in line with different 
intentions to hold or purchase them, KASB adopted the business models shown in 
Table 7. 
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Table 7: KASB’s decision on business models 
Business model Perspective on 
emissions rights 
Existing accounting 
models 
KASB’s 
decision 
Compliance 
model 
(Production 
model) 
Objective to be 
surrendered to the 
authority but can be 
freely traded 
IFRIC 3 
IASB‟s tentative 
decision 
EFRAG, European 
practice 
Accept 
Commodity to be 
consumed in the 
production process 
ANC (France) Do not accept 
Trading model An investment object 
in the pursuit of capital 
gain 
ANC (France) 
EFRAG 
Accept 
 
An accounting treatment for emissions rights can be elaborated separately in 
accordance with a certain type of business model. For example, in a compliance 
(production) model, two different perspectives on emissions rights are assumed. 
One is that emissions rights are regarded as a resource that an entity should 
surrender to the government for compliance under ETS, referred to as the 
„compliance model‟. The other is that emissions rights are a new type of 
commodity consumed during the production process, referred to as the „production 
model‟, which ANC‟s proposal advocated. Meanwhile, in a trading model, 
emissions rights are seen as a type of object to be invested in in pursuit of capital 
gains over the short term. 
Notably, one interviewee (ASS 1) declared that ANC‟s proposal was a well-
developed accounting model for emissions rights on the basis of a robust and 
logical rationale, similar to the accounting model commonly used in the US. 
Nevertheless, this interviewee argued that ANC‟s proposal failed to reflect all the 
various attributes of ETS, especially as ANC‟s perspective on emissions rights 
focused mainly on the feature of being consumed in the production process like 
raw materials. The production model is based on the premise that emissions rights 
are only consumed during the production process, although an entity can sell 
emissions rights at its discretion. This interviewee stated that KASB‟s basic 
premise regarding the nature of emissions rights differed from ANC‟s perspective. 
The same interviewee (ASS 1) reckoned that KASB did not adopt ANC‟s proposal 
as a whole owing to the imperfection of ANC‟s premise. Rather, KASB adopted 
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the compliance and trading business models. The interviewee explained this 
further: 
We [KASB] did not take the business models all together proposed by 
the ANC because I consider the production model not to fully reflect all 
attributes of emissions rights, only focusing on the attribute of being 
consumed during the production process. Unlike the assumption made 
by the ANC, I believe companies are able to hold emissions rights in 
hand for the purpose of not only compliance with obligations under ETS 
but also pursuing capital gains at the same time (ASS 1). 
In essence, KASB adopted the same logic as ANC on business models. Namely, 
under the business models, different accounting treatments for emissions rights 
can be elaborated in line with each business model. The interviewee (ASS 1) 
stated that „KASB made a decision that the compliance model and trading model 
would be adopted as the primary framework to determine a specific accounting 
treatment for emissions rights‟. In effect, similarly to ANC‟s proposal, business 
models were utilised as a structural pillar in elaborating accounting rules for 
emissions rights in Korea. 
Determination of an asset category for emissions rights 
In the KASB staff proposal suggested prior to the exposure draft (see Section 
6.4.2), the classification of emissions rights was not confined to a specific category. 
Instead, the proposal suggested that emissions rights should be sub-categorised 
under the „other liquid asset‟ category. Contrary to the classification in the KASB 
staff proposal, in the exposure draft emissions rights allocated for the entire 
commitment period (i.e. 2015 to 2017 for Phase I) are recognised and classified in 
the intangible asset category. When emissions rights are expected to be 
surrendered within a year, they are re-classified into an „other liquid asset‟ 
category. The practice most commonly used in European companies (hereafter 
„European practice‟) was taken as a primary framework model for the exposure 
draft. It appears that KASB also intended to be in line with European practice in 
terms of classification, so emissions rights were categorised as intangible assets. 
Initial and subsequent measurement of asset and liability 
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In terms of the initial measurement of free allowances, there have been intense 
arguments amongst stakeholders on whether to measure them at fair value (fair 
value method) or at nil value (cost method). Emissions rights are designed to be 
tradable on the market, and it is therefore assumed that prices of emissions rights 
are reliably measurable. In effect, the fair value method was preferred by 
accounting standard setters as a default measurement base for emissions rights 
owing to the market mechanism of ETS. For example, IFRIC 3 and IASB‟s 
tentative decisions in 2008-2010 were based on a fair value approach to the 
measurement of emissions rights. 
On the other hand, in practice, measuring free allowances at nil value has been 
predominantly advocated by stakeholders, especially preparers. Some preparers 
have explicitly supported the „cost method‟, in which free allowances are 
recognised at nil value. In particular, the accounting model in which the cost 
method as a measurement base is combined with net presentation has been 
widely supported by preparers. Interviews with preparers (COM 1, COM 3, COM 8, 
COM 11, COM 12) conveyed a definite sense of being in favour of the cost 
method and net presentation. In particular, one interviewee (EXP_ACC 2) viewed 
the cost method and net presentation as a more suitable accounting model for 
emissions rights in the Korean context. This interviewee stated his view on an 
appropriate accounting model for Korea: 
From an accounting perspective, a gross approach might be more 
desirable; however, this approach may give rise to a degree of 
fluctuation arising from fair value measurement. On the other hand, 
from a practical point of view, a net approach might be more 
appropriate since accounting treatment under a net approach would 
make financial numbers non-volatile. Considering the fact that a net 
approach has been widely used in European practice, the cost 
measurement and net presentation under a net approach, as an easier 
and simpler accounting treatment for emissions rights, would be more 
suitable for Korean companies at the initial stage of ETS (EXP_ACC 2). 
Subsequently, under the compliance model, KASB staff considered two different 
measurement bases: cost method (at nil value) and fair value method. KASB staff 
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appeared to have advocated the fair value method of measuring initial and 
subsequent emissions rights because they believed that this method would 
provide more relevant and useful accounting information. 
Along with measurement bases, three different presentation models were also 
considered: gross presentation, net presentation and linked presentation (see 
Section 5.3.2). 
Interestingly, KASB staff devised different accounting models by matching each 
measurement base to a presentation method, as shown in Table 8. These 
different accounting models were analysed from various perspectives, including 
applicability in practice, the extent of influence on financial statements and 
transparency of accounting information. 
Table 8: Accounting models matching measurement with presentation 
Model Measurement Presentation Proposal or Standard 
Type 1 Fair value Gross presentation IFRIC 3 
Type 2 Fair value Net presentation Not applicable 
Type 3 Fair value Linked presentation Staff proposal (KASB) 
Type 4 Cost method Gross presentation Exposure draft (KASB) 
Type 5 Cost method Net presentation ANC‟s proposal  
 
Meanwhile, in terms of recognition of liability, KASB staff presented that a liability 
and a production cost should be recognised as emissions occurring irrespective of 
how many allowances are retained in hand. This view is different from IASB‟s 
tentative decision that a liability should be recognised when emissions rights are 
allocated (on Day 1). In contrast to IASB‟s tentative decisions, KASB determined 
that an obligation event occurs as emissions arise. Emissions rights (allocated or 
purchased) and liabilities (in accordance with emissions generated) should be 
recognised separately; they should not be netted as one unit of account. A liability 
should be recognised based on actual emissions and de-recognised when the 
allowances are surrendered to the government. Under the compliance model, de-
recognition of emissions rights and related liabilities will also be settled when an 
entity surrenders emissions rights to the government.  
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6.4.2. KASB staff proposal 
Taking all existing accounting models into consideration and having justified the 
accounting issues based on the business models, KASB staff attempted to seek a 
suitable accounting treatment that would be more appropriate and applicable 
under Korean circumstances. The KASB staff proposal was devised by 
elaborating existing models and adding their own ideas to the models. Figure 11 
presents how KASB staff elaborated the accounting models and devised their own 
proposal for the Korean context. 
Figure 11: KASB staff proposal, 2014 
 
 
The KASB staff proposal was formulated by adopting IASB‟s tentative decisions 
as a whole in terms of recognition, measurement and de-recognition. One 
interviewee (ASS 1) believed IASB‟s tentative decisions to be a superior model 
from the perspective of the accounting conceptual framework. For example, IASB 
made a tentative decision to measure initial and subsequent emissions rights and 
related liabilities at fair value. KASB regarded a fair value approach as delivering 
full presentation without causing a measurement mismatch issue, resulting in high-
quality accounting information. In addition, KASB confronted the treatment of free 
allowances as the main accounting issue, akin to the situation in which IASB‟s 
IASB's tentative 
decisions  
(FV method) 
Business models  
(Compliance 
model/Trading 
model) 
KASB staff proposal 
(Business models + 
FV method + Linked 
presentation) 
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tentative decisions were made between 2008 and 2010 (for more detail, see 
Section 5.2). IASB‟s tentative decisions appear to have been the most suitable 
and applicable model for KASB. In this regard, KASB staff made a decision to 
adopt IASB‟s decisions in their entirety and to elaborate them in such a way as to 
add specific accounting treatment for issues on which IASB drew no conclusions, 
such as the presentation issue.  
In essence, adopting IASB‟s tentative decisions in terms of recognition and 
measurement of an asset and a liability, the KASB staff proposal was that 
emissions rights and corresponding liabilities should be measured at fair value. 
Since free allowances were expected to be measured at fair value, some 
preparers argued that fair value measurement may have a significant impact on 
the financial statements of some large emitters, potentially aggravating the debt 
ratio. For example, one interviewee (COM 1) commented that emitters had 
insistently argued that „a fair value approach may cause a sharp rise in the debt 
ratio as well as a degree of volatility of profit or loss arising from fluctuations in the 
market price of emissions rights‟. 
Although an accounting model combining fair value measurement with gross 
presentation was regarded as the best solution from the perspective of the 
accounting conceptual framework, KASB staff had to take into consideration the 
concerns of companies. As a second best, linked presentation was proposed in 
order to address the concerns of prominent preparers. Linked presentation is an 
accounting treatment in which emissions rights and related liabilities are displayed 
as being tied to one unit of account. One interviewee (ASS 1) posited that linked 
presentation would offset the negative impacts of the fair value method on the 
debt ratio and volatility of accounting numbers, addressing large emitters‟ main 
concern.  
Another interviewee (ASS 2) highlighted applicability of linked presentation 
compatible with Korean GAAP. In fact, Korean GAAP for government grants 
allows linked presentation of „government grants‟ and „pension assets under 
management‟. The same interviewee commented: „extending the analogy of 
“government grant” presentation in Korean GAAP, linked presentation could be 
applied to free allowances‟. KASB staff believed that free allowances could be 
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regarded as a type of government grant on the grounds that they are given to 
compensate for the costs of future compliance under the scheme. Since Korean 
GAAP for government grants allows linked presentation, it could be adopted for 
emissions rights at least in this context. 
In addition, KASB staff believed that linked presentation provides more useful 
information than net presentation. In this context, one interviewee said: 
While under net presentation a net amount of emissions rights and 
related liability is displayed on the balance sheet, linked presentation 
displays the effects of ETS in light of both emissions rights and 
emissions liabilities (ASS 1). 
In effect, linked presentation was regarded as the most appropriate solution from 
not only the preparers‟ point of view but also the standard-setter‟s point of view in 
the sense of offsetting the negative impact on accounting numbers while providing 
more decision-useful information than net presentation. On the basis of a number 
of benefits of linked presentation, KASB staff formulated the new accounting 
model for emissions rights by combining fair value measurement with linked 
presentation. The KASB staff proposal was an accounting model that for the first 
time combined fair value measurement with linked presentation.  
Notably, the staff proposal might be considered as an up-to-date model for 
emissions rights and related liabilities. It incorporates all strands of accounting 
issues and discussions addressed in relation to emissions rights hitherto. In 
addition, the accounting treatment in the staff proposal is specified by 
accommodating various interests of stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, there was a critical concern in relation to linked presentation. 
According to the IFRS conceptual framework, gross presentation should be 
applied as a principle. In other words, assets and liabilities should not be offset. 
Linked presentation is exceptionally applied to only specific accounts (e.g. 
deferred tax liability) when specified in the individual IFRS. Accordingly, linked 
presentation may cause a conflict with the IFRS framework, as one interviewee 
suggested: 
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From an investor‟s perspective, they prefer all information in the form of 
gross assets and gross liabilities rather than netting or linked 
presentation. In addition, linked presentation has the potential to cause 
conflict with the conceptual framework of IFRS. In order to be more 
applicable in practice, net presentation could be the second best 
solution corresponding to the accounting treatment which has been 
commonly used in European companies in practice (ASS 4). 
In spite of the innovativeness of the KASB staff proposal, most KASB members 
appeared to be rather sceptical about linked presentation due to its inconsistency 
with the IFRS framework. By and large, KASB members seemed to be doubtful 
about the applicability and acceptability of the accounting treatment in the KASB 
staff proposal when implemented in the Korean context.50 
6.4.3. Exposure draft and final version 
IASB had not explicitly presented an official opinion on linked presentation for 
emissions rights and related liabilities. In order to ensure that linked presentation 
could be used in this case, KASB consulted unofficially with IASB staff with regard 
to the linked presentation issue. In response, KASB was informed that linked 
presentation is allowed in only very exceptional cases in IFRS; it is not a generally 
accepted method of presentation under the IFRS conceptual framework, as 
described by one interviewee: 
We‟ve been told that if the KASB adopts linked presentation in relation 
to emissions rights and liabilities, it might give a signal to information 
users that the KASB would NOT follow IFRS (ASS 1). 
Meanwhile, significant concern had been raised by most stakeholders in Korea 
with regard to the potential imperfection of the carbon market during the initial 
stages in Phase I. Although the Korean ETS was to be launched on 1 January 
2015, several interviewees predicted that „most participants may shun trading 
emission rights due to a high level of uncertainty of the scheme, in particular at the 
                                            
50
 This is inferred from observations when attending KASB meetings as an observer on 28 March and 11 
April 2014. 
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beginning of the first phase‟ (EXP_ACC2, EXP_ACC 3, COM 1, COM 3, COM 5, 
COM 7, COM8, PO 1, PO 3, EXP_CC 1, EXP_CC 2). Rather, participants would 
tend to retain emissions rights (COM 1, COM 3, COM 5, COM 7, PO 1, PO 3, 
EXP_CC 1, EXP_CC 2, EXP_CC2). In this context, one interviewee commented: 
It is expected that no one is likely to take part in trading due to a high 
level of uncertainty of the market; accordingly, entities would tend to 
hold their allowances NOT sell them. This might result in a „dormant 
market‟ for the time being (EXP_CC 2). 
Accordingly, it was anticipated that the Korean ETS market would remain „dormant‟ 
(COM 8) for the time being at the beginning of Phase I. This might lead to 
unavailability of market prices for emissions rights. One KASB member 
acknowledged that an active market is a prerequisite for applying the fair value 
method to measurement of emissions rights (KASB meeting, 28 March 2014). 
Considering the inappropriateness of the fair value method in the Korean ETS 
market at the initial stage, KASB set aside the fair value method as a 
measurement base for emissions rights.51 
These two critical concerns led to the deferral of the whole KASB staff proposal 
(KASB meeting, 11 April 2014) rather than immediate approval. Instead, KASB 
decided to consider two alternatives: one was an accounting model based on the 
most prevalent practice in Europe („European practice‟)52; the other was the 
accounting model in the KASB staff proposal. Table 9 characterises these 
alternative models in terms of measurement and presentation methods. 
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 The accounting model featuring a fair value method and linked presentation was eventually not approved. 
Instead, the exposure draft adopted a cost method approach which had been predominantly used in 
European companies (for more detail, see Section 6.4.3). 
52
 KASB referred to the survey on accounting for emissions rights in Europe conducted by PwC and IETA in 
2007. In terms of granted allowances and related liabilities, the survey demonstrates the most commonly used 
accounting treatment; categorisation – intangible assets; initial measurement – at nil value; valuation of 
liabilities – at carrying value of granted allowances. The survey shows a cost method is the accounting 
treatment which has been most pervasively used in practice. In the case of KASB, „European practice‟ is 
referred to as the „cost method‟ where granted allowances are measured at nil value and the related liabilities 
are measured at the carrying value of (granted) allowances.   
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Table 9: Alternative accounting models for emissions rights and liabilities 
Alternative 1 
(based on 
European practice) 
Measurement of 
asset 
At cost 
(in case of free allowances, at nil value) 
Measurement of 
liability 
At carrying value of emissions rights 
(in case of excess emissions over emissions 
rights held, at fair value of emissions rights) 
Presentation Gross presentation 
Alternative 2 
(based on KASB 
staff proposal) 
Measurement of 
asset 
At fair value (regardless whether allocation for 
free or purchased at own expense) 
Measurement of 
liability 
At fair value 
Presentation Linked presentation 
Source: Abstracted from presentation material in KAI Forum (11 July 2014) 
The Alternative 1 in above Table 9 corresponds to the Type 3 model in Table 8 
while the Alternative 2  corresponds to the Type 4 model in Table 8 respectively. 
With regard to the alternative models, KASB carried out a consultation process 
with stakeholders, including preparers and accounting experts (accounting firms 
and academics), before documenting an exposure draft. It was apparently 
attempting to seek legitimacy from the inputs of stakeholders for decision making 
on the two alternative models. 
Most companies expected to participate mandatorily in the scheme were asked to 
comment on which accounting model would be more appropriate in the Korean 
context. Most stakeholders, including mainstream interest groups (e.g. large 
emitters), presented clear views in favour of alternative 1. Most companies 
presumably considered European practice to be more applicable and practical for 
K-IFRS adopting companies because it is easier and simpler to apply. In addition, 
most stakeholders regarded alternative 1 as a solution that would not have 
adverse impacts on financial statements. 
With regard to presentation, it was observed that stakeholders‟ views on linked 
presentation were split into diverse strands. Some stakeholders expressed a 
sceptical perspective on linked presentation in the sense that K-IFRS adopting 
companies could not embrace linked presentation unless IASB explicitly allowed 
linked presentation for emissions rights and related liabilities. On the other hand, 
some stakeholders were in favour of linked presentation because it would not only 
provide more useful information but would also be the superior accounting model 
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in combination with the fair value method. Other companies preferred net 
presentation to gross presentation on the grounds that a net approach offers more 
useful information to information users. They appeared to believe that gross 
presentation may misguide information users; specifically, after a year, the 
reversibility of emissions rights is clearly predictable so this approach offers no 
valuable information. This view is in line with the users‟ perspective of which IASB 
had been aware during the 2008-2010 ETS project. 
Before setting out documentation for an exposure draft, the consultation process 
demonstrates the extent to which stakeholders‟ inputs may affect a standard-
setting body‟s decisions. In addition, the tentative decisions made by KASB 
regarding an exposure draft indicate the extent to which each alternative 
accounting method was supported or opposed by stakeholders in due process. 
As a consequence of consultations on the alternative accounting models, the 
KASB staff proposal was again unapproved by KASB members because of 1) the 
possibility that linked presentation might be incompatible with the IFRS framework, 
and 2) imperfection in the Korean ETS market, meaning that market prices might 
not be sufficiently observable to allow the fair value method to be applied. In this 
context, one KASB staff explained it: 
Although the KASB staff proposal could be more desirable with a better 
and firmer rationale, in light of the accounting conceptual framework, 
the proposal would not be applicable unless linked presentation is 
manifestly allowed under the IFRS framework. Accordingly, we could 
not approve the staff proposal as a whole (KASB staff, KAI Forum, 11 
July 2014). 
Subsequently, at a meeting held on 9 May 2014, KASB made a tentative decision 
to adopt alternative 1 for development of the exposure draft.53 European practice 
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 Abstract of KASB tentative decisions (KASB meeting, 09 May 2014): 1) Measure emissions rights at cost; 
thereby, free allowances are measured at nil value and purchased allowances are measured at cost to pay; 2) 
Recognise liability as emissions are produced; 3) Measure liability at carrying value, which is linked to 
measurement of emissions rights; 4) When emitting more than the amount of emissions rights held, a liability 
for excess emissions is recognised at the best estimate; 5) Asset and related liability are de-recognised when 
surrendering emission rights: 6) Asset and related liability are presented on a gross basis. 
  
192 
was adopted as the second best solution on the grounds that it would be more 
applicable to the Korean context. As the primary accounting framework, European 
practice, became a pillar on which to build the accounting standard for ETS in 
Korea. 
KASB unveiled the exposure draft on 11 July 2014. Following the tentative 
decisions made in May 2014, the accounting treatment in the exposure draft was 
based primarily on European practice in terms of recognition, measurement and 
de-recognition of an asset and a liability. The exposure draft is distinctive in using 
a cost method for measurement and gross presentation. In terms of accounting 
issues not being observed in European practice, the exposure draft delivered 
more detail on accounting rules on a case-by-case basis, in line with the process 
of Korean ETS, including (partly) selling, banking (forwarding) and borrowing 
emissions rights. 
On the way to the final outcome, the findings demonstrate that KASB inevitably 
conceded to a realistic model rather than an idealistic model. One interviewee 
(ASS 1) commented: „this is a case where the degree of autonomy retained by the 
jurisdiction of the KASB was constrained to some extent due to the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS‟. 
The exposure draft as a whole was accepted and welcomed by most stakeholders. 
In particular, most preparers, including large emitters, were in favour of the 
accounting treatment in the exposure draft. Owing to measurement at cost, free 
allowances are measured at nil value. Consequently, the amounts of free 
allowances and related liabilities are displayed as a net amount in financial 
statements despite gross presentation. This means that companies do not need to 
be concerned about a negative impact on their debt ratio, at least during Phase I, 
as 100 per cent free allowances are being allocated. 
The exposure draft was also based on business models consisting of a 
compliance model and a trading model. The accounting rules were elaborated 
separately in line with each business model. In practice, both activities may be 
concurrently carried out in many groups. In other words, the compliance model 
would be compatible with the trading model simultaneously in one entity. The 
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exposure draft was based on the assumption that large emitters could hold 
emissions rights not only for compliance but also for trading purposes. Accordingly, 
the exposure draft does not articulate any constraint on engaging in trading 
activities within the compliance model.  
An entity may, without restriction, re-justify its business model and re-implement a 
different business model in line with its business strategy. Some stakeholders 
raised a concern that there might be a risk of earnings manipulation by 
deliberately changing from one business model to the other.54 In response, one 
KASB staff articulated that „we [KASB] deliberately developed the accounting rules 
so that the new accounting standard for ETS does not give rise to any obstacle to 
the operation of ETS or the function of the market‟. In particular, the accounting 
treatment in the exposure draft would not hamper companies‟ decisions to hold or 
sell emissions rights. If a specific accounting rule were to restrict trading activities 
under the compliance model, it might to some extent diminish market liquidity, as 
explained by the same KASB staff: 
The Korean government adopted a cap-and-trade scheme with the 
intention of enhancing the tradability of emissions rights on the market. 
In accordance with the intention of a cap-and-trade scheme, we do not 
prevent re-categorisation of the business model if an entity changes its 
intention to hold emissions rights. […] If accounting standards for ETS 
strictly constrain transfers from one model to another, an entity may not 
meet be compliant in surrendering emissions rights because it might not 
purchase them on the market (KASB staff, KAI Forum, 11 July 2014). 
On the other hand, one accounting expert raised some potential weaknesses of 
the exposure draft. In particular, a certain accounting treatment might be logically 
inappropriate in relation to the recognition of deferred income in the case of selling 
or borrowing emissions rights. 
                                            
54
 Such comments were made in the KAI forum (11 July 2014) and in the process of inviting comments on the 
exposure draft. 
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To some extent, the accounting model in the exposure draft seems to 
dismiss the accounting objective and principles which accounting 
standards should follow. […] Admittedly, it is necessary to minimise the 
impact on industry when developing accounting standards; nonetheless, 
minimising the impact on industry is not the only factor to be considered, 
not being a principle that accounting standards must pursue 
(Accounting expert, KAI Forum, 11 July 2014). 
In his response, the above expert implicitly highlighted stakeholder conflicts in 
respect to the above issue, which was essentially a case where the moral and 
decisional soundness of the above treatment gave away to the pragmatic interests 
of the powerful industry. Likewise, one accounting practitioner commented on the 
exposure draft, highlighting unreasonable accounting treatment arising from the 
cost method: 
We [the institution] overall agree with the exposure draft; however, we 
have a different view on re-measurement of the remainder of emissions 
rights after surrendering, recognition of deferred income arising from 
selling and borrowing emissions rights, and categorisation of emissions 
liability (Accounting practitioner, KAI Forum, 11 July 2014). 
In response to comments from accounting experts, one KASB staff explained: 
We [KASB] acknowledge that the fair value method can resolve all 
weaknesses of accounting treatment on the exposure draft as you 
pointed out. However, one of the objectives for providing an accounting 
standard for emissions rights is preliminary prevention of various 
practices in the absence of authoritative accounting guidance (KASB 
staff, KAI Forum, 11 July 2014).  
This staff conceded: 
I believe that the fair value method would be the best and most 
desirable solution if used with linked presentation. Fair value method 
provides a robust rationale, and linked presentation resolves the critical 
concerns of companies. Nevertheless, we [KASB] do not ensure that K-
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IFRS adopting companies are able to accept linked presentation. 
Accordingly, ultimately we do not approve the accounting model with 
fair value measurement and linked presentation (KASB staff, KAI Forum, 
11 July 2014). 
According to a minute of a KASB meeting held on 26 September 2014, KASB 
accepted some comments from stakeholders. There were some comments on 
accounting treatment, such as the subsequent measurement of emissions rights, 
recognition of deferred income in relation to borrowing, and categorisation of 
emissions liability. Notably, KASB undertook mainly minor changes in accounting 
treatment arising from the comments, rather than any fundamental change. 
Consequently, the accounting standard for Non-Public Entities 'Emission Rights 
and Liability to Deliver Allowances' was finally approved at a KASB meeting held 
on 10 October 2014, officially entitled „SKAS No.33 „Greenhouse-Gas Emission 
Permits and Emission Liability'. 
In summary, when the exposure draft was unveiled, most stakeholders largely 
agreed with the exposure draft. There were some comments mainly on minor 
accounting treatments. This indicates that KASB formulated the exposure draft 
after a preliminary coordination of interests. It was formulated on the basis of the 
European practice model supported by most stakeholders. Consequently, most 
potential concerns raised by prominent stakeholders were addressed beforehand, 
resulting in unanimous support from most stakeholders. 
 Summary 6.5.
This chapter has presented the findings in relation to Research Question 1 in the 
case of KASB. 
In accordance with the general observations in relation to key accounting issue 
discussed in Section 5.2, for KASB the main accounting issue also originated from 
free allowances. In particular, KASB had to take several factors into account when 
developing its accounting standard for emissions rights by: 1) offsetting the 
negative impact of the accounting standard on accounting or financial numbers; 2) 
minimising the impact on the operation of ETS and the orderly function of the 
carbon market; and 3) being subject to the IFRS conceptual framework. 
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It has been observed that large emitters participated proactively in the standard-
setting process and persistently called for the adverse effects of the anticipated 
accounting model on the accounting numbers, such as the debt ratio, to be offset. 
Considering the concerns raised by industry, KASB staff devised an accounting 
model combining a fair value approach (adapted from IASB‟s tentative decisions), 
business models (adapted from ANC‟s proposal) and linked presentation. In 
particular, linked presentation is a noteworthy and highly applicable method in 
Korean circumstances. Linked presentation offsets effectively the negative impact 
on accounting numbers arising from fair value measurement. In effect, most 
stakeholders were largely in favour of linked presentation because it addressed 
the main concern of industry. However, the KASB staff proposal gave rise to 
concerns that linked presentation might conflict with the IFRS conceptual 
framework, and that imperfections in the Korean carbon market might lead to the 
inapplicability of fair value measurement. Remarkably, KASB undertook a 
preliminary consultation process with stakeholders on alternative accounting 
models prior to documenting an exposure draft. As a consequence of the 
consultation process, it determined to adopt an alternative solution to replace the 
KASB staff proposal. It approved the European practice as a primary framework 
for the exposure draft. Applying cost method, free allowances are recognised at nil 
value. In effect, the main concern of industry was effectively resolved in the 
exposure draft. 
In the end, KASB finalised the accounting standard for emissions rights, the 
distinctive features of which are cost measurement and gross presentation. Most 
stakeholders supported the accounting standard, importantly guaranteeing that 
they would follow and adopt it on implementation. 
The main accounting issues described in Chapters 5 and 6 were raised 
throughout the standard-setting process in which stakeholders participated in 
order to express their interests to the accounting standard setter. The next chapter 
will present how accounting issues are transformed into an accounting standard 
for emissions rights, highlighting the political aspects of the accounting standard-
setting process.  
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7. Accounting standard-setting process for ETS 
  Introduction 7.1.
This section presents and analyses the findings in relation to Research Question 2 
(How does the accounting standard-setting process proceed in the case of ETS?) 
and its accompanying objectives. As mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, accounting 
standards are an outcome refined through the accounting standard-setting 
process. Hence, it is necessary to explore the accounting standard-setting process 
in order to understand how to reach the desired outcome, an accounting standard 
for emissions rights. 
Firstly, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 will present a number of observations derived from 
the interviews and document analysis in relation to the accounting standard-
setting process in the cases of ANC and KASB. This will be followed in Section 7.4 
by findings revolving around specific features of the inter-relationships between 
IASB and the national accounting standard setters in the case of the ETS project. 
In incorporating the findings and research questions, some distinct themes 
emerge in relation to the accounting standard-setting process. 
 Case of ANC’s proposal 7.2.
Details of the accounting standard-setting process in France were identified during 
an interview with ANC. When deciding to set an accounting standard for emissions 
rights, ANC initiated a „working group consisting of investors, financial institutions 
(e.g. banks), preparers (e.g. companies), accounting expertise (e.g. accountants, 
academics), tax authorities, etc.‟ (ASS 7). 
Notably, various stakeholders participated from the initial stage of the standard-
setting process, since the working group comprised stakeholders including public 
accounting firms, professional accountancy bodies, preparers and users. The 
findings show that ANC fulfilled procedural due process (Johnson and Solomons, 
1984) by facilitating stakeholders‟ participation in the process through the working 
group. Consistent with observations by Durocher and Fortin (2010) and Sinclair 
and Bolt (2013), procedural due process enabled ANC to ensure legitimacy in the 
standard-setting process in this case. 
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As explained in Section 5.4.2, most large emitters in France must apply IFRS in 
their financial statements. ANC tried to set the standard within the scope of the 
IFRS framework in order to guarantee „compatibility between French GAAP and 
IFRS‟. In other words, ANC did not seek to promulgate a totally new type of 
accounting rule, so the standard for emissions rights was formulated by changing 
the existing accounting standards „at the margin‟ (ASS 8). In accordance with this 
premise, the working group sought to issue an „interpretation‟ in the form of French 
GAAP in line with the IFRS framework (ASS 8).  
Interestingly, in the accounting standard-setting process, a so-called „bottom-up 
approach‟, as shown in Figure 12, was undertaken in France (ASS 7). While 
standard setting was in progress, a draft of the proposal was entrusted to the 
working group constituted of various stakeholders. One interviewee (ASS 7) 
commented that the draft was „actually written‟ as the outcome of the working 
group‟s activities. 
Figure 12: ANC’s bottom-up approach 
 
In order to write a draft, it was essential to coordinate and adjust the various 
interests of stakeholders in relation to the accounting issues. In this regard, at the 
beginning of the standard-setting process, the working group played a primary role 
in consultation. In the working group, „consensus‟ (ASS 7) needed to be reached 
as a result of a coordination process between the stakeholders. Consequently, the 
draft produced in the working group already reflected the interests of the 
stakeholders. In this context, one interviewee (ASS 7) said: 
The way we do accounting standards here is different from what the 
IASB does. […] We gather all the stakeholders in a working group. We 
try and sort of coordinate and come to an agreement. So basically it‟s a 
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bottom-up approach, and so the text was actually written by the working 
group, approved by a group of specialists in accounting; it‟s a sort of 
bottom-up approach. So that when we produce something it‟s 
consensual (ASS 7). 
This interviewee asserted that this attribute is substantially different from other 
standard-setting bodies. In both IASB and KASB, as a rule, the standard setting 
body itself is in charge of undertaking due process, and the standard setter, with 
reference to technical staff, is entirely responsible for documentation. 
In essence, since the working group took charge of documenting the draft and 
accommodating the various interests of stakeholders, the bottom-up approach 
enabled stakeholders to play a substantial role in the decision-making process. 
More importantly, in discussing how to actually deal with emissions rights in 
practice, the working group contributed to persuading ANC to seek a solution that 
addressed a variety of features of emissions rights. One interviewee (ASS 8) 
reckoned that the working group infused an insight in such a way that ANC 
referred to „actual practice‟ where companies had dealt with emissions rights in the 
production process like „physical raw material‟. Importantly, the observation of 
practice gave ANC a critical insight into the actual treatment of emissions rights 
and the substantial effect of practice in light of internal management. The same 
interviewee acknowledged the clear role of companies in the development of the 
proposal: 
Companies – major electricity, gas and companies using commodities – 
helped us because the first thing is that they told us this principle: they 
never, never produce or emit without thinking of the production cost 
linked to emission rights – never (ASS 8). 
In essence, practice provoked ANC to acquire insights into an „economic 
approach‟. For the first time, ANC devised business models for emissions rights as 
an accounting standard aligned with real practice. Under these business models, 
specific accounting rules were elaborated relying on the actual treatment of 
emissions rights in practice (for more detail, see Section 5.4.). Owing to the 
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bottom-up and economic approach, ANC‟s proposal was developed with a robust 
rationale for each accounting issue relating to emissions rights. 
In addition, the bottom-up approach may have raised awareness of users‟ needs 
from the beginning of the accounting standard-setting process. ANC believed that 
the working group was beneficial in enabling it to understand users‟ needs, a 
primary principle pursued by all accounting standard setters. One interviewee 
described the contribution of the bottom-up approach in light of users‟ needs: 
With us it‟s a bottom-up approach. So basically, when you had the 
question „what was the information that users wanted?‟ well, within the 
mechanics of the working group and the expert group and the board, 
you have users and they said that that‟s what they wanted (ASS 7). 
In summary, on the basis of a bottom-up approach, ANC established the working 
group which was responsible for producing a draft of the proposal on emissions 
rights. Consisting of various stakeholders, the working group effectively 
coordinated a variety of interests on accounting issues for emissions rights from 
the beginning of the standard-setting process. 
Since the various interests of all stakeholders had already been coordinated 
beforehand, it was anticipated that the accounting standard for emissions rights 
would be implemented with a high degree of acceptability and compliance 
amongst stakeholders. In effect, one interviewee reckoned that no problems would 
be reported following implementation: 
A lot of companies apply this under IFRS as well – and I haven‟t heard 
a single person come and say that there was a problem (ASS 7). 
Overall, ANC posited that the bottom-up approach contributed to a high degree of 
acceptability on implementation, enabling a shorter post-enactment period. 
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 Case of Korean GAAP for ETS in 2014 7.3.
7.3.1. Accounting standard-setting process 
Corresponding with the accounting standard-setting process shown in Figure 5, 
KASB established a timeline for an accounting standard for ETS to be published 
by November 2014. The consultation process continued throughout this process. 
In contrast to ANC, KASB develops its accounting standards on the basis of a 
„top-down approach‟, whereby KASB technical staff are mainly responsible for 
documentation, including a discussion paper, a draft of the accounting standard, 
agenda papers for KASB meetings, an exposure draft, etc. The ETS project was 
also based on a top-down approach. 
Prior to the request from government, KASB was already aware of the necessity 
for authoritative accounting guidance on emissions rights in accordance with the 
commencement of the Korean ETS.55 
Shortly after KASB initiated the ETS project, in March 2013 it held a „KAI Forum‟, a 
type of public workshop, entitled „The Emission Trading Scheme: Introduction and 
Accounting Issues‟. The main purpose of this KAI Forum was to introduce the 
Korean ETS and to listen in advance to the various interests and opinions of 
stakeholders in relation to the expected accounting issues, thereby identifying the 
accounting issues that needed to be focused on. In addition to identifying 
accounting issues, core stakeholders attended the forum and explicitly articulated 
their concerns. Notably, amongst preparers, large emitters were identified as the 
main interest group in relation to accounting issues under the ETS. 
Along with the KAI Forum, a technical committee for emissions rights was 
established in August 2013. The technical committee consisted of representatives 
of stakeholder interest groups in relation to the Korean ETS, including large 
emitters, representatives of preparers, accounting firms, the ETS task force team 
(in the Ministry of Environment), the Financial Supervisory Service and academics. 
It was facilitated as a kind of advisory group to deliver technical and professional 
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 During the pilot interview with KASB in April 2013, it was noted that KAI had already embarked on an ETS 
project in order to set up accounting guidance for ETS. 
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views on certain issues. Accordingly, it mainly addressed highly technical issues,56 
for example the initial and subsequent recognition of emissions rights, 
measurement base for emissions rights, the corresponding entry of free 
allowances, recognition and measurement of liability, de-recognition of asset and 
liability, presentation in financial statements, and recognition of emissions rights in 
the case of borrowing and forwarding. Some large emitters such as POSCO and 
South-East Power Co. that participated in the technical committee consistently 
raised issues in relation to the potential financial impacts of applying different 
accounting models. Although the technical committee was not directly involved in 
the decision-making process, discussions in the technical committee significantly 
influenced the perspectives and views of KASB staff. 
Having reviewed the accounting issues for emissions rights in KASB meeting 
(April 2014), KASB attempted to seek the appropriate accounting model. KASB 
member was concerned about the inapplicability of the accounting model in the 
KASB staff proposal. Consequently, KASB put forward undertaking a preliminary 
consultation with stakeholders including industry, accounting experts, auditors and 
regulators regarding the alternative accounting models prior to documentation of 
an exposure draft (see Section 6.4.3.). As a result of consultation, KASB member 
decided to adopt European practice for the development of an exposure draft 
(KASB meeting, May 2014).  
As soon as the exposure draft had been unveiled, KASB undertook a consultation 
process, including public hearings (in the KAI Forum, 11 July 2014) and invitations 
for comment letters (from 11 July to 15 August 2014).  
When the KAI Forum was held, a wide range of stakeholders attended including 
accounting consulting firms, government, preparers and academics. Panels were 
invited to take part in discussions on the exposure draft, and there were question 
and answer sessions from the floor to the panels. In the KAI Forum, KASB 
explained the details of the exposure draft, including the background, previous 
models that had been referred to, the main features and rationale of the KASB 
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 Observed from minutes of the technical committee meeting held in November 2013. 
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staff proposal, and details of the accounting treatment on the exposure draft along 
with alternative treatments. 
In consequence of the consultation process, the accounting standard for non-
public entities, „Emissions Rights and Liability to Deliver Allowances‟ was finalised 
in a KASB meeting on 11 October 2014.57 KASB promulgated SKAS No.33 
„Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Permits and Emissions Liability‟ on 24 December 
2014 and it came into force on 1 January 2015. 
Overall, Figure 13 demonstrates chronologically the procedures of the 
development of accounting standard for emissions rights and related liabilities in 
the case of KASB.  
It was observed that KASB provided a wide range of opportunities for 
stakeholders to take part in order to express their opinions and interests regarding 
accounting issues for ETS. KASB fulfilled procedural due process by encouraging 
stakeholders to participate in either the technical committee or the KAI Forum 
(public meeting), and to respond to the exposure draft. In addition, it proactively 
sought stakeholders‟ views and opinions while conducting due process by inviting 
comments and feedback from stakeholders on the alternative accounting models 
ahead of documentation of the exposure draft. 
In effect, the entire consultation process enabled KASB to communicate 
sufficiently with stakeholders, enabling a variety of interests to be accommodated 
effectively into the outcome. This indicates how, by conducting procedural due 
process, KASB‟s actions and decisions were conceived by its stakeholders to be 
legitimate (Burlaud and Colasse, 2011; Larson and Herz, 2013), justifiable 
(Sinclair and Bolt, 2013) and authoritative. This implies the achievement of 
institutional legitimacy by KASB in the standard-setting process for emissions 
rights. 
                                            
57
 As shown in Figure 13, accounting issues in relation to emissions rights were addressed seven times at 
KASB meetings. On 27 June 2014, the board approved an exposure draft reflecting the tentative decision 
made at the board meeting on 9 May 2014 where it reached general agreement to base the exposure draft on 
the European practice model. On 26 September 2014, the board decided to make a minor amendment 
reflecting some comments from stakeholders prior to the next meeting, and at the meeting on 11 October 
2014, the board approved the standard for emissions rights. 
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Figure 13: Development procedure for accounting standard for non-public 
entities ‘Emissions Rights and Liability’ in the KASB 
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7.3.2. Stakeholders and their interests 
Main stakeholders 
From the perspective of institutional legitimacy, it is important to identify 
stakeholders who will be affected by a new accounting standard (Durocher and 
Fortin, 2010). Stakeholders are perceived by managers who ultimately determine 
stakeholder salience on the basis of the perception of managers (Mitchell et al. 
1997). This study identifies both general stakeholders and a mainstream interest 
group in relation to accounting issues under ETS on the basis of the extent KASB 
paid attention to stakeholders‟ interests in the development of accounting standard 
for ETS. 
Unsurprisingly, the most prominent stakeholders were the large emitters who 
expected to be significantly affected by the new accounting standard for ETS. In 
particular, large companies in energy-intensive industries (e.g. steel and 
petrochemicals) and power generation companies (e.g. five electricity generation 
companies owned by the Korea Electricity Power Corporation)58 constituted the 
main representatives amongst participants in the Korean ETS. Their emissions are 
regarded as material on the grounds that the aggregated emissions of the top 10 
largest emitters are around 50 per cent of the total aggregated emissions of 
participants.59 Accordingly, most large emitters, such as POSCO and the five 
electricity generation companies in Korea constituted a primary stakeholder group 
in relation to accounting issues for ETS. 
Main interests of stakeholders 
Through the KAI Forum and the technical committee, KASB was able to identify 
the main concerns raised by large emitters. These focused mainly on free 
allowances since all participants in the Korean ETS were expected to receive 100 
                                            
58
 In Korea, the electricity industry is dominated by the Korea Electricity Power Corporation (KEPCO), which 
has six power generation subsidiaries. Amongst them, the five electricity generation companies consist of 
Korea East-West Power Co.,Ltd., Korea South-East Power Co.,Ltd., Korea Southern Power Co., Ltd., Korea 
Western Power Co., Ltd, Korea Midland Power Co., Ltd. 
59
 According to GHG emissions statistics provided by the Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research Center of 
Korea (2014), POSCO (the largest steel maker in Korea) is the largest emitter in Korea. In addition, the 
aggregated emissions of the top 10 largest emitting companies were estimated to emit around 50% of total 
emissions in 2013. 
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per cent free allowances during Phase I. The core accounting issues relating to 
emissions rights were associated with the recognition and measurement of free 
allowances. The significant stakeholders, mostly large emitters, presented their 
concerns about the adverse impact on the accounting numbers. As a 
consequence of receiving a significant amount of free allowances, large emitters 
argued that an accounting treatment based on fair value measurement and gross 
presentation might worsen their debt ratio and increase the volatility of the 
accounting numbers. 
For example, one large emitter persistently contended „the impact on the debt ratio‟ 
because its financial statements might be more significantly affected, depending 
on the accounting model.60 In particular, this interviewee (COM 1) was explicitly 
opposed to fair value measurement and gross presentation. He was concerned 
that recognition of emissions rights at fair value might have a serious effect on his 
financial statements, in particular the debt ratio, due to the significant level of 
emissions. He added further explanation regarding a potential problem of a fair 
value approach from the perspective of information users: 
If the fair value method is used for recognition of free allowances along 
with respective presentation as a total of all free allowances and related 
liabilities arising from emissions, the debt ratio in particular may appear 
to increase significantly. Although no cash flows or economic resources 
outflow at the moment, information users may misunderstand and be 
wrongly guided by the accounting information (COM 1). 
Furthermore, large emitters argued that the fair value method and gross 
presentation might give rise to a distortion in the financial numbers, ultimately 
misguiding investors. In this context, the same interviewee said: 
The fair value method could cause unnecessary fluctuations by initially 
and subsequently measuring emissions rights at fair value. In addition, 
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 COM 1 provided an estimation of the financial impact under a fair value model: „the company emits on 
average 40,000,000 CO2 tonne/year. The total assets of the company are about KRW 40 trillion. In 
recognising a total amount of emissions as a liability given the assumption of a carbon price of KRW 10,000 
(about € 7-8), the liability arising from emissions would be KRW 800 billion. This would be an almost 10% 
increase in total liabilities in recognising the liability as equivalent to 40,000,000 CO2 tonne/year.‟ 
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gross presentation does not provide decision-useful information in the 
sense that both receiving free allowances and emitting per se do not 
accompany substantial cash flow in an entity. It is predictable that free 
allowances will be reversed when surrendering them to the government 
at the end of compliance year. […] As long as the liabilities arising from 
emissions are recognised as a total amount as is, investors (information 
users) may be misguided by inappropriate accounting numbers which 
will be definitely reversed at the end of the compliance year (COM 1). 
Similarly, the power generation companies were concerned about the adverse 
impact on the debt ratio. In particular, the subsidiary electricity generation 
companies belonging to the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) 
expressed concern about a negative impact of the accounting standard for 
emission rights on their financial status. As KEPCO competes with a number of 
international electricity generation companies, it is arguably necessary that the 
accounting treatment for emissions rights should be in line with common practice 
in Europe.61 
In addition, one representative of these companies mentioned that these five 
electricity generation companies are public organisations regulated by the 
government. The government evaluates the performance of public organisations, 
and the debt ratio is a critical index in this evaluation. These electricity generation 
companies were very anxious to retain their sound financial status, and therefore a 
good debt ratio. 
Accordingly, the large emitters insisted on applying the accounting model using 
the cost method and net presentation. They argued that such a model would also 
have more decision-usefulness from a user‟s perspective and more applicability 
from a practical point of view. 
It was observed that stakeholders exerted influence on KASB throughout the 
process, not only through formal lobbying methods but also in informal ways, 
including private meetings and telephone conversations with KASB staff. In 
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 This was observed from panel discussions in the KAI Forum held on 11 July 2014. 
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particular, the most prominent interest group persistently expressed its concern, 
proactively taking part in the consultation process, including the KAI Forum and 
the technical committee. 
Silent majority 
On the other hand, many interviewees in the position of preparers appeared to be 
uninterested in the accounting issues of ETS, irrespective of the size of emissions. 
In effect, most preparers (companies) did not take proactive action in response to 
the accounting issues in the standard-setting process. 
Overall, the findings confirm that most companies remained a „silent majority‟, 
consistently with the assertions of previous studies (e.g. Jorissen et al., 2012; 
Georgiou, 2002). This indifference may stem from a lack of resources in the 
organisation to respond to accounting issues, unawareness of the accounting 
issues, or an insignificant level of agenda priority in the organisation due to a lack 
of financial materiality. In this context, two interviewees commented: 
Overall, the finance and accounting division and the division in charge 
of ETS operate separately. The thing is that staff in the accounting 
department do not know enough about ETS, while staff in charge of 
ETS do not know accounting either. Therefore, it is difficult to respond 
to accounting issues for ETS at the organisational level (ASS 1). 
Considering the enormous sales volume and total assets, the influence 
of ETS on its financial statements is deemed to be fairly immaterial so 
the company may be indifferent in this issue (COM 6). 
It seems that most companies regarded the financial impact of ETS as uncritical, 
so the accounting issues under ETS were not listed on group agendas. Rather, 
most companies were far more interested in how the allocation would be 
determined.62 In addition, it was observed that several companies had been 
making efforts to re-construct their internal systems to adapt to the 
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 Most interviewees viewed the most contentious matters regarding ETS in Korea as those relating to „cap-
setting and the amount of allocation‟ (COM 1, COM 2, COM 3, COM 5, COM 8, COM 9, COM 12, PO 3). 
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commencement of Korean ETS. In this context, two interviewees described how 
they had prepared for the start of the Korean ETS by building an internal carbon 
trading scheme: 
We have been operating internally a pilot emissions trading scheme for 
several years. The period of the pilot project was a sort of „learning-by-
doing‟; accordingly, we‟ve accumulated a lot of experience and 
knowledge in relation to the trading scheme. We‟ve been absolutely 
aware that the most important and urgent task under ETS is identifying 
the internal „marginal reduction cost‟ (COM 3). 
We‟ve been working on developing the internal infrastructure, such as 
the re-construction of the working process at the group level: how to 
assess emissions in each unit; how to distribute the internal cap 
corresponding to the commencement of the Korean ETS. On top of that, 
I think, a „hot potato‟ regarding ETS is determining the internal marginal 
reduction cost. To do this, we‟ve been collaborating with other divisions. 
If the system is developed, we are going to develop a trading strategy 
such as the price and the quantity of allowances (COM 5). 
Meanwhile, the findings reveal that most companies did not always remain in the 
„silent majority‟. While conducting the consultation on alternative accounting 
models prior to documenting the exposure draft, KASB invited comments from all 
stakeholders. Notably, KASB received a number of comments not only from 
industrial associations but also from individual companies. Most respondents 
showed their view in favour of accounting treatment based on the cost method 
during the consultation. Although they tended to remain in the silent majority, once 
a draft accounting standard had been issued, companies were likely to respond to 
the proposal more actively than expected. 
Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that the opinions of most preparers 
(companies) were channelled through industry associations.  
Korean companies tend to rely on their respective industry association in order to 
convey its interests. They perceive an industry association to represent its 
member‟s interests conveying voices of the member more effectively and 
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collectively on behalf of its member companies. 63  For this study, two 
interviewees commented on the role of industry association in the consultation 
process for ETS: 
We (accounting division) will address accounting issues for emissions 
rights and related liabilities. However, as you know, IASB and KASB 
have not provided any official guidance so far. If KASB releases the 
draft of accounting standard for ETS, we may provide comments on the 
draft […] The industry association normally ask us any opinion or 
comment whenever a certain issue arises. So it may do in the case of 
accounting issues for ETS when KASB conducts due process (COM 4). 
Accounting standard setting for ETS is not a core concern for all 
companies. Some companies emitting a large quantity of CO2 such as 
POSCO may have a significant concern on the accounting issues. I 
have been heard that POSCO has a big concern on accounting 
treatment of free allowances. [...] We (FKI) represent our member‟s 
views and interests with a particular issue arising. At the moment, we 
(FKI) have not collected the voices of our members in terms of 
accounting issues for ETS. However, I expect we would do sooner or 
later (COM 12). 
According to an analysis of comments on the exposure draft delivered to KASB,64 
the most significant comments were provided by industry associations. This 
indicates that most companies in the silent majority tended to take advantage of 
industry associations to deliver their views and opinions. One interviewee 
acknowledged this tendency of preparers: 
Once the exposure draft is given, comments from stakeholders in 
response to the exposure draft are only a few in reality. Normally, the 
organisations belonging to the KASB, mostly a form of association or 
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 It comes from the author‟s judgment based on the work experience in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and 
Energy since 2005.  
64
 Agenda item 2 of KASB meeting, September 2014: „SKAS No. 33 „Greenhouse gas emission permits and 
emission liability‟. 
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representative of a certain industry, provide comments on behalf of their 
members; but it is not many (ASS 3). 
This implies that KASB was able to ensure efficacy of consultation by using 
representative organisations rather than directly contacting individual entities that 
were unlikely to respond. 
Moreover, it was observed that the accounting expertise group had a propensity 
not to present its views proactively. Nevertheless, once they participated in a 
particular consultation process, e.g. the technical committee, accounting experts 
tended to actively present their views on a certain issue from an accounting expert 
point of view. For example, in the KAI Forum in July 2014, one accounting expert 
expressed his position in favour of the fair value method and linked presentation 
proposed by the KASB staff paper. He suggested: „it is better not to exclude linked 
presentation but to include it in the standard as an alternative presentation method 
so as to be chosen by companies‟. 
In addition, one accounting firm carried out research on accounting and taxation 
issues of emissions rights in Korea in 2013. This research paper suggested that 
the most applicable accounting model would be a cost method for measurement 
and a net approach for presentation (KPMG, 2013).  
Furthermore, one interviewee (EXP_ACC 4) considered a cost method and net 
presentation to be more decision-useful to information users. He was against the 
fair value measurement and gross presentation model because it did not present 
the substantial effects of an asset and a liability under ETS. In this context, he 
presented his view from a user‟s perspective: 
As far as I‟m concerned, I‟m opposed to recognising free allowances at 
fair value on day one. I‟m sceptical about presenting free allowances at 
fair value in the balance sheet because they must be returned to the 
government at the end of the compliance year. […] From an information 
user‟s point of view, it is predictable that free allowances will be 
reversible sooner or later. I do not agree with recognition of free 
allowances at fair value; they should be measured at nil (EXP_ACC 4). 
  
212 
In summary, a variety of interests and opinions was observed amongst 
stakeholders. The findings demonstrate that arguments from stakeholders were 
more likely to be raised when they disagreed rather than agreed. In particular, 
large emitters (preparers) argued mainly about the economic consequences, 
rather than the accounting conceptual consequences, to justify their position. On 
the other hand, the accounting expertise group, including accounting practitioners 
and academics, tended to make arguments on the basis of conceptual rather than 
economic consequences. The findings enable the extent of support for (or 
opposition to) specific accounting treatments of emissions rights amongst 
stakeholders (preparers, accounting experts, users) to be gauged to a large extent. 
With regard to motivations for participation in the standard-setting process, the 
findings reveal whether or not a company might be motivated to engage in 
lobbying activities with regard to accounting issues for emissions rights. For 
example, preparers expecting significant economic impacts on their accounting 
numbers took part more proactively in the standard-setting process than those 
expecting little impact. This largely supports the identification in several previous 
studies of economic consequences as a motivation for lobbying activities (e.g. 
Orens et al., 2011; Georgiou, 2002; Jorissen et al., 2012; Kosi and Reither, 2014). 
7.3.3.  Effectiveness of stakeholders’ participation 
Having examined the whole process, from the initial stage of the ETS project to 
the final outcome of the accounting standard for emissions rights, all procedures 
were beneficial for assessing the effectiveness of stakeholders‟ inputs. By 
comparing the accounting model featured in the KASB staff proposal with that in 
the exposure draft, a critical determinant can be inferred to have influenced 
KASB‟s decision making (see Section 6.3). 
It was observed that prominent stakeholders attempted to participate proactively in 
the process and made strenuous efforts to reflect their interests in decision making 
on accounting rules. In response to preparers‟ calls to reduce the negative impact 
on accounting numbers arising from a particular accounting treatment, KASB took 
their concerns into account in the accounting standard-setting process from the 
beginning to the end of the process. In effect, stakeholders‟ concerns were the 
most significant factor affecting KASB‟s choice of a specific accounting model and 
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rule. Specifically, KASB proposed „linked presentation‟ in the KASB staff proposal 
and a „cost method‟ in the exposure draft in order to address the effect on financial 
statements. In effect, it is inferred that KASB took stakeholders‟ interests into 
consideration as a top priority throughout the standard-setting process. 
Interestingly, the findings provide an empirical clue in terms of the effectiveness of 
lobbying activities. The interests of industry, motivated by the potential effects on 
accounting numbers (e.g. debt ratio), effectively drove KASB eventually to adopt a 
more applicable and acceptable model in practice. This indicates that KASB was 
substantially influenced by preparers‟ inputs. Accordingly, stakeholders‟ proactive 
participation in the process turned out to be particularly influential and effective in 
the Korean context. 
Meanwhile, in terms of the effective timing of lobbying activities, the findings 
indicate that the pre-exposure draft stage is more effective than the post-exposure 
draft stage. One interviewee (ASS 1) believed that inputs at the pre-exposure draft 
stage could be more influential in terms of the decision making of standard setters. 
In this context, this interviewee supported the effectiveness of participation at the 
earlier stage of standard setting: 
The KAI Forum will be held for public hearings on the exposure draft. 
When comments from stakeholders are suggested on the exposure 
draft, I‟m not sure to what degree the comments will be adopted, 
although it is likely to more or less adopt comments that will not cause 
major changes. More importantly, it is more critical to deliver inputs prior 
to the exposure draft. Namely, in terms of reflection of interests, inputs 
at the discussion paper stage could be more effective than at the 
exposure draft stage. Accordingly, from the stakeholders‟ point of view, 
it is critical to express their interests through the technical committee 
before documenting an exposure draft (ASS 1). 
At the earlier stage of the standard-setting process, there is more flexibility to 
adjust choices of accounting models or rules that may lead to the rejection of a 
specific accounting model being discussed. On the other hand, once an exposure 
draft has been unveiled, it will rarely be entirely overturned. When comments from 
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stakeholders sound reasonable, they may be accepted only as amendments 
rather than converting to a totally different accounting model. Overall, the previous 
interviewee (ASS 1) supports Sutton‟s (1984) assertion that lobbying activities at a 
pre-exposure draft stage are more productive because their influence on the rule-
making body may be greater since the rule-makers‟ preferences are still 
undecided. 
7.3.4. Institutional legitimacy of KASB 
It was observed that the institutional legitimacy of KASB was clearly perceived by 
stakeholders. On the whole, the findings provide empirical evidence of the 
legitimacy of KASB being recognised by stakeholders. The institutional legitimacy 
of KASB was widely perceived by stakeholders as the only „taken for granted‟ 
accounting institution in Korea. Any issued standards therefore would be expected 
to be automatically imbued with cognitive legitimacy. Most interviewees referred to 
compliance with the authoritative guidance provided by KASB, as supported by 
the following comments: 
The KASB is the only organisation responsible for setting accounting 
guidance including Korean GAAP. Once the accounting standard is 
provided by the KASB and referred to as „reasonable‟, most [K-IFRS 
adoption] companies are highly likely to follow the standard even if the 
standard is not mandatory. This is because the KASB promulgates it 
(EXP_ACC 2). 
We‟ve adopted IFRS; however, IFRS for emissions rights has not been 
provided to date. Without IFRS for emissions rights, if the KASB 
provides accounting guidance, we would follow it. We cannot dismiss 
the accounting guidance provided by the KASB (COM 6). 
It is predicted that we would follow the guidance once the accounting 
guidance has been provided by the authority, either the government or 
the KASB. The accounting guidance is just given [by the authority], not 
set up by ourselves at our discretion (COM 11). 
Large emitters, which are mostly IFRS adoption companies, do not need to follow 
Korean GAAP for emissions rights because they can develop their own accounting 
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treatment for emissions rights under IAS 8 (see section 6.3). Nevertheless, the 
findings predict a high level of compliance with the accounting standard on 
emissions rights when they come into force in Korea. 
In terms of the origin of KASB‟s institutional legitimacy, it inherently embraces 
legitimacy endowed by statutory law since it was founded on the basis of the Act 
on External Audit of Stock Companies (see Section 2.5). KASB is the only 
institution authorised to set Korean GAAP in Korea on the basis of the Act on 
External Audit of Stock Companies. Accordingly, stakeholders of KASB consider 
the accounting standards it provides to be authoritative and legitimate.  
If Korean GAAP for ETS is provided by KASB within the IFRS framework 
(EXP_ACC 3), several interviewees (e.g. ASS 3, ASS 4, EXP_ACC 2, EXP_ACC 
3, COM 1, COM 4, COM 6) predicted that most K-IFRS adoption companies would 
prefer to use Korean GAAP and apply it to accounts for emissions rights and 
related liabilities. One interviewee commented in this context: 
Although the (KOSDAQ) listed companies do not necessarily have to 
follow Korean GAAP, most listed companies would be likely to follow 
Korean GAAP for emissions rights as long as the KASB provides it as 
guidance for emissions rights. The premise is that Korean GAAP for 
emissions rights should be compatible with IFRS (EXP_ACC 2). 
Stakeholders would adopt and follow the accounting standard on emissions rights 
as long as it was provided by KASB. In effect, the institutional legitimacy of KASB 
which has been recognised by stakeholders is highly associated with the level of 
acceptability of the accounting standard on emissions rights. If provided by KASB, 
the accounting standard on emissions rights would be regarded by stakeholders 
as legitimate and authoritative guidance. 
Meanwhile, accounting is the general starting point for corporate tax in Korea. 
According to the principles of taxation in Korea,65  standards or practices of 
corporate accounting should be respected in assessing the tax base. One 
                                            
65
 The principles of taxation in Korea are set out in the „Framework Act on National Taxes‟. 
  
216 
interviewee (GOV 3) referred to the principle of „priority of corporate accounting‟ in 
the context of corporate taxation. Consequently, if an accounting standard on 
emission rights were provided, Korean companies would be expected to adopt the 
standard for compliance with corporate taxation: 
The accounting standards provided by the KASB are essentially related 
to corporate taxation. As the tax base for corporate taxation is assessed 
on the basis of corporate accounting, we cannot but comply with the 
accounting standards (COM 6). 
Accordingly, the link between corporate tax and accounting standards contributes 
to the institutional legitimacy of KASB in Korea. 
In summary, the findings present empirically the institutional legitimacy of KASB 
which its stakeholders commonly recognise. The stakeholders take KASB for 
granted as the only authoritative accounting standard setter in Korea. In this 
institutional setting, the accounting standards provided by KASB are regarded as 
being authoritative and legitimate. Accordingly, once an accounting standard on 
emissions rights was offered by KASB, it was anticipated that most companies in 
Korea would comply with it. 
 Case of IASB’s ETS project 7.4.
7.4.1. IASB’s ETS project to date 
Due process for IFRS consists of several consultation processes at a number of 
stages, including the agenda stage, the draft stage of a discussion paper, issuing 
of a discussion paper for comment, drafting of an exposure draft, publication of an 
exposure draft for comment, and drafting of an accounting standard, as shown in 
Figure 14. At each stage of due process, IASB involves all interested individuals 
and organisations from around the world. 
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Figure 14: Standard-setting process for IFRS 
 
Following agenda consultation, a particular accounting issue will be dealt with as a 
research programme. The basic objective of a research project is to identify and 
define an accounting problem, and a research paper or discussion paper is written 
as a result of research on the issue. Recommendations are provided as to 
whether the accounting problem should be added to the agenda for proposal of an 
exposure draft. At the research project stage, all interested parties are 
encouraged to present their views and interests in the consultation process. In 
particular, co-working or co-operation with national accounting standard setters 
may take place right up to setting the IFRS. 
As mentioned in Section 5.3, IASB‟s ETS project was deferred in November 2010. 
In 2012, according to one interviewee (ASS 6) it was resumed as a research 
project following agenda consultation. This interviewee described how the ETS 
project was evolving: „the technical staff is working on analysing and updating 
various types of ETS in the world by gathering relative information‟.66 At the 
research programme stage, the ETS project focuses mainly on „scoping and 
figuring out how the schemes work and what the issues are‟ (ASS 5). 
The latter interviewee mentioned that the initial objective at the research project 
level is to identify and justify the accounting issues relating to a specific issue. 
Accordingly, the ETS project is at the stage of justifying the „accounting problems‟ 
in relation to emissions rights, for example „whether there is a problem‟, „what are 
the dimensions?‟, „what are the problems?‟, and „where might we find solutions?‟ 
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(ASS 5). In addition, a consultation process is undertaken to gather evidence: „is 
there an issue?‟, „is it a widespread issue?‟, „is it a narrow issue?‟, or „is it 
geographically widespread or not?‟(ASS 5). 
Following progress on the ETS project since 2012, a research paper on the ETS 
was released by IASB in November 2014 containing the main accounting issues 
previously discussed, including IFRIC 3, the tentative decisions made in the 
preceding project from 2008 to 2010, prevailing practice in the EU, and accounting 
standards (or proposals) developed by national accounting standard setters. 
Taking all discussions and analysis into consideration, IASB will decide whether 
the ETS project is added to the „active agenda‟. 
Although the ETS project was added as a research project and a research paper 
was released, it appears that the ETS project still remains at the „start-up stage‟ 
(ASS 5) of ultimately developing an IFRS. In other words, the ETS project has still 
to follow a number of procedures on the way to a final version of IFRS. 
The ETS project has certainly lost its driving force compared with when the joint 
project was in progress between 2008 and 2010. The findings identify a number of 
factors leading to procrastination on the ETS project since it was deferred in 2010. 
Firstly, it appears that the ETS project has been demoted in terms of priority on 
IASB‟s agenda, whereas the ETS project was considered to be a significant 
agenda item during the joint IASB/FASB project. Following the 2007 financial crisis, 
IASB had urgently to address several critical issues. In this context, one 
interviewee said: 
There were several big projects in relation to the financial crisis in 2007. 
It was enormous work for the IASB during that time. Consequently, 
others (including the ETS project) were lower priority (ASS 4). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the ETS has experienced shrinkage since the big 
players, including Australia and the US, relinquished the introduction of ETS at a 
national level. Consequently, demands for an international accounting standard for 
ETS are lower than ever before. 
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When IASB started the ETS project in December 2007, it was said to have been 
re-started in response to calls for an international accounting standard on 
emissions rights from several national accounting standard setters (IASB, 2007). 
In particular, Australia was a main demander, putting „a lot of pressure‟ (ASS 5) on 
IASB at that time. Along with the EU, Australia and the US were the major 
stakeholders who drove IASB to propose the 2008-2010 ETS project. 
However, ETS has spread less than expected; accordingly, calls for an accounting 
standard for ETS have decreased to the extent that IASB may feel less pressure 
on this issue. In this context, one interviewee stated: 
It seemed that the ETS would have been more and more widespread; in 
fact, demands for the scheme turned out to be far less than anticipated. 
Namely, there were only a few countries to adopt the scheme or trade 
carbon. In effect, due to the lower pervasiveness of the scheme, the 
priority of the ETS project had been lowered (ASS 4). 
In addition, other national accounting standard setters have come up with their 
own solutions in the absence of IFRS for emissions rights (Lovell, 2014). Having 
withdrawn IFRIC 3, it is predicted that IASB is unlikely to provide IFRS for 
emissions rights. Under these circumstances, some national accounting standard 
setters „have figured out the answers for themselves‟ (ASS 5), for example 
standard-setters in France and Italy. As a result, pressure from other jurisdictions 
has also diminished. 
In short, the impetus for setting up IFRS for emissions rights has diminished 
significantly because some major countries, including the US and Australia, have 
abandoned the scheme, and some national standard setters have introduced their 
own solutions to address this issue by themselves. Accordingly, IASB „has felt less 
pressure from outside to do it quickly‟ (ASS 5), resulting in it being lower priority in 
IASB. By prioritising other projects IASB has thus been essentially short-sighted in 
respect of ETS as in the longer term it would be expected to be harder to develop 
a related standard given the expected already established differences in related 
recommended practice among national standard setters. On the other hand, 
national developments in France and Korea would inform any future IFRS. 
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Thirdly, from a preparer‟s point of view, most companies participating in the EU 
ETS have been accustomed to their own accounting policy. Without an IFRS for 
emissions rights, most have developed their own accounting treatment for 
emissions rights on the basis of IAS 8 paras. 10-12. As entities have been getting 
used to their own accounting rules for emissions rights, preparers would not want 
to change their accounting policy due to the „locked-in effect‟. It is therefore 
inferred that calls for an IFRS on emissions rights are unlikely to arise from 
preparers: 
From a preparer‟s perspective – from a company perspective – a 
preparer never likes a change. […] So never change something, even if 
it‟s a bad thing, though that‟s very often the perspective of the preparer; 
and therefore many European companies, in my personal view, don‟t 
feel any need to exert pressure on the IASB, to accelerate that project 
(EXE_ACC 1). 
Lovell (2014) provides analysis of the extent to which IASB supported the 
establishment of the ETS project in the agenda consultation process in 2010 
showing that significant numbers of respondents explicitly disagreed with re-
starting the ETS project. The findings and implications of this study are largely 
aligned with Lovell‟s (2014) evidence. 
Considering all the changes of circumstance surrounding the ETS project, it has 
been neither an urgent nor a critical issue for IASB since the ETS project was re-
visited in 2010 at a research project level. As long as „nothing big‟ in relation to the 
issues on ETS is found from an accounting perspective, the ETS project may not 
gain momentum for the next step of proceeding to the active agenda. Prioritisation 
of the ETS project over other projects in IASB is unlikely to occur now or in the 
foreseeable future as a result of procrastination in setting up an IFRS for 
emissions rights. 
7.4.2. Inter-relationship between IASB and national accounting standard setters 
In relation to the accounting issues on ETS, a high degree of inter-relationship 
was observed between IASB and other national accounting standard setters. 
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According to the Due Process Handbook (2013) and Charter (IASB, 2014a), the 
proactive participation of national accounting standard setters is greatly 
encouraged throughout due process in order to achieve the objective of IASB to 
provide useful information to information users. IASB describes the division of 
roles and functions between itself and national accounting standard setters: 
The IASB is supported by a network of national accounting standard-
setting bodies and regional bodies. […] National accounting standard 
setting bodies and regional bodies involved with accounting standard-
setting can undertake research, provide guidance on the IASB‟s 
priorities, facilitate and co-operate on outreach, encourage stakeholder 
input from their own jurisdictions into the IASB‟s due process and 
identify emerging issues (IASB, 2013, para 3.49). 
In the standard-setting process, a consultation process is carried out in various 
ways, including invitation of comment letters, and participation in meetings or 
conferences. National accounting standard setters engage in the consultation 
process by undertaking research or expressing the interests of stakeholders to 
IASB. 
In addition, in view of IASB‟s limited resources, the assistance of national standard 
setters is an indispensable element in developing a high-quality IFRS. Since an 
IFRS cannot cover all cases of accounting events arising around the world, the 
complementarity of national and regional GAAPs is broadly accepted. Furthermore, 
IFRS is dictated on a „principle based approach‟ rather than a „rule based 
approach‟. Accordingly, national standard setters may need to set up their own 
national GAAP to specify more clearly a certain accounting issue not addressed 
under IFRS. One interviewee highlighted the role of national accounting standard 
setters in this context: 
Considering the limited resources of the IASB, the national standard 
setters are expected to participate proactively in the IFRS development 
process. This is a way not only to save time but also to develop a high 
quality of standards for one another (ASS 4). 
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IASB therefore expected a high level of assistance from national accounting 
standard-setting bodies, including EFRAG, ANC and the Australian body, in order 
to develop the ETS project. In effect, a lot of work carried out by national 
accounting standard setters supports IASB in reducing its efforts and shortening 
the timeline. Highlighting a role of national accounting standard setters in the 
development of ETS project, one interviewee commented: 
What we aim to do is to use input from other national standard setters 
as well, so particularly during that research phase they can help us with 
some of that research. So there‟s work that‟s been done by EFRAG; 
work has been done by some of the other European standard setters as 
well – the French have done some, I think the Italians have done some 
as well – which some of that‟s fed into the EFRAG work. And that‟ll be 
useful input to us, and it probably shortens the timeline for us a bit 
because they‟ve already done some work. But the board will have to 
make its own decision, so it‟ll be just one of the inputs that we‟ll 
consider (ASS 5). 
National accounting standard setters may contribute more critically, in particular 
when a certain accounting issue is being addressed at a research project level. 
Since IFRIC 3 was revoked in 2005, national accounting standard setters have 
conducted a wide range of research and have released a significant number of 
research papers on accounting issues relating to ETS. Furthermore, some 
national accounting standard setters have promulgated their own accounting 
standards on emissions rights. Consequently, national accounting standard 
setters are capable of helping to identify and justify accounting problems in the 
ETS project, enabling IASB to find answers quickly and easily. 
In turn, IASB has made various efforts to facilitate the participation of national 
standard setters in the ETS project. For example, it has created a new body 
consisting of national accounting standard setters, called the Accounting 
Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF). One interviewee (ASS 5) mentioned that the 
ETS project was expected to be discussed in ASAF. This implies that ASAF plays 
a significant role in assisting IASB in the ETS project. 
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Overall, national accounting standard setters are expected to make a significant 
contribution to IASB in developing a high-quality accounting standard. They 
inspire IASB not only to identify accounting issues relating to ETS, but also to 
obtain evidence of implementation in practice. In this context, one interviewee 
(ASS 5) stressed the importance of assistance from national accounting standard-
setting bodies in the ETS project. 
Notably, the attitude of national accounting standard setters toward IASB was 
observed in relation to the ETS project. Specifically the findings demonstrate that, 
as national accounting standard setters, both ANC and KASB consistently showed 
a high degree of willingness to contribute to setting up IFRS for emissions. 
In particular, ANC may be supportive in developing an IFRS from the perspective 
of „post-implementation review‟ (ASS 7). Since an IFRS is established on the basis 
of a top-down approach, IASB must monitor how a new IFRS is implemented in 
practice for two to three years, in a process known as post-implementation review 
(PIR). In contrast to IASB‟s post-implementation review process, one interviewee 
(ASS 7) believed that the ANC proposal did not need to spend that long on the 
PIR process owing to the bottom-up approach in France (see Section 7.2). By 
curtailing the time for PIR, ANC expected that its proposal would provide a PIR 
reference to IASB: 
IASB standards, if you did a post-implementation review, you would 
wait for two years of application to see. […] So for the moment our way 
of contributing is probably going to be that next year, after two years of 
application, we‟re going to probably take a look at how things have 
been applied – do a type of post-implementation review. And when the 
IASB picks up the project again, the results of that could be available to 
them (ASS 7). 
In essence, this interviewee believed that the French case would be beneficial for 
IASB in the sense of not only providing the idea of business models but also the 
consequences of their implementation. 
In addition, the findings indicate the enthusiasm of KASB for making significant 
contributions to developing the ETS project. One interviewee (ASS 3) expected 
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that Korean GAAP for emissions rights would become a good reference for IASB‟s 
ETS project. In particular, most large Korean companies mandatorily apply IFRS, 
so the Korean case provides evidence to IASB in relation to how Korean 
companies adopt Korean GAAP for emissions rights, corresponding with IAS 8 
similarly to the French case. One interviewee referred to the role of Korean GAAP 
for emissions rights as follows: 
The KASB ultimately pursues participation in the process of developing 
IFRS, not just to adopt and use IFRS. From this perspective, the KASB 
provides Korean GAAP for emissions rights not only as a reference to 
specific accounting rules that IFRS does not give, but also as a 
reflective example of practice in Korea. I hope that Korean GAAP for 
emissions rights will be a material input to the IASB (ASS 3). 
IASB has exhibited considerable interest in how emissions rights are actually dealt 
with in practice under mandatory IFRS. One interviewee (ASS 5) referred to the 
indirect impact of IFRS on how an entity develops its accounting policy in practice. 
The necessity of referring to practice in terms of the ETS project was further stated 
by this interviewee: 
Another factor we would want to consider is what practices are people 
actually using under IFRS? And so it‟s quite possible, if there‟s some 
national GAAP that‟s relevant, that when people are applying IAS 8 they 
might be looking at the national GAAP and considering whether it meets 
the criteria in IAS 8. So it may well be there‟s some indirect influence as 
well on what people are doing in practice already under IFRS, so that 
will obviously be of interest to us (ASS 5). 
Notably, a staff paper was published in November 2014, according to which it 
appears that the stance of IASB staff has changed significantly in terms of its 
perspective on emissions rights and related liabilities compared with the preceding 
discussions. Specifically, the IASB staff paper emphasises the necessity of 
considering the net position under the scheme, the so-called „one unit of account‟ 
position. In addition, the staff paper asserts that an accounting model for ETS 
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should take into account the „net effect‟ of the scheme. The staff paper describes 
this as follows: 
The staff think that it is important for the IASB to consider the net 
position of the entity under the scheme; that is, to view the scheme as 
the unit of account. Any accounting model developed should, in our 
view, reflect the net overall effect of the scheme, even if the individual 
components of the scheme are presented separately (Summary of 
Accounting Issues, IFRS Staff paper, IASB Agenda ref. 6B, November 
2014). 
While the preceding discussions had apparently not accepted the net position due 
to inconsistency with the IFRS framework, the staff perspective has been radically 
overturned. This radical change in perspective on the net position is probably 
associated with practice in Europe, where a net approach has been predominantly 
adopted by companies. Moreover, it is presumed that IASB staff may have been 
influenced by the accounting models proposed by national accounting standard 
setters, such as ANC‟s proposal in 2012. This indicates that IASB is also affected 
by existing accounting models in developing accounting standards. In other words, 
previous accounting models for ETS that have been either extensively used in 
practice or developed by national accounting standard setters may significantly 
influence ensuing discussions of the ETS project in IASB. 
In summary, the findings indicate that interactions take place between IASB and 
national accounting standard setters. IASB is assisted by national accounting 
standard setters in various ways. In relation to the ETS project, IASB is able to 
refer to numerous studies which have been implemented by national accounting 
standard setters. Moreover, the accounting models for emissions rights devised by 
national accounting standard setters may inspire IASB to find an appropriate 
solution as it continues with the ETS project. In addition, practice evolving under 
national GAAPs delivers evidence to IASB to enable it to make an appropriate and 
reasonable decision. 
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In turn, the findings urge national standard setters to engage more proactively in 
the process in order to develop a high-quality IFRS. The desirable role of national 
accounting standard setters was described by one interviewee: 
National standard setters need to act more proactively, creatively, and 
preventively rather than taking a passive position. In particular, given 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS, national standard setters need to 
enhance a sense of responsibility for participating in the accounting 
standard-setting process for IFRS. […] If or when setting up national 
GAAP for emission rights soundly in line with the conceptual framework, 
national standard setters had better more proactively input their 
(national) accounting standards to the IASB (ASS 4). 
In essence, in accordance with the willingness of national accounting standard 
setters, IASB should increase their involvement in the IFRS development process. 
Active interactions between IASB and national accounting standard setters are 
conducive to a high quality as well as a high degree of acceptability of IFRS. To 
this extent, it would ultimately contribute to the achievement of institutional 
legitimacy for IASB. 
  Summary 7.5.
This chapter has presented the findings in relation to Research Question 2 and 
related objectives. By exploring accounting standard setting for emissions rights in 
the cases of IASB, ANC and KASB, the key findings have been identified to be in 
accordance with assertions of previous studies on accounting standard setting. In 
particular, the findings largely support the political aspects of the accounting 
standard-setting process. 
ANC takes a bottom-up approach in which relevant stakeholders are involved in 
the accounting standard-setting process from the beginning. Technically, a draft 
version of an accounting standard is documented by a working group consisting of 
various stakeholders. The bottom-up approach allows a variety of interests to be 
adjusted and reflected from the working group stage. Notably, ANC sought a 
solution from practice, looking at how companies managed emissions rights in 
their businesses. Aligned with actual practice, ANC was the first to develop 
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business models in an accounting standard for emissions rights. Owing to the 
bottom-up approach and business models, ANC‟s proposal was implemented with 
a high degree of acceptability and applicability in practice. 
With regard to KASB, the overall findings reveal how accounting standard setting 
proceeded in Korea. In particular, lobbying activities have been closely 
investigated, and several key attributes have been identified, including motivation, 
methods and timing. 
In line with a number of previous studies, large emitters were mainly motivated by 
economic consequences. They participated in the standard-setting process 
through a range of methods, both formal and informal. On the other hand, most 
stakeholders tended not to respond. The overall result is in accordance with 
previous studies. 
In terms of timing, lobbying at the pre-exposure draft stage may have a greater 
effect than at the post-exposure draft stage on the decision making of accounting 
standard setters. This result is largely consistent with Sutton‟s (1984) assertion. 
Investigation of the case of KASB was conducted from the initial to the final stage 
of the standard-setting process. The findings demonstrate how the final outcome 
was promulgated as a consequence of political compromise in the form of a more 
practical and applicable model in the Korean context, accommodating the interest 
of a wide range of stakeholders. 
Notably, the findings shed light on inter-relationships between IASB and national 
accounting standard setters. IASB is encouraging national accounting standard 
setters to participate more actively in the IFRS-setting process. In particular, it is 
showing significant interest in how companies account for emissions rights in 
practice, using national GAAPs or relying on IAS 8. In turn, ANC and KASB show 
robust willingness to contribute to making progress on the ETS project. Since ANC 
and KASB have developed their own accounting models for emissions rights, they 
expect these accounting models to provide a good reference for IASB in 
proceeding with the ETS project. 
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Based on the empirical findings described in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, in the next 
chapter, interpretation and deeper analysis of findings will be developed by 
intertwining the theoretical lens introduced in Chapter 3. 
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8. Discussion and Conclusions 
 Introduction 8.1.
As described in Chapter 1, this study is concerned with identifying how 
complicated and unresolved accounting issues in relation to ETS are managed in 
the standard-setting process, thereby drawing out elements which render 
accounting standards for emissions rights desirable and appropriate in specific 
circumstances. Empirically, this study focuses mainly on the case of KASB. The 
accounting models addressed in IASB‟s tentative decisions in 2008-2010 and 
ANC‟s proposal in 2012 have substantially influenced the development of Korean 
GAAP for emissions rights; accordingly, this study extends these cases and 
addresses two specific research questions as follows. 
Research Question 1: How does the accounting standard setter tackle accounting 
issues under ETS in the standard-setting process in order to achieve the most 
appropriate accounting standard? 
Research Question 2: How does the accounting standard-setting process proceed 
in the case of ETS? 
The main findings in relation to Research Questions 1 and 2 have been presented 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This chapter highlights the key findings and implications of 
this study. In particular, Section 8.2 provides a summary of the main findings and 
implications, which are presented as major recurring themes emerging in the 
course of addressing the two research questions and associated objectives, as set 
out in Section 4.2. Section 8.3 highlights the contributions of this study from 
empirical and theoretical perspectives. Section 8.4 presents the limitations of this 
study and some implications for further study. 
 Findings and implications 8.2.
8.2.1. Main accounting issues in relation to ETS 
In accordance with the analysis of most extant studies (e.g. Bebbington and 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2008; Cook, 2009; Haupt and Ismer, 2013), the key 
accounting issues for ETS originate mainly from free allowances. Due to the 
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distinctive attributes of emissions rights, several knock-on issues arise, such as 
the classification, recognition and measurement of allowances. 
The key accounting issues addressed by IASB, ANC and KASB are identified in 
Table 10. Breaking down the detailed accounting issues for each accounting 
standard setter makes it clear that, in the different contexts, each accounting 
standard-setting body focused on specific aspects of accounting issues because 
of a variety of considerations that they had to take into account. 
Table 10: Summary of key accounting issues 
Standard-setter Title of project Related ETS Main accounting issue 
International 
Accounting 
Standards Board 
(IASB) 
ETS project 
(2008-2010) 
Phase II 
(2008-2012) of 
the EU ETS 
How to account for emissions 
rights and the corresponding 
entry. 
Should a gain or liability be 
recognised on Day 1? 
Autorité des 
normes 
comptables 
(ANC) 
Proposals for 
Accounting of 
GHG Emission 
Rights (2012) 
Phase III  
(2013-2020) of 
the EU ETS  
How to account for emissions 
rights (including free allocation 
and auctioning) in association 
with various business activities 
under ETS subject to the 
existing accounting 
framework. 
Korean 
Accounting 
Standards Board 
(KASB) 
Korean GAAP 
for emission 
rights and 
liability for non-
listed entities  
(2014) 
Phase I (2015-
2017) of the 
Korean ETS 
How to account for free 
allowances subject to the 
existing accounting 
framework, minimising the 
impact of accounting treatment 
on accounting numbers. 
 
IASB’s tentative decisions in the period 2008-2010: the ‘Day 1 issue’ 
In its tentative decisions made in the period 2008 to 2010, IASB mainly addressed 
accounting issues in relation to free allowances. The most contentious issue was 
associated with recognising the corresponding entry for free allowances on the 
day of receipt, the so-called the „Day 1 issue‟. The findings allow a number of 
plausible reasons to be inferred as to why the Day 1 issue was most problematic 
at that time. 
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Firstly, the fair value (FV) approach may have been a determinant. While IASB 
was working on the ETS project with FASB between 2008 and 2010, fair value 
measurement was perceived as the dominant approach (Georgiou and Jack, 2011) 
to be pursued by both parties. Emissions rights can be regarded as financial 
instruments because they are tradable and the value can be faithfully observed in 
the market. In line with the FV approach as the prevailing criterion for 
measurement, discussions were dominated by this approach. Along with IFRIC 3, 
the tentative decisions in 2008-2010 were made on the basis of an FV approach. 
In effect, a high degree of dependency on the FV approach made the Day 1 issue 
keenly controversial. 
Secondly, the IASB‟s attempt to address the Day 1 issue without causing conflict 
with the existing conceptual framework may result in problematisation of this issue. 
The Day 1 issue may have given rise to a potential mismatch problem in the 
recognition of a liability on Day 1 (see Section 5.3). IASB attempted to address 
this issue by following existing norms and practices, which would be beneficial for 
an organisation to ensure institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). In particular, 
existing conceptual frameworks and accounting standards are a primary source of 
legitimacy for accounting rules and standards. In relying on existing accounting 
standards and the conceptual framework, IASB intended to seek an appropriate 
solution for emissions rights without creating flaws in the existing framework. 
Previous studies (e.g. Lovell et al., 2010; Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011; Lovell, 
2014; Ratnatungan and Jones, 2012) point out the inappropriateness of the 
existing accounting framework to deal with technical complexities in relation to 
emissions rights. Nevertheless, IASB could not set aside the existing framework at 
that time. The intention of staying within the existing framework resulted in the Day 
1 issue being controversial and ultimately unresolved. 
Thirdly, as a supranational accounting standard setter, IASB is responsible for 
implementing IFRS so as to achieve harmony between a number of accounting 
standards in different jurisdictions, enhancing the usefulness of accounting 
information, and improving the quality of accounting information. Furthermore, 
International accounting standards are pervasive and profoundly influential on its 
stakeholders. Admittedly, IASB has a different perspective from other national 
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accounting standard setters. In this regard, it was presumed that IASB would shed 
more light on the Day 1 issue, which entailed more fundamental and significant 
accounting issues. Although the presentation issue was regarded as critical from 
an industry point of view, it seemed to be far less critical than the Day 1 issue from 
the IASB perspective. Accordingly, the board did not reach any decision on the 
presentation issue. This provides an important clue to identifying different 
perspectives in terms of the key accounting issues between IASB and national 
accounting standard setters, as well as between IASB and preparers. 
In summary, IASB sought to achieve a solution for emissions rights within the 
existing accounting framework. It did not explicitly admit the various uses of 
emissions rights with different intentions in business. Subject to the conventional 
accounting framework, IASB may pursue a set of accounting rules „in a single and 
uniform way‟ for emissions rights (Lovell, 2014). This may ultimately be ascribed to 
a failure to address the complexities in relation to accounting issues for ETS. 
ANC’s Proposal in 2012: the pursuit of an ‘umbrella’ accounting model 
In the case of ANC, the main accounting issues in relation to ETS originated 
substantially from a significant change in the EU ETS, whereby auctioning became 
the default method for allocation from Phase III (2013-2020). From a business 
perspective, companies must bear increasing costs in association with purchasing 
emissions rights. ANC acknowledged the necessity for new accounting guidance 
to tackle various types of business activity which might emerge in Phase III of the 
EU ETS onward. Consequently, it decided to issue new accounting guidance for 
emissions rights which could be comprehensively applied to numerous types of 
business from EU ETS Phase III onward. The new accounting guidance would 
play a role as an „umbrella‟ accounting model which would be able to cover 
diverse types of business. 
ANC intended to set up new accounting guidance within the existing accounting 
framework, in particular IFRS and French GAAP. This was developed in such a 
way as to apply to most French companies using IFRS. Consequently, the findings 
show that ANC took an „incremental approach‟, by which a new accounting 
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standard was deliberately developed by changing existing accounting standards 
„at the margin‟ (ASS 8) rather than creating a totally new model. 
Notably, ANC sought a solution on the basis of practice by referring to how 
companies actually accounted for emissions rights in doing their business. ANC 
took an „economic approach‟, drawing on logic from actual practice. Companies 
treat emissions rights in the same way as a commodity, wherein the cost of 
emissions rights is reflected in production costs. By referring to actual practice, 
ANC created the concept of emissions rights as a so-called „new administrative 
raw material‟, as a sub-category of inventory. 
The economic approach enabled ANC to devise business models for ETS: a 
production model and a trading model. The idea of an economic approach has 
essentially the same logic as the „activity-based model‟ suggested by KPMG in 
2008, in which different accounting models are applied depending on the type of 
business activity. In essence, ANC was the first to propose that business models 
should emerge as a form of accounting standard. In line with each business model, 
accounting rules were elaborated, compatible with IAS 2: Inventories and French 
GAAP. 
In this way, ANC emphasised the benefits of business models from the 
stakeholders‟ perspectives. From the preparers‟ (companies‟) point of view, in the 
production model, companies are able to freeze production costs arising when 
purchasing emissions rights. For managerial accounting, this is important in 
setting a product price in the internal budgeting process. Freezing production 
costs is a critical element in determining the marginal cost and setting up a pricing 
strategy. 
From the users‟ point of view, users are able to directly and immediately assess 
the position of a company and what risk it may face in relation to emissions rights 
and related liabilities under ETS. 
In addition, the findings indicate the significant contributions of the business 
models from an accounting framework point of view. The business models may be 
considered to be the most advanced accounting model of emissions rights since 
IFRIC 3 was withdrawn. Remarkably, accounting treatment under the business 
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models is able to address the mismatch problems under IFRIC3 because the 
same unit of account is used for emissions rights and related liabilities. 
The specific accounting treatment under the business models was developed in 
line with IFRS and French GAAP. Harmonisation with the existing model resulted 
in the establishment of a robust and sound rationale in elaborating accounting 
rules, making new accounting guidance more likely to be persuasive and 
acceptable to institutional environments. Since the accounting rules in both the 
production model and the trading model are in accordance with IFRS and French 
GAAP, ANC‟s proposal is considered legitimate by institutional environments, 
including companies, accounting specialists and other accounting standard setters. 
Since the business models were devised by properly incorporating practice, ANC‟s 
proposal is also highly applicable to companies, ensuring a high level of 
compliance and acceptability. 
In the pursuit of legitimacy, Burlaud and Colasse (2011) stress the necessity of 
„dual reasoning‟, whereby the accounting standard setter must balance the 
conceptual framework with practice. The standard setter‟s task is clearly facilitated 
if the conceptual framework is drawn from practice, as opposed to some abstract 
scientific theory or an amalgam of the two as often the case (Dean, 2008). In line 
with Burlaud and Colasse‟s (2011) view, ANC achieved legitimacy on the basis of 
such dual reasoning so as to be compatible with the existing accounting 
framework and to reflect practice. Through this balanced approach, ANC resolved 
the complexities in relation to accounting issues under ETS. 
Unlike IASB, ANC succeeded in dealing with the technical complexities in relation 
to emissions rights. A solution was sought within the existing accounting 
framework, as IASB intended. The main reason for success was the economic 
approach taken under the premise of the various uses of emissions rights in 
business. In essence, the accounting standard turned out to be conceptually and 
technically sound and generally acceptable, and ANC was able to achieve 
legitimacy in the standard setting of emissions rights. 
Korean GAAP for emissions rights in 2014: Tackling negative impact on 
accounting numbers 
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Similarly to other accounting standard setters, KASB had to address the key 
accounting issues associated with free allowances. The findings show that KASB 
confronted a number of constraints: 1) tackling the negative impact on financial 
and accounting numbers; 2) minimising the adverse impact on the scheme and 
the carbon market; and 3) aligning with IFRSs. These factors substantially and 
significantly influenced KASB‟s choice of specific accounting models and rules. 
From the beginning of the standard-setting process, large emitters persistently 
called for the adverse impact on the financial numbers (in particular, the debt ratio) 
to be offset. At the same time, in line with the request from government, the 
accounting standard for ETS was not to undermine the orderly functioning of the 
carbon market or the ability of ETS to achieve the national reduction target cost-
effectively. 
KASB devised its accounting models by elaborating previous models, referring 
mainly to IFRIC 3, IASB‟s tentative decisions (2008-2010) and ANC‟s proposal 
(2012). In addition, KASB developed accounting models in such a way as to offset 
the negative financial effects on companies, minimise the effect on the ETS, and 
remain subject to the IFRS framework. For example, KASB staff devised an 
accounting model combining business models (adapted from ANC‟s proposal) and 
the FV approach (adapted from IASB‟s tentative decisions) with linked 
presentation. This proposal deserves attention because it is the most recent 
version of an accounting model for emissions rights on the basis of an FV 
approach and linked presentation. 
However, concerns were raised about the proposal: 1) linked presentation may 
cause conflict with the IFRS framework; and 2) imperfection of the Korean ETS 
market may bring about inability to observe market price, so the FV approach may 
be inappropriate for the time being. Due to the anticipated practical constraints, 
the KASB staff proposal was not approved. Instead, KASB adopted European 
practice for the exposure draft, entailing cost measurement and gross presentation. 
In short, due to the incompatibility of linked presentation with the IFRS conceptual 
framework and inapplicability of the FV approach at the start of the Korean ETS, 
KASB had to renounce the accounting model with FV measurement and linked 
  
236 
presentation. It compromised with a more applicable model, using a cost method 
and gross presentation, which has prevailed in practice. 
In the process of reaching a final outcome, both accounting models (the KASB 
staff proposal and the exposure draft) reveal how KASB attempted to address the 
concerns of industry by eliminating the anticipated adverse effects of the 
accounting rules on accounting/financial numbers. In contrast to other cases in 
this study, the issue about the competitiveness of industry turned out to be a 
primary concern of which KASB took account throughout the standard-setting 
process. In effect, amongst various factors, the interests of industry appeared to 
be the most influential element for KASB in making a decision on accounting rules 
for emissions rights. 
In summary, the adoption of business models enabled KASB to resolve the 
technical complexities in relation to emissions rights. In addition, KASB attempted 
to devise an appropriate solution in response to the various interests of 
stakeholders. Finally, KASB compromised with a model which had been 
pervasively used in Europe, as a result of which most stakeholders are largely in 
favour of Korean GAAP for emissions rights. 
Based on the accounting issues probed in this research, Table 11 summarises the 
accounting treatments for emission rights and related liabilities proposed by the 
accounting standard setters. This comprises some of the findings in association 
with Research Question 1. KASB staff‟s attempt to propose a standard which 
would be an amalgam of IASB‟s and ANC‟s guidelines is readily noticeable – as 
well as the eventual considerable similarities of the exposure draft issued with 
ANC‟s proposal.  
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Table 11: Summary of accounting treatments for emissions rights and 
related liabilities 
 European 
practice 
surveyed in 
2007* 
IASB’s 
tentative 
decisions 
in 2008-
2010 
ANC’s 
proposal in 
2012 
KASB staff 
proposal in 
2014 
Exposure 
draft of the 
KASB in Jul. 
2014 
Business 
models 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Production 
model and 
trading model 
 
Compliance 
model and 
trading 
model 
Compliance 
model and 
trading model 
Trading model 
Initial and 
subsequent 
measurement 
of asset 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Measuring at 
fair value 
less costs to 
sell 
(changes in 
fair value → 
in P/L)  
Measuring 
at fair value 
(changes in 
fair value 
→ in P/L) 
 
Measuring at 
fair value 
(changes in 
fair value → 
in P/L) 
 
Compliance/Production model 
Classification Intangible 
assets (65%) 
Not 
applicable 
Inventory  Other 
current 
asset 
Intangible 
assets 
 
Initial 
measurement 
of asset 
At cost 
(free 
allowances: 
at nil value) 
At fair value At cost 
(free 
allowances: 
at nil value) 
At fair value 
 
At cost 
(free 
allowances: 
at nil value) 
Subsequent 
measurement 
of asset 
- Not 
revaluation 
(79%) 
- Not 
amortisation/ 
depreciation 
(86%) 
At fair value Not 
applicable 
At fair value 
 
At cost 
De-
recognition  
of asset 
Surrendering 
or selling 
Surrendering 
or selling 
Emitting Surrendering 
or selling 
Surrendering 
or selling 
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Recognition 
of liability 
When 
emitting 
 
- When 
allocating 
free 
allowances 
- When 
emitting 
more than 
emissions 
rights being 
held 
Only when 
emissions 
exceed 
emissions 
rights being 
held 
 
- When 
allocating 
free 
allowances, 
recognise 
„allocating 
liability‟  
- As 
emissions 
arise, 
„allocating 
liability‟ is 
replaced 
with 
„surrendering 
liability‟ 
When 
emitting 
 
Initial 
measurement 
of liability 
- At carrying 
value 
- For 
excessive 
emissions, at 
the best 
estimates 
At fair value At the best 
estimates of 
the outflow of 
resources 
At fair value - At carrying 
value 
- For 
excessive 
emissions, at 
the best 
estimates 
De-
recognition  
of liability 
When 
surrendering 
When 
Surrendering 
When 
purchasing 
When 
Surrendering  
When 
surrendering 
Presentation Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Gross 
presentation 
Linked 
presentation  
Gross 
presentation  
* Surveyed by PwC and IETA in 2007 
Factors affecting the development of accounting standards for ETS 
From the findings in the cases of IASB, ANC and KASB, factors that essentially 
influenced the development of accounting models for emissions rights have been 
derived. These common determinants can be classified into three types as follows. 
1) The legal and economic context of ETS 
Hopwood and Miller (1994) refer to the „constitutive role‟ of accounting in social 
processes. Under the premise that accounting is constructed by the social, cultural 
and political environment (Burchell et al., 1980), it inherently reflects aspects of 
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laws and policies in the context of the social contract (see also Nobes, 1998, 
2006a, 2006b for detailed discussions of these differences). 
When introducing a new policy measure, society calls for accounting rules to be 
set up in accordance with the characteristics of the new measure, e.g. ETS in this 
context. As ETS was introduced, the necessity for accounting reporting under the 
scheme was raised. In response to a surge of calls for authoritative accounting 
guidance on reporting activities under ETS, the accounting standard-setting 
bodies initiated the development of accounting standards consistent with the legal 
and economic context of ETS. 
The findings reveal that accounting standards for ETS embrace features and 
attributes of the legal and economic context of the scheme. When developing 
accounting standards for ETS, accounting standard setters attempted to 
incorporate every feature of the scheme into the standard because all procedures 
under the scheme comprise the accounting events that need to be reported. 
While the basic design features of ETS are similar, once at the implementation 
stage, each scheme varied widely (see Section 2.2.3). Each had specific design 
features which deliberately took account of economic, industrial or political 
circumstances. In other words, ETS has been operated differently, reflecting the 
various circumstances of each country. The findings indicate that the legal and 
economic context of schemes has significantly affected the construction of sets of 
rules as accounting standards. Consequently, accounting standards for ETS may 
have different features and attributes from country to country. 
From an accounting perspective, accounting standards for ETS may be applied to 
both a cap-and-trade and a baseline-and-credit scheme because both schemes 
are fundamentally based on the same mechanism (as described in Section 2.4.1). 
Nevertheless, in reality, cap-and-trade schemes have more commonly been 
adopted by a number of countries to date.  
Accordingly, when setting up accounting standards for ETS, the accounting issues 
tend to focus on cap-and-trade schemes rather than baseline-and-credit schemes. 
For example, both the Korean ETS and the EU ETS are based on a cap-and-trade 
scheme. IASB narrowed its scope to cap-and-trade schemes when working on its 
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joint project with FASB. In devising its accounting rules, KASB also took into 
consideration the cap-and-trade objective on which the Korean ETS is based. 
KASB highlighted that the accounting standard was to be set up so as not to 
hamper the „tradability‟ of emissions rights. 
In addition, accounting standards for ETS incorporate specific attributes relating to 
the commitment period of the scheme. For example, ANC recognised the 
structural change in the scheme from Phase III (2013-2017), and was initially 
motivated to tackle the substantially increasing costs resulting from auctioning. By 
contrast, KASB concentrated on accounting issues relating to free allowances 
because the Korean ETS in Phase I (2015-2017) delivers 100 per cent free 
allocation. 
Interestingly, the findings imply that, due to technical difficulties, accounting 
standards do not reflect all features of ETS. Some processes under the scheme 
cannot be converted to accounting terms corresponding with its legal and 
economic context due to the complexities of the mechanism. For example, an 
offsetting mechanism is commonly included in most schemes to provide flexibility 
as a substitute for obtaining emissions rights. Each scheme sets up different rules 
for offsetting, including a limit on the use of offsetting credits and an exchange rate 
for offset credits per allowance. From an accounting perspective, it is difficult to set 
up a general accounting treatment because of the wide range of offset credits 
depending on the scheme or the offsetting project. One interviewee (EXP_ACC 1) 
acknowledged that the offsetting mechanism may give rise to a very complicated 
accounting issue in relation to how to deal with various types of offset credits, such 
as recognition issues or the equivalent ratio of free allowances. In this regard, 
some accounting guidance intentionally excludes accounting for an offsetting 
mechanism. 
Affecting the accounting standard for ETS, the economic attributes in the Korean 
context can be drawn on. The findings show how KASB took the economic 
circumstances in Korea into account in the development of accounting standard 
for ETS. 
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The Korean economy circumstance has affected the design of ETS in Korea. 
Korean government set the national reduction target committing the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 30% by 2020 in line with business as usual (BAU) 
scenario. In order to achieve the national reduction target, the Korean government 
introduced a wide range of measures in accordance with Green Growth policy 
including ETS. Although ETS is regarded the most effective measures to reduce 
carbon emissions in theory, a number of companies in heavy industries, mostly 
energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, had been strongly against the 
government policy. In addition, they argued that the introduction of ETS would 
give rise to an increase of costs resulting in deteriorating the competitiveness of 
industry, at a time which it was already facing rigorous competition from Chinese 
companies in the global market. In the past five decades, manufacturing industries 
have been regarded as an essential pillar to the Korean economy‟s growth,  so 
the Korean government had to take the interests of the manufacturing industry into 
consideration. Due to the importance of manufacturing industry in the Korean 
economy, the Korean government decided to provide 100 per cent of 
grandfathering permits allocating emissions rights for free for the purpose of 
easing burdens on manufacturing industries. 
While free allowances are beneficial for companies in compensating for the costs 
arising from emissions, recognition or valuation of free allowances in the financial 
statement may give a rise to extra burden in respect of accounting. Companies in 
the heavy industries had persistently delivered KASB their interests in relation to 
the accounting treatment of free allowances in the development of accounting 
standard for ETS. KASB was not able to disregard their concerns because they 
constitute important stakeholders, affected by the accounting standards in Korea. 
Furthermore, the economy‟s growth rate had remained at around 3-4 per cent 
since mid-2013; the Korean government did not intend to give rise to a negative 
shock on economy when Korean ETS embarked in 2015. The economic 
circumstances and the importance of voices of manufacturing industry leaded 
KASB to set up the accounting standard for ETS in the way of incorporating the 
interests of companies. 
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In summary, the findings are in line with Hopwood and Miller‟s (1994) view that 
accounting is influenced by policy measures. The accounting standard setters 
explored in this study initiated the setting of accounting standards for emissions 
rights corresponding with the commencement of a scheme or specific phase of 
ETS. In particular, in the standard-setting process, accounting standard for ETS in 
Korea was developed in accordance with diverse attributes of the scheme which 
reflected the specific economic circumstances surrounding it. 
2) Subject to existing accounting standards and models  
Previous research points out the need for a radical rather than an incremental 
approach to developing accounting standards for ETS. For example, Lovell (2014) 
argues that the existing accounting framework may not be appropriate to embrace 
the complex attributes of emissions rights. In contrast to the assertion of previous 
studies, the findings reveal that, in reality, accounting standard-setting bodies 
explicitly rely on the existing accounting framework and standards along with 
preceding accounting models. In other words, accounting treatment for emissions 
rights has developed in an incremental manner within existing accounting 
frameworks and standards. 
The findings indicate a robust pattern of accounting standard setters seeking 
solutions within existing accounting frameworks, such as IFRS. For example, 
since both France and Korea has adopted IFRS mandatorily, most listed 
companies in those countries must apply IFRS to their financial statements. The 
IFRS conceptual framework constituted a boundary within which the new 
accounting standards for ETS in both France and Korea were built in accordance 
with IFRS. 
In addition, it was commonly observed that preceding debates and existing 
standards were used as references for accounting standard setters in devising the 
most appropriate model. In other words, existing accounting standards and 
previous discussions provided the starting point for new accounting standards. 
This indicates that new accounting standards for ETS inevitably end up as new 
interpretations of previous models by elaborating and updating existing models. 
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In summary, in contrast to assertions of previous research (e.g. Lovell et al., 2010), 
a radical or utterly new approach did not emerge in standard setting for emissions 
rights. Rather, the findings demonstrate that the accounting standard setters 
explicitly took an incremental approach, elaborating rules within the existing 
accounting framework. In accordance with Lovell and MacKenzie‟s (2011) findings, 
the findings of this study confirm „path dependency‟ or „inertia‟, whereby solutions 
were achieved within the existing framework. To this extent, despite being a 
newly-introduced policy measure, accounting standards for emissions rights 
appear within the existing frameworks rather than as a totally new form of 
standard. 
Nevertheless and despite the dependency on the existing conceptual framework, 
the lack of an existing IFRS standard allowed national standard setters such as 
ANC and KASB to attempt to develop solutions both morally sound and 
pragmatically acceptable by their key stakeholders, even though these meant that 
they were acting „at the borders‟ of the current practice allowed under IASB 
guidance. This meant that, although the national standard setters could not debate 
and change the fundamental bases (such as measurement) of IASB‟s framework, 
in the absence of guidance they could still offer potential solutions to practical 
problems and thus offer a basis and ultimately influence future standards issued 
by IASB.  
3) Practices in accounting for emissions rights 
The findings suggest „current practice‟ is a factor affecting the development of 
accounting standards for ETS. Since IFRIC 3 was revoked and IASB has not 
provided accounting guidance for emissions rights hitherto, companies 
participating in the EU ETS have the liberty to develop their own accounting policy 
to address emissions rights and related liabilities on the basis of IAS 8 (see 
Section 3.2.2). Consequently, a variety of accounting treatments has emerged in 
practice. 
Interestingly, the findings indicate that accounting standard setters are very 
interested in how companies account for emissions rights in practice, given the 
freedom of accounting treatment under mandatory IFRS. In particular, referring to 
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practice may matter more with regard to ETS because IFRS-adopting companies 
have been accustomed to their own accounting rules, and therefore would not call 
for the setting up of new accounting standards for emissions rights. This implies 
that analysis of practice is a preliminary step to developing more acceptable and 
applicable accounting rules for ETS. In essence, referring to practice is critical for 
ex post standard setting where a variety of accounting treatments already exists in 
practice. 
For example, ANC sought a solution from practice by examining how companies 
actually dealt with emissions rights in their businesses. ANC perceived that 
emissions rights were managed similarly to raw materials in the production 
process. Indeed, referring to practice provoked ANC to develop business models 
to tackle the complex attributes of emissions rights. 
In addition, KASB reviewed the main accounting treatments used in practice by 
European companies for emissions rights and related liabilities in the absence of 
an international accounting standard, which was surveyed by PwC and IETA in 
2007 (see Section 3.2.2). It provided an adequate reference for KASB to identify 
commonly used accounting treatments for free allowances in terms of recognition, 
classification and reporting. Now that Korean ETS Phase I (2015-2017) has 
commenced, 100 per cent of allowances are allocated for free. In a context akin to 
EU ETS Phase I, it was worthwhile for KASB to refer to European practices 
surveyed in 2007. 
In summary, three recurring elements are drawn from the findings, as shown in 
Figure 15. Affected by these factors, accounting standard setters attempt to 
develop the most appropriate accounting model. These factors provide a 
comprehensive framework for assessing how accounting standards for ETS are 
initiated and developed in various contexts. 
Although common attributes are drawn upon in Figure 15, these factors differently 
affect the development of accounting standards for ETS. In different contexts the 
factors vary. 
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Figure 15: Factors affecting development of accounting standards for ETS 
 
In effect, standard setters seek appropriate solutions in different settings, for 
example with different types of scheme or allocation mechanisms. This implies 
that a desirable or appropriate model of accounting standard for ETS may be 
achieved through reciprocity between the stakeholders, the legal and economic 
circumstances and the accounting standard setter, rather than by pursuing a 
single right answer. 
8.2.2. Political aspects of accounting standard-setting process 
The findings of this study provide empirical evidence of the political aspects of the 
accounting standard-setting process. This study probes almost all procedures in 
standard-setting for emission rights in the case of KASB. To a large extent, the 
findings support the previous literature regarding the political aspects of the 
accounting standard-setting process. They unravel the political attributes 
operating not only in the coordination of various interests of stakeholders but also 
in compromising between idealistic and practical (acceptable) models. In addition, 
the findings indicate that accounting standards are the result of a political process 
in which various interests and constraints are adjusted and compromised. 
Lobbying activities in the accounting standard-setting process 
In exploring the Korean accounting standard-setting process, the participation of 
stakeholders was observed at various stages throughout the process. Significant 
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findings for accounting standard-setting have been identified in terms of the 
participation and lobbying activities of stakeholders. On the whole, the findings are 
in accordance with the literature in relation to lobbying activities in the standard-
setting process, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. 
1) Motivation: economic motives 
The findings demonstrate that the motivation of preparers (companies) actively 
engaged in the standard-setting process is associated with the economic 
consequences of the anticipated accounting standard. In due process, large 
emitters consistently articulated their interests and concerns. For instance, large 
emitters presented their concerns about the negative impact on accounting 
numbers. Since a significant amount of free allowances was expected to be 
allocated, they argued that the debt ratio might worsen under an accounting model 
with fair value measurement and gross presentation. Overall, the findings are 
consistent with those of most previous studies (e.g. Morris, 1986; Deakin, 1989; 
Orens et al., 2011; Georgiou, 2002; Jorissen et al., 2012, Reither, 2014) that a 
negative impact on a firm‟s cash flow or accounting numbers is a significant factor 
driving preparers to engage in the standard-setting process. The findings also 
support positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) to a large extent. 
Meanwhile, it has been revealed that most companies in Korea were largely 
dismissive of accounting issues relating to emissions rights. Although most were 
expected to be affected by the new accounting standard, they were prone to non-
participation in the standard-setting process. These findings empirically support 
Jorissen et al.‟s (2012) argument. From the findings, various reasons for a silent 
majority in the accounting standard-setting process are inferred as follows. 
Firstly, a lack of resources in the organization to respond to accounting issues 
may be ascribed to remaining most stakeholders in silence. In particular, the 
accounting issues for ETS require a high degree of expertise and understanding in 
the disciplines of both ETS and accounting. Unsurprisingly, the matters of 
accounting were addressed in a finance/accounting-related division while the 
issues regarding ETS were dealt with in an environment-related division in most 
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companies. Therefore, most companies may not effectively respond to these 
accounting issues.   
In accordance with Tutticci et al.‟s (1994) findings, another plausible reason is that 
the issues may not be of interest to them since the new accounting standard may 
not have a significant impact on their accounting numbers. Some interviewees 
(preparers) viewed these accounting issues as „insignificant‟ so they would not 
respond. This may keep them from participating in the accounting standard-setting 
process as they remain in the silent majority group. 
In addition, a lack of awareness of how to engage in the accounting standard-
setting process may lead companies to remain in silent majority. Some companies 
were not even aware of the fact that KASB was creating an accounting standard 
for emissions rights. In line with Walker and Robinson‟s (1993) contention, due to 
a lack of awareness, companies were unable to become involved in the process. 
In addition, several comments on the exposure draft were provided by industry 
associations. The findings indicate that most companies depended on 
representative organisations, and most apparently remained silent during the 
process. These findings are compatible with those of previous studies (e.g. 
Gavens et al., 1989, Georgiou, 2010, Jorissen et al., 2013) that companies do not 
make individual submissions; rather they tend to input through special interest 
groups, such as industry associations, which represent their interests. 
On the whole, the findings support those of previous research (e.g. Robinson, 
1993; Tutticci et al., 1994; Georgiou, 2002) regarding motivations for participation 
or non-participation. In addition, the findings offer an indication that stakeholders 
may not necessarily respond to accounting issues with the same intensity of 
motivation. 
2) Timing: effectiveness at pre-exposure draft stage rather than at post-
exposure draft stage 
In terms of the most effective timing for lobbying activities, previous studies are 
inconsistent. Interestingly, the findings of this study indicate that participating in a 
consultation process prior to publishing the exposure draft may be more effective 
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than presenting an opinion on the exposure draft itself. Arguably, the findings 
imply that lobbying at the early stage of the standard-setting process is more 
effective in influencing the standard setter‟s decision making. In the case of KASB, 
despite of the importance of a role of comment letters, which are an essential 
means in due process, comment letters received at the later stage of the standard-
setting process such as at post-exposure draft stage could not significantly affect 
KASB‟s suggestions, as there was little room for changes left on the exposure 
draft. 
These findings are largely in line with those of Sutton (1984, p.711, cited in 
Jorissen et al., 2012) that „lobbying is likely to be most successful if it takes place 
before a civil servant sets pencil to paper for the first time to write a proposal‟. The 
findings indicate that stakeholders need to participate more proactively in the 
consultation process at pre-exposure draft stage, for example on discussion 
papers, in order to influence the staff‟s considerations effectively. 
3) Methods: various methods used 
In accordance with Sutton‟s (1984) assertion that various methods are used in 
lobbying activities, the findings demonstrate that stakeholders exerted influence 
on KASB using not only formal lobbying methods but also informal methods, 
including private meetings and telephone conversations with project staff. For 
example, one of the most prominent stakeholders was observed to involve itself at 
several stages throughout the standard-setting process, including as a technical 
committee member, meeting with technical staff in the KASB, making speeches at 
public hearings and submitting comment letters. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, most preparers relied on industrial 
associations to convey their opinion. Preparers may have believed that industry 
associations could adequately represent their views on their behalf. 
4) Effectiveness: empirical evidence of effectiveness of lobbying activity 
Sutton (1984) indicates the necessity for further empirical study regarding the 
effectiveness of lobbying activities, even though it is hard to observe „lobbying 
outputs‟. In accordance with Sutton‟s (1984) implication, the findings allow the 
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assessment of factors that played a critical role in affecting KASB‟s decision 
making. The findings demonstrate how effectively stakeholders‟ concerns 
influenced KASB‟s choice of accounting models. Throughout the process, it was 
observed that KASB sought effective measures to tackle the negative impact on 
accounting numbers of the anticipated accounting treatment. For example, on the 
one hand, in the KASB staff proposal, linked presentation was suggested in order 
to address the adverse effects of recognition of free allowances at fair value. In 
linked presentation, a net amount of emissions rights and related liabilities is 
displayed on the balance sheet. On the other hand, in the exposure draft, 
European practice was adopted as the primary accounting model. In applying a 
cost method as the measurement base, free allowances are measured at nil value; 
accordingly, no financial disadvantage arises and the interests of industry are 
effectively reflected. 
Both accounting models suggested by KASB entail specific accounting treatments 
to offset the potential negative impact on accounting numbers. In effect, the 
findings indicate the effectiveness of preparers‟ inputs in the extent to which 
lobbying activities were influential in decision making on a specific accounting rule 
or model. 
Political aspects of accounting standard setting 
As the accounting standard for ETS in Korea has been shown to be the result of 
political compromise, this study provides empirical evidence of the political nature 
of accounting standard setting. 
Table 12 presents two types of model which KASB addressed in its standard 
setting-process for emissions rights: one is that of the KASB staff proposal; the 
other is that in the exposure draft which was finalised as Korean GAAP for 
emissions rights. 
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Table 12: Summary of main features of accounting models for emissions 
rights and liabilities in the case of KASB 
KASB Staff proposal Factors consideration Exposure draft 
Business models: 
- Compliance model 
- Trading model 
Minimising impact on trading 
and operation of ETS: 
→ No restrictions on transforming 
from one business model to 
another 
Business models: 
- Compliance model 
- Trading model 
Measurement base: 
FV method 
Practice: 
→ Abandoning FV method 
Measurement base: 
Cost method 
Presentation: 
Linked presentation 
Offsetting negative impact on 
accounting numbers: 
→ Linked presentation, Cost 
method 
Subject to IFRS framework: 
→ Abandoning linked presentation 
Presentation: 
Gross presentation 
 
At first, KASB staff proposed an accounting model on the basis of the fair value 
method and linked presentation. Having considered the concerns raised in relation 
to this model, it then sought a second best model from European practice. By 
adopting European practice, KASB released the exposure draft, distinctive 
features of which include the cost method and gross presentation. 
Table 12 indicates how the accounting standard for emissions rights in Korea was 
compromised from an idealistic to a more practical and applicable model, 
reflecting the factors taken into consideration. The exposure draft was the 
outcome of this compromise. 
The findings provide an empirical example confirming the dynamics of the political 
nature of the accounting standard-setting process. A variety of interests of 
stakeholders throughout the accounting standard-setting process influenced 
KASB to choose a particular accounting model or rule. In particular, as shown in 
Table 12, KASB sought to set accounting rules by aligning with the interests of 
stakeholders in order to ensure a high degree of acceptability from stakeholders of 
the final outcome. In effect, KASB achieved „exchange legitimacy‟, according to 
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Suchman‟s (1995) typology. In addition to accommodating prominent stakeholders‟ 
interests, KASB made a settlement by means of „conforming environments‟. To 
prevent potential conflict with the IFRS conceptual framework, adopting European 
practice was a safer way to ensure legitimate promulgation. KASB ended up 
compromising the legitimacy of the result; Korean GAAP for emissions rights 
exemplifies the outcome as a consequence of political compromise. This implies 
that accounting standards need to be regarded in the context of political choice 
rather than in the context of high technical expertise. 
Understanding the function of institutional legitimacy in the accounting standard-
setting process 
In the context of legitimacy, the isomorphism described by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) was observed in terms not only of undertaking due process but also in 
decision-making by accounting standard setters. From the procedural aspect, all 
three accounting standard setters in this study undertake due process in a 
homogeneous way. Due process evolved in the standard-setting process, 
commonly involving: 1) setting the agenda; 2) project planning; 3) developing and 
releasing a discussion paper; 4) developing and releasing an exposure draft; 5) 
post-enactment. The findings show how accounting standard setters made efforts 
to achieve procedural legitimacy by ensuring the „rightness‟ of due process. For 
example, both ANC and KASB attempted to listen to stakeholders by facilitating 
their participation in the standard-setting process. In addition, the accounting 
standard setters attempted to build a firm and robust rationale for a set of 
accounting rules by relying on the existing accounting conceptual framework. The 
findings confirm the accomplishment of the prerequisite conditions for legitimacy in 
due process – „procedural due process‟ and „substantive due process‟ – described 
by Johnson and Solomons (1994).  
In addition, from the decisional aspect, stakeholders‟ interests have been 
effectively reflected in the outcome since accounting standard setters, in particular 
KASB, attempted to set accounting rules to be more acceptable and applicable in 
practice. From the findings, it is inferred that accounting standard setters tend to 
make decisions in pursuit of a high degree of acceptability of outcome by 
responding to stakeholders‟ interests and relying on prevailing practices. In other 
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words, accounting standard setters set accounting rules in such a way as to 
guarantee the legitimacy of the outcome, developing accounting standards for 
emissions rights in an incremental manner by means of „changing at the margin‟, 
as referred to in the foregoing models. This indicates that the accounting standard 
setters in this study achieved institutional legitimacy, specifically pragmatic 
legitimacy, in exchange for providing a compromise solution which most 
stakeholders believe to be „appropriate, proper, or even desirable‟ given particular 
circumstances.  
Returning to a figure previously given in Section 3.3.3 (previously Figure 6, now 
Figure 16 below), institutional legitimacy is used as a theoretical lens for better 
understanding of the accounting standard-setting process. In particular, in light of 
legitimacy management strategy (Johnson and Solomons, 1984; Suchman, 1995; 
Richardson and Eberlein, 2011; Durocher and Fortin, 2010), it is possible to 
delineate how institutional legitimacy functions in the context of the standard-
setting process in the cases of ANC, KASB and IASB. 
Figure 16: Legitimacy in context of accounting standard-setting process 
 
1) Institutional legitimacy of ANC 
The findings indicate that ANC achieved institutional legitimacy by means of a 
bottom-up approach and in an incremental manner by making changes „at the 
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margin‟. In comparing ANC‟s decision-making process with those of the other two 
accounting standard setters, a remarkable difference is observed: the ANC relied 
on a „bottom-up‟ approach whereas IASB and KASB relied on a „top-down‟ 
approach reflecting also the differences in the economic and legal context 
discussed earlier (see section 7.2). 
The findings imply the efficacy of a bottom-up approach in terms of compliance 
and acceptability. Various interests were incorporated from the very first stage of 
the standard-setting process (in the working group); consequently, the accounting 
standard for emissions rights was implemented with a high degree of acceptability 
in France. 
A bottom-up approach may contribute to enhancing institutional legitimacy 
because it results in a highly consensual outcome. Specifically, it can be inferred 
that ANC achieved „procedural legitimacy‟ by following proper procedure. Various 
stakeholders participated in the process and provided inputs, and a proposal was 
produced based on these inputs. The accounting standard-setting process in 
France is in line with Larson and Herz‟s (2013) suggestion that the active 
involvement of stakeholders in due process enhances acceptance and compliance. 
A high level of acceptability and compliance reinforces the institutional legitimacy 
of ANC. 
Moreover, ANC attempted to ensure that the outcome of accounting standard 
setting would be perceived as legitimate. It devised business models applicable to 
various types of business in accordance with IFRS and French GAAP. From a 
legitimacy management strategy perspective, the accounting standard was 
promulgated „within a preexisting institutional regime‟ (Suchman, 1995, p.587). By 
setting the accounting standard within the existing accounting framework, ANC 
was able to ensure that it was largely accepted by most French companies that 
mandatorily use IFRS. 
Applying the framework in Figure 16 to the case of ANC, Figure 17 shows how the 
institutional legitimacy of ANC functions in the standard-setting process. Applying 
the legitimacy management strategies of Suchman (1995), ANC has achieved 
legitimacy by ensuring procedural legitimacy in the standard-setting process and 
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positioning the standard within the existing accounting framework. Since ANC‟s 
proposal was well-implemented with a high degree of compliance, stakeholders 
might therefore consider the accounting standard proper or appropriate or, in other 
words, legitimate. In light of „consequential legitimacy‟, where organisations are 
judged by accomplishment (Suchman, 1995), it is presumed that a high level of 
compliance on implementation may enhance the institutional legitimacy of ANC. 
Figure 17: Institutional legitimacy of ANC 
 
2) Institutional legitimacy of KASB 
The findings provide empirical evidence with regard to the institutional legitimacy 
of KASB. In the case of accounting standard setting for emissions rights, KASB 
ensured institutional legitimacy by undertaking due process. It ensured 
stakeholders‟ participation in the process and, in turn, prominent stakeholders 
were observed to influence KASB‟s decision making, a process generally referred 
to as lobbying in the standard-setting process. Moreover, KASB attempted to set 
accounting rules by resolving the concerns raised by prominent stakeholders. The 
final outcome was achieved by means of compromising with a more practical 
accounting model compatible with IFRS in order to ensure a high level of 
applicability and acceptability. Following Suchman (1995), in exchange for 
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accommodating stakeholders‟ interests in the outcome, KASB ensured „pragmatic 
legitimacy‟ or „exchange legitimacy‟ by attracting support from stakeholders. 
It was observed that stakeholders in Korea attribute institutional legitimacy to 
KASB. The Financial Services Commission delegates the duty for accounting 
standards to KASB according to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies 
(see Section 2.5). When it was set up, KASB was embedded with institutional 
legitimacy endowed by statutory law. Corresponding to the legitimacy referred to 
by Durocher et al. (2007) and Johnson and Solomons (1984), the regulative 
component of KASB ensures its legitimacy. Most stakeholders perceive KASB to 
be the only institution entitled to be in charge of accounting standards in Korea.  
Notably, the interviewees indicated a significant degree of cognition of the 
institutional legitimacy of KASB. Although K-IFRS adoption companies are not 
required to adopt the accounting standards for non-listed entities, it is anticipated 
that most preparers that use IFRS mandatorily will accept SKAS No.33 because 
they consider the accounting guidance provided by KASB to be authoritative and 
legitimate. In effect, once an accounting standard has been provided by KASB, 
preparers will generally adopt and follow it. The findings reveal a prevailing and 
solid „taken-for-granted‟ perception of the institutional legitimacy of KASB, which is 
expected to contribute to ensuring a high degree of acceptability and compliance 
of Korean GAAP for emissions rights at the implementation stage. 
Applying the framework in Figure 16 to the case of KASB, Figure 18 presents how 
KASB achieved legitimacy in the matter of ETS. Unlike the case of ANC, the case 
of KASB indicates how the legitimacy perceived by stakeholders works in the 
accounting standard-setting process, in particular at the implementation stage. As 
long as accounting guidance is provided by KASB, most stakeholders in Korea will 
follow it without dissent because they consider its accounting guidance to be 
legitimate and authoritative. These beliefs about legitimacy lead to a high level of 
compliance. The findings indicate KASB‟s institutional legitimacy reflects society‟s 
values in the Korean context. Institutional legitimacy of KASB stemmed from the 
authority endowed by the government on the basis of statutory law. In addition, a 
tendency to pursue uniformity amongst Korean companies may be important 
ensuring a new accounting standard is well implemented, which would be a 
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significant element to intensify institutional legitimacy by strengthening its cognitive 
as well as pragmatic element. It implies institutional legitimacy of KASB reflects 
not only the authority but also society‟s value in Korea. 
Figure18: Institutional legitimacy of KASB 
 
On the whole, in line with previous studies (e.g. Johnson and Solomons, 1984; 
Burlaud and Colasse, 2011; Richardson and Eberlein, 2011; Sinclair and Bolt, 
2013; Bamber and McMeeking, 2016), the findings largely support the significance 
of legitimacy in ensuring not only the survival of the standard setter but ultimately 
the efficacy of accounting standards. Standards and standard setters therefore 
retain a reciprocal relationship in that regard – as standards issued by a legitimate, 
widely acceptable standard setter would tend to be more widely acceptable and 
generally adopted, whilst standards generally accepted by prepares and other 
stakeholders will further strengthen the legitimacy of the standard setter. In the 
legitimacy context therefore, standard setters go up and down with their standards. 
3) Interrelationship between IASB and national accounting standard setters 
The findings in the context of IASB are different from national accounting standard 
setting bodies. It is necessary to interpret the institutional legitimacy of IASB from 
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a different angle, as IASB is a supranational accounting standard setter. In 
particular, this study sheds light on the institutional legitimacy of IASB in the 
context of its interrelationship with national accounting standard setters. 
The findings show how interactions and cooperation take place between IASB and 
national accounting standard setters. In relation to the ETS project, IASB was 
assisted by national accounting standard setters in various ways. 
According to the IFRS due process book, IASB encourages national accounting 
standard setters to participate in the IFRS-setting process. Considering the limited 
resources of IASB, the role of national accounting standard setters is viewed as 
critical to achieving high-quality international accounting standards. In effect, IASB 
expects national accounting standard setters to contribute to the development of 
the ETS project by assisting it in several respects. 
For example, a significant accumulation of research on ETS developed by national 
accounting standard setters provides good reference material for IASB to advance 
the ETS project. Since IASB has not provided an accounting standard for 
emissions rights since the withdrawal of IFRIC 3, some national accounting 
standard setters, including ANC and KASB, have already developed national 
GAAPs for emissions rights based on extensive research. Reflecting stakeholders‟ 
interests under different circumstances, extant accounting models for emissions 
rights may also provide numerous inputs into IASB to enable it to choose an 
appropriate solution. 
In addition, IASB shows considerable interest in how emissions rights are actually 
dealt with in practice where IFRS is mandatorily applied. When developed in line 
with the IFRS framework, national accounting standards for emissions rights may 
be widely adopted in practice. By referring to accounting treatments under local 
GAAPs, IASB is able to observe how emissions rights are actually dealt with in the 
absence of IFRS; to this extent, it is able to assess the desirability of accounting 
models in terms of acceptability and compliance. 
In this regard, as expected, in line with Georgiou‟s (2010) assertion, national 
accounting standard setters are the most influential stakeholders of IASB in the 
context of ETS issues. In relation to ETS issues, KASB and ANC comprise key 
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stakeholders for IASB because they have already set accounting standards for 
emission rights. 
IASB has recently changed its view on „one unit of account‟, where emissions 
rights and related liabilities are treated as net in the same account. In fact, IASB 
did not address whether or not to accept the concept of one unit of account while 
making tentative decisions in its joint project with FASB. However, an IASB staff 
paper published in November 2014 indicates the acceptability of a net approach.67 
Presumably, the change of stance toward a net approach was influenced by 
practice that has evolved in Europe. In addition, it is presumed that IASB may 
have gained insights from extant accounting models of emissions rights such as 
ANC‟s proposal. It is plausible that the preceding accounting models may have 
influenced IASB‟s change of view. Therefore, the change of perspective on „one 
unit of account‟ might be regarded as a result of „institutional isomorphic pressures 
for change‟ (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001, p.570) in pursuit of institutional legitimacy. 
ANC and KASB have shown willingness to help develop high-quality international 
accounting standards. In relation to the ETS project, ANC and KASB expect 
national GAAPs to be solid references to enable IASB to proceed with the ETS 
project. For example, ANC expects to contribute to the development of IFRS in 
terms of a „post-implementation review‟. In this regard, collaboration between 
IASB and ANC could be arranged to address the issue of how companies in 
France account for emissions rights under French GAAP, being subject to IFRS. 
In addition, KASB also expects that Korean GAAP for emissions rights will provide 
IASB with a reference by which to assess the appropriateness of accounting 
treatment under Korean GAAP. This may be helpful for IASB in assessing the 
different effects of national GAAPs for emissions rights under mandatory adoption 
of IFRS across different jurisdictions, e.g. France and Korea.  
Meanwhile, the findings indicate the difficulty in setting globally accepted 
accounting standards. Despite that setting a standard for ETS hasn‟t been a 
priority for IASB as yet, it may soon be considering developing some formal 
                                            
67
 Staff paper, „Emission Trading Schemes: Summary of accounting issues‟ (IASB Agenda ref. 6B, IASB, 
2014). 
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guidance although there are fewer stakeholders that now need to agree on. 
IASB‟s concurrent attempt to develop standards whilst re-developing a conceptual 
framework (in its own ongoing struggle to ensure morally correct standards from 
both due process and decisional points of view, whilst also adhering to pragmatic 
interests of stakeholders and indeed market developments) naturally further 
entails that further revisions are deemed to take place. The study thus further 
gives credit to Durocher and Fortin‟s (2010) arguments as well as Young‟s (2003, 
2006) earlier skepticism about user oriented conceptual frameworks offering 
symbolic as opposed to substantive value and having questionable role in 
practical context.  
Despite IASB seemingly generally adopting a „top-down‟ approach, in the case of 
ETS it may eventually benefit from a „bottom up‟ type of engagement. This is 
because, in its original inability to develop a related standard, IASB encouraged 
national standard setters to develop their own models. As the study has revealed, 
standard setters thoroughly engaged with stakeholders to develop standards 
which were morally sound, pragmatically acceptable and were in accord with 
IASB‟s conceptual framework (including the framework‟s exposure draft currently 
debated). Whilst organisations around the word will be practicing the new models 
espoused by ANC and KASB, IASB‟s job then becomes easier in developing 
some future formal guidance in a form of IFRS, as there will already be some 
related national standard practice in place which will have already been rigorously 
tested. Hence ANC‟s and KASB‟s standards could act as „pilot‟ attempts for IASB 
to introduce related regulation and ultimately benefit from a seemingly rare 
opportunity where a „bottom-up‟ approach in standard-setting is applied in that 
context. One hopes that IASB will reflect on this (seemingly good) practice and 
revise its decision making models to become more inclusive and reflect wider 
practitioner concerns, The findings thus stress the importance of closer 
interactions between IASB and national accounting standard setters. More 
frequent interactions and more active cooperation would contribute not only to the 
achievement of high-quality international accounting standards, but also to the 
legitimacy of IASB. 
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Overall, the findings provide clues as to how interactions may take place between 
IASB and national accounting standard setters in addressing ETS issues over time. 
In accordance with Kwak et al. (2010), the findings indicate the significant role of 
national standard setters in the sense that they are able to fill a gap which IASB 
cannot achieve by itself.  
As a supranational accounting standard-setting body, IASB is responsible for 
developing high-quality and globally acceptable IFRS. To accomplish its role, 
IASB should encourage national accounting standard setters to participate as 
much as possible in the accounting standard-setting process. Larson and Herz 
(2013) regard the participation of significant stakeholders as a core factor in 
legitimacy. From the perspective of institutional legitimacy, ANC‟s and KASB‟s 
proactive participation and involvement in the ETS project are essential for IASB 
to enhance its legitimacy. The „willingness‟ or „intention‟ of national standard 
setters implies that they are pursuing a greater role for themselves in shaping 
IFRS. The contribution of national accounting standard setters in the IFRS-setting 
process might also increase the legitimacy of IASB. 
The findings also indicate what national standard setters should do in order to 
make a significant contribution to the ETS project. In response to IASB‟s efforts, 
national standard setters need to involve themselves more proactively in the due 
process of IFRS in order to achieve a high-quality IFRS. Generally, early 
involvement is perceived to be more effective (Jorissen et al., 2012; Kwak et al., 
2010). One interviewee highlighted the necessity for „proactive participation in the 
process including direct interaction with the project staff at the earlier stage‟ (ASS 
4). 
In addition to engagement at an early stage, national standard setters need to 
make efforts to communicate proactively with IASB technical staff. More active 
and sustainable communication with the technical staff in charge of the ETS 
project would effectively support the search for an appropriate solution because 
technical staff may need greater assistance from other accounting standard 
setters to make progress at this stage. 
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In summary, the findings stress the importance of interactions between IASB and 
national accounting standard setters. In light of institutional legitimacy, this implies 
that tighter interactions and more active co-operation would contribute not only to 
achieving high-quality international accounting standards, but also to sustaining 
the institutional legitimacy of IASB. 
8.2.3. Features of desirability 
Core principles: Decision-usefulness and cost-benefit analysis 
It is generally observed that accounting standard setters, when developing 
accounting standards, attempt to be in line with two basic principles of accounting: 
decision-usefulness and cost-benefit analysis. To be specific, accounting 
information should be decision-useful for information users. Decision usefulness 
has been the ultimate criterion to justify accounting standards (Durocher and 
Fortin, 2010), in that accounting standards should enhance the usefulness of 
financial reporting. At the same time, the accounting standard setter must consider 
the cost in relation to producing accounting information. In essence, cost-benefit 
analysis is a core principle linking decision usefulness to production costs. Existing 
accounting frameworks, including the conceptual framework of IFRS, require 
judgments on the usefulness of accounting information as well as cost-benefit 
analyses. 
With regard to decision-usefulness, the findings do not present explicit evidence of 
the position of users in the standard-setting process. The findings largely support 
the assertions of previous studies (e.g. Durocher and Fortin, 2010; Georgiou, 
2004, 2012; Jorissen et al., 2013; Larson, 2007; Sutton, 1984) that preparers tend 
to participate more than users in the standard-setting process. Due to a lack of 
truly pragmatic users‟ participation or inputs into the standard-setting process, 
preparers‟ inputs are more likely to be highlighted throughout the process. This 
indicates that the user-oriented principle remains only in the conceptual framework, 
not emerging in a more practical context. This may be in line with Young‟s (2003, 
p.629) assertion that „Users remain shadowy figures within the paragraphs of 
financial accounting standards‟. In view of the fact that the notion of „primacy of 
users‟ is associated with institutional legitimacy as a core criterion of „rightness‟ of 
decision (Georgiou and Jack, 2011), the findings provide a policy implication in 
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light of legitimacy, that accounting standard setters need to be more aware of 
users‟ needs and interests and better facilitate their participation in the standard-
setting process. 
Example of ‘desirable’ accounting models for emissions rights: the business model 
approach 
The accounting standard setters investigated in this study attempted to seek the 
most appropriate and proper solution given particular circumstances. In other 
words, the accounting models were devised in the process of pursuing an 
„effective‟ or „applicable‟ solution under different circumstances and constraints. 
The findings reveal that the business models proposed by ANC exemplify 
empirically the idea of „desirable‟ features of accounting models in line with the 
research questions of this study. 
It is commonly observed that accounting standard setters start by justifying and 
defining the nature of emissions rights. Emissions rights cannot be fitted exactly 
into existing asset categories because of their unique attributes. Due to various 
characteristics of emissions rights, all relevant accounting treatment within the 
existing accounting framework can be applied to emissions rights, depending on 
their intended use. 
It can be inferred that business models are devised to underpin business activities 
rather than focusing on the attributes of emissions rights per se. The business 
models enable accommodation of various characteristics of emissions rights by 
defining what an entity is doing with them. 
Under the premise of different aspects of emissions rights and different uses in 
various businesses, any relevant accounting treatment can be differently 
elaborated depending on the type of business being conducted. The underlying 
logic for business models is presented in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Logic of business models under ETS 
 
Different accounting treatments are applied to different business activities 
depending on the purpose of the purchase or use of emissions rights as a part of 
the business. The acknowledgement of different uses of emissions rights 
formulates the premise that different accounting rules can be applied to the same 
item. In turn, accounting treatments for emissions rights can be differently set up 
depending on different intentions in holding emissions rights. 
ANC took a „business model approach‟, being the first to introduce business 
models as an accounting standard. Since it intended to set accounting guidance to 
be used for a variety of business activities under ETS, the business models were 
the best solution for ANC to satisfy all conditions. Indeed, the ANC‟s pragmatic 
business model approach illustrates how the practical solution is deduced from 
practice rather than a theory. 
Notably, the business model approach provides an empirical example of how a 
desirable accounting model is sought. It is worth noticing that the business model 
approach may be the most appropriate solution to address the technical 
complexities in relation to accounting issues for emissions rights. In other words, 
due to the umbrella treatment of various uses of emissions rights, business 
models may provide the most appropriate method to tackle the „unresolved 
tension‟ referred to by Lovell et al. (2013). In addition, business models may 
Diverse nature of 
emissions rights 
•Like intangibles 
•Like financial instruments 
•Like inventory 
Various business 
activities with 
emissions rights 
•Surrendered for compliace  
•Puschased for surrender 
•Consumed during production 
•Traded for capital gain 
Business models 
(Different accounting 
treatments for 
different models) 
•Compliance 
model 
•Production 
model 
•Trading model 
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ensure significant acceptability in practice, in the sense of reflecting actual practice. 
In virtue of a number of attributes of the business model approach, it is suggested 
that the adoption of business models may be extended to other jurisdictions where 
an accounting standard for emissions rights needs to be set up. 
Desirable features of accounting standard for emissions rights 
Underpinning the political aspects of the accounting standard-setting process, this 
study has explored how accounting standard setters come up with solutions in 
practice. Indeed, the accounting standard for emissions rights turned out to be 
accomplished as a result of compromising with a more acceptable and applicable 
standard under particular conditions, rather than adopting the best answer from a 
theoretical point of view. This confirms that accounting standards are prone to be 
a political outcome rather than the result of highly professional expertise, since 
they are achieved through a process of political compromise. 
Previous studies on the standard-setting process reiterate that accounting 
standard setting proceeds in a political way, as various interests are 
accommodated into the outcome. In line with previous research, the findings of 
this study reveal political aspects of the accounting standard-setting process. In 
particular, this study sheds light on the institutional behavioural mechanism to 
produce a legitimate outcome. Consequently, the findings demonstrate the 
strenuous attempts of accounting standard setters to put forward desirable, proper 
and appropriate accounting standards for emissions rights within various 
constraints. 
For example, ANC‟s proposal is considered to be legitimate by stakeholders as 
the most desirable and appropriate solution, resolving a number of conditions and 
constraints. In the case of Korean GAAP for emissions rights, the findings reveal 
that the final version has been achieved as a consequence of political compromise. 
While the KASB staff proposal was regarded as more desirable from both the 
theoretical and practical point of view, KASB compromised with a more practical 
model on the basis of European practice. As a result, most stakeholders in Korea 
are in favour of the final version of the standard for emissions rights. Most will 
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perceive the standard to be legitimate and authoritative as long it is provided by 
KASB. 
In summary, the findings provide evidence of the political nature of the standard-
setting process. As a consequence of a highly political functioning in the standard-
setting process under various circumstances, accounting standards for emissions 
rights vary. In other words, accounting standards for emissions rights cannot be 
rolled into a single absolute accounting model consisting of a desirable set of 
accounting rules. 
With regard to desirable features of accounting standards for emissions rights, the 
findings uphold the absence of a perfect model in the pursuit of a desirable set of 
accounting rules for ETS. In line with Demski‟s (1973) impossibility theorem, it is 
impossible to achieve an absolute, complete or perfect solution of which the 
substance can be feasibly delineated. Rather, the findings imply that the 
desirability or appropriateness of accounting standards is judged by stakeholders 
in the context of legitimacy. In other words, the desirability or appropriateness of 
accounting standards is de facto an ex-post perception, as accounting standards 
are considered legitimate within institutional environments. This is associated with 
the extent to which accounting standards are acceptable from stakeholders‟ points 
of view. Not only soundness of rationale but also acceptability in practice are 
critical determinants in judging the desirability and appropriateness of accounting 
standards. 
In essence, the findings indicate that the key determinant of desirability and 
appropriateness of accounting standards for emissions rights stems from the 
general perceptions or beliefs of stakeholders. If stakeholders perceive the 
promulgation to be legitimate, which means desirable, proper and appropriate 
given particular circumstances, the accounting standard will be considered to be 
the most appropriate solution. The findings exemplify that the accounting standard 
setter must commit to making decisions on specific accounting rules or models in 
such a way that the accounting standard for emissions rights is largely approved 
as legitimate by stakeholders. 
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In order to ensure the legitimacy of the outcome, two dimensions can be derived 
from the standard-setting process: procedural and decisional. On the procedural 
dimension, a proper procedural process that ensures stakeholders participate is a 
critical determinant in engendering procedural legitimacy in stakeholders‟ beliefs. 
Accordingly, guaranteeing stakeholders‟ participation in the standard-setting 
process is a key prerequisite for an outcome which stakeholders believe to be 
legitimate. On the decisional dimension, political compromise, in which various 
interests are coordinated and reflected, is conducive to enhancing stakeholders‟ 
perception of institutional legitimacy. From a legitimacy perspective, the 
accounting standard setter is likely to make choices in response to stakeholders‟ 
interests in order to gain legitimacy. In turn, stakeholders may be satisfied with a 
set of accounting rules which reflect their interests; hence they will perceive the 
outcome to be desirable, proper and appropriate. In essence, the problematic 
accounting issues for emissions rights and related liabilities under ETS can be 
resolved in the standard-setting process. The findings indicate that the solution 
can be found in pursuit of legitimacy.  
In summary, the whole process of standard setting influences stakeholders‟ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the final outcome. Relying on institutional 
legitimacy, which is relatively stable in stakeholders‟ minds, stakeholders judge 
whether the accounting standard for emissions rights is legitimate. In effect, the 
desirability or appropriateness of the accounting standard is determined by 
legitimation. Therefore, accounting standard setters need to facilitate as much 
constituent participation as possible. In addition, effective responsiveness to 
stakeholders‟ interests is even more critical for legitimation. Ultimately, it will be 
beneficial to enhance institutional legitimacy in association with roles, goals and 
objectives. 
 Contribution 8.3.
The study has made some important contributions to accounting research as well 
as accounting practice in respect of ETS. 
This research contributes to enhancing practical understanding of accounting for 
ETS. Empirical research on accounting issues in relation to ETS has so far been 
scant and this study offers some unique insights on the accounting issues and the 
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accounting standard-setting process in relation to ETS. The study offers examples 
of how complexities in relation to accounting issues for emissions rights were 
addressed by each accounting standard setter following the withdrawal of IFRIC 3. 
By specifying the problematic accounting issues and practical accounting models 
which were actually tackled by the accounting standard setters, the findings 
provide tangible solutions for dealing with the complexities in association with the 
distinctive attributes of emissions rights. From a practical point of view, the 
accounting models explored in this study may be considered by other jurisdictions 
in need of developing the accounting standard for emissions rights and ultimately 
influence future developments. 
The study also offers unique insights into the accounting standard-setting process 
of Korea. Due to factors such as linguistic limitations, the relatively short history of 
KASB, and limited access to data very few studies have looked at Korean 
standard setting to date. This study is believed to be the first exploration of 
lobbying behaviour and of the accounting standard-setting process in the Korean 
context. In this regard, this study broadens and enhances understanding of the 
standard-setting process in the Korean context. Moreover, this study provides 
policy implications for KASB. The findings indicate the importance of preparers‟ 
associations in the accounting standard-setting process in Korea. Since Korean 
companies tend to rely on industry associations to represent their voices, the role 
of preparers‟ associations needs to be highlighted in terms of developing well-
balanced and justified standards. Thus, the findings may be of interest to KASB in 
persuading them to facilitate the participation of preparers‟ associations in the 
standard-setting process. 
The study advances legitimacy theory by offering a framework particularly 
applicable to the accounting standard setting process, which also incorporates 
stakeholder theory research. The study finds theoretical support for the framework 
and further contributes to the related literature by comprehensively reviewing 
legitimacy conflicts. The findings indeed showcase that in the context of 
accounting standard setting, regulators pursue legitimacy in several forms, 
including moral, pragmatic and cognitive. Findings nevertheless showcase that 
these forms may in cases be in conflict. For example, adhering to the conceptual 
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framework (and achieving cognitive legitimacy) may be in conflict with pragmatic 
stakeholder concerns or with morally sound arguments. Findings indicate that 
stakeholder theory antecedents such as stakeholder power (e.g. IASB) and 
urgency (e.g. particular interests of companies affected) may assist organisations 
(i.e. national standard setters) achieve legitimacy and mediate potential legitimacy 
conflicts and thus ultimate influence the outcome.  
Standard setters may not only prioritise stakeholders (and thus violate the 
legitimacy theory‟s expectation of neutrality in this context, as per Bamber and 
McMeeking, 2016) but also legitimacy types to ensure wider acceptability of 
actions. For both ANC and KASB, adherence to essentially the most powerful 
stakeholder‟s (i.e. IASB) guidance based on its framework agenda, not only 
suggests pragmatic legitimacy is granted but it also benefits cognitive legitimacy 
(through isomorphism). Among the two, gaining cognitive legitimacy was more 
challenging for ANC as it was among the first to attempt to develop a „dual-model‟ 
approach, which whilst it was borderline acceptable by IASB, it provided „dual 
reasoning‟ benefits by also following established (and preferred) business practice. 
Whilst KASB‟ clearly made every effort to follow IASB‟s suggestions, their decision 
to subsequently essentially adopt ANC‟s key recommendations made achieving 
cognitive legitimacy less problematic (and in doing so, it essentially „cognitively‟ 
benefited not only itself but further strengthened the legitimacy of ANC‟s earlier 
adoption). Both ANC and KASB also gained pragmatic legitimacy by addressing 
other powerful stakeholders‟ (i.e. industry‟s) concerns, which particularly for KASB 
was those expressed by the heavy industry which has been the powerhouse of its 
economic development for over 50 years and has been under fierce competition 
by Chinese and Indian competitors recently. 
Whilst both standard setters prioritised cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy 
elements, they seemed to be least concerned about the theoretical soundness of 
their suggested accounting treatments and thus the impacts on the moral 
legitimacy. As it became particularly evident in KASB‟s case, despite that the staff 
proposal incorporated arguments which had a higher decisional validity, they 
eventually had to abort it due to the realisation that „markets‟ could not currently 
support this approach. KASB‟s decision thus gives credit to arguments earlier 
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expressed by Chambers (1998), Deen (2008) and Whittington (2010), which 
emphasised the increased subjectivity in measurement in financial reporting. The 
study indeed provides evidence that, “[i]n reality, markets are imperfect and 
incomplete, so that ideal unique market prices are not available for all assets and 
liabilities” (Whittington, 2010, p. 104) When moral legitimacy is sacrificed, standard 
setters may highlight their adherence to rules/due process (which would ensure 
procedural legitimacy) in order to compensate for the loss in decisional legitimacy 
(i.e. which would require going for the actually more valid/theoretically sound 
option).  
The study has demonstrated therefore that standard setting is not a product of an 
objective, linear process but rather an outcome of a continuous conflict among 
stakeholders with different degrees or power and urgency per specific situation, 
which reach temporary compromises, subject also to the degree of changeability 
of interests (Monciardini, 2016). When as in the case of ETS, the standard has 
inherent issues of contention (such as measurement and accounting treatments), 
these conflicts and variations in treatments become even more evident as recent 
research on the wider but related field on non-financial reporting also indicates 
(e.g. Costa and Agostini, 2016; Fallan, 2016; Luque-Vilchez and Larrinaga, 2016; 
Monciardini, 2016). 
The study has further demonstrated the impact of lobbying activities in the 
accounting standard setting process. It particularly contributes evidence from 
interviews to that from analysing comment letters, which has so far been the case. 
The study explores various attributes of stakeholders‟ participation in the standard-
setting process for emissions rights in the Korean context. Several characteristics 
have been identified in terms of the motivations, methods and timing of lobbying 
activities. The findings have shown how lobbying behaviours exhibit patterns 
similar to the findings of previous studies of accounting standard-setting bodies. It 
confirms previous literature (e.g. Sutton, 2007; Jorissen et al., 2013) finding 
preparers to be the most active stakeholder group, and particularly at the national 
level. It would be natural to expect that the lower the level of resolution, the higher 
the impact of lobbying activities would be. 
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 Limitations and suggestions for further research 8.4.
Limitations of the study may be identified in both the methodological and the 
theoretical points of view. Due to the fact that observations were conducted on the 
basis of predominantly a single country (South Korea) and a single issue (ETS), 
this is constraining the generalisability of the results to other countries or issues. 
Future research could adopt a different methodological design, such as surveys 
using questionnaires and focus on more countries to produce more generalizable 
findings.  
This study is limited to a single issue with the cases of IASB, ANC, and KASB 
showing how accounting standard setters addressed accounting issues for 
emissions rights and related liabilities in the accounting standard-setting process. 
The accounting models explored in this study could potentially influence other 
jurisdictions which need to develop accounting standards for ETS. However, as 
discussed earlier, the findings are heavily influenced by the specific social, political 
and economic context examined and their relevance to other standard setters in 
the matter of accounting issues for emissions rights is unknown. In this regard, in 
order to ensure validation of the main findings in this study, further research may 
be necessary in relation to how the accounting models found in this study would 
evolve. In particular, based on the accounting models proposed by ANC and 
KASB, it would be valuable conducting research on how the accounting models 
affect other accounting standard setters to develop accounting standards for 
emissions rights from the perspective of legitimacy.  
The findings were interpreted using a theoretical framework developed on the 
basis of the reviewed relevant literature. In spite of examining how the framework 
worked in a particular case, it is necessary to explore the applicability of the 
framework in order research settings in order to validate it.  
Moreover, this study does not involve the analysis of the financial results 
corresponding with particular accounting models explored in this study. The most 
contentious arguments in relation to accounting issues for ETS in this study were 
largely associated with measurement base – e.g. fair value or cost measurement. 
Hence, it is clear that further research is meaningful for assessing the impact or 
appropriateness of measurement base for emissions rights and related liabilities 
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from various perspectives. To this extent, it is worth conducting further empirical 
research on how financial statements (or financial numbers) may be influenced 
depending on different accounting treatment for emissions rights and related 
liabilities with a variety of variables – i.e. industry and firm size.  
In addition, this study explains only a part of aspects or attributes of lobbying 
activities in the accounting standard-setting process. For example, the study 
provides empirical evidence to demonstrate some motivations of stakeholders‟ 
participation, but cannot cover all drivers of participation in the process. 
Furthermore, due to the limited size of the sample investigated for this study, only 
certain features of the behaviours and interests of prominent stakeholders could 
be observed. Accordingly, the findings do not allow identification of the extensive 
range of attributes of stakeholders‟ lobbying behaviours widely identified in 
previous studies. To this extent, this study does not include analysis of various 
aspects of stakeholders who lobby or do not lobby, for example a comparative 
analysis of preparers and users, or of large and small and medium-sized firms, as 
this was not a prime objective.  
The study has primarily relied on interviews for data collection purposes and has 
therefore not extensively considered comment letters. It would be valuable to 
conduct further research on the role of comment letters in the standard setting 
process in Korea to not only verify the study‟s findings but also explore whether 
the findings from analysing comment letters in other jurisdictions also apply in the 
Korean context.  
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Appendix 1: Accounting treatment under IFRIC 3 
Several previous studies (e.g. Black, 2013; Cook, 2009; Ratnatunga and Jones, 
2012; Haupt and Ismer, 2013; Starbatty, 2010) have provided analyses of 
accounting treatments under IFRIC 3. Based on a review of a strand of papers 
analysing IFRIC 3, the main features of accounting treatments under IFRIC 3 are 
presented as follows. 
The International Financial Reporting Standards Interpretation Committee (IFRIC) 
issued IFRIC 3 Emission Rights in 2004. IFRIC 3 provided guidance on how to 
account for emissions rights and obligations under ETS within existing accounting 
standards. IFRIC 3 dealt only with cap-and-trade schemes. 
According to IFRIC 3, emissions allowances, regardless whether they are 
allocated for free or purchased, are defined as intangible assets in accordance 
with IAS 38 Intangible Assets. Emissions allowances, whether granted (free) or 
purchased, are initially recognised at fair value. If allowances are allocated for less 
than fair value (e.g. free allowances), IFRIC 3 recommends that the corresponding 
entry is recognised as a government grant on the grounds that they are 
„government‟s transfers of resources to an entity in return for past or future 
compliance with certain conditions relating to the operating activities of the 
entity‟(Cook, 2009, p.461). On the day of receipt of free allowances, in accordance 
with IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance, the grant is recognised as deferred income on the balance sheet 
(Starbatty, 2010). Subsequently, the deferred income is recognised as income in a 
systematic manner over the compliance period, regardless whether the 
allowances are sold or held (Haupt and Ismer, 2013; Starbatty, 2010). Initial entry 
of an asset is carried as follows: 
Dr) Allowances (intangible asset) XX (at fair value) 
  Cr) Government grant  XX 
As for the subsequent measurement of emissions rights, in accordance with IAS 
38 either a „cost model‟ or a „revaluation model‟ must be applied. When applying 
the cost model, the allowances are subsequently measured at cost less 
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amortisation and impairment. A revaluation model can be also applied because 
emissions rights are tradable on an active market. With a revaluation model, 
allowances are subsequently revalued at fair value. According to the revaluation 
model, an increase in the carrying amount of allowances as a result of revaluation 
is recognised in other comprehensive income (OCI), which is under „equity‟ 
(Starbatty, 2010). 
In summary, the subsequent measurement of emission rights is taken as either: 
a) at its cost less accumulated amortisation and impairment losses; or 
b) at a revalued amount, being its fair value at the date of revaluation less any 
subsequent accumulated amortisation and any subsequent accumulated 
impairment losses. 
The subsequent entry of an asset is carried as follows: 
Dr) Deferred income  XX 
  Cr) Income  XX (Income Statement) 
Dr) Allowances XX (revaluation at fair value) 
  Cr) OCI XX (Balance Sheet) 
Meanwhile, a liability occurs corresponding to the obligation to deliver emissions 
rights to the government. The recognition of a liability is separate from the 
recognition of the asset (EFRAG, 2012). As emissions arise, a liability should be 
recognised because of the occurrence of an obligation to surrender allowances 
equivalent to emissions which are produced during a commitment period. This 
liability is treated as a provision under IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liability and 
Contingent Assets. According to IAS 37, a liability is measured at the best 
estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation. The present 
market price of allowances may be used as a reference for the best estimate 
(Starbatty, 2010). Thus, changes in the value of obligations as a result of 
revaluation are reflected in the income statement. Initial entry of a liability is 
carried as follows: 
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Dr) Emission expense  XX (income statement) 
 Cr) Emission liability  XX (at market price of allowances) 
With regard to presentation, under IFRIC 3, assets and liabilities should be 
displayed at gross value. In other words, offsetting (or netting off) emissions rights 
held and emissions liabilities is not allowed (Warwick and Ng, 2012). 
A summary of accounting treatment under IFRIC 3 is presented in Table App 1. 
Table App 1: Summary of accounting treatment under IFRIC 3 
(adapted from Cook, 2009, p.462) 
 Classification Measurement 
basis 
Revaluation Recognition in 
I/S 
Allowances Intangible 
asset (IAS 38) 
Fair value  B/S (equity)  
Grants Government 
grant (IAS 20) 
Fair value of 
allowances on 
receipt 
Not 
applicable 
Deferred income 
in line with 
emissions 
Emissions Contingent 
liability (IAS 
37) 
Fair value of 
allowances when 
recognising liability 
I/S  
(profit or 
loss) 
Expense as 
producing 
emissions 
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Appendix 2: Illustration of financial results under different accounting 
models 
Returning to a table previously given in Section 3.2.2 (previously Table 3, now 
Table App 2 below), each accounting approach has a different accounting 
treatment for emissions rights and related liabilities, which have been used to 
advantage by companies participating in the EU ETS. 
Table App 2: Approaches applied in practice 
(Adapted from Starbatty, 2010, p.47) 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
Initial recognition – 
Allocated 
allowances 
At market value on date of issue; 
corresponding entry to government grant 
(deferred income) 
At cost; allowances 
for grants are at nil 
value. 
Initial recognition – 
Purchased 
allowances 
At cost 
Subsequent 
measurement of 
allowances 
Subsequently measured at cost or market 
value, subject to review for impairment 
Subsequently 
measured at cost, 
subject to review for 
impairment 
Subsequent 
measurement of 
government grant 
Government grant is amortised on a 
systematic and rational basis over 
compliance period 
Not applicable 
Recognition of 
liability 
Recognise liability as emissions are 
produced 
Recognise liability 
as emissions are 
produced. The 
liability is not 
present until 
emissions produced 
exceed allowances 
held by participant 
Measurement of 
liability 
At market value of 
allowances 
corresponding to 
actual emissions 
At carrying value of 
allowances on 
hand to cover 
actual emissions; 
plus market value 
of allowances to 
cover excessive 
emissions 
At carrying value of 
allowances on hand 
to cover actual 
emissions (nil or 
cost); plus market 
value of allowances 
to cover excessive 
emissions 
 
Approach 1 is based on fair value measurement, as for the accounting treatment 
under IFRIC 3. For the initial measurement, free allowances are measured at 
market value on the date of receipt. In terms of subsequent measurement, either a 
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cost model or a revaluation model may be applied. Revalued emissions rights in 
the revaluation model are recognised in OCI under equity. 
Approach 2 is basically the same as Approach 1 except for the way of measuring 
liability. Emissions rights are initially measured at market value. Subsequently, 
either the cost method or the revaluation method is applied. The liability is 
measured at the carrying amount of emissions allowances held. Any amount of 
emissions in excess of allowances on hand is measured at the market price of 
emissions rights at the date of reporting. 
Approach 3 is the so-called „net approach‟, in which emissions allowances are 
measured at nil value and the liability is recognised when actual emissions exceed 
the equivalent amount of allowances on hand. 
Each accounting approach in Table App 2 is applied below to exemplified 
transactions in order to illustrate their financial results on financial statements: 
 1 January 201X 
Assuming that 1 unit of emission rights represents 1 CO2 tonne, company A 
receives 100 units of free allowances to emit 100 CO2 tonnes for a compliance 
year from 1 January to 31 December. On the day of receipt, the market price of 
emissions rights is 10/unit. 
 31 December 201X 
Company A emits 110 CO2 tonnes over the compliance period. The market price 
of emissions rights is 12/unit. 
By creating the entries, the net position on the balance sheet and the net effect on 
profit/loss in the income statement are demonstrated in Table App 3. 
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Table App 3: Financial results under different accounting treatment 
 Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 
1Jan Dr) emissions rights 1000 (100x@10) 
Cr) government grant 1000 
No entry* 
* Allowances are 
measured at nil value 
31Dec 
(cost 
model) 
Dr) emissions expense 
1320 
Cr) emissions liability 
1320 
(110x@12) 
Dr) emissions expense 
1120 
Cr) emissions liability 
1120 
(100x@10 + 10x@12) 
Dr) emissions 
expense 120 
Cr) emissions liability 
120(10x@12) 
Dr) government grant 1000 
Cr) emissions income 1000 
Not applicable 
(revalu-
ation 
model) 
Dr) emissions rights 200 (100x@(12-10)) 
Cr) OCI* 200 
* Other Comprehensive Income (under equity in 
B/S) 
Not applicable 
Balance Sheet (B/S) and Income Statement (I/S) with cost model 
B/S  
(31Dec 
201X) 
Asset 
Emissions rights  1000 
Liability 
Emissions liability 1320 
Net asset        (320) 
Asset 
Emissions rights  1000 
Liability 
Emissions liability 1120 
Net asset        (120) 
 
 
Liability 
Emissions liability120 
Net asset      (120) 
I/S 
(31Dec 
201X) 
Emissions income 1000 
Emissions expense 1320 
Net income      (320) 
Emissions income   1000 
Emissions expense 1120 
Net income       (120) 
 
Emissions expense120 
Net income     (120) 
Balance Sheet (B/S) and Income Statement (I/S) with revaluation model 
B/S 
(31Dec 
201X) 
Asset 
Emissions rights  1200 
Liability 
Emissions liability 1320 
Equity 
OCI             200 
Net asset        (320) 
Asset 
Emissions rights   1200 
Liability 
Emissions liability  1120 
Equity 
OCI              200 
Net asset        (120) 
 
 
Liability 
Emissions liability 120 
 
 
Net asset      (120) 
I/S 
(31Dec 
201X) 
Emissions income 1000 
Emissions expense 1320 
Net income      (320) 
Emissions income   1000 
Emissions expense 1120 
Net income       (120) 
 
Emissions expense120 
Net income     (120) 
 
As shown in Table App 3, Approach 1 gives rise to significantly different net 
results on the balance sheet and the income statement compared with the other 
two approaches (i.e. ∆320 vs. ∆120). Regardless of the amount of emissions 
rights held, the emissions liability and corresponding expense should be 
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recognised at the fair value of emissions rights. Recognising both the asset and 
the liability at a gross amount may have a significant impact on the financial 
numbers compared with other approaches. 
Meanwhile, the net effect on profit/loss under Approaches 2 and 3 turns out to be 
equivalent (i.e. ∆120 in Table App 3). However, the balance sheet is different. 
Under Approach 2, the asset and the liability are displayed at a gross amount 
while under Approach 3 a net amount of liability is only shown as much as actual 
emissions exceed the equivalent amount of emissions rights held by an entity. 
According to Approach 3, the accounting treatment is apparently simpler and 
easier as a whole. Although the net effect on profit/loss is equal under Approaches 
2 and 3, in terms of the impact on the debt ratio, Approach 3 may be more 
beneficial as it demonstrates a lower level of debt ratio if an entity is holding a 
sufficient amount of emissions rights to offset actual emissions. In effect, 
Approach 3 has been predominantly used in practice. 
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